Yemeni Report Explores Al-Qa'ida's 'New Strategy' in Southern Yemen



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description to be given to the Kawr al-Awaliq areas would be Tora Bora

-- whose mountain peaks have witnessed the heaviest and fiercest

battles between the NATO coalition forces and the Al-Qa'ida

Organization in Afghanistan.

Will Al-Qa'ida be able to isolate the security units through promoting

the concept of "popular Jihad?"

The new strategy of the Al-Qa'ida Organization in Yemen is based on

four basic fronts:

The first front focuses on reinforcing the idea that the Messenger's

prophecy about the emergence of the Aden-Abyan army has come, by

making the sons and dignitaries of Kawr al-Awaliq in the Abyan-

Shabwah area believe that concept.

Through this direct contact, Al-Qa'ida will be able to revive the idea

of popular Jihad among the local residents. Here is the second front.

The idea of popular Jihad would enable the Al-Qa'ida elements to take

cover and barricade themselves behind the tribes' people, with which

the security forces would avoid confrontation. The Al-Qa'ida elements

would thus be able to survive the dangers lying in wait for them,

which would subsequently lead to achieving the third strategy. The

third strategy is based on isolating the security and military units

by mobilizing the people against them.

The fourth front, however, focuses on avoiding random bomb attacks -

which we shall explain later.

In separate interviews conducted by Al-Masdar Online with Al-Qa'ida's

men, I learned about a term, Al-Ansari, which Al-Qa'ida elements use

to describe members of the security services suspected of affiliation

with Al-Qa'ida.

In mid-September, I paid a visit to Al-Mukalla. My objective was to

find the link through which the Al-Qa'ida elements communicate, but I

failed to do that since what I am searching for is not here. "It is

in Wadi Hadramawt," Abu-Hammam said.

We were to meet before sunrise. I went with him to have tea and

bakhmari, "a Hadramawt resident's preferred breakfast meal."

Moments later, he asks me to stand up. On the way, he talks at length

about what he describes as the light in which he is living.

I set out with him from old Al-Mukalla to Al-Khalaf. The man had

still not finished his talk an hour and a half later, so we scheduled

another meeting. However, he postponed the meeting twice, and I was

responsible for postponing another, after which I left without meeting

with him again.

Until now, Abu-Hammam has not committed any security violation and has

not been harassed.

[Abu-Hammam] I fear to be subjected to harassment without fault

[Al-Umqi] How?

[Abu-Hammam] The security forces can easily accuse you of something

you have not done, of something which even our brothers, the

mujahidin, have not done.

[Al-Umqi] What do you mean?

[Abu-Hammam] Sometimes, security members are forced into carrying out

bombings for extortion purposes. At other times, other sides, such as

drug-dealers, are involved or even ordinary persons who had been

assaulted or whose property had been damaged by security personnel.

To cover up those scandals, they accuse the mujahidin."

During his talk, Abu-Hammam described himself as Al-Ansari, as he is



called by the real Al-Qa'ida members.

Many Al-Qa'ida supporters can be found in the same city, as well as

many infiltrators, hypocrites, and spies -- as Al-Qa'ida describes

them.

When Al-Hasan Ba-Sarah was at home, the security apparatuses raided

his house in Al-Mukalla and dragged him to the PSO prison. After

detaining him for nine months, they released him. The security source

shortly after lists Ba-Zar'ah's name among the casualties of the

suicide attack in Tarim in 2008. In Al-Masdar Online's field

investigation focusing on the governorates of Aden, Hadramawt, and

Abyan, we came across many samples, such as those which can be

considered as elements of the Yemeni intelligence's Al-Qa'ida

Organization [as received]. Other elements can be described as

victims of the intelligence - since they have no relation with the

intelligence or Al-Qa'ida. Others are being taken advantage of by

Al-Qa'ida under the slogan of popular Jihad.

It seems that Al-Qa'ida's preachers were aware of the weak points in

the second front of their new strategy, "popular Jihad," and so they

made sure to add and to stress on the fourth front - which focuses on

avoiding acts such as random bombings.

