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- Dual use tech can actually be linked to the development of WMD’s and devastating conventional weapons
Mil mod – dual useChina uses relations as cover for military modernization through dual use techHoar 10 [William P. Hoar, New American, “China Embraces U.S. Debt and Technology,” September 28, 2010, http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/reviews/903-correction-please/4704-china-embraces-us-debt-and-technology]-DD China does not want to develop “military ties” with Washington and “reset a positive course” because Beijing loves “peace” and has warm fuzzy feelings for Americans and hopes to enhance the influence of the United States. Anyone who really thinks that is naïve beyond help; many of the policymakers who pretend this to be the case are dangerously duplicitous. Communist China is on a long march for more power. For decades, as a few stalwarts in the U.S. Congress used to point out, the Communist Chinese have been increasingly focused on acquiring U.S. and foreign technology and equipment — in particular dual-use technologies that can be integrated into the People’s Republic of China’s military and industrial bases. What isn’t bought or otherwise transferred is often stolen. Moreover, as the Cox Committee in the U.S. House noted as long ago as 1999, “The PRC has also purchased weapons systems or their components from Israel, France, Britain, and the United States, including air-to-air missiles, air-refueling technology, Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, helicopter parts, and assorted avionics.” Dual use tech can actually be linked to the development of WMD’s and devastating conventional weaponsGoldman and Pollack 97 [Charles and Jonathan, both work @ RAND and prepared this release for the Secretary of Defense, “Engaging China in the International Export Control Process”, 1997, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a325273.pdf]-DD To assess these issues, we first examine the relevant policy context. In the post-Cold War/post-CoCom (post-Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) era, the United States and its allies and security partners are trying to devise new mechanisms and arrangements to restrain or prevent the sale or transfer of military technology or dual-use technology linked to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or destabilizing conventional weapons. Chinese involvement in the export control process was not solicited historically. Indeed, the United States believes that the Chinese have made destabilizing transfers in the past and they could do so again. Because of its previous lack of involvement in this process, China is tied to few binding international norms with respect to export control and nonproliferation, and its adherence to different international agreements is mixed at best. U.S. policymakers also face growing problems in controlling technology flows. The world is entering an era where the challenges of technology transfer and technology control are becoming much more complicated. Technology transfer activities will rely less on delivery of finished military systems, and an increasing number of suppliers will be involved in these processes. Now and in the future, technology transfer will often require delivery of only certain critical components of a weapon system or production facility. As technological capability spreads, technology transfer will rely increasingly on sharing engineering know-how, techniques, and designs, much of which seems to fall principally in the realm of civilian technologies. These intellectual property transfers present much greater challenges for international regimes than transfers of finished weapons systems. Scientific transfers and cooperation are harder to detect since they 3 do not require shipments of large physical objects. In addition, scientific transfers have many legitimate peaceful purposes, making it difficult to distinguish a scientific exchange for weapons system purposes from transactions for power generation, space exploration, or civilian manufacturing technology. Because of changes in the nature of technology transfer and the radically altered international environment following the end of the Cold War, international agreements have become much less powerful instruments in controlling exports of destabilizing technologies. This briefing starts from the proposition that more fully engaging China in the international export control system will foster a reduction in destabilizing transfers, even though the linkage between regimes and transfer behavior appears to be weakening worldwide. Download 357.18 Kb. Share with your friends:
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