The United States federal government should close the United States Department of Transportation



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Privatizing roads reduces congestion and creates sustainable growth.


Rouhani, 9 – PhD candidate Civil and Environmental Engineering Department @ UC Davis (Omid, “SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORTATION AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE”, Projections, Volume 9, MIT Journal of Planning, http://web.mit.edu/dusp/dusp_extension_unsec/projections/issue_9/issue_9_rouhani.pdf) //RI

ARE ROADS PUBLIC GOODS? A common definition of a public good is “A good which once provided to one user must be provided to others in the same amount” (Public good def-a), in other words, everyone can simultaneously obtain benefits. This means that the good should be 1) Non-rivalrous (one’s consumption does not impede that of others’) and 2) Non-exclusive (no one can be excluded from its consumption). Do roads fit this definition? Even in non-congested conditions, each driver’s entrance to a road lowers other drivers’ utility by reducing overall speed. When roads become congested, one person’s benefit definitely reduces that of others. Thus, they are rivalrous. This becomes worse with congestion. The second argument is that some people’s consumption is much less than others’ (less VMT). Some people cannot afford a car, which means roads are partially exclusive. Since the rich consume more and have higher VMT, public roads provide a kind of progressive subsidy for society, with a higher subsidy for people with higher income. This creates an inequality. The other definition for a public good is “A good that is hard or even impossible to produce for profit” (Public good def-b). This is not true for roads anymore. A $4 billion concession fee contract for the Indiana Toll Road (Crowe Chizek, 2006), for example, shows huge profits can be gained from road infrastructure. Users’ willingness to pay is seemingly high enough to compensate for the travel cost increase. This can constitute a profitable industry which increases GDP directly and indirectly. One general conception about roads is that they are strategic goods like national defense, and should be under national control and treated as public goods. Leasing instead of selling roads complies with this conception to some extent. Government does not sell its property and applies some control levers on these roads. Thus, this relation will not be out of control. Finally, transportation infrastructure should improve with economic growth. Considering the lack of financial resources limits this growth, there may be no other solution than at least a partial private road system. In this regard, the Public-Private Partnerships investments have grown in the transportation sector (IRF, 2007).



Road privatization works better -- empirics.


Block, 9 – PhD in economics from Columbia, Harold E. Wirth Endowed Chair in Economics at Loyola University (Walter, “Privatization of Roads and Highways”, Ludvig von Mises Institute, 2009, http://library.mises.org/books/Walter%20Block/The%20Privatization%20of%20Roads%20and%20Highways.pdf)//RI

Smithian 2 case that we can more effectively organize an economic system through decentralization based on private property, freely fluctuating prices and unencumbered markets than centralization, bureaucracy and commands.3 Nor will we again rehearse the arguments in favor of private rather than public roads in particular. There is already a rela- tively large body of work (given the admitted unpopularity of the argument) that attempts to justify this enterprise.4 That is, it shows that private streets, roads, highways, bridges, tunnels and other vehicular thoroughfares are feasible, workable, violate no scientific or ethical codes, and, actually, were the historical practice, not the exception. It demonstrates benefits in terms of reduced traffic fatalities, declining automobile congestion (peak- load pricing which has still eluded public sector road managers is more likely to be implemented), and more efficiency. If socialism cannot work in Cuba, North Korea, East Germany or the U.S.S.R., why should it be supposed it would function ade- quately on any nation’s roads or its city’s streets? This literature, further, deals with issues of eminent domain, bankruptcy, encroaching (a private road owner surrounds a domicile with concrete, and will not permit access or egress), monopoly, street sweeping, profiteering, policing, traffic lights, dealing with bad weather conditions, drunken motorists, etc. It is important to realize, too, that there are numerous real world examples of private streets which function highly effectively. These include the private streets of St. Louis; the streets internal to shopping malls and shopping centers (even the aisles of groceries and department stores may be considered for our purposes in this regard); gated communities worldwide, and the rural roads owned by associations of property owners in Finland and Sweden.5 Contrast the private streets in Disney World with those in New York City’s famous Central Park; it is no accident that the former are safe for passersby, while the latter have been the location of numerous murders and rapes.

Marketplace dynamics solve the case better.