The zeal of the new fighters - [and the idea of] "popular Jihad" -

will drive them to carry out operations without prior planning or

coordination.

Despite Al-Qa'ida's emphasis on not carrying out random bomb attacks,

excessive zeal has led the young men to do so. You probably remember

the incident, during which soldiers were killed while having breakfast

during Ramadan.

What is shameful about those new fighters is that they are just

youngsters or gangsters so to speak. Youngsters are known for doing

reckless acts, through which they express their strength and tenacity.

Salim sees himself as an Al-Qa'ida member - although, while talking to

Al-Masdar Online, he had an earphone attached to his mobile phone,

from which a song could be heard saying "by coincidence, and out of

all people, I got hooked."

Salim is one example out of scores of youngsters in Lawdar and Ja'ar

in Abyan Governorate attracted by Al-Qa'ida to adopt popular Jihad.

However, according to Al-Miqdad who lives in Zinjibar, those

youngsters have become a burden on Al-Qa'ida because of the sabotage

acts they had independently carried out in defiance of the security

apparatuses, who have been their bitter and permanent enemy for many

years for pursuing them over crimes they had committed.

The local residents describe those new fighters as being "friendly,"

since they take and are addicted to anti-depressants such as Despam,

Restall, and others.

When asking Salim about it, he took out a pack and asked me to try

some pills - so I would write a powerful report about him that would

bring US aircraft.

With the strategy of popular Jihad, the method of battle management

between Al-Qa'ida and the security developed, after having been on an

attack and retreat basis. Now, however, it has become a war on

cities. Al-Qa'ida which dreams of taking control over Kawr al-Awaliq

and seeks to provide the appropriate environment for the emergence of

the Aden-Abyan army is now thinking of assuming control over Jabal

Tharrah located between Lawdar and Al-Bayda Governorate, so the

security forces would not use it as a passageway for reinforcements

and supplies, as has happened in mid-September. Without those

security reinforcements, the unimaginable would have taken place,

especially since security soldiers are now nowhere to be seen in many

districts of Abyan.

[Description of Source: Sanaa Al-Masdar Online in Arabic -- Website of

independent weekly newspaper, critical of government policies; URL:

http://www.al-masdar.com/]

Yemeni 'Sources': Al-Qa'ida Reappears in Abyan, Army Moves Toward Lawdar

GMP20101104105001 Sanaa Al-Wasat Online in Arabic 03 Nov 10

[Unattributed report: "SMM Begins The First Step of Partisan Disintegration; Al-Qa'ida Militants Return to Lawdar, the Army Moves Toward Yasuf"]

Local sources have confirmed to Al-Wasat the reappearance of groups of Al-Qa'ida in Lawdar, Abyan Governorate, and also the return of some of its elements to their houses without any resistance. Among those who returned home is Adil Hardhalah, the main suspect in the killing of the soldiers in what was termed at the time Bloody Friday.

In a move seen as overdue, eyewitnesses stressed that the army, which had remained stationed in the outskirts, started moving to the Yasuf Mountain, located between Lawdar and Mudiyah. The mountain overlooks the eastern area of the entrance of Lawdar, which is the only access point used by the Al-Qa'ida elements. The warplanes started again to fly at low altitudes over Mudiyah and the city of Zinjibar in Abyan, breaking more than once the sound barrier and causing panic and anger among the citizens.

[Passages omitted on the security developments in the different governorates of Yemen]

[Description of Source: Sanaa Al-Wasat Online in Arabic, website of independent political weekly newspaper; URL: http://www.alwasat-ye.net]

Yemen: Al-Qa'ida Elements Attack Employees of Electricity Company in Ja'ar City

GMP20110110139002 Sanaa Al-Watan Online in Arabic 09 Jan 11

[Unattributed report: "Eight Casualties in Al-Qa'ida Attack on Employees in Abyan"]

On 9 January, elements from the Al-Qa'ida Organization in Yemen launched an armed attack against a number of employees in the Electricity Company of Ja'ar city in Abyan Governorate, situated in southern Yemen. The attack led to at least 8 casualties, including a soldier.

