[ ] China is pursuing space dominance – they are challenging American space assets and becoming more dependent on their own Cheng 2011 - Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center [Dean Cheng. Published February 11,2011. Delivered January 26, 2011. Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. China’s Active Defense Strategy and Its Regional Impact. The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/2011/01/Chinas-Active-Defense-Strategy-and-Its-Regional-Impact. Accessed June 21.] One of these themes derived from the available Chinese writings that discuss the establishment of space dominance is that it does not necessarily require the destruction of satellites, such as in the 2007 anti-satellite test or last year’s exo-atmospheric test. Rather, it involves a full range of measures, involving both hard- and soft-kill, aimed at the satellites, the terrestrial infrastructure of launch sites; tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) facilities; and the data links that bind the system together. Indeed, PLA writings emphasize that the establishment of space dominance requires integrated operations, involving the use of all available strength, all techniques, and all operational methods. By integration of all available strength, this refers to two aspects. One is civil-military integration. The PLA, it is worth recalling, manages China’s terrestrial space infrastructure, and plays a role in satellite design and manufacturing. It also is presumed to have access to information derived from space-based systems, consistent with the larger, long-standing Chinese theme of civil-military integration. The other is integration of space capabilities with those of land, sea, and air forces, with the goal of generating synergies that will lead to space dominance. Ground, naval, air, and missiles forces, for example, can suppress enemy terrestrial space facilities, such as TT&C centers, and interfere with data links. This can prevent an opponent’s space forces from properly operating, as well as help defend one’s own space capabilities. Meanwhile, space forces can enhance the operation of ground, air, and naval forces by providing information support that will make them more effective.[2] By integrated application of techniques, this refers to the combination of destructive and disruptive techniques. In some cases, disrupting an opponent’s systems may be as effective, and more desirable, than destroying them. Destruction of systems in orbit may generate diplomatic problems, especially among third parties whose systems may be affected by debris. Attacking terrestrial targets in third countries may result in horizontal escalation. Thus, in some cases, one may choose to rely on jamming, cyber warfare, and other less physically destructive means to attack enemy space infrastructure.[3] On the other hand, soft-kill systems often cannot permanently destroy physical facilities, and it may be difficult to assess whether it has succeeded in disrupting normal space operations.[4] In order to inflict long-lasting impact on enemy space capabilities, or to be assured of disruption of high-value targets, one may prefer more kinetic, hard-kill options. [ ] China will inevitably challenge the U.S. for space dominance – 5 reasons.
Maogoto 2006, Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Newcastle [Paper 1347. The Military Ascent into Space: From Playground to Battleground: The New Uncertain Game in the Heavens. Jackson N. Maogoto. University of Newcastlle. Bepress legal series http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6239&context=expresso Accessed 6/23/2011.]
Having watched the United States harness the effectiveness of an integrated battleground platform underpinned by space technology and weaponry in the first Gulf War, Chinese defense analysts recognized that space control provides the key to military victories in modern warfare. As a consequence, China has in recent years been concentrating on sharpening its military power through incorporation of technology geared toward a leaner and efficient technologically driven military. This is in part due to five factors. 1. the technical and professional reforms of the 1980s which sought to de-politicize the military allowing it to focus more robustly on its core business—effective warfare capability. 2. the learning experience from the use of space technology by the United States in both Gulf Wars and Kosovo. 3. an awareness that the benignly labeled Japanese Self-Defense forces of its chief competitor in Asia have a serious technological edge. 4. the Bush Jr. administration’s push to implement a national ballistic missile shield and significantly the potential provision of this technology to Taiwan in an atmosphere of increased tension between the tiny island state and mainland China. 5. its aspirations to superpower status, helped in no small measure by the vacuum created by the break-up of the Soviet Union, its chaotic and inept transition to free market economy that has hamstrung it economically resulting in a significant decay of its military capabilities. In view of the factors outlined above, it was not surprising that in 2003, a Chinese military official declared: “In the current and future state security strategy, if one wants not to be controlled by others, one must have considerable space, scientific and technological strength. Otherwise one will be bullied by others.”
[ ] China intends to catch up to US military space capabilities – Defense Department reports prove. MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations [Bruce, Council Special Report No. 38 September China, Space Weapons, date accessed : June 24th, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707]
China has been developing a significant military and civilian space capability since 1955. This effort was led by Tsien Hsue-shen, a brilliant U.S.-trained rocket scientist who cofounded the U.S. Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Caltech, but whom the United States deported to China during the excesses of the McCarthy era. While Dr. Tsien helped China develop ballistic missiles to improve its nuclear deterrent, Beijing has mainly concentrated on economic development in the past three decades: Of Deng Xiaoping’s “Four Modernizations,” national defense 7 received the least priority. Recently, though still focused on economic growth, China has been building its military strength, including multiple offensive counterspace options, with the U.S. Department of Defense noting China’s “multidimensional program to generate the capability to deny others access to outer space.”3 Well aware of its military inferiority to the United States, China is likely doing what countries in comparable security situations do: developing military capabilities targeted against the vulnerabilities of its stronger potential adversary. The United States’ relative space advantage will probably shrink as China strengthens its space capabilities over the next ten to twenty years.