The United States federal government should pursue a defensive space control strategy that emphasizes satellite hardening, replacement, redundancy and situational awareness
Code of Conduct Counterplan Responses
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- [ ] Permutation – Do Both – diplomacy complements defensive military preparations
- [ ] Doing both solves better – best mix of options MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations
- [ ] A code of conduct fails – it is impossible to define key terms, and it depends on peaceful intentions Bellflower 2010, instructor at the Advanced Space Operations School
- [ ] The Rules of Road don’t protect satellites from ground based ASATs Hui 2007 - Research associate at Harvard University
Code of Conduct Counterplan Responses[ ] Permutation – do both. Developing a Code of Conduct doesn’t prohibit ASATs, but makes their development safer. Hitchens 2007 – Director of World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information [Thersea, U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From “War of Words” to Cold War in Space?, cs5_chapter2.pdf, Accessed June 21, 2011] Finally, the United States and China need to recognize that they must make an effort to manage their emerging competition in military space in a manner that does not undercut their own national security, as well as the security of others. Breaking off nascent discussions about space cooperation in favor of launching a kind of Cold War in space is bound to backfire on both Washington and Beijing in the long run. Instead, a frank and open dialogue about each side’s national security concerns in space is called for – along with serious consideration of how a new code of conduct for behavior in space might be drafted to clearly demark the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behavior in space. A code of conduct for space is not a radical, or even new, idea. Indeed, the administration of Ronald Reagan, while pursuing space-based missile defenses and an ASAT program, also was considering the value of pursuing a code of conduct that might include measures such as barring attacks on early warning satellites.53 Pursuit of a space code more recently has been endorsed by a number of international media outlets, including The Economist, a libertarian-oriented British magazine, and U.S. trade journal Aviation Week & Space Technology.54 China and the United States should take heed, and seek to shape rules of the road that can help ensure mutual security in space for all. Failure to act to restrain unfettered military competition in space is bound to result in a “Wild West” environment that raises the risks not only to Chinese and U.S. uses of space, but to the peace and prosperity of the entire world. [ ] Permutation – Do Both – diplomacy complements defensive military preparations MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations [Bruce, Council Special Report No. 38 September China, Space Weapons, date accessed : June 24th, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707] The strategic landscape of this new space era is largely unexplored and poorly understood. Nonetheless, certain objectives are clearly in the interest of the United States. The risks inherent in space conflict, where vital U.S. interests are at stake, suggest that preventing space conflict should be a major U.S. security objective, and that all instruments of U.S. power, not just military measures, should be drawn upon to this end. The United States needs to deter others from attacking its space capabilities and bolster an international space regime that reinforces deterrence, the absence of conflict in space, and the preservation of space as an environment open to all. Such a regime would allow the United States to continue reaping the critical information and service benefits that U.S. military space assets provide. To achieve this, the United States needs vigorous diplomatic initiatives as well as defense programs and strategy. Such a stable space regime would seek to: – focus U.S. policies on stability, deterrence, escalation control, and transparency; – create incentives that encourage nations to avoid actions that are inherently destabilizing and cannot be reversed; – construct a military space architecture on the basis of an in-depth, layered defense in order to ensure the availability of vital space services; – reduce incentives to and the ability of adversaries to target space capabilities; – foster uncertainty with respect to the consequences of such an adversarial action; – increase warning time to enable both strategic- and operationallevel actions; – facilitate agreements and understandings that would constrain the most destabilizing dimensions of space competition and provide ground rules for normal space operations; and – maintain ongoing dialogue among U.S., Chinese, and other military and policy experts to promote greater understanding and reduce chances for misunderstanding and miscalculation. [ ] Doing both solves better – best mix of options MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations [Bruce, Council Special Report No. 38 September China, Space Weapons, date accessed : June 24th, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707] The fundamental U.S. security interest in the wake of China’s 2007 ASAT test should be deterring China and others from attacking U.S. assets in space, using both a combination of declaratory policy, military programs, and diplomacy, and promoting a more stable and secure space environment. At the same time, the United States and China should both pursue diplomatic options to increase clarity and minimize misunderstanding on space-related matters, and reduce the chances of accidental conflict. This comprehensive mix of military and diplomatic measures is more likely to achieve U.S. space and larger national security objectives than either by itself. [ ] A code of conduct fails – it is impossible to define key terms, and it depends on peaceful intentions Bellflower 2010, instructor at the Advanced Space Operations School [Air Force Judge Advocate General School. The Air Force Law Review. The influence of law on command of space name: major john w. Bellflower Lexis Accessed June 21, 2011] As discussed above, the protection of space lines of communication is synonymous with American command of space. 