The United States federal government should pursue a defensive space control strategy that emphasizes satellite hardening, replacement, redundancy and situational awareness



Download 1.07 Mb.
Page40/49
Date26.04.2018
Size1.07 Mb.
#46787
1   ...   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43   ...   49

Congress Counterplan Responses



[ ] Executive action is necessary on space military planning – it is key to coherence
Hyten 2001 Director, Space Programs, Office of the Ass Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, [4 January 01. Air & Space Power Journal . A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space. Lt Col John E. Hyten. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Hyten.html Accessed June 21, 2011.]
The international nature of space as a commons is what makes the problem of dealing with conflict so difficult. The U.S. military, as a minority player in space and in the absence of a coherent national strategy, is finding it increasingly difficult to develop the means to deal with conflict in space in the next century. Therefore, it is impossible for the military alone to effectively plan for and deal with all the elements of space as it relates to national security. It is a national problem and must be dealt with in a coherent manner by the executive branch—integrating all the elements of national power into a coherent policy.

[ ] Executive action is key to solvency – only it can coordinate different plans – congress is too deliberative
Hyten 2001 Director, Space Programs, Office of the Ass Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, [4 January 01. Air & Space Power Journal . A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space. Lt Col John E. Hyten. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Hyten.html Accessed June 21, 2011.]
Recommendation #1: The Administration should reconstitute the National Space Council. The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) is currently "the principle forum" for resolving issues related to national space policy.22 Unfortunately, very few of the critical decisions regarding the future of space are issues of science and technology. They are issues that cross the boundaries of many agencies in government and impact everything from national security to economic prosperity. Addressing these issues in the context of science and technology gives them the wrong focus. The result has been the development of disparate visions and plans (in Commerce, Defense, State, NASA, etc.) for dealing with the future of space without an integrated assessment of their impact on the other instruments of national power. Science and technology plans are integrated, but the overall national policy is unclear. What is clear is that the problem must be handled in the executive branch of government. Congress is beginning to legislate different elements of the problem, but by its very nature, Congress will have a difficult time attempting to integrate the different elements of foreign and economic policy that mostly lie within the executive branch. The original National Space Council (disbanded in 1992) effectively integrated the different elements of the executive branch and allowed the development of coherent strategies. Having the council chaired by the Vice President gave it the authority needed to make the tough decisions. Having a new National Space Council chaired by the Vice President may be politically obsolete, but a similar body needs to be chartered with the power and authority to make critical policy recommendations to the President. It should include senior representatives from all the impacted segments of the government—state, defense, commerce, CIA, NASA, the National Security Council, to name but a few. Its first order of business should be to define the overarching space policy of the nation that must contain a clear vision for the next century. This vision must be more than simply being committed to "the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes."


Conditioning Counterplan Responses



[ ] Counterplan will fail – China will not use space military capability as a bargaining chip
Tellis 2007 – Senior Lecturer at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace [Ashley J., China's Space Weapons, http://www.globalcollab.org/mailinglists/eassnet/archives/2007/aug/Chinas_Space_Weapons.pdf, Accessed June 21, 2011]
The importance of space denial for China's operational success implies that its counterspace investments, far from being bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space regime, in fact represent its best hope for prevailing against superior American military power. Because having this capacity is critical to Chinese security, Beijing will not entertain any arms-control regime that requires it to trade away its space-denial capabilities. This would only further accentuate the military advantages of its competitors. For China to do otherwise would be to condemn its armed forces to inevitable defeat in any encounter with American power.

