Political Reform in Yemen Threatens U.S. Security Interests

Political Reform in Yemen Threatens U.S. Security Interests

Sarah Phillips, National Democratic Institute-Yemen, 2008, Beyond the Façade: political reform in the Arab world, eds. M. Ottaway & J. Choucair-Vizoso, p. 255-6

Foreign donors’ margin for maneuver is hampered by their own concerns with combating terrorism. This is not likely to change in the near future, particularly if the potential for a serious economic or resource crisis is realized. In the prevailing climate of heightened security concerns, foreign governments tend to prefer reform and funding initiatives that do not squeeze the Yemeni regime too hard, least it retract its support in combating anti-Western terrorist threats. It is by no means just the Yemeni side that is cautious about provoking rapid political changes, democratic or otherwise. Security is the key objective of many donor countries, particularly the United States, and the Yemeni regime is adept at marrying its domestic policies—however antithetical to genuine reform and democratization—to this concern. President Saleh’s tacit warning about the link between Yemen’s stability and the preservation of his own leadership was writ large across his recent electoral platform. Responding publicly to the outcome of the elections, the president reminded his audience that stability under authoritarianism is preferable to state collapse. “Which is better, the dictatorship of Mohammed Sayeed Barre or the situation in Somalia now?” Elsewhere, he played on Western fears that democracy could put Islamist extremists into power: “Our democracy will not be as the US wants it to be in Palestine, yes some Islamic movements are extremis and are not qualified to take power but we all must accept the result whatever it is.” The U.S. administration’s overly congratulatory statement that the elections were “free and fair and will set an example for the region” probably demonstrated to the Yemeni regime that the United States did indeed value stability over greater democratic competition. These types of public statements only reinforce the types of reforms used by pluralized authoritarian states to maintain their positions of power. In the future, the United States and other donors should place more emphasis on differentiating between significant and cosmetic changes, so that the Yemeni government does not continue to treat the ornaments of democracy as though they were its substance.
PUSHING DEMOCRATIZATION ON YEMEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO SECURITY INTERESTS

Sarah Phillips, National Democratic Institute-Yemen, 2008, Beyond the Façade: political reform in the Arab world, eds. M. Ottaway & J. Choucair-Vizoso, p. 257-8

It appears that while outsiders can facilitate the endurance of pluralized authoritarianism and the curtailed margins of free speech and association that it entails, there is probably not a great deal that they can do to dislodge the dominant political balance of power. Pushing too hard for aggressive reform is likely to be counterproductive to the West’s security concerns and also to the Yemeni government domestically, which must emphasize its sovereignty in dealing with the West, lest its opponents use this for political advantage. If significant political changes are to occur in Yemen, it is primarily for the Yemeni regime to choose. The West, however, should still apply consistent pressure in this direction and work to build the capacity of domestic actors who share this goal.

The likelihood of Yemen charting a course from pluralized authoritarianism to democracy is not high in the near-term future. However, the postunification reforms have changed the dynamics of the relationship between state and society in a more than purely superficial manner hand have had an impact on the ways that the state and social forces relate to and interact with one another. Elections may be manipulated and opposition groups hindered and co-opted, but the use of a democratic façade represents a political shift, even if it is not necessarily a democratic one. The location of legitimacy, the modes of political discourse, and the expectations of the citizens are all being remolded to fit within a new political environment in which there is still room for some creative maneuvering for those in Yemen who seek change.

NGOs Ineffective in Yemen

Dirk-Jan Koch, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, Aid from International NGOs: blind spots on the aid allocation map, p. 163

This research found that international NGOs are not disproportionately engaged in countries with low levels of governance. It challenges the view held by many international aid agencies and academics that international NGOs enjoy a comparative advantage in difficult institutional NGOs can play an important role in countries with better levels of governance, for instance to support the voice of marginalized groups, but ideally could focus more of their service delivery efforts in countries where aid cannot be channeled through the government. Such targeting is, according to this research, not yet sufficiently taking place. Consequently, countries like Cote d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic, Yemen and Nigeria do not receive any support through government channels and are neglected by international NGOs. This situation necessitates policy discussions and maybe a policy response.

*Focus Efforts on Women Negative*

U.S. Including Focus on Women Now

Marina Ottaway, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 123

Available evidence suggests that women only become an effective voice in legislatures when they are present in sufficient numbers to constitute a substantial bloc. This evidence has encouraged the launching of programs that seek to increase the number of women in elected positions. The 1995 UN Conference on Women, held in Beijing, adopted as a target that women should occupy 30 percent of parliamentary seats. By March 2000, twenty-one countries had imposed a quota of 20 or 30 percent for at least one house, and an additional country, Finland, has imposed a 50 percent quota. Some Arab governments, including those of Jordan and Egypt, have made an effort to appoint more women to national legislatures and high-level government positions. The United States, which does not advocate a quota system, is nevertheless committed to increasing the presence of women in Middle East legislatures. For example, through the MEPI, the United States is providing training to female political candidates in the hope of increasing women’s presence in the legislatures.
U.S. INCREASING FUNDING THROUGH MEPI FOR WOMEN’S PROJECTS

Marina Ottaway, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 126