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- No War- Both sides have every incentive to avoid conflict
- Abe leadership fosters cooperation with china, avoiding conflict
- Senkaku Islands
- Chinese aggression over Senkaku is drastically declining
- Guidelines establish effective deterrence that prevents Senkaku from happening
Japan-ChinaWarRelations strong now- top officials and business agreements solveSEKIGUCHI and WONG 14— Japanese government and politics correspondent and Chinese politics correspondent for the WSJ (TOKO and CHUN HAN, “China-Japan Relations Ease Back From Brink,” The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-japan-relations-ease-back-from-brink-1411650347). WM Relations between Asia's two biggest economies are finally thawing after two years of rising tensions that included near-clashes in the air. China and Japan have eased back from the brink, quietly in recent weeks and more openly this week, with representatives of the two nations holding what they described as cordial talks on maritime security and business relations. Outside observers caution that little progress is visible on the fundamental issues dividing the world's second- and third-largest economies. But they say the chance has risen that at a regional summit in Beijing in November, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will achieve his long-standing wish for direct talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping. "I hope very much to meet" Mr. Xi, said Mr. Abe on Monday in New York, where he was visiting the United Nations. "A meeting and a handshake between leaders alone can lead the way to regional peace and security." On Wednesday, senior Chinese and Japanese diplomats along with defense officials wrapped up two days of discussions in the eastern Chinese city of Qingdao on the topic of East China Sea. That is the location of the small islands, controlled by Japan and claimed by Beijing, that have often been a flash point between the two nations. The two have established overlapping air-defense zones, and earlier this year military aircraft from the two sides were just about 30 meters (yards) apart in an East China Sea encounter, according to the Japanese side. But the meetings this week had a calmer tone and ended with agreement to try to develop better channels of communication. "Leaders at the top on both sides have apparently made a decision that relations were too dangerous, and that it's not in the interests of both countries to be so tense," said Harvard University professor Ezra Vogel, an expert on both Japan and China. Both sides recognize that warmer ties are good for business. Two-way trade was down 6.3% in 2013, according to the Japan External Trade Organization, hurting Japanese exporters. Many Japanese companies have shifted their investment sights to Southeast Asia because of a perception that they aren't welcome in China. That is a problem for Beijing, which is coping with slower growth and a troubled property market. On Wednesday, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang in Beijing met Japan's largest trade delegation to China to date, made up of more than 200 business leaders. Mr. Wang told the Japanese delegates he was seeking to resume high-level economic discussions with Tokyo soon—talks that have been suspended since August 2010. "The economy is one factor" behind improved ties, said Liang Yunxiang, a professor of international politics at Peking University. "Another could be that Xi Jinping senses he has secured his political authority, thanks to his anticorruption drive and assertion of control over the military, which gives him more space to maneuver on foreign policy." Still, neither side has made the kind of bold gestures that would be expected to precede a deeper rapprochement. Both are expanding military spending. Mr. Abe, who angered China by visiting a controversial Tokyo war shrine in December 2013, has continued to make offerings to the shrine on ceremonial occasions, although people close to the prime minister expect him to refrain from another visit. "It's hard to see either side making any major concessions. The relationship has been moved from the freezer to the refrigerator," said Yasuyuki Miyake, a professor of China studies at Kwansei Gakuin University in Japan. Mr. Abe's latest cabinet, named early this month, includes several ministers with conservative views, such as internal-affairs minister Sanae Takaichi, who said she would continue to visit the shrine during her term. Mr. Abe retained education minister Hakubun Shimomura, who has pushed for an end to what he describes as the overly apologetic view of history taught in Japanese schools. China reiterated Thursday that any formal talks between the two leaders would depend on Tokyo. "The key is that the Japanese side should show sincerity and take concrete actions to remove the political obstacles that stand in the way of the normal development of bilateral ties," said foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying. Christopher Hughes, professor of international relations at the London School of Economics, said Mr. Xi's standing could be undermined if he is perceived as reconciling with Japan in the absence of concessions. "In some ways, Mr. Abe's domestic position is more secure than Mr. Xi's," Mr. Hughes said. "China won't want to be seen as weak—they want to portray themselves as negotiating on their own terms, from a position of strength." No War- Both sides have every incentive to avoid conflictMoss 13— Hong Kong based journalist (Trefor, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won't Go To War,” The Diplomat, February 10, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?allpages=yes). WM But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan: 1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either. 