Giant conflict leads China to pursue the South China Sea
Ruscheinski 2002 (Stephen J., China’s Energy Security and the South China Sea, Navy Lt Commander, http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:2guhFzZMAAkJ:www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc%3FLocation%3DU2%26doc%3DGetTRDoc.pdf%26AD%3DADA407062+%22south+china+sea%22+resources+china+aggression+energy&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgA6LSEautbd0CJT9XMT68BZK0ZA0L5Q8DsoNwbU7aZ_DL35V1TtmirOGwWC9SrFWNFumMPHlULlNAllDwgNjbpy_kxEY4hC8Ni79TPow31xnmgWOIVDVNT8p7tkiO5c3lt8zd2&sig=AHIEtbRbH28pjoOMDoYXV4-VSuUbPPIDwA)
Under the conditions listed above, the South China Sea is not considered vital to China's energy security, but what circumstances could change this deduction? Two concurrent conditions would need to be realized for access to become a potential vital Chinese interest. First, the existence of substantial exploitable reserves in the South China Sea (specifically, the Spratlys) would need to be proven: however, as demonstrated above, this factor alone would not make access vital to the Chinese. The primary factor that would necessitate access becoming a vital interest is the replacement of peacetime conditions with that of catastrophic international crisis. If a crisis such as world war was responsible for completely cutting off oil supplies to the worldwide market, the necessity for oil might be enough for China to deem military conquest of territories in the South China Sea as vital to their energy security, especially if it believes no other options are available. However, without these two conditions, access to the South China Sea will not be considered vital to China's energy security for some time to come.
Impact- Stability
US Space Hegemony kills the inherent international balance
Zukang 2000 (Chinese Ambassador, “Disarmament Diplomacy,” Issue No. 43, January-February 2000, http://www.acronym.org.uk/43usnmd.htm)
Over the decade since the end of the Cold War the international community has achieved remarkable progress in stemming the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. The basic reason for such progress lies in the relative stability of the global and regional security environments, as well as the willingness of the countries concerned to resolve problems through dialogue instead of confrontation. If the United States is genuinely concerned, as it claims, about the threat to its security caused by the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, the right thing to do would be to abandon its hegemonic mentality and behaviour, respect the legitimate security interests of other countries, strengthen international co-operation and dialogue, and shore up - and where possible build on - the international arms control and non-proliferation regime. The development and deployment of NMD and TMD systems may be able to psychologically and temporarily satisfy some people's anxiety for absolute security, but it will do little to reduce the threat of WMD and their means of delivery. Furthermore, by disrupting the global strategic balance and stability it will destroy the basis for any progress in the field of arms control and non-proliferation, and in the end adversely affect the security interests of all countries, including the United States.
Impact- War
Full Internal link card
China Daily 05 (Daily Chinese Newspaper, “China ready to counter US space plans,” updated 2005-05-23, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/23/content_444886.htm)
One major Chinese concern about U.S. space weaponization plans, as addressed frequently in statements at the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), is that the deployment of space weapons “will disrupt strategic balance and stability, undermine international and national security and do harm to the existing arms control instruments, in particular those related to nuclear weapons and missiles, thus triggering new arms races.”[14]
Because space weapons are at once threatening and vulnerable, it is reasonable to assume that other countries would attempt to block such a move by political and, if necessary, military means. One possible response, for example, would be the development of anti-satellite weapons to target space-based weapon systems. It is widely believed that space weapons and sensor satellites would themselves become prime high-value targets and the most vulnerable elements for defense suppression attacks.[15] It is reasonable to believe that other countries could resort to a number of low-cost and relatively low-technology anti-satellite devices to counter those critical and vulnerable U.S. space-based weapons. