The United States federal government should close the United States Department of Transportation
A2 CP Fails – No Investment/Profit Motive
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- A2 CP Fails – Real Estate Costs
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A2 CP Fails – No Investment/Profit MotivePrivate firms want to invest in highways -- it’s a steady and predictable cash flow.Orski, 8 [C. Kenneth, Editor and Publisher, Innovation Briefs, http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2008/07/01/private-investment-tolls-will-play-increasing-role-funding-tomorrows-tr, “Private Investment, Tolls Will Play an Increasing Role in Funding Tomorrow's Transportation Infrastructure”, Accessed Jun 19, //SH] Many of the infrastructure funds tend to favor investments in toll roads. That's because roads generate strong demand even in times of slower economic growth and produce steady and predictable cash flow relatively unaffected by economic downturns. Toll road-related investments appeal especially to long-term investors such as pension funds and insurance companies, which require stable, income-oriented investments to match their long-term liabilities and payout obligations. A2 CP Fails – Real Estate CostsPrivatization reduces real estate costs.Block, 9 – PhD in economics from Columbia, Harold E. Wirth Endowed Chair in Economics at Loyola University (Walter, “Privatization of Roads and Highways”, Ludvig von Mises Institute, 2009, http://library.mises.org/books/Walter%20Block/The%20Privatization%20of%20Roads%20and%20Highways.pdf)//RI Blockades. One argument for the thesis that roads are different, and thus either cannot or should not be privatized, or, if so, that special provisions applicable nowhere else must apply here, is based upon the “blockade problem”: if the four streets sur- rounding the block in which my home is located are privatized, then I can be blockaded in, or entrapped. Alternatively, I can be made to pay such a high price for egress and access to my own property that virtually the entire capital value of it would end up being captured by these private road owners, e.g., the “entrap- ping” firm or firms will charge a fee just below the present dis- counted value of the house. We know that this scenario could not occur in the natural operation of a free market in road provision (see chapter 1). No one would purchase such a home, initially, unless access and egress rights were first stipulated, and at a mutually agreeable price, at present and in the future as well. Just as “title search” is now the order of the day in real estate trans- actions, so, too, would “access search” come to be a common- place in the free society earmarked by private roadways. This being the case, no proper disbursement of public streets into private hands could ignore this issue. For, to do so would in effect be to give to the private road owners not only the streets them- selves which is part of the explicit privatization plan, but also (the value of) virtually all the property “entrapped” by these traf- fic arteries. What, then, could be done to obviate such a monu- mental injustice? One possibility would be to add a codicil to the transfer of the roads (however else effectuated); to wit, that due weight would have to be given to the contrary-to-fact, hypothet- ical bargaining over these access rights that would have, but did not, take place, since no private road market existed. Here, the new private firms would own the street, but they would be sub- ject to the side order constraint that they grandfather in all extant property owners abutting their newly owned roads. As for com- plete newcomers to the area, e.g., those traveling through it for the first time or those who purchase real estate lying within the bounds of these recently privatized avenues, they could be charged as much as the market will bear. But, for those already established, and also their visitors, repairmen, deliverymen, etc., due consideration would have to be given to this hypothetical contrary-to-fact bargaining over egress and access. How, in turn, might this be done? One possibility is to look at the market value of rights of way in arenas where this is subject to open and free bargaining, and then to incorporate this knowledge into newly privatized roads. For example, Christopher Muller notes that, with regard to his railroads, “James J. Hill encouraged settlement by letting immigrants travel halfway across the country on his railroad for ten dollars if they would settle along the route. He rented entire families freight cars for little more money.”4 The point is, if this railroad magnate was attempting to attract people to live on territory abutting his holdings, he must have offered them inducements to do so. Borrowing a leaf from his and other such offers would be of help in solving our present challenge. Continues Muller: “Unlike other railroad builders such as Cor- nelius Vanderbilt who built their railroads around a population, Hill built a population around his railroad.” Precisely. But if you are going to do this sort of thing, you must make attractive offers to would-be future neighbors. Tolls SolvencyPrivate tolls solve -- creates successful road financing and facilitates better maintenance.SCRIBNER 10-Policy analyst, Competitive Enterprise Institute(MARC,” LETTER TO THE EDITOR: Tolls, more freeways would improve transport” Washington Post, April 20, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/20/tolls-more-freeways-would-improve-transport/)//EL The editorial “Freeways are the solution to congestion” (Comment & Analysis, April 12) got it half-right. Widening roads to support more cars is far less costly than expanding commuter rail, and it avoids many of the land-use problems and the authoritarian “smart growth” social engineering that characterize commuter-rail projects. But while expanding existing highways is necessary to alleviate congestion and improve the transportation system, tolls and congestion pricing both serve useful functions. Getting the road-financing mechanisms right is crucial for long-term transit privatization efforts. Tolls coupled with congestion pricing means that those using and placing stress on the highway system actually pay for its continued operation and maintenance. Given that tolls are by far the most practical method of generating revenue for private roads, bridges and tunnels, the alternative is maintaining the status quo indefinitely: high-cost, low-quality government monopolies controlling our transportation sector. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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