A security source told Al-Watan that the attack led to the killing of 3 employees in Ja'ar's Electricity Company, namely Mahfuz Abu-Ali al-Darjaj, Ghassan Salam, and Radwan al-Haydari from Ja'ar, in addition to soldier Nasir Abid, who was accompanying the employees as they were heading to deposit the company's revenues amounting to approximately 10 million rial [corresponding to $ 46,570] in the bank.

The source noted that four others were wounded, namely Haydarah al-Azraq, Abdu Yaslam, Abdallah Mahtish al-Darjaj, and Hamadah al-Qasmah, and later were rushed to one of the hospitals in neighboring Aden governorate.

The source pointed out that the Al-Qa'ida elements, who were riding motor bikes, ambushed the employees in Hajar area, situated between Zinjibar and Ja'ar, by firing on them with Kalashnikov machine guns in order to seize the money.

While it is still unknown whether the revenues were seized or not, the security patrols started investigating the incident and tracking down the criminals in a massive security mobilization covering a number of areas in Ja'ar and the road to Zinjibar, capital of the governorate.

[Description of Source: Sanaa Al-Watan Online in Arabic -- Website of pro-government daily, focusing on local affairs; URL: http://www.alwatanye.net/]

South Yemen's Restive Regions; AQAP Uses Fatwa Allowing Robbery To Fund Attacks

GMP20101230001003 London Al-Sharq al-Awsat Online in Arabic 30 Dec 10

[Report by Arafat Madabish from South Yemen: "South Yemen's Restive Regions;Yemeni Experts: Al-Qa'ida Has Fatwa Sanctioning Rebbery To Fund Attacks" PART 12 and last]



Yemeni authorities say that Al-Qa'ida organization in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP] has used certain areas in south Yemen as a safe haven and hiding places for its leaders, and as a launch pad for carrying out terrorist attacks. A visitor to south Yemen's restive regions would only concede that Al-Qa'ida is present there. Numerous popular circles stress this claim, but most of them say or believe that AQAP in south Yemen is "an official product," which is a controversial issue and will continue to be so for some time.

Even before it was known as AQAP, this organization had carried out a series of attacks in south Yemen from early in the 1990s until late in that decade. These attacks began in Aden with the bombing of US Marines who arrived in Yemen from Somalia. Groups of tourists were attacked late in 1998 by the then banned so-called the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, led by Abu-al-Hasan al-Mihdar. Yemeni security forces arrested and executed Al-Mihdar after he killed a number of Australian and British tourists during a rescue operation to secure the release of the hostages in Abyan Governorate.



The biggest attack which Al-Qa'ida carried out in south Yemen was the targeting of the USS Cole in October 2000 at Aden Port while it was refueling, which left 17 US Marines dead. The organization then carried out a similar attack at Al-Dabbah oil-exporting Port two years after the attack on the USS Cole, targeting the French oil tanker Limburg.

Over the past 10 years, several attacks were launched but were not big ones, and took place mainly in the governorates of Abyan, Shabwah, Aden, and Hadramaut. Similar attacks also took place in north Yemen governorates, including Ma'rib, Sanaa, and adjacent areas. AQAP elements currently appear in public in certain areas of south Yemen.

Over the past 18 months, certain areas in south Yemen have witnessed major armed robberies, involving seizure of large amounts of money, a phenomenon unprecedented in Yemen's history. On 17 August 2009, gunmen robbed a vehicle of an Arab Bank branch in Aden, seizing 100 million riyals, the equivalent of approximately $500,000. On 31 March 2010, gunmen in Zanzibar, the capital of Abyan Governorate, seized 80 million riyals, the equivalent to $400,000, assaulting a government vehicle carrying the salaries of the Ministry of Education employees and teachers in Lawdar District in Abyan Governorate. On 25 September 2010, an armed group seized 200 million riyals, approximately $1 million, from a post office vehicle near Al-Hawtah, capital of Lahj. In all, the gunmen seized in only three assaults almost $2 million. Who was behind those robberies?