Block, 9 – PhD in economics from Columbia, Harold E. Wirth Endowed Chair in Economics at Loyola University (Walter, “Privatization of Roads and Highways”, Ludvig von Mises Institute, 2009, http://library.mises.org/books/Walter%20Block/The%20Privatization%20of%20Roads%20and%20Highways.pdf, p. 14)//RI

As such, all the usual benefits and responsibilities that are incumbent upon private enterprise would affect roads. The rea- son a company or individual would want to build or buy an already existing road would be the same as in any other business—to earn a profit. The necessary funds would be raised in a similar manner—by floating an issue of stock, by borrowing, or from past savings of the buyer. The risks would be the same— attracting customers and prospering, or failing to do so and going bankrupt. Likewise for the pricing policy; just as private enterprise rarely gives burgers away for free, use of road space would require payment. A road enterprise would face virtually all of the problems shared by other businesses: attracting a labor force, subcontracting, keeping customers satisfied, meeting the price of competitors, innovating, borrowing money, expanding, etc. Thus, a highway or street owner would be as much a busi- nessman as any other, with much the same problems, opportuni- ties, and risks. In addition, just as in other businesses, there would be facets peculiar to this particular industry. The road entrepreneur would have to try to contain congestion, reduce traffic accidents, plan and design new facilities in coordination with already existing highways as well as with the plans of others for new expansion. He would have to set up the “rules of the road” so as best to accomplish these and other goals. The road industry would be expected to carry on each and every one of the tasks now under- taken by public roads authorities: fill potholes, install road signs, guard rails, maintain lane markings, repair traffic signals, and so on for the myriad of “road furniture” that keeps traffic moving. Applying the concepts of profit and loss to the road industry, we can see why privatization would almost certainly mean a gain compared to the present, nationalized system of road management.



Privatizing roads solves -- profit motives lead to more effective maintenance and innovative solutions.


Servodio, 4 – MA in economics at the University of Akron, Ludvig Von Mises Institution Graduate (Paul, “Snowed by Road Statism”, Ludvig von Mises Institute, 12/27, http://mises.org/daily/1704/)//RI

As time passed we did not see even one plow/salt truck. This prompted a discussion between my friend and I on how much better the roadways would be if they were privately owned. Obviously with privatized roads, the owners of these roads would have huge incentives to keep the roadways as clean as they possibly could during snowstorms. The profit incentives of being able to claim that one's roadway is much safer during inclement weather than a competitor's would be tremendous. Surely word of mouth would spread through consumers on which roadways were consistently safer to travel during inclement weather. The road owner who does nothing to keep his roadways clean during snowstorms would certainly suffer large profit losses. What seems to be the state's problem with keeping roadways clean of snow is that there simply are not enough plow/salt trucks to do all of the work. Isn't there a word for that scenario? What is it called? Ah yes, shortage! The state has a shortage of plow/salt trucks. The process works like this: all limited access highways are taken care of first, followed by primary city streets, and in a distant third are residential streets. I say a distant third because many of these streets do not get cleaned until the middle of the night or the next day. Some people have to wait until the sun gets around to being warm enough to melt the snow. Instead, road entrepreneurs would have their own teams of plow/salt trucks and know the precise number of these vehicles to have in order to efficiently keep their roadways clean of snow and ice.



Investors are ready and willing to invest -- road privatization solves the case.


Rouhani, 9 – PhD candidate Civil and Environmental Engineering Department @ UC Davis (Omid, “SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORTATION AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE”, Projections, Volume 9, MIT Journal of Planning, http://web.mit.edu/dusp/dusp_extension_unsec/projections/issue_9/issue_9_rouhani.pdf) //RI

Private industries 3. Road owners try to maximize their benefits from roads. Their income depends both on the quantity of demand and prices charged. Roads owners are responsive to the demand, trying to price their roads to increase not only their profits (by charging effective tolls) but also the demand (by providing a better service). Both of these two objectives are neglected in the centralized-public structure. 4. A gigantic industry will be formed. Long term and stable revenue streams encourage the private sector to invest in this industry. A significant part of the industry would be formed just by leasing the existing roads. Consequently, government can make profits from an industry that is in a near breakdown condition now. 5. Some companies will substantially suffer from privatization because transportation costs account for a high proportion of their costs, and introducing this policy will increase their costs by great amounts. They may be compensated by being offered shares of the private firms running tolled roads or travel credits. 6. Landlords will benefit from their property appreciation when a new road is constructed. They can participate in the construction by purchasing bonds, or they can be taxed to maintain equity (Engel et al, 2005).



