OTHER CAMPAIGNS AGAINST TERRORISM

OTHER CAMPAIGNS AGAINST TERRORISM

65. 
    Since the Taliban was driven from power in Afghanistan in December 2001, there has been much discussion about the next phase of the war on terrorism. Recently, concern in the US administration that many key members of the al-Qaeda leadership are still at large has prompted plans to expand the role of US Special Operations forces in counter-terrorist campaigns. US Special Operations Command would have increased responsibilities, including direct command of a number of counter-terrorist operations around the world. This would mark a significant shift from the current emphasis on training and equipping local troops to the direct involvement of US special forces and counter-terrorism units in unilateral covert operations.
    
66. 
    Following the destruction of its headquarters in Afghanistan, it was suggested that al-Qaeda might try to regroup in South-east Asia. The island of Basilan in the southern Philippines has been the home of a long-running Islamic insurgency led by Abu Sayyaf, a militant Muslim group, which is also believed to have provided logistical help to al-Qaeda. In February 2002, a 660-strong US contingent (including 160 special forces) was deployed to Basilan to conduct a six-month exercise, focusing on training Filipino troops in counter-insurgency tactics. The US troops’ assignment was strictly limited to the provision of support services and at no point did they engage in combat. The United States also promised about $100 million (€103 million) in equipment to the armed forces of the Philippines, whose efforts to stamp out Abu Sayyaf have long been hindered by a lack of modern equipment.
    
67. 
    In April the US commander for the military forces in the Pacific called for 300 more American troops to engage in projects to improve the local economy and infrastructure in Basilan, with a long-term view to diluting support for Abu Sayyaf. The joint US-Philippine operation was formally concluded in July 2002, and the Philippine army claimed a significant shrinking of Abu Sayyaf membership from around 2,000 to 200. However, analysts have noted that this shrinking is due more to deserters than captives, presenting the possibility that Abu Sayyaf might regroup in the future. Moreover, its leadership structure remains intact, with four of the group’s five most senior figures still at large.
    
68. 
    In early 2002, concerns were raised that the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, a remote and mountainous region bordering Chechnya, was harbouring hundreds of Chechen fighters. In addition, Georgian officials claimed that there were dozens of Afghan and Arab fighters in the gorge, which Sergei Ivanov, the Russian defence minister, called “a mini-Afghanistan on Russia’s doorstep.” There is serious concern that the Georgian government is unwilling and incapable of addressing this threat. In March, the US deployed 200 special forces troops to Georgia on an equip-and-train mission. The year-long programme aims to prepare four Georgian rapid deployment battalions in anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. In July, the US pledged $10 million in aid to bolster border controls.
    
69. 
    Russia’s original acceptance of the US operation in Georgia gave way to interventionism in Summer 2002, as Russian aircraft repeatedly crossed the Georgian border in pursuit of Chechen fighters. In September, in a letter to the UN Secretary General and the Security Council, President Putin stated that if Georgia did not take concrete action to destroy the Chechen terrorists, Russia would take “appropriate measures to counteract the terrorist threat, in strict accordance with international law”. Russian analysts speculated about a possible “Iraq-for-Georgia deal”, in which Russia would not use its veto power in the UN Security Council to block US action in Iraq if the US acknowledged Russia’s right to intervene in Georgia. US officials firmly denied any linkage between Iraq and Georgia, and a State Department spokesman announced that the US “strongly supports Georgia’s territorial integrity and would oppose any unilateral military action by Russia inside Georgia.” In October, Georgia reportedly arrested 15 suspected al-Qaeda operatives who were captured in the Pankisi Gorge and turned them over to the United States.
    
70. 
    US intelligence located several camps along Yemen’s border with Saudi Arabia as potential havens for Arab fighters retreating from Afghanistan. In March 2002, Yemen accepted “several hundred” US special forces troops to instruct Yemeni troops in anti-terrorist tactics. A Yemeni official said the US has promised coastguard training and 15 boats fitted with high-tech equipment to patrol the Gulf of Aden, where the 2000 terrorist attack on the USS Cole killed 17 US sailors. As noted above, the October 2002 attack on the French oil tanker Limburg took place 5 km off the Yemeni coast.
    
