I. UNIVOCITY OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL CONCEPTS

Primary:

Avicenna as translated in Marmura, Michael E. “Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the Metaphysics of his Al-Shifa’,” in Logos Islamikos: Studia Islamica in Honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens, ed. M. E. Marmura and D. A. Agius. Toronto, 1984, 219-40. [Being is a primary concept.]

Aquinas, ST I.13.1-6.

Secondary:

Ashworth, E. J. “A Thirteenth-Century Interpretation of Aristotle on Equivocation and Analogy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary vol. 17: 85-101 (1991). [This paper is a case study of how Aristotle’s remarks about equivocation were read in the thirteenth century.]

de Libera, Alain. “Les sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l’analogie,” Les études philosophiques 3-4 (1989) 319-45.

Lonfat, J. “Archéologie de la notion d’analogie d’Aristote à saint Thomas d’Aquin.” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 71 (2004), pp. 35-107

Owens, Joseph. The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics 3rd. rev. ed. (Toronto, 1978), “The Aristotelian Equivocals,” pp. 107-36. [Discussion of Aristotle’s concept of pros hen equivocity, which the medievals called ‘analogy’.]

Primary:

Summary by Scotus himself of Henry’s position on analogy in Wolter, DS, pp. 20-22.

Secondary:

Brown, Stephen. “Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being.” Franciscan Studies 25 (1965) 117-50. [Compares Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Gerard of Bologna, and Peter Aureoli on the interpretation of the above text of Avicenna.]

De Corte, Jos. “Henry of Ghent on Analogy. Critical Reflections on Jean Paulus’ Interpretation,” in VanHamel [14] above, pp. 71-106.

Duns Scotus on Univocity

Primary:

Secondary:

Dumont, Stephen D. “Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus.” In The Routledge History of Medieval Philo­sophy III: Medieval Philosophy, ed. John Marenbon (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 291-328.

Marrone, Steven P. “The Notion of Univocity in Duns Scotus’s Early Works”, Franciscan Studies 43 (1983) 347-95.

Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name ‘animal’; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only.

Univoca vero dicuntur quorum et nomen commune est et secundum nomen eadem substantiae ratio, ut animal homo atque bos. Communi enim nomine utrique animalia nuncupantur, et est ratio substantiae eadem; si quis enim assignet utriusque rationem, quid utrique sit quo sint animalia, eandem assignabit rationem.

2 · There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but they are related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not homonymous. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing in the sense that it possesses it, another in the sense that it is naturally adapted to it, another in the sense that it is a function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used similarly to these. So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of some of these things or of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is non-being. As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion. It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study all things that are, qua being.--

Haec autem nulli est in parte dictarum eadem. Aliarum enim nulla intendit universaliter de ente in quantum est ens, verum partem eius abscindentes aliquam, circa quidem hanc speculantur ipsum accidens: veluti scientiarum mathematicae.

Quoniam autem principia et extremas quaerimus causas, palam, quia cuiusdam eas naturae secundum se esse necesse est. Si ergo et entium elementa quaerentes, ea quaesierunt principia, necesse et entis elementa esse non secundum accidens, sed inquantum sunt entia. Unde et nobis entis inquantum est ens, primae causae sunt accipiendae.

Ens autem multis quidem dicitur modis; sed ad unum et ad unam naturam aliquam et non aequivoce. Sed quemadmodum salubre omne ad sanitatem, hoc quidem ad conservationem, id vero in actione, aliud quia et signum (ut urina) sanitatis, hoc autem quia illius est susceptibile. Et medicinale a medicina. Hoc enim habendo medicinas dicitur medicinale, illud vero susceptibile ad eam, aliud vero per actus existentium medicinae. Similiter autem alia sumemus his dicta. Ita vero et ens multipliciter dicitur quidem, sed omne ad primum principium. Haec enim quia substantiae entia dicuntur, illa vero quia passiones substantiae dicuntur, alia quia via ad substantiam aut corruptiones, aut privationes, aut qualitates, aut effectiva, aut generativa substantiae, aut ad substantiam dictorum, aut quorumdam horum negationes, aut substantiae. Quare et non ens esse non ens dicimus.

Quemadmodum ergo salubrium omnium una est scientia, ita hoc etiam et in aliis. Non enim solum circa unum dictorum unius est scientiae speculari, sed ad unam dictorum naturam. Etenim ea modo quodam circa unum dicuntur.

So we have now to consider how motion is differentiated: and this discussion serves to show that the genus is not a unity but contains a plurality latent in it and distinct from it, and that in the case of equivocal terms sometimes the different senses in which they are used are far removed from one another, while sometimes there is a certain likeness between them, and sometimes again they are nearly related either generically or analogically, with the result that they seem not to be equivocal though they really are.