Free enterprise solves roads better -- privatization is empirically effective.


Stossel, 10. American consumer reporter, investigative journalist, author and libertarian columnist. (John, “Private Enterprise Does It Better”, Reason Foundation, February 11, 2010, http://reason.org/news/printer/private-enterprise-does-better, Callahan)

In Myths, Lies and Downright Stupidity, I bet my readers $1,000 that they couldn't name one thing that government does better than the private sector. I am yet to pay. Free enterprise does everything better. Why? Because if private companies don't do things efficiently, they lose money and die. Unlike government, they cannot compel payment through the power to tax. Even when a private company operates a public facility under contract to government, it must perform. If it doesn't, it will be "fired"—its contract won't be renewed. Government is never fired. Contracting out to private enterprise isn't the same thing as letting fully competitive free markets operate, but it still works better than government. Roads are one example. Politicians call road management a "public good" that "government must control." Nonsense. In 1995, a private road company added two lanes in the middle of California Highway 91, right where the median strip used to be. It then used "congestion pricing" to let some drivers pay to speed past rush-hour traffic. Using the principles of supply and demand, road operators charge higher tolls at times of day when demand is high. That encourages those who are most in a hurry to pay for what they need. It was the first time anywhere in the world that congestion pricing was used. Bureaucrats were skeptical. Now congestion pricing is a hot idea for both private and public road management systems. Likewise, for years there was a gap in the ring road surrounding Paris that created huge traffic problems. Then private developers made an unsolicited proposal to build a $2 billion toll tunnel in exchange for a 70-year lease to run it. They built a double-decker tunnel that fits six lanes of traffic in the space usually required for just two. The tunnel's profit-seeking owners have an incentive to keep traffic moving. They collect tolls based on congestion pricing, and tolls are collected electronically, so cars don't have to stop. The tunnel operators clear accidents quickly. Most are detected within 10 seconds -- thanks to 350 cameras inside the tunnel. The private road has cut a 45-minute trip to 10 minutes. Indiana used to lose money on its toll road. Then Gov. Mitch Daniels leased it to private developers. Now it makes a profit. The new owners spent $40 million on electronic tolling. That's saved them 55 percent on toll collection. They saved $20 per mile by switching to a better de-icing fluid. They bought a new fleet of computerized snowplows that clear roads using less salt. Drivers win, and taxpayers win.



More evidence -- either economic outcome is preferable to the status quo.


Rouhani, 9 – PhD candidate Civil and Environmental Engineering Department @ UC Davis (Omid, “SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORTATION AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE”, Projections, Volume 9, MIT Journal of Planning, http://web.mit.edu/dusp/dusp_extension_unsec/projections/issue_9/issue_9_rouhani.pdf) //RI

Privatization might result in two possible broad outcomes: an oligopoly or a competitive framework. These two are the same in providing better service than the present conditions. Figure 1 shows the transition from present conditions to two possible outcomes based on the Van Aerde model (Rakha et al, 2002), a more complicated model version of the Greenshields model (Greenshields, 1934). It should be noted that this model estimates different points of the intersection of supply and demand for each road with speed, flow, or density as variables. The left curve of the figure shows some hypothetical data which are close to average present conditions and the other two curves show two possible outcomes (speed and flow diagram). By representing private roads and the consequent pricing regime, both the demand and supply change results in less congested roads. Rufolo et al (2008) showed that mileage fees result in reduction in driving even with the same total money gathered as the gas tax spent to drive. The difference between competitive and oligopoly outcome is based on the power of firms to change prices. In a competitive framework, firms do not have any power to change tolls (prices), so they probably try to increase the demand, maximize the traffic, and stay at the maximum flow part of the curve to increase their revenue. But the competitive behavior of roads owners is less probable (Zhang et al, 2006). The oligopoly structure is more probable based on the spatial restrictions of roads’ construction. Adding that changing routes may be time-consuming and users may not have any other options, the owner can overcharge and consequently increase his/her profits and gain a monopolistic power. In addition to the spatial restrictions, land purchasing problems and high construction costs are barriers to entering the market, which may lead to a monopoly or some kind of oligopoly (Zhang et al, 2006). For several practices, the tolls are the highest in the world; the prime example is a 13-mile stretch outside Mexico City that costs $6 to use, twice the daily minimum wage in Mexico (Porter, 1997). However, charges decrease the demand for travel. Thus, both frameworks reduce congestion. The private owners try to prevent the congested part by increasing prices when demand increases. They try to sustain their revenues and decrease their maintenance costs by restricting the demand. If the demand is not restricted, the traffic flow (consumption) decreases and as a result, their revenue will decrease due to both lower demand and the poorer service. An oligopoly, which is commensurate with less consumption- lower VMT, is superior to a competitive outcome without regulating emissions due to the higher charges required. Generally, private marginal costs instead of social marginal costs govern the transportation market (concept of externalities). To approach the social optimum, consumption should be reduced. In fact, oligopoly behavior and externalities cancel or reduce the effect of each other. It should be noted that the road owners can smooth the change in travel demands by applying different prices for different periods of the day (changes in supply).

