The United States federal government should pursue a defensive space control strategy that emphasizes satellite hardening, replacement, redundancy and situational awareness
Download 1.07 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- US China Relations Disad Responses
Russia Disad Responses[ ] Russia isn’t serious about space arms control – reaction to Chinese ASATs proves Hitchens 2007 – Director of World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information [Thersea, U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From “War of Words” to Cold War in Space?, cs5_chapter2.pdf, Accessed June 21, 2011] Somewhat surprisingly, Russia’s response to the news of the Chinese test was muddled, at best, and disingenuous at worst. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov at first denounced reports about the Chinese test as “rumors.”33 ITAR-Tass quoted Maj. Gen. Vyacheslav Fateyev as calling the test “hooliganism,” but noting that it demonstrated a “strong capability;” and Lt. Gen. Leonid Sazhin as saying the test was a response to U.S. development of space weapons, to ensure China’s security.34 Russian President Vladimir Putin, addressing the issue in a Jan. 25 press conference in New Delhi with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, also blamed U.S. plans for space weapons as the reason for the Chinese test and avoided any direct criticism of China, while reiterating Russia’s opposition to space weaponization. “We must not let the genie out of the bottle,” Putin said.35 Considering that Russia has been China’s chief partner in calling for a space weapons ban – even going so far as to make a unilateral declaration that it would not be the first to deploy weapons in space and urging others to do so – Moscow’s failure to reprimand Beijing raises questions about Russia’s seriousness on the issue, as well as its commitments regarding space debris mitigation. Further, the attempt to shift primary blame onto the United States plays into the hands of those in Washington who have long argued that the main goal of the Chinese-Russian weapons ban proposals has been to tie U.S. hands while strengthening their own positions to counter U.S. capabilities. [ ] Non-Unique – Russia is already in a space arms race with the US MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations [Bruce, Council Special Report No. 38 September China, Space Weapons, date accessed : June 24th, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707] While China represents the most prominent challenge to U.S. space assets, it is not the only one. Russia and others7 are taking another look at space to counter U.S. military capability, and friendly countries such as India are reexamining space’s role in this new era, in at least partial response to China’s 2007 test. India’s army chief of staff has stated that “the Chinese space program is expanding at an exponentially rapid pace in both offensive and defensive content,” and another Indian general has observed that “with time we will get sucked into a military race to protect our space assets and inevitably there will be a military contest in space.”8 Such actions could possibly trigger responses from other regional adversaries as well. US China Relations Disad Responses[ ] Non Unique - Chinese ASAT tests undermind US Chinese civilian projects and military to military cooperation Hitchens 2008 - Director of World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information [Theresa, leads CDI’s Space Security Project. She serves on the editorial board of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and is a member of Women in International Security and the International Institute for Strategic Studies:http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/31975/ichaptersection_singledocument/bba43944-559b-431b-8695-aeb531994ec/en/cs5_chapter2.pdf accessed 6-23-11] On the civil space side, Beijing is also likely to feel repercussions in its efforts to spur cooperation with NASA on planetary exploration. Considering that there were strong voices in the U.S. national security establishment, and in Congress, opposing last year’s visit to China by NASA Administrator Michael Griffin and accusing China of wanting nothing except access to technology it could supply to its military programs, it is almost inconceivable that any new progress can be made in the wake of the ASAT test. And since civil cooperation in space is largely a political exercise for the United States, withholding cooperation is also a method of political punishment. Indeed, U.S. National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe told reporters on Jan. 18 that “The United States believes China’s development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area.”18 Likewise, military-to-military cooperation in space as a means of confidence-building – as called for by Gen. James Cartwright, head of U.S. Strategic Command last year19 – is now unlikely to get anywhere fast. Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., the chairman of the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee that oversees military space spending, called a closed-door hearing on the Chinese test on Jan. 25, and reminded reporters that he has long been concerned about the transfer of U.S. technology to China that could allow it to become a space competitor.20 Christopher Padilla, assistant secretary for export administration at the U.S. Commerce Department, told reporters in Beijing on Jan. 25 that the test had contributed to distrust between the U.S. and Chinese governments. Padilla, who was in China to explain a proposed U.S. plan to heighten export controls on high technology to China, said: “I raised the point that the test is one more example of how a lack of transparency and clarity requires the U.S. to hedge its relations with China.”21 This is too bad, for both sides, in that such cooperation and confidence-building – even if baby steps – would work to improve understanding between Chinese and American space officials and help mitigate against future misunderstandings. [ ] US militarization is less threatening the Chinese – it is done openly and more safely with less debris Mackey, 2009 - Air Force Institute of Technology [Accessed on 6-21-11 Fall Birmingham- Southern College;; Deputy group commander at Eglin AFB, Florida -Air and Space Power Journal “US and Chinese Anti-satellite Activities” proquest] Several notable differences distinguished the ASAT missions as well- for example, the altitudes of the satellites. Only a few days away from reentry into the atmosphere and potential impact with the surface, USA-1 93 orbited at a relatively low 247 kilometers at the time of its destruction, whereas Feng Yun-lC orbited at the significantly higher altitude of 864 kilometers. This 617-kilometer difference is important because of the time that the residual debris field will remain in orbit, posing a threat to other satellites. According to Geoffrey Forden, even residual segments from the USA-1 93 intercept that acquired a greater speed due to the collision will have an orbital perigee of 210 kilometers and should degrade in altitude, burning up in reentry far more rapidly than the remnants of Feng Yun-lC.30 Estimates for the debris from USA-1 93 indicate no remaining pieces in orbit after 40 days; meanwhile, modeling suggests that debris from Feng Yun may stay in orbit for up to 100 years.31 In an interview prior to the USA-1 93 shoot-down, Gen James Cartwright (USMC), vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, avowed that the US test launch differed from the Chinese launch, pointing out that the United States was providing the world advance notification of its launch and that the US intercept would occur at a very low orbital altitude to assure that no residual debris remained in long-term orbit.32 This difference in altitude also drove the size of the launch vehicle. Given the estimated six times greater mass of the Chinese kinetic-kill vehicle and the higher altitude, the DF21 /KT-I had a launch mass 20 times greater than that of the SM-3. Furthermore, the US missile relied upon the global positioning system (GPS) and inertial navigation system with radar guidance, whereas the DF-21/KT-1 employed an inertial navigation system with terminal radar guidance (table 3). Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.07 Mb. Share with your friends:
|