71. 
    In September 2002, Paul Wolfowitz, the US deputy defence secretary, conceded that the US had not “achieved anything like the cooperation or the success in Yemen that we achieved in the Philippines”. The arrests of suspected al-Qaeda members of Yemeni origin in Pakistan and the US point to deeply rooted links to the terrorist organisation; however, the fragile Yemeni government reportedly has not cracked down on tribal chiefs, who continue to give sanctuary to key al-Qaeda members, and President Ali Abdullah Saleh is reportedly to have refused to extradite arrested suspects to the United States.
    

6. IRAQ

1. OVERVIEW

72. 
    The most pressing security policy decision facing the NATO allies is what to do about Iraq and its programmes to develop NBC weapons. As Pierre Lellouche notes in his general report, the possibility that terrorists might gain access to WMD is the gravest security threat facing the 19 NATO allies. In addition, Iraq has missiles capable of reaching NATO territory, missiles that could carry nuclear, biological or chemical warheads. Iraq threatens the security of the Alliance and of the region, and dealing with the Iraqi threat is of the utmost importance.
    
73. 
    UN Security Council Resolution 687, passed in 1991, calls for a verified end to Iraqi WMD programmes. However, UN inspectors were expelled from Iraq in 1998, ending efforts to verify whether the regime of Saddam Hussein was in compliance with UN resolutions. In the four years since inspectors left Iraq, Saddam Hussein has had ample opportunity, as well as the financial and technical resources, to continue his programmes to develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Enforcement of all relevant UN resolutions concerning Iraqi disarmament is essential to ensuring international security. The diplomatic dance in which Iraq is engaged is a means to undercut international support for military action to deal with the threat of Iraqi WMD, without offering any likelihood that Saddam Hussein will accept free and unfettered inspections of his nuclear, biological and chemical weapons facilities.
    

2. IRAQ AND TERRORISM

74. 
    No direct link between Saddam Hussein and the September 11 attacks has been established, as reports that the leader of the hijackers and an Iraqi intelligence official met in Prague in April 2001 were disproved by Czech President Vaclav Havel in October 2002. Nevertheless, defectors from Iraqi intelligence agencies have said that Iraq has operated a secret terrorist training camp since 1995, with simulated hijackings as part of the training regimen using a Boeing 707 fuselage.
    
75. 
    Iraq has long been listed by the US State Department as being a state-sponsor of terrorism. According to the latest State Department report, released in May 2002, Iraq has provided bases to several terrorist groups including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Abu Nidal organisation (ANO). Top Iraqi officials have met with officials of the Palestine Liberation Front and endorsed terrorist attacks against Israel.
    
76. 
    While Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser to President Bush, notes that “no-one is trying to make an argument at this point that Saddam Hussein somehow had operational control of what happened on September 11,” evidence continues to be uncovered regarding links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Ms Rice has said that the United States has evidence that Iraq trained al‑Qaeda members in the use of chemical weapons. Mr Rumsfeld added, “We have what we consider to be credible evidence that al-Qaeda leaders have sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities.” Unclassified reports show that that Saddam Hussein has harboured al-Qaeda operatives, who now have a strong and growing presence in Baghdad. Your rapporteur believes that Baghdad’s continuing support of international terrorism, including evidence of ties to al-Qaeda, means that any discussion of the war on terrorism must address Iraq’s programmes to develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, which cannot be permitted to fall into the hands of terrorists.
    

3. IRAQI WMD PROGRAMMES

77. 
    In the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq promised the international community that it would give up its WMD and longer-range ballistic missiles. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq agreed to destroy or dismantle, under international supervision, its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes. In addition, Resolution 687 also requires Iraq to destroy or dismantle its programme to develop or acquire ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 km. Under that resolution, Iraq undertook unconditionally not to develop weapons of mass destruction or prohibited ballistic missiles thereafter.
    
