The United States federal government should pursue a defensive space control strategy that emphasizes satellite hardening, replacement, redundancy and situational awareness



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Doctrine - Inherency



[ ] The US is not developing a space military doctrine now – we are ignoring the recommendations of the space commissions
Kyl 2007 – US senator and Attorney. [Jon Kyl. Published on February 1, 2007. Delivered on January 29, 2007. China's Anti-Satellite Weapons and American National Security. The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/Chinas-Anti-Satellite-Weapons-and-American-National-Security. Accessed June 21]
An eighth example: U.S. Space Commission rec­ommendations overlooked. In addition to high­lighting the importance of U.S. space assets and their vulnerability, the 2001 report of the U.S. Space Commission made a number of important recom­mendations. Unfortunately, most of these recom­mendations have not been implemented.[18] For example, the commission argued that space must be recognized as a "top national security pri­ority" by the President and recommended establish­ing a presidential advisory group and an inter­agency group for national security in space. None of these steps has been taken. The Defense Depart­ment has not created a separate funding category, or "Major Force Program," for space, meaning that space security funds can be (and frequently are) diverted to pay for shortfalls in non-space areas. The report also noted the inevitability of conflict in space and urged decision makers to "develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space."[19] As I noted, we still lack proper defensive and offensive programs. This demonstrates the paradox of the U.S.-China competition in space. The Chinese profess peaceful intent and uncategorical opposition to space weap­ons. At the same time, they are developing and test­ing a multi-layered space warfare capability. The U.S. on the other hand, repudiates arms control, publicly asserts its rights to deny space access to our enemies, and yet seems ambivalent toward the means of exerting that control.

Doctrine - Solvency



[ ] Military doctrine must plan for space security – covering all aspects of counterspace operations is critical to space dominance
Kyl 2007 – US senator and Attorney. [Jon Kyl. Published on February 1, 2007. Delivered on January 29, 2007. China's Anti-Satellite Weapons and American National Security. The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/Chinas-Anti-Satellite-Weapons-and-American-National-Security. Accessed June 21]
Consistent with previous iterations, the current policy reaffirms space as a vital national interest and opposes "development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space."[10] It also restates U.S. commit­ment to "[d]evelop capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of action in space, and, if direct­ed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries." This statement means we reserve the right to devel­op offensive and defensive ASAT capabilities, as well as robust missile defenses. We also have an Air Force Counterspace Operations Doctrine, which properly recognizes the imperative to control the "ultimate high ground" by building three capability areas: Space Situational Awareness (SSA) forms the foundation for all space activities by "characterizing, as completely as possible, the space capabilities operating within the terrestrial and space environments."[11] Using sensors and telescopes based both on the ground and in space, SSA allows warfighters to know where the adversary's space assets are and what they are doing. Defensive Counterspace is defined as "protecting, preserving, recovering, and reconstituting friendly space-related capabilities before, during, and after an adversary attack." This could include everything from hardening satellites against laser attacks to launching an air strike against an enemy's GPS jamming facility to quickly launching replacements that are destroyed initially. Offensive Counterspace denies the adversary the use of space assets through reversible or permanent means. It encompasses everything from jamming or blinding to destroying enemy satellites.
[ ] The military needs to develop space military doctrines – this is key to coordination and success
Hyten 2001 Director, Space Programs, Office of the Ass Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, [4 January 01. Air & Space Power Journal . A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space. Lt Col John E. Hyten. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Hyten.html Accessed June 21, 2011.]
At the same time, the military needs to more fully develop the doctrine necessary to operate and use space control capabilities. The concept of space superiority is still relatively new for military planners. Significant work still needs to be done on how to effectively and efficiently achieve space superiority for today’s military. Otherwise, when and if the day arrives where space weapons are needed, the transition will be confused at best. Understanding concepts and doctrine will allow military leaders to give political leaders sound advice on how to achieve space control as well as when space weapons need to be deployed and used. This same approach should be applied for the development and use of space weapons for missions other than space control—specifically missile defense and force application. Again, when a threat emerges in the world that cannot be handled through either peaceful means or with traditional military methods, and a space weapon can respond to such a threat, the time will have arrived to deploy such weapons.
[ ] Space strategy is necessary to protect US leadership of the space commons – other countries are catching up.
Denmark 2010 - Fellow with the Center for a New American Security [By Abraham M. and Dr. James Mulvenon CNAS, Jan, Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Contested %20Commons%20Capstone_0.pdf Accessed Jun 21]
Despite the emergence of an increasingly complex set of military threats, it is important to remember that it is not America’s absolute level of power and influence that is falling, but its relative power compared to other emerging states. 16 While its dominance may be contested in the coming decades, America’s ability to lead remains. The key for the United States will be to recognize both its capabilities and its limitations, and to act now to shape the future security environment in ways that will protect key U.S. interests, as well as interests shared with the international community. Protecting the Contested Global Commons Going forward, the United States should develop political and military strategies that take these new realities into account and preserve the openness and stability of the global commons in an age of multipolarity. This report advocates a broad and multi-pronged strategy to preserve the openness of the four global commons: maritime, air, space and cyberspace. This strategy should employ all elements of national power, including diplomacy, strategic public engagement, and economic incentives and disincentives. Military power will continue to play an essential role because militaries worldwide can sustain the commons by promoting access, or they can destroy them by enforcing exclusivity or rendering a commons unusable. The U.S. military, for its part, should be prepared to sustain and defend the global commons. This strategy should be firmly founded in the best traditions of American institution-building and with the recognition that the United States can no longer protect the commons alone. Specifically, the United States should develop and enable an international order which, in turn, nurtures a loose set of international agreements and regimes among responsible and like-minded states that effectively preserves the openness and stability of the global commons. Although America’s “unipolar moment” may be fading and its military dominance becoming increasingly contested, the need for American leadership is as strong as ever. To support this strategy, the United States should re-commit to three traditional pillars of American foreign policy: preserving American leadership, projecting American power as necessary, and promoting alliances and partnerships. American leadership in the coming decades will depend on Washington’s ability to adapt to an era in which American military primacy throughout the global commons will be contested. Rising and revanchist powers are investing heavily in naval, air, space and cyber power; non-state actors are also gaining access to advanced anti-access military capabilities. The United States must be prepared to lead in a world in which its dominance is also contested politically in a world where other powers demand influence on and within the world’s common spaces. The status quo, in which the United States is the sole guarantor of the openness of the global commons and other states free ride, is unsustainable.




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