The war against terrorism


CONTRIBUTIONS BY NON-NATO COUNTRIES



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CONTRIBUTIONS BY NON-NATO COUNTRIES


  1. Equally important to the war on terrorism has been the contributions of countries outside of NATO. Some countries, particularly other US allies, have made significant contributions of military forces to the Afghanistan campaign. The role of the countries of Central Asia has been extremely important in that campaign, giving coalition forces bases from which to operate against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Other countries have contributed by sharing intelligence or in other ways.

  2. One of the most important contributors has been Russia. Since the events of September 11, Russia has provided both political and technical support for US operations, drawing on its long and dismal experience in Afghanistan. Russia also assented to an American and allied presence in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, which was critical to the operation. Much of this co‑operation is due to Russian concerns about terrorism in the Eurasian region. Russia has been particularly active in co-operating with the United States and the coalition in intelligence sharing.

  3. Russia provided $45 million (€46.5 million) in weapons to the Afghan anti-Taliban forces early in the campaign, and Moscow has been active in assisting humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Russia has donated hundreds of thousands of tons of food and medicine, as well as emergency shelter and generators. Russia has also helped build a pontoon bridge from Tajikistan into Afghanistan, allowing the organisation of a continuous route from Tajikistan to the central region of Afghanistan for delivery of international humanitarian assistance, and opened a tunnel enabling transport between northern and southern Afghanistan.

  4. East European, Central Asian and Caucasian countries have also contributed to the success of Operation Enduring Freedom.  NATO and the US military had established links to these countries during the 1990s in the Partnership for Peace programme and through bilateral military-to-military contacts.  Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan have provided basing and overflight permission for US and coalition forces.

  5. For these countries, the US-led war on terrorism offered the possibility of assistance in countering their own terrorist threats from fundamentalist Islamic groups. However, most of these countries are not consolidated democracies, and the human rights record of Uzbekistan especially is a cause for concern. The US State Department has stated that “arbitrary arrest and detention of Muslim believers is common” and that torture is used, with at least three political prisoners having been tortured to death in recent months. While the assistance of the Central Asian countries is vital to the campaign in Afghanistan, the United States and other coalition partners cannot in the long term turn a blind eye to the human rights violations and disregard for democracy there.

  6. The assistance of countries in South Asia has also been critical to the success of Operation Enduring Freedom. Pakistani help has been crucial, as overflight rights granted to coalition forces enabled the first air attacks from the Arabian Sea against al-Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan. Pakistan has also provided basing rights to coalition aircraft at four air bases. However, the Islamabad government has little control over its border with Afghanistan, across which many al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters are thought to have sought refuge.

  7. NATO candidate countries have also been active in the war on terrorism. Romania has given basing and overflight permission for all US and coalition partners. The Romanian government contributed one infantry battalion and one nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) company to Operation Enduring Freedom. Romania has also deployed a military police platoon and one C-130 transport aircraft to ISAF, and has pledged four MiG-21 Lancer fighter aircraft and medical personnel to the US-led coalition forces.

  8. Bulgaria has provided basing and overflight rights for coalition aircraft. The Bulgarian government has also provided a 40-person NBC decontamination unit to support ISAF in Kabul, as well as support capabilities. Six US tankers have been based at the Bulgarian air base at Burgas, flying from there to the Caspian Sea to refuel coalition aircraft flying into Afghanistan. Slovakia has deployed an engineering unit into Afghanistan, as well as a Special Forces regiment, NBC reconnaissance units and a mobile field hospital.

  9. All three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, declared their support for the war on terrorism and offered unconditional overflight and landing rights for the US and coalition partners. In addition, the three Baltic countries offered two explosive detection dog teams for airbase operations, as well as 10 cargo handlers each, as part of the Danish contingent deployed to Kyrgyzstan.  Lithuania also deployed four medics with a Czech contingent in ISAF and has approved deployment of a reconnaissance team of 37 soldiers.

  1. TRANSFORMING NATO TO FIGHT TERRORISM


  1. In the wake of September 11, all countries in the North Atlantic Alliance must rethink what it means to defend our countries and our people. Several NATO countries are already taking steps to improve their capabilities to meet future campaigns against terrorism. In the United States, there was an immediate infusion of billions of dollars to fund the war on terrorism. The Congress in October 2002 passed a $355 billion (€362 billion) defence appropriations bill for 2003 that provides for a $35 billion (€36 billion) increase from 2002, somewhat less than the $48 billion (€49 billion) increase the president requested. President Bush signed that bill into law in mid‑October. In the United Kingdom, Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, has initiated a new chapter in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review to examine new needs in the wake of September 11. Among changes being proposed are the creation of elite rapid response teams that could be deployed quickly to carry out strikes against terrorist targets.

  2. NATO itself must also transform its institutions and capabilities to play a role in counter-terrorism operations. The Secretary General, Lord Robertson, has already declared that the November summit in Prague will be the “transformation summit,” at which NATO will decide how it will address the broad range of security challenges facing it today. NATO, of course, already identified terrorism as a threat to its security in the 1999 Strategic Concept, but the Alliance must do more. NATO must embrace fighting terrorism as one of its primary missions. As Senator Joseph Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Richard Lugar, soon to become the senior Republican on the committee, have noted, “NATO should declare that the threats to our territory and interests can come from beyond Europe – and that the Alliance is prepared to respond to them by acting beyond Europe.”