2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders. 3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness.The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary. 4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all. 5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase. 6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships.There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before). 7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners. Abe leadership fosters cooperation with china, avoiding conflictMoss 13— Hong Kong based journalist (Trefor, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won't Go To War,” The Diplomat, February 10, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?allpages=yes). WM Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch. In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated. Senkaku IslandsNo conflict- Japan is making concessions over the islands in the status quoKeck 14— formerly Managing Editor of The Diplomat (Zachary, “Japan Caves to China on Senkaku Island Dispute,” The Diplomat, October 18, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/japan-caves-to-china-on-senkaku-island-dispute/). WM In order to secure a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe agreed to a significant concession in Tokyo’s ongoing dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands, according to Japanese media outlets. As Shannon noted earlier today on China Power, Japanese officials now expect there to be a brief meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe during next month’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Beijing. The meeting would be the first between the two heads of state since they took their current positions. It comes after a prolonged Japanese charm offensive towards China, which resulted in extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations aimed at securing a heads of state meeting at APEC. The meeting, which Japanese officials acknowledged would be more symbolic than substantive, did not come cheaply for Japan. Indeed, if Japanese media reports are accurate, Tokyo appears to have caved on the major issue that prevented a heads-of-state meeting to date. On Thursday, Mainichi reported that Japan made a three-prong proposal to China in order to secure the meeting between the two heads of states next month. According to the report, which cited “Japanese government sources,” Japan proposed that during his meeting with Xi, Abe would first reassert that the Senkaku Islands are an inherent part of Japanese territory, but then “acknowledge that China has a case as well” to the islands. He would then propose that China and Japan seek to settle the issue through mutual dialogue over time. None of this would be included in a joint statement or any other documents officially released after the summit meeting. Still, if the report is accurate, Abe’s acknowledgement that a territorial dispute exists and proposal to settle the issue through mutual dialogue represent huge concessions to long-standing Chinese demands. The Japanese government has always refused to acknowledge that a territorial dispute even exists with China over the Senkaku Islands, which Beijing refers to as the Diaoyu Islands. “There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands,” Japan has said on numerous occasions. China’s main precondition for agreeing to a heads of state meeting between President Xi and Prime Minister Abe has long been Japan’s acknowledgement that the territorial dispute exists. As Kyodo reported in June 2013, “Even after the change of government last December with the inauguration of the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, China has continued to call for Japan to acknowledge that a territorial dispute exists as a precondition for holding a summit.” That same report noted that Japan had refused to do this, and thus that a leadership summit appeared unlikely for the foreseeable future. The two sides also publicly fought over the issue during the UN General Assembly meeting in September of last year. First, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at a think tank speech before the UNGA opened that China was willing to reopen dialogue with Japan, but first “Japan needs to recognize that there is such a dispute. The whole world knows that there is a dispute.” Prime Minister Abe appeared to respond to Wang in a press conference following his appearance at the UN summit. “Senkaku is an inherent part of the territory of Japan in light of historical facts and based upon international law, and the islands are under the valid control of Japan,” Abe said at the press conference. While Tokyo would not escalate the situation and wanted to open dialogue with China to avoid an armed conflict, Abe insisted that “Japan would not make a concession on our territorial sovereignty.” Some in China are already taking the concession as a sign of Japanese weakness. Specifically, the Global Times quoted Yang Bojiang, director of Japanese studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, as saying: “Abe is under economic pressure to resume talks with China and advance the bilateral relationship, so he has to show the world his willingness to talk.” Chinese aggression over Senkaku is drastically decliningHarner 14— (Stephen, “China De-Escalating The Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis, But Will Abe Respond?,” Forbes, 8/21/2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2014/08/21/china-de-escalating-the-senkakudiaoyu-crisis-but-will-abe-respond/2/). WM A “deep truth” column by in the August 15 on-line Nihon Keizai Shimbun focuses on the dramatic decrease in Chinese “intrusions” into waters around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Nikkei editorial board member Akita Hiroyuki cites Japanese government sources to reveal that during the first six months of 2014 40 Chinese vessels entered waters around Senkaku/Diaoyu claimed by Japan. This works out to 6.6 vessels a month. In the first six