A. E. Ruud, U. of Oslo Towards an understanding of Bangladeshi political culture
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- Boycotts of the parliament
- Hartals, in 1999
- Election results, parliamentary elections
- Explaning the political culture in Bangladesh
- Personal rivalry, and the founders
- The war as a defining event
- Patrimonial reciprocity and loyalty
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation. A. E. Ruud, U. of Oslo Towards an understanding of Bangladeshi political culture This paper investigates an aspect of Bangladeshi political culture, that of the rivalry between the two dominant political parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. The rivalry is often intense and violent, and has in most views severe negative consequences on the country’s economy and progress. The rivalry is not easily explained. In terms of socio-economic composition of their respective groups of supporters, the two parties are close to similar. This paper argues that theories based on presumptions about materially based patron-client relationships are insufficient explanations and that the political culture instead should be seen as emotionally charged – that what constitutes and maintains the two separate followings is emotional attachment and rhetoric. In the absence of any defined socio-economic difference between the two, emotional attachment has become a constitutive element in the country’s political culture and is expressed through shows of devotion, respect, loyalty or anger. Bangladesh has been given a number of negative characteristics over the last few years. ‘Politics of intransigence’,1 ‘Democracy on the ground’,2 ‘Desperately seeking a responsible opposition’,3 ‘Imperiled democracy’,4 ‘Destructive politics’,5 ‘Spiralling lawnessness’,6 and ‘Confrontational political culture’.7 Democratic consolidation in Bangladesh, writes….??, ‘has gone off-track’ and ‘the political system continues to be illiberal or at best quasi-liberal’.8 These negative characteristics refer to consequences of the rivalry between the country’s two dominant parties, the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). These two parties have alternated in power since the return of democracy in 1991, a period which has seen drawn out opposition boycotts of parliament, a high incidence of opposition initiated general strikes, and increasing suppression of the opposition by the government. One observer feels that ‘the politics of confrontation’, as it has been called, has ‘grown into a frightening scale’ and is ‘causing havoc on the nation’s democracy and economic advancement’.9 The international anti-corruption organisation Transparency International has put Bangladesh on top of several of its yearly list of most corrupt countries, and Amnesty International states in its report for 2003 that both torture and police brutality were widespread in the country. Amnesty’s report highlighted political violence in particular, stating that ‘Dozens of people died in violence during and after local elections…’ and that ‘Several opposition politicians were assassinated’.10 In May 2004 the American newsmagazine Time characterised Bangladesh as ‘Asia’s most dysfunctional country’ in an article with the heading ‘State of disgrace’.11 Someone else, I am yet to ascertain who, characterised Bangladesh as a ‘failed state’. The latest of these characterisations caused a small tempest of protest in Bangladesh. Among other events and statements, a seminar organised by an NGO and attended by prominent newspapermen and lawyers was held on the theme ‘Bangladesh: Dysfunctional state versus real perspective’.12 They claimed, with some justification, that the characterisations were misjudged and ignored the many achievements that Bangladesh has seen since attaining independence some 30 odd years ago. They acknowledged, however, that these achievements have come by ‘despite natural disaster, corruption and mismanagement’ and that successive governments have failed in several public sectors. They attributed these failures to ‘misuse of power, corruption and mismanagement’. This statement was in many ways representative of the various Bangladesh reactions to the increased focus on the country’s poor governance and a chaotic and often violent political culture: They objected to the characterisations of a failed state but acknowledged the severity of the problems. In an editorial in the widely read English language newspaper The Daily Star, the editor and publisher Mahfuz Anam wrote that the characterisation ‘failed state’ was unjustified because it grouped Bangladesh with collapsed states like Afghanistan, Somalia and Haiti.13 Bangladesh, he felt, was not failing or on the verge of collapse, but he acknowledged the problems in the same vein as the seminar participants above, and believed that a more precise characterisation was ‘failed government’, adding that many of the country’s government institutions ‘are falling apart’. Bangladesh has no doubt seen a number of remarkable achievements since its bloody and devastating war of independence in 1971. HDI figures from UNDP give reason for modest optimism,14 and in terms of economic growth Bangladesh has seen a modest yet steady growth of 4-6 percent per annum over the last 10-15 years.15 This is all the more remarkable in view of the country’s other problems, including natural disasters, poor infrastructure, and a very low level of economic development to start with. However, in most of the recent focus on the country’s achievements and failures, such as in the debate mentioned here, the single most important manmade negative variable on the country’s social stability and economic progress pointed at is the political development and the political culture. The purpose of this paper is to point to the development of the country’s political culture to seek an explanation for this state of affairs. It is the rivalry of the two dominant political parties and the charged atmosphere in which their rivalry is fought