  3. Senator Lugar noted that “The most critical issue facing our nations today … is the war on terrorism. NATO has to decide whether it wants to participate in this war. It has to decide whether it wants to be relevant in addressing the major security challenge of our day.”

  4. To this end, Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, proposed the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) at a meeting of NATO defence ministers in Warsaw in late September. This high-readiness force would be readily deployable on short notice (defined as five to 30 days) and would be “technically superior to any envisioned threat.” In Warsaw, Mr Rumsfeld said, “If NATO does not have a force that is quick and agile, that can deploy in days or weeks rather than months or years, then it will not have capabilities to offer the world in the 21st century.”

  5. According to the paper that Mr Rumsfeld presented in Warsaw, this force would be capable of fighting either as a stand-alone force or to secure the initial entry into a hostile theatre for follow-on forces. The US proposal envisions the force as being able to sustain itself and fight effectively alone for 30 days. NATO heads of state and government are expected to discuss this proposal at the Prague Summit. The proposal calls for the force to reach an initial operational capability by October 2004 and full operational capability by October 2006.

  6. The proposed force would operate as a NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) under a NATO CJTF headquarters. It could consist of up to 21,000 personnel, with a brigade-sized land force; air assets capable of flying up to 200 combat sorties per day; and maritime forces up to the size of NATO standing naval forces, which can range from eight to 15 frigates and destroyers. Among the possible missions for the NRF could be crisis response, such as non-combatant evacuation; to deter aggression as a “proactive force package,” designed to accept reinforcements; or as an initial entry force for large-scale operations that would secure ports and lines of communication and prepare a theatre for forces, such as NATO operations in Kosovo.

  7. US officials noted that the elements of NATO’s new capabilities initiative, to be discussed at Prague, are the same capabilities that a NATO reaction force would require. These include defences against NBC attack; secure interoperable command, control and communications; improved interoperability and combat effectiveness; and the ability to deploy rapidly and sustain themselves outside Alliance territory. The General Report of Pierre Lellouche examines this initiative in greater detail. The US proposal envisions the NRF as driving interoperability, modernisation and transformation across the Alliance.

  8. As a NATO force, the NRF would be composed of forces from both Europe and North America, but US officials cautioned that it should not be overly dependent on American capabilities. However, it could provide a co-operative basis for European countries and Canada to contribute forces to a high-readiness expeditionary force. As noted by Jackson Diehl, a commentator for the Washington Post, the force “essentially would take the modest pieces of existing European armies that have been modernised, combine them under a new command, and prepare them to join US forces in Afghan-like missions on short notice.” Richard Kuglar, a scholar at the US National Defense University, estimates that the force would consume only 2% to 3% of European defence spending. By combining the modern parts of NATO member militaries with the power-projection capabilities of countries like the United States, United Kingdom and France, the NATO Reaction Force would provide an option for a unified Alliance response to future out-of-area Article 5 missions and peace support operations, particularly when combined with the deployable headquarters envisioned in the NATO command and force structure reviews. Those NATO reviews are discussed in greater detail in the sub-committee report by Wim van Eekelen (on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co‑operation).

  9. Reports from the Warsaw meeting indicate that there was no opposition to the NRF proposal expressed during the ministers’ meeting. However, outside the meeting, officials offered two concerns. The first is that the NATO Reaction Force might in some way compete with the European Rapid Reaction Force that the European Union plans to have operational in 2003. It is true that some European units pledged to the EU force would also be pledged to the NRF, as such capable forces are in short supply in EU countries, but the two reaction forces would not compete with each other, as 11 of the 15 EU countries are also NATO members.

  10. Additionally, the NATO Reaction Force would be much smaller than the EU force. The US proposal envisions a land force of only one brigade, compared to the 15 brigades the EU hopes to deploy. The suggested 21,000 personnel of the NRF would comprise land, maritime and air components; the EU envisions a corps of 60,000 ground troops, plus additional maritime and air contributions. In addition, while the EU force would be prepared for a broad range of missions, the NATO force would need all of those capabilities plus the ability to fight in collective-defence missions under Article 5. The NATO force would be more capable than the EU force because it could be needed for a collective-defence mission, which is not a requirement for the EU.

  11. A second criticism voiced about the NATO force is that it would transform the Alliance into an organisation with world-wide responsibilities. Michèle Alliot-Marie, the French minister of defence, raised this point when she declared that NATO must first concentrate on its primary mission of security in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, having a force that could be deployed anywhere is not at odds with NATO’s collective-defence mission, as was illustrated when allied countries undertook an Article 5 mission in Afghanistan in response to an attack on a member-state. The decision on where to deploy a NATO force is a political decision for Alliance governments to make, and politicians are correct in raising questions about where NATO would act; however, there are few threats to NATO from within Europe. If NATO is to defend its members from the most likely security threats, it must be able to fight terrorists and the states that sponsor them wherever they may be.


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