Empirically highway privatization has increased choices while decreasing prices.


Ball, 94 [Martin, PHD, http://www.libertarian.co.uk/sites/default/lanotepdf/econn057.pdf, “Liberate The Roads! The Benefits That Will Come From Road Privatisation”, Accessed Jun 20, //SH]

And I have faith that privately owned roads will im-prove service to customers as well. The evidence from other privatisations is that removing privileged producer monopolies from former state (i.e. badly) run companies has given the consumer more choice and a better deal.


Highway privatization means lower costs and better products for consumers.


Caplan, 96 [Bryan, Professor of Economics, George Mason University, http://www.libertarian.co.uk/sites/default/lanotepdf/econn072.pdf, “A Practical Proposal for Privatising the Highways- And Other ‘Natural Monopolies’”, Accessed Jun 20, //SH]

The incentives for innovation would be distinctively improved. What incentive does a state monopoly have to improve its product or lower costs? In contrast, a private monopoly has every incen-tive to exploit all possible cost savings and to introduce new and improved products. It may charge an arm and a leg for them, but it will certainly want to introduce them. (c) It definitely seems like a private road system could have very high transactions cost. In a best-case scenario, it would just charge a (high) flat fee; this would be a definite improvement over the current morass of registration fees, gasoline taxes, tire taxes, and tolls used to pay for the existing highway system.


The CP solves the aff better.

Samuel, 95—freelance journalist who writes on regulatory affairs and whose work appears in Forbes and National Review (Peter, “Highway Aggravation: The Case For Privatizing The Highways”, Cato Policy Analysis, 6/27, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-231.html)//EM

The economics, politics, and technology are right for progressively privatizing highways and creating markets in highway service. Washington State, Virginia, and California have begun to do so. Private highway projects in those states are discussed in detail. State highways should be sold section by section to private owners. With private operators responsible for maintenance as well as improvement of the highways, gasoline taxes and other government charges for roads could be phased out. New ideas and new technologies would be applied. For example, to eliminate stop-and-go conditions, private highway operators could vary toll rates by the minute to encourage less peak-hour travel.


Highway privatization solves transportation technology innovation.

Samuel, 95—freelance journalist who writes on regulatory affairs and whose work appears in Forbes and National Review (Peter, “Highway Aggravation: The Case For Privatizing The Highways”, Cato Policy Analysis, 6/27, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-231.html)//EM

There is enormous opportunity for entrepreneurship in highways--for example in catering to the special needs of truckers with liberalized width, height, and weight limits, and to car drivers by providing car-only lanes and real-time information about congestion, parking space availability, and commercial services. There is a plethora of new technologies being developed under the title "intelligent transportation" systems--gadgets to produce a map on a digital display in your car, to tell you what nearby services are available, and to tell you by synthetic voice where to turn. And smart weapons guidance technology from satellites and space-miniaturized sensors is being commercialized so that a variety of driver controls will soon be marketed to help the driver, or take over some car controls. Greyhound buses already carry collision avoidance radars, and on special lanes in California cars are being "hooked up" with the lead driver pulling a "train" of following cars by radio signals and computerized engine controls. Of a thousand such systems, perhaps 950 will be no more than gee whiz stories for Popular Science. But some will certainly find their way into use. Many will require that highways be adapted with special flyovers, ramps, and barriers, and that will require entrepreneurial profit-seeking management of the highways





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