*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention
Democracy Assistance Includes Negative Actions
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- Democracy Assistance Must be “Directly Political”
Democracy Assistance Includes Negative ActionsNEGATIVE ACTIONS ARE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION – ENDING “ANTI-DEMOCRACY” ASSISTANCE Burnell, ‘01 (Peter, PhD, Professor of Politics and International Studies at University of Warwick, Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization, pg 13-14) At the end of the day our estimates of the overall commitment to democracy assistance and its likely impact should dwell not just on activities that carry labels like democracy assistance and the budgets so defined. The balance sheet should discount for all the activities emanating from the established democracies and the international institutions where their influence is paramount that tend to contradict the aims of democracy assistance and harm democratization – what has been called 'anti-democracy assistance'. These can be the product of structural circumstances or individual acts of human agency. They might be intentional or they may follow as accidental by-products of competing policy goals. Often-cited examples include how external support to counter-insurgency measures and steps to eradicate the production of internationally-traded illicit narcotics in a country like Colombia can further the militarisation of politics there. They share responsibility for the human rights abuses committed by security forces. It would be legitimate then to discuss all the forms of support to authoritarian regimes and governments that weaken democracy and more especially arms exports including exports traded on purely commercial terms. With respect to the conditions for democratization, the adverse influence of economic globalisation and the negative effects of western-led pressure to move rapidly towards free market economics would also have to be considered – as being forms of democracy subversion. One view is that the world-wide rise of multi-layered public and private governance structures and the decline of the nation-state are making liberal democracy irrelevant. Democratic states are surrendering the function of transforming domestically generated inputs into authoritative outputs, in the face of new global structures of unaccountable power.' Those are large claims, and here is not the place to determine whether democracy assistance is yet another example of 'too little, too late' . Instead a different concern dwells on political aid's own challenge to traditional notions of sovereignty. Democracy Assistance Must be “Directly Political”DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE MUST BE STRICTLY POLITICAL – SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE NOT TOPICAL Burnell, 01 (Peter, PhD, Professor of Politics and International Studies at University of Warwick, Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization, pg 4) Thus the notions of democracy that lie at the centre of much democracy assistance, while not all being identical, occupy a limited range. First they are a political construct. Ideas of social democracy and economic democracy are excluded. Second they are informed by individualism rather than by expressly communitarian notions of society. Third, although many of the formulations specify a range freedoms and other qualities going well beyond mere electoralism and they should not be confused with 'illiberal democracy', even so there are few concessions made to the most radical models of participatory democracy. These are all limitations that will not satisfy every shade of democratic theorist. Nevertheless a plausible argument is that external actors can contribute very little to the development of truly popular or grass-roots democracy anyway. Moreover, it is quite logical for international democracy assistance to try to avoid setting goals that must inevitably lie beyond its purchase. And to promote something other than elements of the standard western experience would be reprehensible if it meant exporting untried models of democracy that are judged too risky to entertain at home. DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE DEFINED AS HAVING A DIRECTLY POLITICAL FOCUS Burnell, ‘01 (Peter, PhD, Professor of Politics and International Studies at University of Warwick, Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization, pg 11-13) Democratization may be served best by applying assistance to a selection of political values that are associated with democracy and which can be supported each in their own right: legitimacy, accountability, participation, openness and transparency in the conduct of public affairs, the rule of law and so on. But a rather different proposition is to promote the democratic prospects by helping the emergence and strengthening of democracy's supporting conditions, economic conditions for example. On this reasoning democracy assistance would encompass a very wide range of activities, some of them having fairly short-term horizons. For example in June 1999 it was announced that international lenders like the International Monetary Fund had agreed to make US$llbillion (£6.8bn) available to Mexico to facilitate the smooth conduct of presidential elections due in 2000. The intention was to avoid a repetition of past events when severe financial turbulence affecting both the country's economy and its political situation marred four successive presidential elections and their aftermath." In the largest sense then democracy promotion could include all manner of development assistance designed to advance the social, economic and other conditions that experts believe would be beneficial to democracy. What these conditions are, and how essential they really are, is the subject of a large social science literature. Some leading candidates are: the elimination of absolute poverty (which in some circumstances is `the most important cause of the absence of human rights');" an end to gross inequality (for 'social dependency and economic inequality are shown conclusively to make the enjoyment of the standard rights associated with political democracy impossible' );13 and 'human development', including improved status for women and underprivileged minorities. Education is often singled out as a key factor contributing both to economic development and democratization.' So, the