138 In seeking to protect those lines of communication, some advocate the introduction of kinetic weapons in space. 139 This is impractical and ill-advised in the space environment. Employment of kinetic weapons in space generates an extremely dangerous debris cloud with a very long orbital life--in effect, perpetual shrapnel that poses a grave threat to all other satellites in orbit. While our potential adversaries may consider such weapons, the United States must avoid doing so because of the great risk of collateral damage to our own and our allies' space lines of communication. The United States should pursue a prohibition on the use of such weapons in order to preserve the global commons of space from space debris. 140 [*131] Any such prohibition, however, must focus on the effect to be prevented rather than any particular weapon. 141 One method to address this issue is the proposed development of a Space Code of Conduct that would require states "to refrain from harmful interference against space objects." 142 However, as acknowledged by its drafters, this suggestion suffers from the same challenge as the exercise of defining space weapons: what is "harmful interference"? 143 While it would obviously encompass permanent physical destruction or functional disablement of a satellite, what about temporary interference with a satellite's operation or capabilities that causes no long term damage or limitation? The principal drafter of the code believes that the inclusion of radio frequency jamming within the definition of harmful interference would likely limit significant support for adoption of the code by space-faring nations. 144 Moreover, since the code itself is not binding, debris mitigation is still left to the goodwill of space-faring nations. As a proposal, the code's redemptive value lies in the fact that it directs attention away from space weapons per se to instead focus on the intent of the space actor, that is, the desired effect, by proscribing intentional generation of space debris regardless of method or means. This is a critical step in developing a successful international space debris mitigation strategy that would be compatible with U.S. space security. However, in order to not limit the right of self-defense, the proposed prohibition would have to permit the potential use of non-kinetic measures that do not generate such debris. 145 For example, the [*132] European Code of Conduct for Debris Mitigation simply prohibits the "intentional destruction of a space system or any of its parts in orbit." 146 This language could serve as the foundation for a broader international agreement to prohibit the intentional creation of space debris, which would be compatible with U.S. command of space. However, such a prohibition alone is insufficient to provide an effective foundation for U.S. space security. America cannot rely solely upon the professed peaceful intentions of its strategic competitors. Indeed, our reliance on space assets presents a lucrative target for any potential adversary. 147 Several non-kinetic measures could provide a defensive capability without also jeopardizing America's own space assets or that of its allies. Rather than destroying an adversary satellite, such measures could temporarily disable, degrade, or otherwise render it incapable of functioning to the adversary's benefit. Such measures could limit an adversary's space lines of communication without endangering our own or that of a third party. 148 [ ] The Rules of Road don’t protect satellites from ground based ASATs Hui 2007 - Research associate at Harvard University [Zhang http://www.wsichina.org/space/focus.cfm?)focusid=94&charid=1 Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective Accessed June 24 Furthermore, a number of measures could be taken to secure space assets by multilateral rules or agreements. Specific rules or agreements for space use might include, for example, “keep-out zones,” a non-interference rule for satellites, cooperation on reducing space debris, notification of space launch, development of safe traffic management procedures, and building a hotline between major missile and space powers. These “rules of the road” would be intended to reduce suspicion and encourage the orderly use of space. However, it should be noted that the above technical measures and rules, although important for reducing present risks, would not remove the implicit threat of ASAT attacks. A potential rule on “keep-out-zones” would not prohibit an attack by a space-based laser at long distance. Technical solutions are unlikely to suffice in the absence of strengthened international agreements on space activity. In addition, hardening satellites would be extremely costly, and potentially infeasible, in particular for civilian and commercial satellites. It would impair the operational flexibility of satellites. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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