*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention
Good Governance Conditionality/Promotion Necessary for Effective Democracy Promotion
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Good Governance Conditionality/Promotion Necessary for Effective Democracy PromotionEFFECTIVE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION REQUIRES EFFORTS TO IMPROVE GOVERNANCE AND REDUCE CORRUPTION Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, In Search of Democracy, 2016, p. 22-3 Chapter 21 begins Part IV by looking at the relationship between democracy and poverty reduction. In keeping with the central theme of this book, I argue here that the obstacles to ending poverty are political: democracy should in theory do much to address these obstacles, but often its record is disappointing because of bad governance. While distinctive circumstances (such as relative ethnic homogeneity and strong states) have enabled developmental authoritarian regimes in East Asia, I explain why the model of “developmental authoritarianism” is unlikely to work in Africa or in most of the rest of the less developed world. The key to sustainable poverty reduction is a political context of accountability, transparency, and rule of law, where the poor can have effective voice and use that voice (and vote) to hold their leaders accountable. Crucially, that requires as well an effective state which is not only able to deliver education, health services and physical infrastructure, but which can also maintain public security and safety without abusing citizen’s rights. Electoral democracy can thus be an important instrument for achieving policies—and policy implementation—to level power disparities and reduce poverty, but democracy will only deliver in this way if it is paired with decent governance that is actually able to produce and distribute these public goods for development. The quality of democracy is thus strongly related not only to the stability of democracy but to the economic development and the reduction of poverty as well. The more that the basic framework of electoral democracy is wedded to vigorous channels for grassroots participation in civil society, a strong rule of law, and a robust architecture of horizontal accountability to control corruption and abuse of power, the better the prospects for achieving brisk and lasting reductions in poverty. And of course, the more the progress in reducing poverty, the more sustainable will be the democracy, good governance, and poverty reduction. This compels a change in the logic of development assistance, toward an integrated and more political strategy that views the development and deepening of democracy, accountability, and the rule of law as key instruments in the overall campaign to reduce poverty.
Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, In Search of Democracy, 2016, p. 42 Civil and political rights are thus critical to the vigorous participation and competition of parties, interests, and organizations that make for vertical accountability and responsiveness. They are necessary as well for horizontal accountability, in that these state agencies become more active and effective when they are reinforced, beseeched, and informed by agents of vertical accountability, particularly mass media, NGOs and other actors in civil society. But none of this is possible without a rule of law, wherein an impartial judiciary affirms rights and prohibits violations of the institutional safeguards for vertical and horizontal accountability. Neither can a rule of law be sustained and the abuse of power preempted and contained without strong institutions of horizontal accountability, which also ensure that the electoral instruments of competition and vertical accountability will not be abused. At the same time, participatory citizens, voting at the polls and acting in various organized ways in civil society, are the last line of defense against potential executive efforts to subvert rule-of-law and good-governance institutions. Good Governance Conditionality LegitimateCONDITIONING AID ON GOOD GOVERNANCE IS LEGITIMATE Olav Stokke, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1995, Aid and Political Conditionality, ed. Olav Stokke, p. 72 The principle of non-intervention does not recognize a competing legitimacy, namely that of the concerned regime vis-à-vis the governed. It does not distinguish between a regime which bases its position on the control of coercive powers and one founded on popular consent. With growing recognition, from various perspectives, of the value of some form of participation by the governed in decisions which affect their fortunes, a competing legitimacy has a bearing on our problematique. The increased international prominence of the human rights agenda serves both as a facilitator and an indicator in this regard. Authoritarian, repressive, self-seeking regimes – in the post-Cold War world order – are no longer considered a treasured conservation target. Apart from the legitimacy of the recipient government (although this, too, has an impact), the characteristics of the aid relationship make it necessary to balance one type of legitimacy against another. A donor government may have to choose between the legitimacy of its policy vis-à-vis its own electorate and its legitimacy vis-à-vis a contested principle of non-intervention. This dilemma does not make an intervention legitimate; it does, however, make it legitimate for a donor government to abstain from providing aid to a recipient system where the framework conditions are not in place for aid to work according to the objectives and guidelines set. POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY IS IN THE INTEREST OF PEOPLE LIVING IN POVERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Peter P. Waller, German Development Institute, 1995, Aid and Political Conditionality, ed. Olav Stokke, p. 126 Finally there is the question of the sustainability of political conditionality especially in the face of the deteriorating economic situation in m any donor countries. Judging from the German experience there seem to be two trends. In relation to economically important developing countries a certain retreat in the application of political conditionality can be observed because of economic interests. In relation to economically weak partners, however, the public pressure not to spend money on undemocratic and repressive regimes has even increased, not least because of the scarcity of funds for urgent internal social problems. In view of the fact that the worldwide deterioration of the environment, the fear of international migration, and the growing international engagement in peace-keeping, will make development co-operation more rather than less important in the future it can be safely predicted that this co-operation will continue to be linked to conditionality. Since democracy and respect for human rights are the most important factors to prevent mass migrations and political conflicts, political conditionality is in the interest of donor countries as well as of the majority of the people in developing countries.
Mosharaff Hossain, Economics Professor, Dhaka University, 1995, Aid and Political Conditionality, ed. Olav Stokke, p. 270 Aid conditionalities are essential for democratic institutions to take root in countries such as Bangladesh. There are ample opportunities for collusion between the ruling classes in recipient countries and business corporations in the developed market economies: the lengthy process of eliminating market imperfections calls for unqualified support from aid donors. There is a strong urge to respond to narrow self-interest rather than enlightened self-interest. If aid ceases to be the preserve primarily of the officials and business interests of donor and recipient countries and becomes a subject of serious and informed discussion everywhere, it is still possible that the phenomenon of aid dependence and the endemic poverty of billions in Third World countries will become a thing of the past. Directory: assets assets -> Northern territory of australia assets -> Number: caveat in the [Will/Will and Codicil/Estate of] assets -> Invitation for Bid Calact/mbta for Standard Floor and Low Floor Rural Duty Vehicles ifb no. 12-03 November 14, 2012 assets -> 12 Step Retreats For Everyone in Twelve Step Recovery Ratner Fellowship assets -> 12 Step Retreats For Everyone in Twelve Step Recovery Ratner Fellowship assets -> Sigaccess annual Report assets -> Central Government is expected to ask the seventh pay commission to consider merging 50% dearness allowance assets -> List of accessible executive records assets -> Emergency telephone numbers Call toll-free from anywhere in France Download 2.51 Mb. Share with your friends:
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