right kinds of assistance to education seemingly offer a double pay-back for democracy, direct as well as indirect. The links between democratically-elected governments and 'good governance' provide another factor which, according to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), includes the abilities to maintain social peace and guarantee law and order.' Yet another prominent thesis is the positive role played by progress towards a successful market economy. That thesis is firmly embraced by many providers of democracy assistance, although a lively debate persists among academics over the market's propensity to hinder as well as help democracy and especially over the proclivity of rapid economic liberalization to jeopardise the democratic prospects.'6 Relief from the burden of high international indebtedness is argued by many to be another prerequisite for development and democratization in a number of countries in the former second and third worlds. Finally, international interventions to resolve or prevent violent conflict and build peace at the sub-state level are further candidates. Civil peace is a precondition for constructing viable democracy. This explains the claim that over the last 50 years the United Nations has been the single most influential democracy-promoting organization." The promotion of democracy and particularly the staging of inclusive, free and fair elections can be conceived as a strategy for achieving reconciliation. They help lay the basis for mutual trust and co-operation among formerly divided communities and develop the social capital that democracy requires.' Similarly certain peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives could be considered as forms of democracy assistance where they enhance the possibilities for sustainable democracy, especially when taking the form of post-conflict electoral assistance (see Chapter 7 by Krishna Kumar). Help with programmes to demobilise former combatants and integrate previously warring parties into one professional military force, and the organisation of war crimes tribunals and 'truth and reconciliation' commissions, might qualify as well. All things considered, it follows that if democracy assistance is defined as whatever helps democratization directly or indirectly, sooner or later, then our sense of it could be so generous as to undermine the value of the term. There would be a long history of it to study. Quigley (in Chapter 11) demonstrates this in regard to political evolution in East Asia – in part an unintended and indirect consequence of development aid – and, in Japan's case, the subtle influence of the international climate. We would then have to conclude that what is most special about the contemporary situation is not the existence of democracy assistance but the distinguishing forms that it now takes. Definitional problems are unavoidable, not least because democratization itself is a protean idea, with a variety of meanings. The analytical separation of democracy-building and state building (or state reconstruction) as different objects of international assistance can be particularly difficult to maintain, in newly independent countries as well as post-conflict situations. Confining our idea of democracy assistance to efforts that are focused directly on democracy's political variables, to the exclusion of democracy's supporting conditions, helps make the concept and its study more manageable. Of course it does not resolve all of the issues. Take, for instance, the development of a democratic political culture. Is this a defining feature of democratization? Or is such a culture simply a necessary (or alternatively merely a helpful?) condition for democracy to take root? Or is the emergence of such a culture a consequence of exposure to democratic practice, the benign effect of a shrewd choice of democratic institutions? Perhaps it fits more than one of these descriptions, or takes on a different significance in different places and circumstances? Needless to say the literature provides conflicting answers to questions such as these. In reality contributors to these debates and the practitioners of what has come to be known as democracy assistance share a catholic understanding of democratization, while largely confining ideas of democracy assistance to the more direct and politically-focused activities. Thus democratization is not just a movement towards, and the building of, a democratic state –something that involves legal-constitutional principles and formal institutional structures – but is also the development of a particular kind of political society, a plurality of competing political parties and appropriate styles of leadership. Attitudinal and behavioural dimensions (that is to say the cultural aspects) and forms of (civic) education are also included, as is the objective of an increasingly active and democratically-oriented civil society. The reach extends beyond central government and national politics to regional or provincial levels, the municipalities and local councils. This means that in total democracy assistance is multifaceted. Potentially it is an enormous undertaking. In practice the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD¬DAC), in its annual statistical record of all development aid classified by major purpose, placed 'Government and Civil Society' at just 2.9 per cent of development assistance in 1998.19 DEMOCRACY ASSITANCE DISTINCT FROM “GOOD GOVERNANCE” Burnell ‘01 (Peter, PhD, Professor of Politics and International Studies at University of Warwick, Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization, pg 8-9) In principle democracy assistance can be distinguished from the aims associated with efforts to improve governance, which has been defined by the World Bank as the exercise of political, economic and administrative power in the management of public affairs. The notion of capacity-building that often features in manuals for better governance is not the same as democratic capacity-building. There is considerably greater scope for international programmes that aim to improve governance to be negotiated on a commercial basis and without resort to concessionary arrangements. Indeed, the lending programmes of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development normally take place on financial terms that do not qualify as 'assistance' in the Development Assistance Committee's terms.