Reject OST Counterplan Responses



[ ] Turn – rejecting the Outer Space treaty would destroy commercialization of space – it would undermine the legal regime that makes development possible
Gabrynowicz 2005, Director, National Center for Remote Sensing, Air and Space Law [THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE TREATY REGIME IN THE GLOBALIZATION ERA. BY JOANNE IRENE GABRYNOWICZ. Ad Astra, the magazine of the National Space Society – Fall 2005 issue. http://www.space-settlement-institute.org/Articles/IntlSpaceTreatyGabryno.pdf Accessed June 23, 2011.]
As regards to property rights per se, the Outer Space Treaty is silent. It contains no prohibition. Here it is important to note that the space treaty regime is comprised of interrelated treaties that are all specifically based on the Outer Space Treaty. Rejecting the Outer Space Treaty because it is silent on property rights will bring into question the rest of the regime that contains the fundamental legal structure needed for commercial activities. It will also call into question the future applicability of the private law that has developed over the years in the form of contracts and insurance agreements. If the treaty regime needs further clarification regarding property rights, the answer is to develop the political will to do precisely that, and not to cause legal instability by eliminating the existing legal structure. By rejecting the space treaty regime, the right of the private sector to operate in space could be jeopardized. When the space treaties were negotiated, it was far from obvious that the legal regime would allow commercial activities and private actors. In fact, the not unexpected position of the former Soviet Union was that the only proper actors in space were nation states. The also not unexpected position of the United States was that private entities were to be legally recognized actors. Article 6 of the Outer Space Treaty contains the compromise that allows private actors to participate in space under government supervision. In the case of U.S. law, this supervision exists in the form of licensing regulations for launches, remote sensing systems and other applications. Without this specific provision, it should not be assumed that the private sector would be accepted as legal space actors. In the era of globalization, communist ideology may no longer be available to threaten private actors in space, but as popular anti-globalization demonstrations grow in size and strength around the world, so does the evidence that other ideologies may have arisen that can do the same.
[ ] Withdrawing from space treaties won’t improve hegemony – Space command depends upon legitimacy which comes from the law
Bellflower 2010, instructor at the Advanced Space Operations School [Air Force Judge Advocate General School. The Air Force Law Review. The influence of law on command of space name: major john w. Bellflower Lexis Accessed June 21, 2011]
An operative definition for command of space adequately balances the temporal and conceptual dimensions of command such that it is an entirely legitimate pursuit. "Command" is typically thought of as being attained and maintained through the use of military force and thought of in terms of "space control." 90 However, command of space "is inclusive of much more than 'space control.'" 91 The U.S. DOD defines space control as "combat, combat support, and combat service support operations to ensure freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies and, when directed, deny an adversary freedom of [*123] action in space." 92 The failure to embrace the broader definition of command of space in favor of a more narrow emphasis on measures to achieve space control generates a mistaken belief that space control equates to hegemony. From a strictly military standpoint, outer space is viewed by some as the ultimate high ground. 93 The highest available ground in a military operation has always been viewed as the most desirable location given its predominance of the surrounding terrain and its concomitant advantages in combating an enemy. 94 These advantages include commanding overviews, enhanced fields of fire, and a more secure defensive position. 95 While such advantages are certainly desirable in times of armed conflict, the emphasis on means of combat invokes the illegitimate hegemonic, normative definitional construct of command of space. For example, one theorist offers a three-part plan, based on the political doctrine of astropolitik, 96 to achieve space control. 97 Demonstrating the plan's illegitimacy under the current international space law regime, he first advises U.S. withdrawal from all space-related treaties. 98 Next, he advocates that the United States immediately "seize control of low-Earth orbit" which would, in effect, establish "a police blockade of all current spaceports, monitoring and controlling all traffic both in and out." 99 Lastly, he suggests the creation of a national space agency to regulate all space activity. 100 These three steps would provide the total domination in space that some within the U.S. military advocate. 101 Clearly, the requirement for legitimacy to achieve effective U.S. command of space prohibits withdrawing from the current international [*124] legal regime governing space. Rather, at a minimum, legitimacy would require firm grounding upon the principle of freedom of use outlined in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, rather than any high ground theory. The distinction illustrates the difference between positive and negative command. Much like space control, positive command denotes access assurance, while negative command represents access denial with respect to an adversary. 102 However, negative command does not constitute or require unilateral action outside the existing legal regime. Rather, positive command and negative command are inextricably linked, in that both seek to maintain freedom of access to and use of outer space. 103 Negative command is the self-defense component of command of space when positive command is challenged by an adversary. 104