months of 2013 94 Chinese vessels had entered the waters, a monthly average of 15.6 vessels. Thus, this year’s “incursions” have fallen by half. Also the duration of the Chinese vessels’ presence in Japanese-claimed waters declined. Last year in was not uncommon for the vessels to remain for over four hours. Since this spring, two to three hours has been the rule. From the Japanese perspective, it has not been only the number and length of China’s “intrusions” that have diminished, certain “provocative” acts have ceased. Last year Chinese coast guard vessels were detaining Japanese fishing boats and threatening to prosecute their crews, while also performing course blocking maneuvers against Japanese patrol ships. Such Chinese actions have recently declined. “There is intelligence suggesting that the Chinese authorities have ordered an end to forced expulsion of Japanese fishing boats,” writes Akita. Guidelines establish effective deterrence that prevents Senkaku from happeningKotani 15— (Tetsuo, “THE MARITIME SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW U.S.-JAPAN GUIDELINES,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, April 30, 2015, http://amti.csis.org/the-maritime-security-implications-of-the-new-u-s-japan-guidelines/). WM The new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines will upgrade bilateral operational cooperation and enhance the alliance structure. The new Guidelines enable Japanese and U.S. forces to conduct effective combined operations defending each other’s units and assets in the high seas—even beyond Japanese territorial waters. The new Alliance Coordination Mechanism will endorse this upgraded operational cooperation. Under this new Mechanism, the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) and U.S. military will share information and situational awareness from peacetime to gray-zone and full-fledged military contingencies, while coordinating bilateral responses. The Guidelines will have huge implications for U.S.-Japan cooperation in the maritime domain. For the last several years, China has been challenging Japanese territory and sovereignty in the East China Sea. China recognizes that the overall military balance still favors Japan and the United States, and therefore takes measures short of armed attack to avoid U.S. military intervention. The first responder to Chinese gray-zone challenges in the East China Sea is the Japan Coast Guard (JCG). By involving JCG in the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the alliance can effectively respond to Chinese creeping coercion. The new Guidelines will also allow the JSDF and US forces to prepare flexible deterrent options (FDOs) for escalation control. By demonstrating its will and determination through the deployment of allied units, the alliance can dominate escalation. The new Guidelines will enhance overall deterrence too. An increasingly important aspect of alliance deterrence is its ability to respond to China’s precision strike capabilities. The new Guidelines refer to dispersion, hardening, and resiliency of existing facilities to deal with China’s ballistic missile threat vis-à-vis, for instance, Kadena Airbase in Okinawa. Even after a Chinese ballistic missile attack, the alliance will maintain counterattack capabilities using other military and commercial facilities, while rapidly recovering damaged ones. The new Guidelines also define the division of labor between the JSDF and U.S. military for island defense. This is to endorse US commitment to defend the Senkaku Islands and the entire Japanese southwestern island chain. The traditional alliance division of labor was spear and shield—U.S. forces provide offensive strike capabilities and JSDF provide defensive measures. In island defense, however, the JSDF takes the primary responsibility through the Dynamic Joint Defense Force, while the U.S. military plays a supporting role with strategic strike capabilities. Maritime security and the protection of freedom of navigation without geographical restriction is a core of the new Guidelines. The alliance will continue to be a major security provider for the Taiwan Strait. Given the ongoing Chinese land reclamation and nuclear submarine (SSBN) program in the South China Sea, the new Guidelines will enable Japan-U.S. cooperation for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in these troubled waters. Japanese ISR activities in the South China Sea will not only secure freedom of navigation but also maintain the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The new Guidelines also assume bilateral cooperation for minesweeping and ship inspection in the international waters. The new Guidelines call for cooperation with third parties. The alliance can work more with Australia in the Pacific and India in the Indian Ocean. The alliance can conduct more effective and efficient capacity building for countries like the Philippines and Vietnam, too. U.S.-Japan cooperation for the new Australian submarine program will enhance underwater superiority of the alliance in the Pacific. The Guidelines need to be endorsed by Japanese domestic security legislation reform. The ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito has already agreed on the content of the legislation, and they will pass it in the Diet by summer. The new security legislation will allow the JSDF to use force, only in a situation that threatens Japan’s national survival. But how that is defined remains to be seen— Komeito is still reluctant to regard a threat to Japanese sea lanes as a threat to national survival. Seventy years ago, Japan was defeated not by atomic bombing but by commercial raid. To make the new Guidelines work for maritime security, Japanese political leaders need to reach a consensus on the importance of sea lanes, and their role in national defense. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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