*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention
Egyptian Democratic Transition Bad for Egypt
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Egyptian Democratic Transition Bad for EgyptEGYPTIANS HAVE LEGITIMATE REASONS TO FEAR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION Robert Bowker, Center for Arab & Islamic Studies, Australian National University, 2013, American Democracy Promotion in the Changing Middle East: From Bush to Obama, eds. Akbarzadeh, MacQueen, Piscattori & Saikal, p. 115-6 Apart from the removal of Mubarak and his civilian entourage, not much has changed which would lead ordinary Egyptians to believe that transformative change is now on the agenda. At the same time, Egyptians are remarkably adept at coping with political and economic dysfunctionality, even while wishing to see greater economic security, employment opportunity and cleaner government. And, seeing the manner in which economic reforms under Mubarak led to the appropriation of opportunities by a well-connected handful of Egyptians to further enrich themselves, they are not readily persuaded that major changes in the political and economic sphere would necessarily benefit them as individuals. Meanwhile, among secular Egyptians, and Egyptian Copts, there is a deep-seated anxiety associated with the notion of extending political freedoms to the rising number of Islamists in their midst. The newly found political ambitions of the Salafist stream of Egyptian Islamists generates even greater alarm among Copts and secular Egyptians alike. Egyptian Democratic Transition Bad for U.S.NEW EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT ADOPTING FOREIGN POLICIES HOSTILE TO U.S. INTERESTS Lloyd C. Gardner, History Professor-Rutgers, 2011, The Road to Tahrir Square: Egypt and the United States from the rise of Nasser to the fall of Mubarak, p. ix-x However one thinks about those questions, the history of U.S.-Egyptian relations provides the essential missing factor if we are to understand where and why the new government in Cairo, even in its interim form, has already departed significantly from Mubarak’s agenda of satisfying Washington above all other things. The new government has signaled its intention to reestablish diplomatic relations with Iran, to end cooperation with Israel in blocking the border with Gaza, and has already brokered an agreement between rival Palestinian factions, one of whom, Hamas, is regarded as a terrorist organization by Israel and the United States. Egypt, said a representative of the government, intends to keep its commitment to the peace treaty with Israel—adding a comment obviously directed at Mubarak’s cooperation on rendition, among other secret acts, that it also hoped to do a better job complying with some human rights protocols it had signed. “We are opening a new page,” said Ambassador Menha Bakhoum, spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry. “Egypt is resuming its role that was once abdicated.”
But instead of moving aggressively to lift a $3 billion burden off of Egypt’s back, a debt that will cost them roughly $315 million this year and for many years to come, the administration has proposed reprogramming $150 billion so that USAID aid could support ‘‘nongovernment organizations supporting the Egyptian-led economic and citizen-led transition effort’’—in other words, exactly the same kind of inconsequential programs that USAID has been doing for the past several decades. It is a big box with the same old mush and a great big ‘‘new and improved’’ sticker slapped on it, the same great mush, now even more feckless. USAID has proposed spending 75 million bucks on three new economic growth programs that will include ‘‘secular-based dialogues for local businesses to encourage local, regional, national, and international trade expansion; and improving the skills and access to finance of entrepreneurs, enterprises, and business owners.’’ This bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo sounds to me like a bunch of seminars in a Holiday Inn. It is the commercial, ‘‘I am not really a global power, but I did stay last night at a Holiday Inn.’’ Egypt has 80 million people and a $500 billion economy. USAID is proposing a bottle of aspirin for a man who needs a heart transplant. Debt relief, by comparison, is big, is fast, is meaningful, and it leverages America’s standing as a global leader and a diplomatic powerhouse. American support for debt relief could help encourage European support for debt relief, something the Egyptians are already seeking, to the tune from the Europeans of some $9 billion. The Egyptian Government’s total foreign debt is roughly $30 billion. Instead of us playing small ball at the Holiday Inn, leading a global effort to eliminate the debt accrued by Mubarak’s Egypt would show real commitment and real friendship. Debt relief could help leverage Egyptian reform efforts and be done before the back of the hurricane hits, without the bureaucratic delay and parasitic contractors that so regularly plague even USAID’s debt efforts. Debt relief requires no new outlays from the U.S. Treasury. And, best of all, debt relief empowers Egyptians to chart a new course for their country on their own terms, which was the point of their revolution in the first place. *Yemen*Political Reform in Yemen DifficultYEMENESE GOVERNMENT MANIPULATES REFORMS TO MAINTAIN AUTHORITARIANISM Sarah Phillips, National Democratic Institute-Yemen, 2008, Beyond the Façade: political reform in the Arab world, eds. M. Ottaway & J. Choucair-Vizoso, p. 233 Like many states in the Arab world that have embarked on limited reform, Yemen developed a political system best described as pluralized authoritarianism. The regime is authoritarian, and although some space is granted for alternative voices, there are severe restrictions on the establishment of alternative voices, there are severe restrictions on the establishment of alternative power centers that might threaten the elite. Elections are usually regular and at times even somewhat competitive, but the officials are much less focused on policy formulation than building and reinforcing patronage links between themselves and society. In pluralized authoritarian states, opposition groups can unintentionally strengthen the regime they seek to weaken. The managed and curtailed political space that regimes grant opposition groups can mean that the opposition’s actions serve to either legitimize the regime, providing them with access to popular discontent. Formal, and therefore identifiable, opposition groups provide avenues for dissent that are manageable for the regime than if discontent were simply left to bubble below the surface unchecked. Regimes in pluralized authoritarian states thus maintain their positions in part through the type of openings that might normally be expected to dislodge them.
