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A2 Science diplomacy solves war
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A2 Science diplomacy solves warScience just offers a new means of interstate domination.David Dickson, February 25, 2011. http://www.scidev.net/en/science-and-innovation-policy/editorials/now-is-the-time-for-science-diplomacy-in-the-arab-world.html I have argued previously that science diplomacy — the use of scientific cooperation as a tool of international diplomacy — has a key weakness: despite what its supporters sometimes claim, it can never substitute for political initiatives. Nothing illustrates this more clearly than the lack of any significant follow-through to, or indeed impact of, a speech given by Obama in Cairo in the summer of 2009, in which he publicly advocated the use of closer scientific contacts between the United States and Muslim countries as a form of "soft diplomacy". But science diplomacy can be invaluable when it provides the basis for a genuine scientific partnership between two (or more) countries — and especially when such partnerships allow the sharing of skills and experience, for example through joint teaching or research projects. The danger of this approach, of course, is that the stronger partner may come to dominate, for example in planning or implementing a research project. A2 Sci Dip solved in the AntarcticTheir evidence is hype – the Antarctic Treaty proves science does not prevent interstate friction.Roger Launius, September 17, 2010. http://launiusr.wordpress.com/2010/09/17/governing-antarctica-a-continent-dedicated-to-science-or-a-place-of-geopolitical-rivalry/ Of course, the IGY did indeed play an important role in the resolution of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute, but not in quite the idealistic way that the traditional narrative has suggested. The actual science of the IGY, and the improved understanding of the Antarctic environment that it facilitated, played an important role in the partial resolution of the question of sovereignty. As officials in the treaty nations, especially in Great Britain and the United States, learned more about the reality of the Antarctica environment through the work of IGY—in particular the realization that it contained little or nothing of immediate economic value—they acceded to arguments in favor of internationalizing the continent. There was, in any eventuality, not much of a downside in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the U.S. led an effort to diffuse geopolitical tensions in Antarctica by internationalizing the continent. As the various nations accepted this position they found themselves members of the Antarctic Treaty system’s “exclusive club,” which continues to govern the continent to this day. Initially the Antarctic Treaty signatory countries disagreed on the question of the Soviet Union’s role on the continent. U.S. officials, perhaps somewhat naively, believed that they could create a treaty regime for Antarctica that would exclude the Soviet Union. British officials—who were especially keen to resolve the dispute—argued, more realistically, that the communist superpower would have to be included for any internationalization of Antarctica to work. After some discussion, the British position prevailed. Since the ratification of the Antartic Treaty in 1960 the international partners have jockeyed and cajoled each other seeking to gain advantage, competitive or otherwise, in Antarctic activities. Download 357.18 Kb. Share with your friends:
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