The United States federal government should pursue a defensive space control strategy that emphasizes satellite hardening, replacement, redundancy and situational awareness
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- [ ] Non-Unique – weaponization now – Chinese ASAT tests prove
- [ ] No Link – plan doesn’t cause destabilizing Arms Race – space militarization wouldn’t be any different from sea or land weapons Ghoshroy 2004, Research Associate at MIT
- [ ] Space militarization doesn’t cause weaponization – it doesn’t deny other nations access to space MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations
Arms Race Disad Responses[ ] U.S. space militarization does not lead to arms race- too expensive and time-consuming Dolman 2005, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies [Everett C. Dolman. “US Military Transformation and Weapons.” September 14, 2005. http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf. Accessed June 24, 2011.] And America would respond … finally. But would another state? If America were to weaponize space today, it is unlikely that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the infrastructure necessary is too high; hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment it would take to achieve a minimal counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the US to entrench itself in space, and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments in kind. They might oppose US interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively America uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the US deploy weapons there—at least for the next few years—is extremely remote.–- [ ] Non-Unique – weaponization now – Chinese ASAT tests prove Broad 2007 - Senior Writer at The New York Times [William J. and David E. Sanger, Chief Washington Correspondent for the New York Times, China Tests Anti-Satellite Weapon, Unnerving U.S., New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/world/asia/18cnd-china.html?ex=1184212800&en=7faa759d46da0a05&ei=5070, Accessed June 22, 2011] China successfully carried out its first test of an anti-satellite weapon last week, signaling its resolve to play a major role in military space activities and bringing expressions of concern from Washington and other capitals, the Bush administration said Thursday. Only two nations — Russia and the United States — have previously destroyed spacecraft in anti-satellite tests, most recently the United States in the mid 1980s. Arms control experts called the test, in which a Chinese missile destroyed an aging Chinese weather satellite, a troubling development that could foreshadow either an anti-satellite arms race or, alternatively, a diplomatic push by China to force the Bush administration into negotiations on a weapons ban. “This is the first real escalation in the weaponization of space that we’ve seen in 20 years,” said Jonathan McDowell, a Harvard astronomer who tracks rocket launchings and space activity. “It ends a long period of restraint.” White House officials said the United States and other nations, which they did not name, had “expressed our concern regarding this action to the Chinese.” Despite its protest, the Bush administration has long resisted a global treaty banning such tests because it says it needs freedom of action in space. [ ] Militarization inevitable – Chinese ASAT development proves Devan 2007 [Janadas Devan ,Senior writer, The Straits Times HOW impressive was the Chinese Asat weapon? February 2; Lexis Accessed June 21 ] Other analysts saw things differently. Chinese strategists, they noted, have spoken openly of acquiring an Asat capacity. This would be an existential necessity for China, especially if the US missile defence system - a system that would be heavily reliant on satellites - proves viable. The US could launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike on China and expect its interceptors to take care of whatever remains of China's limited nuclear arsenal. An Asat capacity would help preserve China's second-strike capability. And it would enable the Chinese to disrupt US military operations in the event of a war over Taiwan. Chinese strategists have spoken of the possibility of waging 'asymmetrical warfare' against the better-equipped US military, and Asat weapons would fit the bill. So, whatever its public claims, why would China want a space treaty, these analysts asked. It would not be in its interest to sign a treaty banning Asat weapons. [ ] No Link – plan doesn’t cause destabilizing Arms Race – space militarization wouldn’t be any different from sea or land weapons Ghoshroy 2004, Research Associate at MIT [Subrata Ghoshroy. “Ensuring America’s Space Security: Report of the FAS Panel on Weapons in Space.” The Federation of American Scientists. September 2004. http://www.fas.org/pubs/_pages/space_report.html. Accessed June 22, 2011.] The author Steven Lambakis is a leading proponent of weaponizing space. Below is a summary of his arguments excerpted from one of his published articles. Lambakis begins by asking a rhetorical question: Should space be treated any differently from the land, sea, or air? He answers in the negative by stating that in his view, despite physical differences between the earth and space environments, there should be no difference from the point of view of policy and strategy. He also says that whether or not the United States chooses to put weapons in space, it is inevitable that some other country would. He refutes the case against weaponization by challenging the validity of some tacit assumptions made by opponents. For example, he notes that opponents say space combat would be destabilizing. Lambakis counters this assumption by saying that there is no way of knowing whether placing weapons in space would be destabilizing since we have no experience in space warfare. He asks why shots in space would be any more harmful than shots on earth. He notes, for example, that it is not self evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite would precipitate a wider-scale war. Lambakis also finds fault with opponents' wish to "draw a line in space;" he argues that such a line is strictly conceptual. Nothing in the tactics and strategy of war-fighting nor the logic of deterrence says there must be such a line, he adds. The example of Soviet efforts to develop the MIRV was a case in point, he says. Many people argued at the time that the Soviet MIRV nuclear weapon was a direct response to the U.S. action in developing such a weapon. But Lambakis writes that the Soviets had embarked on the MIRV program on their own and would have exploited their innovation irrespective of the U.S. action. Could we stop the historical progression of weaponry at the edge of the earth, he asks. It is a political decision, he contends, adding that the absence of universal political will means there is no practical way to enforce any treaty or law. As for critics' assertion that the United States will lose international support if it deploys space weapons, Lambakis offers the following rebuttal. He says that when the stakes are high, the United States must act in self-defense and that our allies will judge U.S. actions appropriately. For example, despite widespread antiAmericanism, the United States was able to put together a large coalition to fight the Gulf War in 1991. Again, he calls such widely held assumptions as "ASATs are destabilizing" or "space must remain a sanctuary" as old-fashioned dogmas that should not stand in the way of implementing new security policies. He referred especially to Ballistic Missile Defense, which he says ought to be viewed in the "broader context of space power." Finally, he adds an important caveat to his arguments for weaponization by making the following statement: "Should military requirements warrant and cost permit, space weapons could be invited to join the rest of the arsenal…." [ ] Space militarization doesn’t cause weaponization – it doesn’t deny other nations access to space MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations [Bruce, Council Special Report No. 38 September China, Space Weapons, date accessed : June 24th, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707] Many nations benefit from space assets used for military purposes, including communications, reconnaissance, and positioning. However, space militarization does not necessarily mean space weaponization; the important distinction between the two lies in the unfettered use of space. While space militarization has indispensably augmented U.S. conventional military forces, such capabilities do not deny others the use of similar capabilities. Space weaponization, on the other hand, can seek to prevent an adversary from using space for military purposes. According to the U.S. Air Force, space weaponization, or “offensive counterspace capabilities,” would involve space-based or earthbased weapons that could destroy, disable, or disrupt space-based systems such as satellites. Earth-based weapons capable of attacking satellites’ ground stations and communications links must also be considered as part of any evolving space-weaponization architecture. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.07 Mb. 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