out that form the focus of the investigation here. Other aspects of importance are left out. The BNP—AL rivalry The dominant feature of Bangladeshi politics is the rivalry between the two major political parties. After military rule ended and democracy was reintroduced in 1990-91, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) ruled from 1991-1996, Awami League (AL) from 1996-2001, and BNP again from 2001. The two rely to some extent on alliances with a series of other minor parties in order to secure majorities in the first-past-the-post electoral system that the country has adopted. These other parties include the highly fragmented Jatiyo Party (established during the last military regime), various Islamic parties including the Jamaat Islami, and a range of leftist parties. Although these parties are interesting in themselves and speak volumes on the country’s political history and development, the present paper focuses on the rivalry between the two major parties. The BNP-AL rivalry is remarkable because in socio-economic terms there is little or no difference between the two. This is a basic point which is acknowledged by most observers, although there are important nuances which we will return to. The economic policies are almost similar, guided mainly by the liberalisation line that the largest donors in the country prefer. The social composition of the supporters of the two parties are for all practical purposes identical – both comprising poor and rich, middle class, bureaucrats, businessmen, landless labourers, slum dwellers. There is no or only very limited class differences between the two, and no ethnic difference (the population is 98 percent Bengali speaking and 90 percent Muslim). For all the similarities, the rivalry is all the more intense. A serious and very common consequence of the rivalry is the practice of parliamentary boycott. Walkouts from parliament is another common tool of politics. Walkouts may last from a few minutes to several days, whereas boycotts may last whole sessions or more, in some cases entire years. The most dramatic boycott of parliament took place in 1996 when the general election was boycotted by the opposition. This eventually forced the government to hold a new election. There are also boycotts of by-elections, municipal elections, etc. The below summary of parliamentary boycotts indicates that since 1994 the opposition has boycotted the parliament more than it has participated in its proceedings. Boycotts of the parliament First BNP-government: AL boycotts From March 1994, ending in resignation from parliament of all opposition members November 1994, parliament dissolved December 1995 Boycott of general elections February 1996, new elections June 1996
August 1996—January 1997 August 1997—March 1998 June 1999—October 2001 (election) Second BNP-government: AL boycott October 2001 (election)—June 2002 June 2003—ongoing
February 23-25 3 days May 11 8 hours June 13 12 hours (‘dawn-to-dusk hartal’) August 2 30 hours August 22 12 hours September 12 60 hours October [date?] 12 hours November 1, 7, 8, 9, 16 and 25 December 5-6 [?] January 3, 1998 7 hours Source: Shehabuddin 2000. In addition to the nationwide hartals, local hartals are also quite common. An important aspect to the ‘culture of hartals’ is the level of violence which is often – albeit not always – associated with them. A not-too-uncommon sequence of events would include a hartal in protest of high level of prices, during which someone would be beaten, arrested or killed, and in protest a new hartal would be called. In spite of the misgivings among the diplomatic community, aid workers and the business community, and in spite of the increased level of violence and of corruption, all of which has found place under the aegis of either a BNP or an AL government, voters’ support for the two rivals does not seem to have dampened. Quite the contrary. Both have increased their share of votes cast quite substantially from about 30 percent to about 40 percent between 1991 and 2001. This increase is all the more remarkable given the increase in the proportion of voters to the total electorate, from 55 percent to 75 percent. If calculated as ‘mobilised vote’ (i.e. the proportion of the total electorate that each party mobilise into casting a vote), both AL and BNP have increased their share from about 15 percent to 32 percent. Election results, parliamentary elections Votes 1991 February 1996 June 2001 October AL 30,81 37,47 40,21 BNP 30,08 33,34 40,86 Jatiyo Party 11,92 16,10 Jamati Islami 12,13 8,47 Votes cast: 55,35 75,72 Sources: 1991: Maniruzzaman 1992, 212; 1996: Kochanek 1997; 2001: Rashiduzzaman 2002. In summary: In the midst of chaos and poor governance, the two main political parties maintain and substantially increase their popular support. What we are looking for then, is a political culture that frightens observers but still manages to attract voters and popular support. Explaning the political culture in Bangladesh Although a whole lot cannot be said to have been written on the country’s political culture, a few Bangladesh observers have offered explanations that are likely to have wider appeals. Stanley A. Kochanek, who has followed Bangladeshi politics for decades, holds in an article that the problems of governance in the country ‘are deeply rooted in the country’s historical experience and the behaviour and values of the Bangladeshi elite’.17 He mentions patrimonial politics and patron-client relationships as among the main elements that deny a fair chance to the parliamentary system. The elite in the country is relatively small and recent, he writes, but it has strong roots in the countryside where it has the mainstay of its popular support. Within the elite, ‘leadership is highly personalized, based on patrimonial authority and loyalty, and maintained through a complex, informal network of patron-client relations’. It is the strength of the patron-client relationships and of patrimonial politics which prevent the formation