Sarah Phillips, National Democratic Institute-Yemen, 2008, Beyond the Façade: political reform in the Arab world, eds. M. Ottaway & J. Choucair-Vizoso, p. 233-4 The granting of some political space, however limited, and the holding of somewhat competitive elections also provide certain benefits to members of the opposition. As a result, the opposition has been wary of provoking a harsh response from the regime by manifesting its dissent too boldly. As a leader of the al-Tajammu al-Yamani lil-Islah told the author in late 2004, “President Saleh could call a state of emergency of dissolve Islah, other political parties and the parliament, and arrest thousands of Islahis…Right now we are pushing for progress but we avoid the more sensitive issues.” Although opposition members complain vocally about the limits and controls placed on them, they have been disinclined to champion systemic changes too aggressively for fear of losing round gained since 1990. Opposition members may see the current system as flawed, but many also believe that the likely alternative is chaos or further repression. Thus they see political demands that threaten the regime too dramatically as counterproductive. In Yemen, the perception that the regime’s removal would lead to a power vacuum and to strife reinforces the view that negotiating with the regime is more prudent than aggressively working to topple it. It is likely, however, that if economic and political stability continue to deteriorate, opposition groups will become more willing in this regard. ELECTIONS IN YEMEN DON’T PROVE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION Sarah Phillips, National Democratic Institute-Yemen, 2008, Beyond the Façade: political reform in the Arab world, eds. M. Ottaway & J. Choucair-Vizoso, p. 245-6 Despite the description of the elections by some international observers as a “positive development in Yemen’s democratization process,” Yemen emerged from the process as more a consolidated pluralized authoritarian state than one necessarily on the path to democracy. The distribution of power and resources remains centralized, and the formal and informal state institutions remain geared toward facilitating this distribution. Nevertheless, the elections were significant, mainly because of the willingness of the diverse members of the JMP to work together. JUDICIARY REFORMS IN YEMEN NECESSARY BUT DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT Sarah Phillips, National Democratic Institute-Yemen, 2008, Beyond the Façade: political reform in the Arab world, eds. M. Ottaway & J. Choucair-Vizoso, p. 248-9 If political reform is to progress significantly, state institutions with not only the capacity but also the political will to enforce the law need to be established. Although many of Yemen’s laws meet international standards on paper, the corruption and weakness in the judiciary and the lack of institutional power granted to the police force severely undermine legal enforcement. Yemeni citizens are theoretically equal before the law, but in practice punishments are unevenly applied with little possibility of recourse, particularly where the regime itself is involved. The executive regularly intervenes in judicial procedures, and judges tend to be politically appointed, which further skews the legal balance in favor of those already in power. It is virtually impossible to seek legal redress under this system without the protection of personal relationships. Yemenis’ attachment to their formal legal institutions is not nearly as high in some other Arab states, such as Egypt, and remolding them is not inconceivable, particularly if the benefits of doing so are clear. The majority of Yemenis are sick of the inefficiencies and inequalities endemic in their formal systems, and genuine reform would probably be well received at the lower level. Again the difficulty lies in the unwillingness of those at the top to reform a system from which they draw personal benefit. LACK OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN YEMEN UNDERMINES DEMOCRATIZATION Sarah Phillips, National Democratic Institute-Yemen, 2008, Beyond the Façade: political reform in the Arab world, eds. M. Ottaway & J. Choucair-Vizoso, p. 253 One frequently cited prerequisite to democratization is that the vast majority of citizens must agree they belong to the same political community. Although most Yemeni citizens do not dispute their identity as Yeminis per se, the link between this identity and sovereign Yemeni state is more tenuous. Yemen has a complex array of subnational tribal and regional identities, some of which receive more loyalty from their members than does the state, which is seen as feckless and corrupt. Yemen’s tribes are often referred to, and often consider themselves, as a state within a state. Tribal leaders do not always grant the government access to the territory under their control, and the number of government soldiers killed for entering an area without the permission of the tribe provides good reason for the state to heed these restrictions. 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