78. 
    Despite its international commitments, Iraq is developing WMD. As a Member of the US Congress, your rapporteur bases this conclusion on his meetings with George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, Mr Rumsfeld, Ms Rice, and President Bush himself. Some of the details of these meetings are classified, and your rapporteur cannot include them in this report, but the case against Iraq is strong and convincing.
    
79. 
    A dossier released by the British government in September 2002 concluded that Iraq possesses and continues to produce chemical and biological weapons, which could be mounted on long-range missiles and activated within as little as 45 minutes. In addition, Iraq is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons. These conclusions are similar to those of the US government and former UN weapons inspectors. A net assessment released earlier in September by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that Iraq could be a year away from producing a nuclear bomb. Baghdad has been actively trying to purchase significant quantities of enriched uranium, with which IISS estimates that it could build a nuclear bomb within months.
    
80. 
    In presenting the British dossier to the House of Commons, Tony Blair, the prime minister, said, “I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt that Saddam Hussein has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme.”
    
81. 
    The dossier notes that Saddam Hussein continues to attach great importance to the possession of WMD, which he views as the basis of Iraq’s bid to be the dominant power in the region, and he is committed to retaining this capability. According to the dossier, Iraq can deliver chemical and biological weapons using an extensive range of artillery shells, gravity bombs, crop sprayers and ballistic missiles, including longer-range missiles capable of reaching eastern Turkey and Israel. The 650 km range of these 20 or so al-Hussein missiles that were retained after the Gulf War exceeds the 150 km limit on Iraqi missiles set out in Resolution 687. In addition, Iraq has begun to develop missiles with a range of 1,000 km, though such missiles are unlikely to be completed before 2007 if UN sanctions remain in place.
    
82. 
    As noted in the British dossier, the Iraqi chemical weapons programme dates back to 1971, when a research programme was established. A chemical weapons production facility became operational in 1982-83. According to Iraqi declarations, by 1991 it had produced at least 2,850 tonnes of mustard gas, 210 tonnes of tabun, 795 tonnes of sarin and cyclosarin, and 3.9 tonnes of VX. Mustard gas is a blister agent; the other chemical weapons are nerve agents. In the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the British dossier notes, Iraq used significant quantities of mustard, tabun and sarin, resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties. In addition, Saddam Hussein ordered the use of chemical weapons on his own people. In March 1988, Iraqi warplanes dropped mustard and nerve agents on the Kurdish village of Halabja, killing an estimated 5,000 people. According to the British dossier, when UN inspectors left Iraq in 1998, they were unable to account for up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent, and up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including approximately 300 tonnes related to VX production.
    
83. 
    The Iraqi biological weapons programme was begun in the mid-1970s, and production of biological agents began in 1988. According to Iraqi declarations, by 1991 Iraq had produced 19,000 litres of botulinum toxin, 8,500 litres of anthrax, and 2,200 litres of aflatoxin. According to the British dossier, when UN inspectors left Iraq, they were unable to account for growth media that would have enabled production of more than 25,000 litres of anthrax and more than 30,000 shells capable of delivering biological or chemical weapons.
    
84. 
    The British dossier states that during the war with Iran, Iraq began efforts to develop a nuclear weapon. Iraq never succeeded in its efforts to produce the highly enriched uranium needed for a nuclear weapon, but it has been seeking uranium from Africa, despite having no active civilian nuclear programme. The British assessment is that Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons, including work on centrifuges to enrich uranium. The report’s conclusion is that Iraq cannot produce a nuclear weapon as long as sanctions remain in place and if sanctions were removed, it would take Iraq at least five years to produce sufficient fissile material for a weapon. However, “if Iraq obtained fissile material and other essential components from foreign sources … Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two years.”
    