of horizontal relationships and larger classbased or corporate ties. The patron-client relationships are formed within a moral universe that legitimizes hierarchy and the right or obligation of the superior to be superior and protect the lesser. Hence, Kochanek writes, ‘leaders are expected to be authoritarian and authority becomes highly personalized’.18 Another theory comes out in Mobasser Monem’s question of a link between ‘confrontational politics’ and economic liberalisation in Bangladesh. He basically answers that economic liberalisation has aggravated the culture of confrontational politics and democratic decay.19 But the confrontational politics itself is based on two historical developments, he asserts. In the country’s ‘duopolistic system’ the two main parties need pay no attention to allies, supporters or even rank and file. The reason is that within a duopolistic system the voters have no choice but to support either of the two dominant parties. A second development is, he asserts, that ‘a class of businessmen, distributive traders, retailers and rent-seeking class’ have entered into politics in a big way. He calculates that the business community accounts from more than 70 percent of the membership of parliament in 2001. Previously important groups, such as lawyers and professionals, are down from a combined 40 percent in 1973 to 17 percent in 2001. That businessmen have found politics to be an important ‘medium of business’ has had severe consequences for the country’s political culture. These are people who are ‘uninitiated in the art of responsible business and government’. What the country lacks, he asserts, is ‘a competent and responsible set of people’.20 A historical explanation… [fill in] These various theories have much to recommend themselves as they point to three central issues: The economic elites’ dominance over the country’s political system, the destructive consequences of the war of liberation and the subsequent military regimes, and the continued relevance of patron-client relationships in forming hierarchical political alliances. There are aspects of the country’s political culture, however, that cannot easily be explained by these theories. In particular two issues are interesting: The emotional intensity of the rivalry between the AL and the BNP, and the focus on these parties’ leaders and their immediate predecessors. Personal rivalry, and the founders The importance of the persons of the nation’s leaders comes out in the 2001 issue of security for the outgoing prime minister. In June 2001, at the very end of its term (before a technocratic caretaker government took over to prepare for the elections), prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government passed the ‘Father of the Nation Family Members Security Act’. This happened at a time when Sheikh Hasina had received death threats following the trials of those involved in her father’s assassination. Her father was Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, prime minister from 1971 until he was assassinated in 1975. Sheikh Hasina and her sister Sheikh Rehana were the only close family members to survive the assassination. The act passed by Sheikh Hasina’s government entitled them both to lifelong state security by the Special Security Forces – which otherwise looked after the prime minister, president and other high profile members of the state. The sisters were also given houses at the state’s expense, and were entitled to some other state facilities.21 A few days later the government stepped down and elections were held three months later under the caretaker government. Sheikh Hasina and the AL lost the election. Fifty days into its tenure, the next government – a BNP government – cancelled the act. The AL protested and termed the government’s move ‘part of a conspiracy to kill Sheikh Hasina and her sister’.22 The party also called for an 8-hour general strike in protest. This strike was the first called by AL since its loss of power and came in spite of a promise the AL had made while in power of not resorting to such weapons.23 However, the matter of the personal security of the leader of the party was seemingly deemed sufficiently important for the party to break its promise to the electorate, and to start a nationwide mobilisation of its cadre and activists to ensure a successful general strike. In other words, the nation was asked to stay indoors and away from shops, offices and other business in order to protest against the removal of a special security provision for the party’s leader. Either that, or it was a flimsy excuse exploited to regain a useful political weapon – the general strike.24 However, as we shall see, the rhetoric of the leaders’ persons and their well being has returned on several occasions and given opportunity for political action. Even more important than the leaders of today, are the leaders of yesterday – with each party hailing their founders in a ‘cult of personality’.25 In a content analysis of election speeches in 1990-91, T. Maniruzzaman found that in 87 percent of her speeches Khaleda Zia invoked the name of her late husband – former military dictator and BNP’s founder Ziaur Rahman – and the village development programme associated with him.26 She also made extensive use of her election speeches to make derogatory remarks on her opponent’s father. In two out of three speeches she found it necessary to draw attention to the AL government of 1971-75, which she characterised as the ‘years of darkness’. Sheikh Hasina, on her part, made as much use of her inheritance as did Khaleda. The main theme of Sheikh Hasina’s speeches was the promise to fulfil her father Mujibur’s dream of a ‘Golden Bengal’. She also promised to punish his killers, and depicted his government as a golden era. Maniruzzaman adds that ‘Given the abysmal poverty of the Bangladesh people there was not much discussion on the strategy of economic development by the two parties’. For the AL Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the