On 19 June 2010, an armed group, believed to be affiliated with AQAP, carried out an attack on the old building of the Political Security Apparatus (intelligence) in Al-Tawahi neighborhood near the Queen Victoria Garden in Aden. It was a daring, unprecedented assault, which left 11 guards and male and females employees of the intelligence service and a child of a female employee dead. AQAP claimed responsibility for that attack, saying it was in revenge for military operations by the army and security forces in the Ubaydah Valley in Ma'rib Governorate, in east Yemen. Next day, the security forces carried out an operation in Aden during which they arrested a group they described as the "terrorists elements" involved in the attack on the intelligence building, saying they were suspected of affiliation with Al-Qa'ida. At the time, the Yemeni authorities announced that the leader of the group was called Ghawdal and that it was the same group that robbed the Arab Bank vehicle. They also said that Ghawdal appeared in a video clip on an Arab television channel standing beside one of Al-Qa'ida leaders, and threatening acts of terrorist against US interests in Yemen. The Al-Qa'ida leader, Umayr, was killed in an air strike believed to have been carried out by a US drone at Rafd area in Shabwah Governorate.

In the last six month of 2010, a series of armed attacks were carried out in A byan and Shabwah governorates, targeting security and intelligence headquarters and security patrols, and assassinating intelligence officers and soldiers. The Yemeni government stressed repeatedly that as part of its war on terror, it sought to dry up the sources of funding of Al-Qa'ida as one of the means of combating terrorism. There is no doubt that Al-Qa'ida has managed to get funds in various ways through usual remittances. Fighting terrorism financially is not carried out by the Yemeni government alone, but in cooperation with regional and international partners.

With the exception of the official statements which link and accuse Al-Qa'ida elements of seizing the funds carried by the Arab Bank vehicle, and of attacking the intelligence building in Aden, there is no evidence convicting Al-Qa'ida of seizing the funds to finance its operations in south Yemen. From the three robberies, one can only reach the conclusion that the three robberies took place in a similar method, targeting vehicles carrying funds, not assaulting banks or buildings to seize funds. In addition, Al-Qa'ida itself had not claimed responsibility for the three robberies. Needless to say, it would not claim responsibility if it perpetrated those assaults because it would lose the respect of some quarters and the sympathy of others.

Nu'man Qa'id Sayf, a writer and journalist in Aden, does not rule out the possibility that Al-Qa'ida or one of the "organizations opposed to the Yemeni regime" may resort to robbery "if one or more of the sources of funds is dried up." He describes such sources as having "ideological [affinity with], or sympathetic to Al-Qa'ida." In a statement to Al-Sharq al-Awsat, he said that if restrictions are imposed on one of Al-Qa'ida sources of funds, it would "definitely look for alternatives to cover its needs as quickly as possible. I do not think it would hesitate to resort to robbery." The pretext would be that "according to an Islamic shari'ah fatwa, such acts are sanctioned out of necessity, particularly plundering funds of a state with which Al-Qa'ida is in a state of open war, and of its agencies, or loyalists."

Sayf says that if it can be confirmed that Al-Qa'ida carried out the robberies, these acts would "mean it is taking further steps in its challenge, which would add further burdens on the Yemeni government forces in the confrontation with Al-Qa'ida." He adds: "This might lead to opening a new front, and it would be difficult to speculate about the time, place, and types of attacks and about finding the necessary funds to cover the necessary expenses."

According to observers, what is certain is that Al-Qa'ida needs funds to buy weapons, ammunition, and to cover the expenses of its leaders and elements and to meet other needs. Al-Qa'ida's public sources of fund come from donations and grants by financiers and businessmen sympathetic to it as well as well as from donations by people with [similar] ideological orientations in Yemen and beyond.