(Daniela, Department of International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies,” 2-7, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629390701864836) The term democracy assistance is used in academic literature, as well as in the programmes of the US and the EU, without comprehensive clarifications. This section will therefore outline the actor’s comprehensions of the term and the (however insufficient) academic literature on it. On this basis it will develop a definition of the term democracy assistance, which will be followed by the elaboration of a methodological framework. The US and EU have quite similar concepts of DA. USAID defines it as technical assistance and other support to strengthen capacity of reform-minded governments, nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in order to develop and support democratic states and institutions that are responsive and accountable to citizens. These efforts also include promoting democratic transitions in countries that are not reform minded. Democracy programs promote the rule of law and human rights, transparent and fair elections coupled with a competitive political process, a free and independent media, stronger civil society and greater citizen participation in government, and governance structures that are efficient, responsive, and accountable. (USAID, 2005: 4) Similarly, the EU specifies the following categories of DA: These can include questions of democratic participation (including universal suffrage, free election, multiparty structure, equality of access to political activity, participatory decision making); human rights (including adherence to, and implementation of, commitments under international human rights Treaties and Conventions, protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech and of assembly, effective operation of human rights monitoring); and the rule of law (including an independent and effective judiciary, transparent legal framework, equality of all citizens before the law, police and public administration subject to the law, enforcement of contractual obligations). (EC 2003a: 10) The American researcher Thomas Carothers gives a definition of DA which is closest to the understanding of this article: ‘Democracy aid is all aid, for which the primary purpose, not the secondary or indirect purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient countries. It does not therefore include economic and social aid programs’ (Carothers, 2000: 188). In addition, two further characteristics of democracy assistance are introduced in order to differentiate it from other efforts at democracy promotion: first, it is not only an explicit or direct, but also a positive measure of foreign policy as opposed to negative measures such as sanctions or even military means.4 Second, it represents an active instrument, as the democracy promoter takes measures itself, whereas a passive instrument such as positive political conditionality implies that the democracy promoter rewards internal democracy promotion efforts. Table 1 visualizes the different democracy promotion instruments. Directory: assets assets -> Northern territory of australia assets -> Number: caveat in the [Will/Will and Codicil/Estate of] assets -> Invitation for Bid Calact/mbta for Standard Floor and Low Floor Rural Duty Vehicles ifb no. 12-03 November 14, 2012 assets -> 12 Step Retreats For Everyone in Twelve Step Recovery Ratner Fellowship assets -> 12 Step Retreats For Everyone in Twelve Step Recovery Ratner Fellowship assets -> Sigaccess annual Report assets -> Central Government is expected to ask the seventh pay commission to consider merging 50% dearness allowance assets -> List of accessible executive records assets -> Emergency telephone numbers Call toll-free from anywhere in France Download 2.51 Mb. Share with your friends:
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