present leader’s father who was assassinated in 1975, is the iconic leader. A brief background may be necessary. Sheikh Mujibur was the leader of the political movement for Bengali autonomy within the Pakistani state since the mid-1950s. He was undoubtedly the most prominent political figure in East Pakistan and his party, Awami League, won almost all that could be won in the provincial and national elections in 1970. Negotiations with the military leadership of the joint Pakistani state for transfer of power to a democratic government stranded in March 1971, and according to the Awami League, Mujibur declared independence on 26 March. According to standard history books his speech amounted to a call for independence – falling short of being an actual declaration. The point is disputed, as we shall see below. During the civil war (or liberation war, or war of independence) that erupted, Mujibur sat imprisoned in West Pakistan. After the war he returned to the newly independent nation, where he was hailed and installed as president. Within a short time, however, his government showed signs of nepotism and corruption, and in 1974 Mujibur introduced one party rule. He was killed in a bloody coup in 1975, along with most of his family. He was survived only by two daughters, of whom Sheikh Hasina is one. Mujibur is affectionately and officially called Bangabandhu – Bengal’s friend. In addition he is also officially called ‘Father of the nation’. Following an ordinance issued by his daughter when she became prime minister in 1996, portraits of her father were placed in all government offices and schools, and the date he was assassinated (15 August) was declared a day of national mourning. The first such mourning extended over three days. The daughter also had the parliament repeal the Indemnity Ordinance, which had prevented persecution and trial of those involved in the 1975 assassination, and moved to arrest those involved in the coup.27 In addition, his party, or hers, celebrates or marks events like his birthday and his ‘homecoming day’ (his return from prison in West Pakistan). The party also celebrates with enthusiasm all important anniversaries of the liberation war with processions and meetings at war memorials. Such events are also used to highlight Mujibur’s role. The celebration of the party’s founding, for instance, is used to highlight the role of Mujibur by placing a wreath around his portrait.28 For the BNP, on the other hand, the iconic leader is Ziaur Rahman, the late husband of the presentday BNP leader and prime minister, Khaleda Zia. Ziaur was the military leader of the war of independence; as a major in the Bengali part of the Pakistani army and stationed in Bengal, he mutinied against his superiors in March 1971 and soon became effective military head of the regular military resistance throughout the war of independence. After the war he became chief of the armed forces. A few months after Mujibur was assassinated in 1975, Zia assumed power of the country and led it through a relatively calm and prosperous period of about 6 years. He was assassinated in 1981. The BNP, the party he founded, today refer to him as Shaheed President Ziaur – ‘martyred president’. The party regularly marks his birth and death anniversaries, mostly with extensive programmes over several days. Such celebrations include cultural functions and processions. In a symbolic gesture, they also distribute warm clothes to the poor and hand out the Shaheed Zia Smriti Award (Martyr Zia’s Memorial Award). They also place a wreath at his tomb and offer prayers.29 The founders and their memories and memorials are an important arena for political statements and counter statements by the two parties, also when in control of the government. To hail and promote their respective predecessors seems to have become a crucial element in the political legitimacy of the two parties, or the two ladies. After coming to power in 2001, the BNP government proposed to spend Tk 100 crore for the renovation of Ziaur’s tomb. At the same time the government proposed to suspend the construction of a monument commemorating the war of independence30 – the memory and memorials of the war of independence constitute a domain that the AL seeks to appropriate. On its part, on coming to power in 1996, the AL government removed the bridge that led out to the small island where Ziaur’s tomb is located.31 The bridge was removed on the grounds that it was in poor condition and needed repair. Police were placed on the site, allegedly to prevent trespassers. This caused an uproar from the BNP and the bridge was later reopened. But the incident is indicative of the importance attached to the parties’ late founders. At the same point of time, the AL government also discussed changing the name of the Zia International Airport (in Dhaka), although this did not happen. The government did, however, cancel the National Solidarity Day, a public holiday established by Ziaur in 1976 and celebrated on the date that he took power in 1975. Quite often, the statements and counter statements take on a very personal and vindictive colour. An instance was when Sheikh Hasina said she doubted that it was actually Ziaur who had been buried in the tomb that the BNP leadership regularly visited and offered prayers at. She challenged them to verify their claims with a DNA-test.32 An additional quirk is the issue of Khaleda Zia’s birthday. BNP and Khaleda Zia hold that her birthday is 15 August, which to them is a day of celebration. 