85. 
    Equally worrying are Iraq’s preparations to use weapons of mass destruction. The British dossier notes that Saddam Hussein “does not regard them as weapons of last resort” and is “ready to use them.” Iraq has military plans to use WMD, including against its own population, and has command-and-control arrangements in place that would enable them to be deployed within 45 minutes of a decision to use them. Given Saddam Hussein’s repression of his own people, his record of using WMD, his record of using force against neighbouring states, and his support for international terrorism, the international community cannot permit him to retain his chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles and programmes to develop nuclear weapons.
    

4. UNITED NATIONS INSPECTIONS

86. 
    Under UN Security Council resolution 687, which provided the cease-fire in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq agreed to destroy or dismantle, under international supervision, its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes. Resolution 687 also requires Iraq to destroy or dismantle its programme to develop or acquire ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 km. In addition, Iraq undertook unconditionally not to develop WMD or prohibited ballistic missiles thereafter.
    
87. 
    To verify compliance of Iraqi disarmament, the UN established the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). Weapons inspectors from UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq were to destroy, remove or render harmless Iraqi nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Iraq refused to cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA, intimidated the international inspectors, obstructed their work, withheld information about its WMD programmes, and retained the capability to revive those programmes. In 1997, Iraq announced that eight “presidential” sites would be off-limits to inspectors, despite no such provision in its agreements with the UN. Finally, in December 1998, UNSCOM declared that it was no longer able to perform its mandate. UN inspectors were withdrawn, and the US and UK launched Operation Desert Fox, four days of air strikes against Iraqi targets linked to its WMD and missile programmes.
    
88. 
    UNSCOM did enjoy some success in eliminating existing stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. A 1999 UN report concluded that UNSCOM achieved “significant progress” in destroying chemical weapons production facilities. Likewise, the IAEA concluded in 1998 that “there is no indication that Iraq possesses nuclear weapons or meaningful amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material.” However, inspectors could not certify they destroyed all aspects of Iraq’s WMD programme and could not prevent the programme from being restarted after their departure.
    
89. 
    In 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1284, which established a new inspection regime to ensure Iraqi compliance with Resolution 687. This resolution created the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and required Iraq to give UNMOVIC inspectors “immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport”. The Iraqi regime has not complied.
    
90. 
    In early October 2002, UN officials and Iraq announced that they had reached agreement on the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq, with the possibility that advance teams of UN inspectors could begin work in Iraq by October 19. However, the agreement fell far short of the complete access that must be required for UN inspections, most notably in excluding the eight presidential compounds from inspection. After American and British objections were raised, the chairman of UNMOVIC, Hans Blix, stated that he would delay the start of new inspections until after the Security Council had agreed to a new resolution outlining the UNMOVIC mandate.
    

5. INTERNATIONAL DEBATE

91. 
    In his State of the Union address in January 2002, President Bush drew international attention when he linked Iraq, Iran and North Korea into an “axis of evil,” as state-sponsors of terrorism that could provide terrorist groups with WMD. Mr Bush pledged, “We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver WMD.” Since that speech, world attention has focused on the threat Iraq poses to international security and possible steps that the United States and the international community might take to ensure that Iraq cannot provide terrorist groups with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.
    
92. 
    Speaking before the United Nations on September 12, 2002, a day after the anniversary of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, Mr Bush again drew the attention of the international community to the threat that Iraq poses to international security. President Bush outlined the commitments that Iraq has made to the UN to eliminate its WMD programme and the 11 years of defiance that have followed. In that speech, he announced the United States would work with the United Nations to craft a new resolution to disarm Iraq. “We want the resolutions of the world’s most important multilateral body to be enforced,” he said. “Right now these resolutions are being unilaterally subverted by the Iraqi regime.”
    
93. 
    The Bush administration has made clear that military action may be necessary in order to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not able to share WMD with terrorists or to use them in the region. In particular, President Bush has called for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, saying that “regime change is in the interests of the world.” Vice-President Dick Cheney argued that the risks of inaction “are far greater than the risk of action,” adding that what Saddam Hussein wants is “more time to husband his resources to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons programme, and to gain possession of nuclear weapons,” and Mr Rumsfeld said that the risk posed by the Iraqi WMD programme left “the solemn realisation that sometimes the consequences of no action can be more terrible than choosing to act, even if the act is war.”
    
94. 
    Within the United States, the Congress plays an essential role in any decision to take military action. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution explicitly gives the Congress the power to declare war; however, the president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and the line between the two powers is often a source of tension between the two branches of government. Your rapporteur was one of the first members of the House of Representatives to call for a vote to force the Administration to provide the legislative branch with more information, believing that a debate would help inform our constituents. Your rapporteur also believes it is important for the international community to see our debate and vote.
    
95. 
    In mid-September, Mr Bush asked for Congressional authorisation to use “all means he determines to be appropriate, including force” to disarm Iraq. His initial request was broad, asking for the power to enforce UN resolutions, “defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region.” Members noted that the last section was perhaps too broad and might be applied to other countries in the Middle East. The administration worked with Congressional leaders to craft a compromise resolution early October that deleted the last section. It also required the president to certify to congressional leaders that diplomatic and other peaceful means “will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and that action against Iraq is consistent with the aims of the war on terrorism. The resolution was approved by both houses of Congress, gaining a 296-133 majority in the House of Representatives on October 10 and a 77-23 majority in the Senate a day later.
    
96. 
    Mr Blair, the British Prime Minister, has also argued that military action may be necessary to eliminate the threat to international security posed by Iraq. However, the British government has been more narrow in its aims, citing the need to eliminate Iraqi WMD, rather than to change regime in Iraq. Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, stressed, “The key part of our approach is to get the weapons inspectors back.”
    
97. 
    Critics of military action in Iraq argue that traditional concepts of deterrence and containment are sufficient to prevent Saddam Hussein from using the weapons of mass destruction that he already possesses. They note that he did not use such weapons during the Persian Gulf War precisely because he feared an overwhelming response by the UN coalition that could have ended his regime. Because Saddam Hussein values the survival of his own regime above all else, they argue, he would not risk using WMD and inviting a devastating response that would lead to his fall. At the same time, critics argue, launching military action against Saddam Hussein with an avowed aim of regime change would remove any incentive Saddam Hussein might have not to use his WMD, leading to possible chemical and biological weapons attacks on coalition forces or against Israel, in a last-ditch effort to spark a wider war in the Middle East.
    
98. 
    Following the release of the British dossier in late September, Mr Blair recalled Parliament to debate the issue of Iraq. Many Members argued that military action should be taken against Iraq only with UN approval. Critics of Mr Blair’s policy in his Labour Party and the opposition Liberal Democratic Party argued that his case for military action against Iraq was unpersuasive and that evidence was needed that containment and deterrence had failed and military action was necessary. However, only 53 of the 412 Labour MPs voted against the government, with Conservatives and Liberal Democrats abstaining. The vote was on a non-binding technical point because the British Parliament has no formal role in a decision to use armed force.
    
99. 
    In the aftermath of that debate, the United States and United Kingdom began an effort in the UN Security Council to obtain a new resolution on the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq. The revised draft resolution that was circulated in late October, would require Iraq to provide a full account of its WMD and prohibited ballistic missile programmes; to provide inspectors with immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites, records, officials and other persons within Iraq in order to determine whether Iraq is in compliance with UN resolutions; and to allow UN security forces to accompany the inspectors at their bases. According to the revised draft resolution, if Iraq were to fail to comply, this would constitute “a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations.” The resolution goes on to note “that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violation of its obligations.”
    
100. 
     Meanwhile, the French president, Mr Jacques Chirac, proposed a plan for two resolutions in the Security Council. Mr Chirac called for a new resolution that would give Iraq three weeks to admit weapons inspectors “without any restrictions or preconditions.” If Saddam Hussein rejected their return or impeded their work, the Security Council would consider whether to pass a second resolution authorising military force. The Foreign Affairs Minister, Dominique de Villepin, said that France will not support a “blank check” to attack Iraq. “An action whose stated goal from the outset is regime change would be against international law and open the way to all sorts of abuses,” he said.
     
101. 
     Among the other permanent members of the Security Council, Russia has expressed support for the return of UN inspectors, but not for military action if Iraq fails to meet UN conditions. President Vladimir Putin has questioned the need for a new UN resolution, calling for “a rapid resolution of the situation by political and diplomatic means, on the basis of existing UN Security Council regulations.” Russia has also been critical of American and British air strikes against Iraqi radar and antiaircraft installations in the southern no-fly zone. The Prime Minister, Zhu Rongji, declared after a meeting with Mr Chirac that China supports the two-stage French approach. Analysts think China may abstain from voting on a new Security Council resolution.
     
102. 
     Among other NATO allies, Germany has been outspoken in its opposition to military action against Iraq.  The position of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder before the September elections that Germany would not take part in any military action, even if sanctioned by the UN, caused a deep rift in its relations with the United States, where officials were harshly critical of the unilateral German position ruling out participation in a multilateral operation.  However, German politicians note that Germany's aversion to military action arises from its experience in the two world wars, and both German and American politicians say that the German-American relationship is strong enough to repair the damage caused by Mr. Schröder's stance.  In Turkey, Yasar Yakis, the new foreign minister, said Turkey would allow use of its bases and airspace for a campaign against Iraq only if all peaceful options had been exhausted.  The Canadian defence minister, John McCallum, said his country would not support an attack unless it had evidence that Saddam was planning to attack the West.  In Spain, the Aznar government has declared that Iraq must comply with UN resolutions and that Spain will not hesitate to contribute to a military campaign should Iraq continue to defy the UN. Italy has also pledged its support.
     

6. MILITARY OPTIONS

103. 
     Over the course of this year, analysts have examined possible options for military action against Iraq. In addition, the American press has reported details of several plans that were leaked from the Pentagon, although it is likely that at least some of these were made public intentionally to deceive Iraqi planners. Most possible strategies fall into one of three categories: a conventional armed attack along the lines of the Persian Gulf War; a strategy like that used in Afghanistan, where air strikes and special operations forces worked with indigenous opposition forces; or encouraging Iraqi opposition groups to rise up and overthrow Saddam Hussein.
     
104. 
     US Central Command announced in September that it planned to send about 600 officers from its headquarters in Tampa to the Gulf nation of Qatar, a deployment that could form the core of a theatre headquarters to command any war against Iraq. The move, which is to take place in November, was a test of the ability to deploy a headquarters quickly in case of a crisis, but Pentagon officials are reported to have said that the officers would likely remain in Qatar after the exercise is completed. US Army Gen. Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM commander-in-chief, was to be part of the deployment. Subordinate commands already have headquarters in the region: the army in Kuwait, the navy in Bahrain, and the air force in Saudi Arabia.
     
105. 
     A recent Washington Post report on war planning at the Pentagon indicates that a US-led attack would focus on targeting the Iraqi leadership, particularly Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit, a city of 50,000 people about 150 km north of Baghdad. The report stated that the initial air attack would target antiaircraft systems and missiles and aircraft that could deliver WMD. It would then target Saddam Hussein’s power base, including his palaces, bodyguards, communication systems, secret police and elite Republican guard. Iraqi civilian infrastructure would be spared attack, as would any regular troops who stayed in their barracks. An invasion force is expected to number only about 100,000 ground troops. These would include two heavy armoured divisions, a light marine division, an infantry division for reinforcement, and parts of an airborne division and special operations forces. British news reports indicate that such a force “would include a significant British component,” with SAS special forces to hunt for WMD production and storage sites.
     
