*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention
AT: “Conditionality Undermines Ownership of Reforms”
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- AT: Causes Recipients to Try to Get the Most for Reforms
- Conditionality Guards Against Moral Hazard
- Democratic Conditionality on US Assistance Good – Should Not Remove Conditions
- Key to Effective Assistance
AT: “Conditionality Undermines Ownership of Reforms”CONDITIONALITIES ARE NECESSARY TO PROMOTE REFORMS Devesh Kapur & Richard Webb, Harvard University, 2000, Governance-Related Conditionalities of the International Financial Institutions, G-24 Discussion Paper No. 6, August, p. 8 Most of these studies agree that attaching conditions to aid can strengthen the arm of governments that are trying to push through necessary but unpopular measures. It would seem intuitively obvious that reforms rarely succeed unless a government shares the conviction that they are essential, rather than agreeing to measures with reluctance, merely to meet a deadline for the release of a lie-saving trance. Taken to an extreme, the importance of “ownership” would imply that conditionality is unnecessary, but realties are more complex because opinions differ within governments, and power alignments shift over time. An incumbent government might “own” a program but its successor might not; a government might genuinely believe in the need to abolish agricultural subsidies but its farmers might not; technocrats may “own” programs that many other members of society do not.
Christopher L. Gilbert & David Vines, Finance Professor Vrije University & Fellow at Balliol College, Oxford, 2000, The World Bank: Structure and Policies, eds. C. Gilbert & D. Vines, p. 26 Economists have tended to emphasize a different and more Machiavellian mechanism. If the World Bank is offering money for policy reforms, developing country client governments need policies or sectors which require reform. Furthermore, strategic considerations and support from developed company champions (often the ex-colonial powers) confer governments with a degree of monopoly power in the supply of reforms. A rational government will, in these circumstances, withhold reforms to increase their price. Furthermore, less than complete success in implementation can result in reforms being recycled. There is no doubt some truth in this view, but it features relatively little in political economy accounts or reform processes. This is probably because only a few countries have sufficient monopoly power to be able to extract good prices—more normally, adjustment reform offers “stringent reform for a modest amount of financing” (Kahler 1990, 1992).
Tony Killick et al, Overseas Development Institute, 1998, Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change, p. 13 A closely related argument presents conditionality as a safeguard against moral hazard, i.e. against the danger that the provision of a loan or grant, by providing additional resources, will actually diminish governments’ incentives to undertake (often politically risky) economic policy reforms. So long as the conditionality can be enforced, that possibility should be ruled out. Democratic Conditionality on US Assistance Good – Should Not Remove ConditionsFAILURE TO CONDITION ASSISTANCE MAKES US LOOK COMPLICIT IN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS Elisa Massimino, President Human Rights First, 2010, House Hearing: Human Rights and Democracy Assistance: Increasing the Effectiveness of U.S. Foreign Aid, June 10, [http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg56888/html/CHRG-111hhrg56888.htm] The absence of effective conditionality on foreign security assistance fuels the damaging impression that the United States Government condones or even supports human rights violations committed by recipient security forces and governments. Such impressions are harmful to the broader U.S. national security interests and represent a significant cost that should be taken into consideration when objections are raised suggesting that applying human rights conditions will complicate or worsen vital strategic relationships. Key to Effective AssistanceCONDITIONING AID ON GOOD GOVERNANCE KEY TO ITS EFFECTIVENESS Wil Hout, Associate Professor World Development in the Hague, 2007, The Politics of Aid Selectivity: good governance criteria in World Bank, US and Dutch development assistance, p. 19-20 Several World Bank working papers and the report Assessing Aid arrived at the conclusion that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries that have good policies and governance. The message according to the World Bank was as follows: “The development strategy emerging from this view is two-pronged – put in place growth-enhancing, market-oriented policies (stable macro-economic environment, effective law and order, trade liberalization, and so on) and ensure the provision of important public services that cannot be well and equitably supplied by private markets (infrastructure services and education, for instance). Developing countries with sound policies and high quality public institutions have grown much faster than those without – 2.7 percent compared with -0.5 percent per capita. Put simply, failures in policymaking, institution building, and the provision of public services have been more severe constraints on development than capital markets… The key recommendation from these findings is not that finance should go only to well-managed countries. Rather, we recommend that aid be allocated on the basis of poverty and economic management. Among countries with similar poverty levels but different policy regimes, more finance should go to the countries with better management.” (World Bank 1998: 11, 15-16) INCREASED OWNERSHIP DOESN’T WORK IN COUNTRIES WITH POOR GOVERNANCE Steven Radelet, Center for Global Development, Aid Effectiveness and the Millennium Development Goals, February, [http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/MDG-aid-paper-introduction-v2.pdf] Providing recipients with more flexibility, greater latitude, and more ownership is precisely the right way for donors to move in well-governed countries, but not necessarily in poorly governed ones. Donors should move to a much more differentiated strategy with respect to country ownership. Countries with stronger governance should be given the responsibility for setting the broad priorities and designing programs financed by ODA. This should start with the design of poverty reduction strategies, and should be carried through to specific donor activities that grow out of the PRS process. Donors should be prepared to finance activities designed by recipients and reflecting recipient priorities, subject to strong technical review. By contrast, in weak, failing, and poorly governed countries where governments have shown little commitment to good development policy, donors should retain a strong role in setting priorities and designing programs. In many poorly governed countries, donors still talk about increased country ownership, even when they have no intention of actually allowing it. 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