15 August is also the date on which Sheikh Mujibur was murdered and to the AL and Sheikh Hasina personally a day of mourning. AL insists that it is not the real date of birth of Khaleda Zia, but that the date has been picked as a deliberate insult to Sheikh Hasina and to Mujibur and his memory.33 The BNP’s increased attention on Ziaur’s legacy seems to have come at least partly as a reaction to the uncensored official honouring bestowed on the personification of the rival party. The second Khaleda Zia government initiated a Tk 300 million Ziaur memorial (which later turned out more costly).34 Contests over the past An interesting aspect of the active promotion of their respective founder-heros comes out in the issue of the ‘proclaimer’. This issue shows that not only is inheritance important to the political legitimacy of the two parties, and something to contest over, it also shows that political legitimacy is anchored in the 1971 war of independence. BNP has increasingly insisted that Ziaur be treated on par with Mujibur as main mover behind the war of liberation. The party now calls Ziaur ‘Proclaimer of independence’, and asserts that it was he who proclaimed Bangladesh’ independence in a military radio broadcast on 26 March 1971. On the BNP website, a recorded voice says ‘I, Major Ziaur Rahman, do hereby declare independence of Bangladesh’.35 In 2003 Ziaur’s widow Khaleda conferred the highest national award on both Ziaur and Mujibur simultaneously, in what may have been a reconciliatory move but equally one that conferred equal status to the two – challenging her opponent’s view that Mujibur was supreme.36 In prime minister Khaleda Zia’s words on that occasion, it was following Ziaur’s announcement that ‘students, teachers, journalists, intellectuals, farmers, workers … the armed forces … were imbued with fresh confidence [and could] stand against the occupation forces’.37 AL contests this view because in their opinion and in their official history, this fresh confidence and the willingness of the Bangladeshi people to fight the Pakistani forces came from the declaration of independence that Mujibur made a few hours before Zia. The effort to promote Ziaur to the heights of national pantheon was taken a step further in July 2004 with the publication of a new edition of the official history of the war of liberation, the voluminous printed Swadhinota Juddher Dolilpatro. The volumes contain documents and official versions of historical events connected with the liberation war. In the 2003 edition a new chapter has been added, entitled ‘The first proclamation of independence by Major Zia’.38 AL countered that this statement was in violation of the constitution, which says Mujibur declared independence, and that any other claim is liable to persecution.39 ‘Denying the proclamation of independence by Bangabandhu equals to denial of the emergence of Bangladesh and its constitution’, held Sheikh Hasina.40 In other word, suggesting that Ziaur proclaimed independence first amounts to something close to treason. The 1971 war of liberation has taken on a role as a defining event in the national rhetoric, or in the discourse of the nation’s identity. This role seems relatively new, at least in some respects. In a speech on national television marking her first year in power, Sheikh Hasina said that her greatest achievement was resurrection of the history and heritage of the Bangladesh nation and return of the ‘spirit’ of 1971.41 This was a reference to the values of secularism, nationalism and socialism that constituted the basis of the independence movement. At the same time it was a claim that projected herself and the AL as the best or only custodians of these values When the AL won the election in 1996, writes Kochanek, Sheikh Hasina ‘saw the League’s victory as a restoration to power of the rightful rulers of Bangladesh and the defeat of the anti-liberation forces that had usurped power …’.42 The ‘Father of the Nation Family Members Security Act’, which came at the end of her government’s tenure, legally tied the government – of whichever party – to provide particularly extensive security measures and housing to her and her sister.43 It was the iconic status of Mujibur as the ‘father of the nation’ that legitimised these measures. No similar measures were awarded to family members of other assassinated state leaders, for instance of president Ziaur Rahman. The act was politically useful in that it singled out the AL and Sheikh Hasina for special status. The AL seeks to appropriate the war of independence as its domain by portraying itself as the custodian of its legacy and heirs of its heroes. Thus it represents the only true nationalists. This has caused quite a grudge among members of the BNP. After all, it is only fair to keep in mind that even if the AL claims itself to be the heir of the independence movement, Ziaur Rahman was one of the main figures in the military resistance and a key figure in the creation of Bangladeshi independence. In this light the issue of the ‘proclaimer of independence’ is part of a quest and a rivalry over which party can claim to be the more legitimate heir of the quests and the values of the independence war. However, when the official history of the war of independence was first conceived, by Ziaur as president, there was no effort to promote him as a co-architect of independence alongside Mujibur. The issue of the rightful ‘proclaimer’ was introduced at a later stage by his widow in an effort to appropriate some of the lustre of the war. Another revealing incident shows slightly contradictory notes among BNP members. A senior BNP politician, SQ Chowdhury, was in 2003 was forwarded by the BNP government as a candidate for the position of secretary general of the Organisation of Islamic Countries. The AL claimed that he had an anti-liberation background and that he had committed serious crimes during the 1971 war.44 Eventually SQ Chowdhury lost the OIC vote, and the BNP blamed the AL’s war crime claims for the defeat. Both the BNP and SQ Chowdury himself argued that the AL seemed to have taken a ‘lease on patriotism’.45 Contestations over the role and importance of Mujibur and Ziaur in the war of liberation point to the role of the war in political legitimacy in the country. As a catastrophic event with its heros and traitors it has become a defining event in Bangladeshi politics. That the AL’s appropriation of the war of liberation and its heritage cause envy among its opponents in the