Aequivocorum alia sunt casu, alia consilio. Casu, ut Alexander Priami filius et Alexander Magnus. Casus enim id egit, ut idem utrique nomen poneretur. Consilio vero, ea quaecunque hominum voluntate sunt posita. Horum autem alia sunt secundum similitudinem, ut homo pictus et homo verus, quo nunc utitur Aristoteles exemplo; alia secundum proportionem, ut principium, namque principium est in numero unitas, in lineis punctus. Et haec aequivocatio secundum proportionem esse dicitur. Alia vero sunt quae ab uno descendunt, ut medicinale ferramentum, medicinale pigmentum, ab una enim medicina aequivocatio ista descendit. Alia quae ad unum referuntur, [Col. 166C] ut si quis dicat salutaris vectatio est, salutaris esca est, haec scilicet idcirco sunt aequivoca, quod ad salutis unum vocabulum referuntur.

Thus, it has been shown to you from these considerations that being insofar as it is being (ens inquantum ens) is common to all these things and that it must be posited as the subject of this discipline. ... Therefore, the first subject of this science is being insofar as it is being, and those things which this science investigates are the attributes of being insofar as it is being without qualification.

We say: the ideas of “the existent,” “the thing,” and “the necessary” are impressed in the soul in a primary way, this impression not requiring better known things to bring it about.

Convenientia sunt media inter univoca et aequivoca, ut ‘ens,’ quod dicitur de substantia et accidente. Non enim est sicut haec dictio ‘canis.’ Ea enim quae appellantur ‘canis’ non conveniunt in aliqua significatione canis. Esse vero convenit substantiae et accidenti. Nec sunt sicut univoca. Animalitas enim aeque convenit equo et homini indifferenter et eodem modo. Esse vero prius habet substantia; deinde accidens, mediante alio. Ergo est eis esse secundum prius et posterius. Hoc dicitur ambiguum, eo quod aptatur ad hoc et ad hoc.

Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?

[28824] Iª q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 1 Sed contra, quidquid praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen et non secundum eandem rationem, praedicatur de eis aequivoce. Sed nullum nomen convenit Deo secundum illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur de creatura, nam sapientia in creaturis est qualitas, non autem in Deo; genus autem variatum mutat rationem, cum sit pars definitionis. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Quidquid ergo de Deo et creaturis dicitur, aequivoce dicitur.

[28825] Iª q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 2 Praeterea, Deus plus distat a creaturis, quam quaecumque creaturae ab invicem. Sed propter distantiam quarundam creaturarum, contingit quod nihil univoce de eis praedicari potest; sicut de his quae non conveniunt in aliquo genere. Ergo multo minus de Deo et creaturis aliquid univoce praedicatur, sed omnia praedicantur aequivoce.

[28826] Iª q. 13 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce. Quia omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed deficienter, ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in effectibus, in causa est simpliciter et eodem modo; sicut sol secundum unam virtutem, multiformes et varias formas in istis inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est, omnes rerum perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis, puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam, non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur.

Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari; sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam contra philosophos, qui multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam etiam contra apostolum dicentem, Rom. I, “invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur”.

Dicendum est igitur quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in nominibus, vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dictum, significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem sanitatis. ...

[28830] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 4 Ea vero quae sunt in contrarium, concludunt quod non univoce huiusmodi nomina de Deo et creaturis praedicentur, non autem quod aequivoce
Aquinas,

Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics Bk 7 Lec 8
The reason for this is that species is taken from the ultimate form, which in the nature of things is simply one. Genus, however, is not taken from a form which is one in the nature of things, but only from reason [ratio]. For man is not an animal through a form other than that by which man is man. Therefore all men, who are of one species, agree in the form which constitutes the species, because each of them has a rational soul. But there is not in man, or a horse, or an ass some common soul which constitutes animal beyond that soul which constitutes man, or horse, or ass (for if there were, then genus would be one and comparable, as is species). Rather the form of a genus is received only in the understanding by the abstraction of the intellect from differences.

Therefore, a species is a unity which derives from one form existing in the nature of things. But a genus is not a unity because the diverse species of a genus receive predication according to the diverse forms existing in the nature of things. Thus a genus is one logically, but not physically.

Therefore, a genus is in some way one, but not simply. Rather genera hide many joined things, that is, because of the similarity and nearness to unity of a genus, the equivocation of many things is latent in it.

There are some equivocal terms so disparate that only the name is common. For example, a dog is said to be a celestial constellation and a barking animal.

There are others which have some similarity. For example, the name ‘man’ is said of a real man and a picture of a man insofar as the latter has some similarity to a real man.

Other equivocal terms are very close because of a conformity in genus (for example, when ‘body’ is said of a celestial body and a corruptible body, the term is used equivocally, speaking naturally, because their matter is not one. Nevertheless, they agree in logical genus, and because of this agreement in genus they seem to be not completely equivocal.) Or else they are very close in respect to some similarity, for example, he who teaches school is called a master, and likewise he who heads a house is called the master of the house, but equivocally. But this is a very close equivocation because of the similarity. For each is a director, one of learning, the other of a house. Because of this closeness either of genus or of similarity, they do not seem to be equivocal, but they are.