The United States federal government should pursue a defensive space control strategy that emphasizes satellite hardening, replacement, redundancy and situational awareness
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Bodyguards Solvency[ ] Bodyguard satellites solve the threat to US satellites – they intercept ASATs Mackey, 2009 - Air Force Institute of Technology [Accessed on 6-21-11 Fall Birmingham- Southern College;; Deputy group commander at Eglin AFB, Florida -Air and Space Power Journal “US and Chinese Anti-satellite Activities” proquest] During a speech at the 2007 Air Warfare Symposium, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne stated that "space is no longer a sanctuary."33 These remarks underscored the fact that China had demonstrated its ability to strike US satellites and that several other countries possessed or were seeking similar capabilities. In light of the potential threat posed by ASAT systems, how can the United States mitigate or reduce it? In his paper Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? Maj William L. Spacy gives some indication of how such counter- ASAT systems might work, highlighting three potential methods: bodyguard satellites, ground-based directed energy weapons, and space-based anti-ASAT missiles.34 Assigned to high-value satellites, bodyguard satellites would place themselves between the protected satellite and the attacking weapon system, thus performing much the same service for other satellites as fighter escorts did for bombers in World War II (i.e., providing both active and passive defense).35 Bodyguard satellites would need some autonomy in order to discern when an attack is imminent and take protective measures to maneuver into the correct position. Ground based directed-energy weapons could intercept attacking direct-ascent, kinetic energy weapons/missiles, rendering them ineffective prior to their reaching friendly satellites. Due to their fixed position on the planet, these counter-ASAT weapons would have an inherently limited line-of-sight striking range. However, by possessing nearly instantaneous striking capability, they would prove very timely if called upon. Lastly, space-based anti-ASAT platforms or kinetic-kill systems, more technologically feasible than surface-based directed-energy weapons, would intercept an attacking ASAT system and destroy it prior to its reaching the targeted satellite. Early Warning Inherency[ ] Funding for enhanced Early Warning Satellites has been cut Jakhu 2010 - Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University (Dr. Ram , with Cesar Jaramillo Managing Editor, Project Ploughshares, Phillip Baines (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada),), John Seibert (Project Ploughshares), Dr. Jennifer Simmons (The Simmons Foundation), Dr. Ray Williamson (Secure World Foundation). “Space Security 2010.” Spacesecurity.org. August 2010. http://www.spacesecurity.org/space.security.2010.reduced.pdf. pp. 119-167. Accessed June 21, 2011 With the DSP racing towards degradation,67 news that the next-generation SBIRS for missile warning and missile defense faces a further delay of twelve to eighteen months comes at a bad time for the US military’s space-based early warning systems.68 The latest plan is for Lockheed Martin to deliver the first geosynchronous satellite by the fourth quarter of 2010, one year later than the previous planned delivery date.69 While two of the hosted SBIRS payloads are now in orbit on classified satellites,70 the dedicated geosynchronous satellites are more than eight years behind schedule and the SBIRS program has exceeded its original $3.5 billion budget by nearly $8 billion.71 Additional funding, $143 million of it, for a 2010 follow-on program called the Third Generation Infrared Surveillance system, was recently approved by the US Senate.72 The experimental STSS, comprised of two long delayed satellites designed to track missiles through all stages of flight,73 was launched in September.74 The satellites fly in tandem 730 nautical miles above the Earth and provide a “stereo” view of missiles that are being tracked, allowing the system to differentiate actual warheads from decoys.75 If the system performs as expected, the satellites will be able to detect missile launches and track them through the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight – something that no other sensor system can presently do.76 Pop-Up Solvency[ ] Pop up military space platforms can assure superiority without prompting a backlash because they don’t deny the Commons Hyten 2001 Director, Space Programs, Office of the Ass Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, [4 January 01. Air & Space Power Journal . A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space. Lt Col John E. Hyten. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Hyten.html Accessed June 21, 2011.] Space superiority, like that of air superiority or maritime superiority, is not something that exists all the time. Rather, it is something that must be achieved only when dealing with a specific conflict, and then must be maintained for the duration of that conflict only. Space differs from air and maritime superiority because of its unique physical characteristics. In conflict, air and maritime superiority can be achieved over the limited geographic area involved in the conflict (e.g., air superiority over the Persian Gulf, or maritime superiority in the Mediterranean Sea). Space presents a more complicated problem. Orbiting space systems have the potential to impact an enormous portion of the globe, and therefore, space superiority must be evaluated from the perspective of all of space, not just a limited theater of operations. In its efforts to achieve space superiority, even for the limited duration of some future conflict, the United States must, therefore, consider the overall impact of its actions on the overall commons of space. If the U.S. impedes on the commons, establishing superiority for the duration of a conflict, part of the exit strategy for that conflict must be the return of space to a commons allowing all nations full access. This requires two approaches: (1) the development of a complete spectrum of military options (non-lethal to lethal), and (2) the development of doctrine and concepts of operation that will employ the military option least threatening to the commons—thus allowing a better peace following the conflict. 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