BNP is an indication of the success of the claim. The war as a defining event SQ Chowdhury also claimed in a separate statement that it was possible for anyone to become a ‘freedom fighter’, merely by joining the AL. However true this may be, the fact is that it does not happen all that often. Most people do not change their political coats, even when their party looses an election. There are two possible reasons for this. One is that affiliation to one’s party is conceived of in highly emotional terms, and subsequently so is any effort to abandon one’s party. There seems to be, at least on select occasions but probably more generally, a strong demand for loyalty to the cause and to the heroes and for emotional attachment. Conversely, there are strong reactions to acts that may be interpreted as ‘treacherous’. More of this below. Another reason for why people do not change party often, and one that forms a backdrop to the first, is that the war of liberation is a highly charged theme in Bangladeshi society in general (not just the select few at the top), one which divides the society. An illustration can be taken from the small town (large village) of Joydebpur, just outside of Dhaka. Afzal Hossein Kaiser’s family was wealthy by local standards and had prospered during the Pakistan years.46 An important element in their prosperity, had been his father’s ability to position himself in the political institutions of local government that were introduced in the 1950s and 1960s. The family maintained close contacts with local bureaucrats and other powerfuls, and it owned land. The family did not support the war of independence, but they probably did not actively oppose the liberation struggle either. However, after the war they were termed collaborators and after summary court hearings lost their land, houses and positions. All positions of influence in Joydebpur were taken over by members of the Awami League, mostly sons of local educated middle class families. Afzal remembers them to have been spiteful and vengeful against his family, whom they variously termed anti-national, capitalist bourgeois or traitor. Having suffered further humiliations, Afzal’s father died a few years later. In 1976 the family got some of the land and the houses back, except the largest which now contained a hospital. This hospital was run by a doctor who was also one of the front Awami Leaguers. Under the military governments of Ziaur and Ershad (1982-1990), Afzal rebuilt his family’s position. With democracy he joined the BNP and has reasserted his family’s position in Joydebpur, as an elected representative on the newly established municipality board. This lends some colour and background to Kochanek’s assertion, that many key sectors of Bangladeshi society harbour ‘deep seated resentment’ against Hasina and her father Mujibur.47 AL’s assertion is that the war of independence was a popular uprising of the masses, and that it brought in the only legitimate representative of the people’s will, the Awami League. A somewhat more nuanced picture would suggest that local leadership was formed by the rural-based educated elite, the district lawyers, doctors, school teachers and some traders.48 Even if most Bengalis were in favour of breaking away from the joint Pakistan state (the extent to which the 80 percent uneducated had an idea or gave a dime is entirely in the blue), quite a few were still against it and many were hesitant or lukewarm. Still more were at an early point disenchanted with the chaotic and nepotistic rule of Mujibur. The disenchanted and the neutral were easily persuaded into Ziaur’s regime a few years later, a regime that embraced local powerfuls of most colours in order to create political stability in the countryside. Ziaur later established the BNP on a concoction of former leftists, religious fundamentalists, pro-Chinese radicals, wealthy landowners, businessmen and disenchanted members of the AL.49 To a considerable extent those who had been introduced into positions of power by Mujibur as a reward for their role in the 1971 war, were squeezed out by Ziaur in order to benefit efficiency and professionalism in the administration. In their stead, the ‘Zia restoration’ reintroduced those excluded by AL back into their positions of power and influence.50 In the military governments of the late 1970s and the 1980s, former freedom fighters played only a limited role. A main difference between the AL and the BNP stems from this development, a difference which is not so much a socio-economic difference as it is ideological. AL’s founder and the republic’s first president, Mujibur, established the republic with a constitution that stated it to be both secular and socialist. He also banned religious parties. These acts were obvious references to Bengal’s secular and modernist traditions, dating back to the cultural and political developments of undivided Bengal in the 19th and early 20th centuries. It was a theme popular with Bangladesh’s educated classes and had formed an important element in the student uprising against the joint and Muslim Pakistan state. Mujibur later softened his stand, but this is oftenmost overlooked by the AL today. Ziaur, on the other hand, expressed slightly more conservative and Islamic values, and he inter alia permitted religious parties, changed the official name of the language and people from Bengali to Bangladeshi, and initiated other such symbolic measures.51 This difference is significant in explaining the division of the electorate in two opposing camps. As the story of Afzal tells us, it is partly to do with personal life histories. The story of the war of liberation and the personal sacrifices in it, is a highly emotional, sensitive and charged story. It has become a main arena for contestation of credentials. In this perspective, the two leaders, Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina, are not simple ‘patrons’ in the sense of being distributors of boons. A very crucial aspect of their respective position