[ ] China uses claims of vertical sovereignty to deny access to “Chinese” space
Bellflower 2010, instructor at the Advanced Space Operations School [Air Force Judge Advocate General School. The Air Force Law Review. The influence of law on command of space name: major john w. Bellflower Lexis Accessed June 21, 2011]
C. Chinese Assertions of Vertical Sovereignty in Space Absolute national sovereignty over the airspace above a state's territory has "been claimed and exercised as far back into history as proof may exist of the creation and protection by state law of exclusive private property rights in such place." 187 Land and airspace, therefore, were viewed as inseparable; a rule that can be traced to Roman times. 188 This right of absolute vertical sovereignty continued to prevail until the Chicago Convention of 1944 when, despite the convention's failure to define airspace, it defined an aircraft as "any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of air against the earth's surface." 189 By indicating that the convention would apply "only to those parts of the atmosphere where gaseous air is sufficiently dense to support balloons and airplanes," the convention set a de facto limit on airspace. 190 This proposition was reinforced when no nations objected to the overflight of satellites above their territorial airspace at the dawn of the space age. 191 However, the lack of a definitive resolution of this issue in international law has permitted some in China to advocate vertical sovereignty in space. 192 Consistent with China's seamless view of warfare, a number of Chinese authors 193 are exploring the nexus between traditional notions [*139] of state sovereignty and space, with particular emphasis on attempting to establish a legal foundation for potential military operations in space. Although such apparent assertions of Chinese vertical sovereignty may only be in their formative stages, the United States must respond and counter them now or risk permitting China to gain credibility, regarding potential military operations, which would restrict freedom of movement in the space domain. 1. The Chinese Position and Its Implications China's most prominent advocate for vertical sovereignty is Major General Cai Fengzhen, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army Air Force. 194 General Cai contends that the space above ground, including airspace and space, is inseparable and integrated. 195 Thus, General Cai reaches back to the Roman-based doctrine of cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum, 196 which essentially means "he who owns the soil, owns up to the sky." 197 Absent a clear demarcation between airspace and space, international law does not directly contradict or prohibit this view. 198 Indeed, Bin Cheng warned in 1997 that "States which object to certain types of satellites, such as those that engage in remote sensing, [may] claim sovereignty over national space above the usual heights at which such satellites orbit so as to subject them to the consent and control of the States overflown but not necessarily to exclude them." 199
[ ] The Outer Space Treaty prohibits Vertical Sovereignty claims
Bellflower 2010, instructor at the Advanced Space Operations School [Air Force Judge Advocate General School. The Air Force Law Review. The influence of law on command of space name: major john w. Bellflower Lexis Accessed June 21, 2011]
2. Legal Analysis Reliance on the absence of an explicit airspace-space demarcation ignores historical context by attempting to identify a minimum altitude at which space begins. In fact, there is no controversy that all current satellite orbits transit within the space domain. 211 Irrespective of the demarcation argument, Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) expressly refute any conception of vertical sovereignty. 212 Article I designates outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, as "the province of all mankind." This language has been universally understood to mean that "all nations have a [*142] nonexclusive right to use and explore space." 213 Article II further prohibits in space any "national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." Thus, the OST clearly permits all uses of the space domain short of an appropriation by claim of sovereignty or the like. 214 It therefore seems clear that the plain language of the OST prohibits any claim of vertical sovereignty in space. Sovereignty denotes supreme authority within a territory, 215 "the right to command and correlatively the right to be obeyed," with the term "right" connoting legitimacy. 216 Thus, a claim of sovereignty over space, or any portion thereof, seeks, in some measure, to extend a state's territorial sovereignty into the space domain. 217 The holder of sovereignty derives its authority for sovereignty from some mutually acknowledged source of legitimacy. 218 In space, the OST's explicit prohibition on appropriation removes the essential support for legitimate sovereignty. 219



Download 1.07 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43   ...   49




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page