106. 
     Earlier articles by military analysts had foreseen a larger force; for example, one analyst estimated that 200,000 to 300,000 personnel would be required – four to six ground divisions plus support, 700 to 1,000 aircraft and one to five carrier battle groups. Reports indicate that Mr Rumsfeld criticised initial plans for being too conservative and ordered military planners to provide more imaginative options.
     
107. 
     The greatest concerns about the Iraqi response concern WMD use and urban warfare. If Saddam Hussein believes that his regime is threatened, he may consider using WMD against American and allied troops. American officials have tried to persuade Iraqi military commanders to disregard any such order from Saddam Hussein, suggesting that a commander who carries out an order to use WMD would be held personally responsible. Still, the possibility of WMD use is very real, which is the reason why many analysts believe that an attack might take place in the winter, when lower temperatures would make it easier to fight in protective gear. Fighting in urban areas is particularly worrying, because such combat negates many of the technical advantages that American forces enjoy. Large numbers of civilian casualties would be inevitable if there is street-to-street fighting in Baghdad, a city of 4.8 million people. If the civilian population viewed American and allied forces as invaders, rather than liberators, the battle could be bloody.
     

7. CONCLUSION

108. 
     The terrorist attacks of September 11 demonstrated that the NATO nations face new and insidious threats to their nations, to their people, and to their way of life. The Alliance responded forcefully to this attack, invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and thereby asserting that the attacks on one ally constituted an attack on them all. The allies have backed this declaration with concrete contributions of military capability, assisting the multinational campaign that drove the illegitimate Taliban regime from power in Afghanistan and destroying the sanctuary of the al‑Qaeda terrorist network. Their contributions, and those of partners from outside the North Atlantic Alliance, are greatly appreciated by the US Congress and the American people.
     
109. 
     The campaign in Afghanistan has been successful, but as long as terrorists there maintain the capability of harming our forces, it cannot be considered completed, and the broader war on terrorism has far to go. Already, governments in places like the Philippines, Yemen, Sudan and Georgia are working with the United States to eliminate the terrorists in their midst.
     
110. 
     Given the terrorist threat to the Alliance, NATO must transform itself to deal with this threat. The Alliance should support plans to create a NATO Reaction Force that could quickly deploy anywhere within or outside of the Euro-Atlantic region to combat terrorists and the regimes that support them, as well as other threats to the security of the Alliance. At their meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002, NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers agreed that “NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly wherever they are needed.” At the same time, individual allies must commit themselves to carrying out NATO’s new capabilities initiative so that they can deploy and sustain forces wherever in the world they are needed and can continue to operate technologically with American forces. We must also use the new relationship with Russia to ensure that its NBC weapons and materials are securely safeguarded.
     
111. 
     The possibility that the Iraqi regime, a state sponsor of terrorism, might provide NBC weapons to a terrorist group that would use them against us constitutes the gravest threat to the Alliance today. The decision of whether to support military action against Iraq is a very serious one. While President Bush is to be commended for working through the United Nations to seek a multilateral, diplomatic solution to the Iraqi threat, war might still be a necessity. Iraq continues to possess and develop weapons of mass destruction, in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, posing a grave threat to regional and international security. Your rapporteur continues to hope that we can avoid a war with Iraq. The UN Security Council must pass a tough, no-nonsense resolution with deadlines for Iraqi compliance and consequences if it fails to do so.
     
112. 
     Your rapporteur has voted in the House of Representatives to give President Bush the authority to use armed force against Iraq if diplomatic efforts fail to compel Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions. In the light of the mountain of evidence against Iraq, it is clear that the threat of military action is needed if Saddam Hussein is to be forced to fulfil the commitments he has made to the international community. Giving our governments the authority to act militarily may be the best way to persuade Saddam Hussein that he has no hope except to cooperate with the UN.
     
113. 
     The war against terrorism promises to be a long, hard struggle. It is a war that will be fought on many fronts other than the military one, but it is a war in which NATO has a critical role to play, and the NATO allies must declare that terrorism is one of the gravest threats to the Alliance today. Working together, this is a war that we can, we must, and we will win.