is not formed by their dexterity as linchpins in a redistributive network. In that case they could have been replaced at some point, or challenged, as the case very often is for village level leaders or faction leaders of minor political parties. Rather, Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina are irreplaceable symbols personifying the ideological foundation of Bangladesh, a personification which to many is tied to a history of personal suffering. The personification of the values of the freedom struggle is an important aspect of the historical development of the country’s political culture. There are, however, still questions to be asked. The vote percentage for the BNP and the AL was 40:40 in 2001. This figure is unlikely to tally with ideological divisions in the 1970s. Although ‘once an AL family, always an AL family’ is likely to be a fair description of most political loyalties, there is still other aspects of political affiliation that cannot be accounted for by historical projections only. The increase in mobilised vote, for instance, suggests that new voters are attracted to the two parties. There are also the many new voters to account for, and the millions of migrants from the countryside to less closely knit urban areas. Rather than argue that loyalties are projected from the past, it is necessary to understand the past as an environment, a discourse, in which political loyalty is expressed. Patrimonial reciprocity and loyalty In a sense the emotional element identified above is unnecessary in the exchange of votes for material support that in one view has formed political parties and political culture in South Asia. However, the emotional element does have a place in the model of patrimonialism. Patron-client relationships were in the anthropological and village studies traditions of the 1950s and 1960s generally understood to be formed within a hierarchical moral universe, where the superior protected and the inferior followed, and where strong norms tied both parties into a long term relationship. It is for instance common for patron-client relationships in South Asia to be coated in kinship terminology, where relationships between landowners and labourers were constructed as fictitious kinship relationships. The anthropologist Marvin Davis challenged this view and held that such relationships were much more ‘reciprocal’, so that the ‘inferior’ could actually exchange his patron for another if the opportunity arose.52 Davis’s own material brings out this, although it also shows that one of the ‘elements’ that are reciprocally exchanged is respect and personal engagement. His Torkotala village politician received the political support of the low caste village Bagdis by accepting their claim to a higher ritual status and partaking in their ceremonies. From Nepal, Kondos shows that people understand personal bonds to be prior to material exchange, so that a long term relationship of trust needs to be established before requests can be made.53 Other ethnographies and historical accounts suggest in the same vein that political loyalty is primarily based on an element of personal engagement and involvement. An emotional attachment to either Khaleda Zia and her late husband or to Sheikh Hasina and her assassinated father thus becomes a necessary element in the constitution of the patron-client relationships that makes it possible for followers to make demands on their superiors. A last set of questions that follow from this is whether the emotional element is a mere rhetorical gloss over hard core competition for resources and positions, and whether or not the issue of emotions and respect is what politics in Bangladesh is all about. The case of the sacking of the president in 2002 shows that emotional attachment is a requirement beyond mere words. It seems that the requirement for emotional attachment includes demands on one’s time and energy, and in some cases even one’s well being. In June 2002 the republic’s president AQM Badruddoza Chowdhury was forced to step down. Badruddoza Chowdhury was one of the founding members of the BNP and had been member of its leadership since then. He became the republic’s president in 2001, following the BNP’s election victory. Seven months later, young parliamentarians in the BNP demanded impeachment of him, and after a hefty few days he felt forced to resign from his post. His offence and what had caused the uproar in the first place, was his ‘attitude towards the party’ (i.e. the BNP). The core of the matter was that Badruddoza had not visited Ziaur’s grave on the 21st death anniversary of BNP’s founder Ziaur a few days earlier. Besides, in a message which he had given on that day he had failed to mention Ziaur’s contribution to the war of liberation. This allegedly caused great offence in the party leadership. In one report, the whole BNP parliamentary party, and not just some hotheaded young parliamentarians, accused him of ‘betraying the party’. The meeting that passed this resolution was presided over by prime minister Khaleda Zia herself. Badruddoza Chowdhury’s own defence was they he sought to be neutral, as a president should and in accordance with the constitution. Members of the BNP, however, objected to this and questioned how someone nominated by the party could be neutral.54 Reports suggest that there may have been other motives behind the outcry and the sacking of Badruddoza. His son, Mani Chowdhury, who was also a BNP member of parliament, had recently received the opposition leader Sheikh Hasina at his constituency. To some this was a questionable behaviour. Another event during the same few days was that the prime minister’s son, Tareque Rahman, was introduced into the party leadership as joint secretary-general. It was suggested that Badruddoza’s own ambitions or principles made it difficult to accommodate the crown prince. Although there may have been other motives behind the move to make Badruddoza resign and that these serve as sufficient explanations, it is none the less interesting to note the kind of language the reasoning was coated in, and that this language served as a lever. Badruddoza had a long record of service with the BNP and was known as a ‘staunch Zia loyalist’. This, however, was not sufficient to save him. He failed to show loyalty to the party and its founder-hero, even in a constitutionally neutral position. In other words, the demand from the party was that he ought to have exceeded the limits of his office in order to show his loyalty and attachment. In a sense it seems that he had to stick his neck out and take risks in order for his loyalty to be believed. Only when engaged beyond the call of duty is the loyalty credible. 