Sa'id Ubayn al-Jamahi, an expert in the affairs of Al-Qa'ida organization in Yemen, differs somewhat with what Sayf's views regarding the possibility of Al-Qa'ida resorting to robbery to fund its attacks. He says that given "the ideological background and religious principles on which the organization was built, practicing what is proscribed by the Islamic shar'iah negates the possibility of the organization relying on robberies and plundering to fund its operations." In a statement to Al-Sharq al-Awsat, he said: Al-Qa'ida organization has proved that it has a high and multiple capabilities of collecting funds. However, having recently been forced to rely on a decentralized strategy -- being besieged and its sources of funding being strictly monitored regionally and internationally -- the question arises whether its embracement of the [Islamic] shari'ah background will hold and not change. He answers his question by saying that "the idea of the organization's resorting to what is not religiously sanctioned cannot be ruled o ut in order to safeguard its entity and prevent its collapse. This is particularly possible because Al-Qa'ida in Yemen has no religious scholars specialized in judging shari'ah issues."

Al-Jamahi adds: "By misinterpreting religious texts and adopting shari'ah edicts that involved the organization in issues that it previously shunned, like killing armed forces personnel, I do not rule out the possibility that the organization may resort to robbery. It would resort to such a practice after seeking a fatwa from the shari'ah committee sanctioning resorting to robbery, particularly if this is coupled with zeal and belief in well-intentioned purposes."

Al-Jamahi adds that regarding Al-Qa'ida organization in general, not only its branch in Yemen, he still "rules out the possibility that Al-Qa'ida can be linked to drug trafficking, and the claims that it profits from the revenues of drug trafficking. This charge was imputed to the organization as part of the war on terror. However, it cannot be denied that it may resort to counterfeiting documents and kidnapping people to ask for ransom, as Al-Qa'ida in the Maghreb does. And it may engage in plundering, seeing such acts as legal being booty of war gained after military attacks."

[Description of Source: London Al-Sharq al-Awsat Online in Arabic -- Website of influential London-based pan-Arab Saudi daily; editorial line reflects Saudi official stance. URL: http://www.asharqalawsat.com/]

AQAP Said Waging War on Senior Yemeni Army Officers; Several Soldiers Killed

GMP20110109001003 London Al-Hayah Online in Arabic 09 Jan 11

[Report by Faysal Kakram in Sanaa: Yemen: Al-Qa'ida Wages Open War On Senior Army Officers in Yemeni Governorates"]

A high-ranking Yemeni army commander escaped an attempt on his life by elements believed to be affiliated with Al-Qa'ida organization in Hadramaut Governorate. In another incident, four soldiers were killed in an ambush believed to have been set up by Southern Mobility Movement's [SMM] gunmen in Lahj Governorate.



Al-Qa'ida organization seems to have begun an open war against senior army officers in a number of governorates in revenge for the pursuit of its elements and the military campaigns being launched in distant areas which terrorists are believed to be using as safe havens. Al-Qa'ida gunmen have built fortifications in those desolate areas from which they launch attacks targeting army officers and security centers in a number of governorates, particularly Abyan, Shabwah, and Lahj in south Yemen, and in Hadramaut and Ma'rib in northeast Yemen, and in Sanaa.

Local sources in Hadramaut Governorate told Al-Hayahthat Staff Brig Gen Abd-al-Rahman al-Hulayli, commander of the army brigade stationed in the Al-Khash'ah area, was the target of an assassination attempt on the morning of 8 January. He was lightly wounded but his driver was seriously wounded. Al-Qa'ida gunmen had set up an ambush for his motorcade on the road leading to his workplace west of the township of Shabam in Hadramaut Valley. These sources said that "military and security forces rushed to the scene of the attack where clashes had erupted between the gunmen and the guards."

Military squads specialized in defusing explosives in Abyan Governorate defused an explosive charge placed in the vehicle of Col Nasir Mahdi, director general of the Criminal Investigation Agency in Al-Musaymir village in the Khanfar District. It is believed that Al-Qa'ida-affiliated elements had planted the bomb in the vehicle.



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