*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention
“Regime Change” Programs Not Democracy Promotion
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- Civil Society Assistance Includes
“Regime Change” Programs Not Democracy PromotionDEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE DISTINCT FROM REGIME CHANGE N.E.D. ‘06 (National Endowment for Democracy, 6/8/2006, “The Backlash against Democracy assistance,” http://www.ned.org/docs/backlash06.pdf) The association of democracy assistance with regime change is a position taken by honest, if impatient, advocates of democracy as well as by more malicious critics. This misleading equation has been taken up by authoritarian rulers to deny the legitimacy of democracy assistance and to portray these efforts as an instrument of foreign policy designed to undermine U.S. adversaries. The National Democratic Institute, for instance, reports that “American NGOs in particular are being associated with the color revolutions and have been singled out in Chinese news reports.” Democracy assistance is, of course, neither a European nor a U.S. conspiracy.22 Contrary to the claims of authoritarian regimes, there is little evidence that the advanced democracies of the West, whether singly or collectively, utilize democracy assistance programs as a lever for regime change. Arguably, the advanced democracies have in fact failed to maintain a consistent or well-resourced commitment to democracy promotion.2_ Regime change and democracy assistance are not synonymous. Democracy assistance does not actively promote domestic policy agendas or champion opposition forces. Democracy is the purpose of democracy assistance groups’ efforts, and the fall or removal of a non-democratic regime does not automatically produce democracy as an outcome. The replacement of Batista by Castro or the Shah by Khomeini makes that clear. Democracy assistance focuses not on determining outcomes but on enhancing democratic institutions, practices, and culture. Ending a dictatorship can provide the space and opportunity for people to build democracy, but that is inevitably a long-term and arduous task, entailing a long-term process of work, learning, and the cultivation of civic values and nurturing of institutions of governance that enable pluralist societies to resolve differences through peaceful means. The equation of democracy promotion with regime change by commentators and some practitioners in the West has been unhelpful and has played into the hands of authoritarian regimes. In fact, democracy assistance groups generally play a restraining role, cautioning groups impatient for regime change that democratization is a process, not an event, and one that requires long-term investment to secure genuine, sustainable change. Yet the relative success and dramatic visibility of the color revolutions does present a “genuine conundrum” for democracy promotion groups. While regime change rhetoric is used to legitimize the authoritarians’ backlash, the elevation of democracy promotion as a guiding principle and objective of U.S. foreign policy, combined with demonstrably successful and U.S.-assisted transitions, resonates strongly with domestic decision-makers—and funding agencies. Formulaic regime change approaches reveal a mechanistic approach to democratization, suggesting that popular movements can be artificially manufactured and that resources determine success. They not only overrate the influence of U.S. funding and organizations but also underplay the significance of independent forces and neglect the countervailing powers of authoritarianism. BROADLY INTERPRETING ‘DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE’ TO INCLUDE REGIME CHANGE CHASES THE TERMTO BE REDEPLOYED AS A EUPHEMISM FOR INTERVENTIONS Lappin ’10, (Richard Lappin, Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies at the University of Leuven in Belgium, 2/1/2010, “Obama and Democracy Assistance: Challenges and Responses,” http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/ethics_online/0042.html) Perhaps the principal challenge that the Obama administration faces is to re-establish the credibility of U.S. democracy assistance after the exaggerated hyperbole, inconsistency, and mistakes of the Bush administration. Indeed, Bush's persistent association of democracy assistance with the Iraq War and regime change did much to malign the concept and help to foster a perception in many parts of the world that democracy assistance was a mere euphemism for aggressive U.S, interventionism. As Eric Hobsbawm acerbically comments, 'one should always be suspicious when military powers claim to be doing favours for their victims and the world by defeating and occupying weaker states.'3 Furthermore, the contradiction between Bush's 'Freedom Agenda' and his continuing positive relations with undemocratic governments such as those in Saudi Arabia, China and Egypt, further amplified concerns about the underlying rationale of America's pro-democracy position. The harm caused by the Bush appropriation of democracy has been recognised within the democracy assistance community. Lorne Craner, head of the democracy assistance agency International Republican Institute, has stated, 'if I could trade for the anonymity we had in the '90s,' before Bush came to power, 'I would do it in a minute.'4 The Bush legacy has undeniably resulted in a situation where the very concept of democracy assistance is often cast in a negative light even before the actual substance of a programme is examined. As Thomas Carothers notes: The sad, mildly ironic reality of the Bush approach to democracy promotion is that it may represent the worst of both worlds: It has soured people all around the globe, and many in the United States as well, on the very legitimacy and value of U.S. democracy promotion, despite having involved only a limited engagement in democracy promotion.5 Civil Society Assistance Includes“CIVIL SOCIETY” ZONE OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIVE LIFE Amy Hawthorne, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 82 All these factors have contributed to the idea of making aid for Arab civil society a leading element of a new U.S. democracy-promotion strategy for countries beyond Iraq. (Civil society also appeals to many European officials who are beginning to consider developing a more vigorous democracy-promotion policy for the Middle East.) Defining civil society and its role as a prodemocratic force is a matter of extensive scholarly debate. Reduced to its elemental meaning, civil society refers to the zone of voluntary associative life beyond family and clan affiliations but separate from the state and the market. Nonprofit organizations, religious organizations, labor unions, business associations, interest and advocacy groups, societies, clubs, and research institutions, as well as more informal political, social, and religious movements, are all part of civil society.
Amy Hawthorne, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 100 Assistance programs sought to build service NGOs’ capacity as vehicles for citizen participation and as partners with governments. USAID provided technical assistance in accounting, staff development, management, fund raising, and program planning, as well as training in so-called democracy skills (the ability to encourage participation, network, aggregate citizen demands, and exercise oversight of government agencies). In the late 1990s, USAID began to emphasize advocacy training for service NGOs. Advocacy was defined as a participatory but non-political activity. As a report on assistance to Egyptian civil society explained, “Advocacy is defined as an action, rooted in a broad-based community need o interest, taken by NGOs to represent themselves and their constituency to public officials or the public in general. In the Egyptian case, this is exclusive of religious and political interests.” CIVIL SOCIETY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 201 Programs to expand civil society often consist of: *funding for NGOs devoted to public-interest advocacy, such as on human rights, the environment, and anticorruption; *support for women’s rights organizations; *strengthening independent media; and *underwriting formal and informal efforts to advance democratic civic education. Directory: assets assets -> Northern territory of australia assets -> Number: caveat in the [Will/Will and Codicil/Estate of] assets -> Invitation for Bid Calact/mbta for Standard Floor and Low Floor Rural Duty Vehicles ifb no. 12-03 November 14, 2012 assets -> 12 Step Retreats For Everyone in Twelve Step Recovery Ratner Fellowship assets -> 12 Step Retreats For Everyone in Twelve Step Recovery Ratner Fellowship assets -> Sigaccess annual Report assets -> Central Government is expected to ask the seventh pay commission to consider merging 50% dearness allowance assets -> List of accessible executive records assets -> Emergency telephone numbers Call toll-free from anywhere in France Download 2.51 Mb. Share with your friends:
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