MUST CONDITION ASSISTANCE ON GOOD GOVERNANCE
Larry Diamond, Sr. Fellow Hoover Institution, 2002, Winning the New Cold War on Terrorism: The Democratic-Governance Imperative, Institute for Global Democracy, Policy Paper No. 1, [http://www.911investigations.net/IMG/pdf/doc-267.pdf], p. 13
Strategies for international assistance must take seriously the challenge of improving governance. It is not enough simply to generate the demand for better governance in civil society. We also need a substantially enhanced supply. Where there are state actors ready to embrace reform, this requires new and enhanced programs to improve and professionalize public administration, the judiciary, other agencies of horizontal accountability, the institutions of economic governance and regulation, as well as the military and police. These state institutions need training and resources, patiently invested over a long period of time. So do political parties, which in any developing democracy are an indispensable link between parliament and government on the one hand and the public and civil society on the other. However, investments in political institutions will not pay off unless institutional leaders are committed to improving governance. That is one reason why firm standards and expectations are needed from the international community.
Anti-Corruption Efforts Effective: US Key
US MUST TAKE THE LEAD IN TYING ASSISTANCE TO GOOD GOVERNANCE STANDARDS
Larry Diamond, Sr. Fellow Hoover Institution, 2002, Winning the New Cold War on Terrorism: The Democratic-Governance Imperative, Institute for Global Democracy, Policy Paper No. 1, [http://www.911investigations.net/IMG/pdf/doc-267.pdf], p. 14
In the international community, the United States remains the indispensable country in the quest for democracy and good governance. People still look to the American example for leadership and inspiration. In many impoverished, conflict-ridden, predatory societies, ordinary people increasingly understand that real change requires better governance and an end to wanton corruption, exploitation and abuse of power. Ultimately, democracy is necessary, but not sufficient. In our own national policies on debt relief and aid, we have an opportunity to help battered societies begin to construct the institutions and norms of a civic community. As a nation, we are the first, and still the leading, civic community. We have an obligation–to our own national security, as well as to the world–to lead the way.
US MUST TAKE THE LEAD IN PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE
Nazif M. Shahrani, Anthropology Professor Indiana University, 2002, American Anthropologist, September, Vol. 104, No. 3, p. 720-1
The United States has the opportunity to set a new precedent for combating the conditions that give rise to terrorism worldwide by aiding in this effort. This daunting task can be accomplished by doing two things. First, now that the people of Afghanistan are freed from being terrorized by the Taliban and their global terrorist partners, they must be assisted in establishing an appropriate national governance structure that should not only facilitate the national reconstruction and reconciliation of their battered society but must also avoid returning to the utterly inappropriate previous system of centralized misrule. Second, the United States must take the lead in mobilizing sustained and long-term international reconstruction assistance for Afghanistan. By means of these integrated and coordinated international efforts in Afghanistan, the international community may be able to begin to address one of the root causes of global terrorism. It should be obvious that the strategies of waging war against global terrorism, no matter how militarily effective, will not solve Afghanistan's problems and will not solve our national security concerns here in the United States. The question remains: Is the United States leadership willing to conduct its foreign policy differently to find out what the outcome might be? Afghanistan can be a very important test case, if done right.
Anti-Corruption Efforts Effective: Assistance Effective
AID CAN INCREASE ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFECTIVENESS BY PARTNERING WITH NGOs
Robert Charlick, Political Science Professor, Cleveland State University, 1993, Corruption and Reform 7:177-187, p. 179-80
As more actors are permitted to develop a voice in policy, some may, by the unique character of their definition of self-interest, be “public-minded.” They may have a professional interest in condemning or limiting corruption. Human rights groups, for example, may have to adopt more universalistic standards to justify and further their positions, limiting their discretion to simply helping themselves. Such groups are emerging at a rapid pace throughout Africa, and may become useful allies of anti-corruption policies as “watch groups” not only for abuses of integrity of life, bur for official corruption. There are already aspirations to work with such groups in a network paralleling Amnesty International, currently being called “Transparency International.” The conjuncture of the two issues, however, may make the work of African human rights groups that much more hazardous, at least in the short term. The second phenomenon, the reliance on national and even regional professional associations, such as accountants and inspectors-general, constitutes a major plank in AID’s anti-corruption accountability programs in Latin America. Without judging its prospects for success on that continent, it is clear that such groups are much less well-developed in Africa and cannot be expected to play an analogous role in the near future.
DONOR PRESSURE ENCOURAGES AFRICAN STATES TO ADOPT NECESSARY GOVERNANCE REFORMS TO REDUCE CORRUPTION
Robert Charlick, Political Science Professor, Cleveland State University, 1993, Corruption and Reform 7:177-187, p. 181
It may seem tautological to argue that public corruption can be reduced by reducing the public role in governance, but this proposition is not trivial. Where state institutions control most of the public allocation process, particularly in an environment of centralization, incentives to charge “rents” for public services are high, since the supply of governance is severely limited. One potential remedy is to increase the supply of decentralizing governance, permitting non-state actors, such as voluntary cooperatives, business associations, professional associations, such as water-use associations, religious societies and the like to perform tasks of managing resources and setting standards for the particular and often a local “public.” Increasing the supply of governance may not only devalue abuse by public officials, but when coupled with mechanisms for linking state and non-state actors through law and electoral power, a set of checks or limits may be established on the abuse of either. While in the formal sector modern African states have shown little propensity to share governance functions, a number of forces may be pushing them in this direction. These include the state’s financial incapacity to provide “services” and the need, therefore, for raising “user-fees”; pressure from international donors to reduce state bureaucratic salaries; the need to attempt to bring the massive non-formal sectors into relationships with the state which will involve considerable negotiation and incentive; and the growth of voluntary institutions in much of Africa in response to an expanding political space.
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