22 September 2004 Reference list Ahmed, Nizam U., 1995. Party politics in Bangladesh’s local government: The 1994 city corporation elections. Asian Survey XXXV 11. Alam, A.M. Quamrul, 1993. The nature of the Bangladesh state in the post-1975 period. Contemporary South Asia 2, 3. Bertocci, Peter J., 1982. Bangladesh in the early 1980s: Praetorian politics in an intermediate regime. Asian Survey XXII 10. Davis, Marvin, 1983. Rank and rivalry: the politics of inequality in rural West Bengal. Cambridge UP. Hakim, Muhammad A., 1994. The Mirpur parliamentary by-election in Bangladesh. Asian Survey XXXIV 8. Hossain, Akhtar, 2000. Anatomy of hartal politics in Bangladesh. Asian Survey XL 3. Hossain, Golam 1995. Bangladesh in 1994: Democracy at risk. Asian Survey XXXV 2. Hossain, Golam, 1996. Bangladesh in 1995: Politics of intransigence. Asian Survey XXXVI 2. Huque, Ahmed Shafiqul and Muhammad Yeahia Akhter, 1987. The ubiquity of Islam: Religion and society in Bangladesh. Pacific Affairs 60 2. Jahan, Rounaq, 2003. Bangladesh in 2002: Imperiled democracy? Asian Survey LXIII 1. Jahan, Rounaq, 2004. Bangladesh in 2003: Vibrant democracy or destructive politics? Asian Survey XLIV 1. Khan, Mohammed Mohabbat, undat. Political and administrative corruption: Concepts, comparative experiences and Bangladesh case. A paper prepared for Transparency International – Bangladeshi Chapter. Khan, Zillur A., 1994. Bangladesh in 1993: Values, identity, and development. Asian Survey XXXIV 2. Kochanek, Stanley A. 1998. Bangladesh in 1997: The honeymoon is over. Asian Survey XXXVIII, 2. Kochanek, Stanley A., 1997. Bangladesh in 1996: The 25th year of independence. Asian Survey XXXVII 2. Kochanek, Stanley A., 2000. Governance, patronage politics and democratic transition in Bangladesh. Asian Survey 2000 XL, 3. Kondos, Alex, 1987. ‘The question of “corruption” in Nepal’. Mankind (New South Wales) 17, 1. Maniruzzaman, Talukder, 1992. The fall of the military dictator: 1991 elections and the prospect of civilian rule in Bangladesh. Pacific Affairs 65, 2. Monem, Mobasser, 2004. Confrontational political culture and economic liberalisation in Bangladesh: Is there a link? Paper for 18th Conference on Modern Asian Studies Lund, Panel 41. Murshid, Tazeen M., 1997. State, nation, identity: The quest for legitimacy in Bangladesh. South Asia XX 2. Rashiduzzaman, M. 1997. Political unrest and democracy in Bangladesh. Asian Survey XXXVII 3. Rashiduzzaman, M., 2001. Bangladesh in 2000: Searching for better governance? Asian Survey XLI 1. Rashiduzzaman, M., 2002. Bangladesh in 2001: The election and a new political reality? Asian Survey XLII 1. Shehabuddin, Elora, 1999. Bangladesh in 1998: Democracy on the ground. Asian Survey XXXIX 1. Shehabuddin, Elora, 2000. Bangladesh in 1999: Desparately seeking a responsible opposition. Asian Survey XL 1. 1 Hossain 1996, 196. 2 Shehabuddin, 1999, 148. 3 Shehabuddin 2000, 181. 4 Jahan 2003, 222. 5 Jahan 2004, 56. 6 Rashiduzzaman 2001, 122. 7 Monem 2004, 1. 8 Check reference, s. 291. 9 Monem 2004, 1. 10 Amnesty International, Bangladesh 2003. web.amnesty.org (240804). 11 Time 050404, www.time.com (240804). 12 Daily Star 290604 (060904). 13 Daily Star, editorial ‘Speaking up: ‘Failed state’ and Bangladesh’’, 110604 (070904). 14 UNDP Human Development Report 2003. 15 Asian Development Bank, report…? 16 Shehabuddin 2000, 184. One crore is 10 million. Tk 100 crore equals approx. US$ 17 million. 17 Kochanek 2000, 530; see also Bertocci 1982. 18 Kochanek 2000, 548. 19 Monem 2004, 3. 20 Monem 2004, 8-9; for similar arguments see…. 21 Daily Star 031201 (140904). 22 Daily Star 021201 (140904). 23 Daily Star 011201 (140904), editorial ‘Sheikh Hasina breaks her pledge on hartal’. 24 On 21 August 2004 grenades were launched at a meeting presided over by Sheikh Hasina. 20 people were killed and 200 injured. Sheikh Hasina, who is generally believed to have been the target, survived. The event lends credence to the AL’s claim that the government paid insufficient attention to her security situation. However, the event cannot be counted as a confirmation of a claim made three years earlier, nor does it in itself explain why the AL made a political issue out of it rather than seek a solution with the government. 25 Khan 1994, 162. 26 Maniruzzaman 1992, 209-210. 27 Kochanek 1998, 140; Kochanek 2000, 535; Khan 1994, 162. 28 Daily Star 230603 (080803). 29 For instance Daily Star 120103, 180103. 30 Daily Star 200602 (180304). The sum equals Tk 1 billion, which sounds exaggerated. 31 Kochanek 1998, 137, 141. 32 Daily Star 200602 (180304). 33 Kochanek 1998, 137, Daily Star 310803. 34 Prothom Alo 131003. 35 www.bnpbd.com. 36 The Independent 260303, Daily Star 260303. 37 The Independent 260303. 38 Daily Star 090704 (250804). 39 Daily Star 110704 (250804). 40 Daily Star 150704 (240804). 41 Dhaka Courier 270697, cited in Kochanek 1998, 141. 42 Kochanek 2000, 535. 43 Daily Star 010403. 44 Daily Star 120603 (160603), 150603 (180603). 45 Daily Star 120603? 46 Various interviews Joydebpur 240999. 47 Kochanek 1997, 141. 48 Kochanek 2000, 532. 49 Kochanek 2000, 533. 50 Bertocci 1982, 995. 51 Murshid 1997; Huque & Akhter 1987. 52 Davis 1983. 53 Kondos 1987. 54 Daily Star 200602 (180304), Frontline 06-190702 ’The sacking of a president’ (180304). 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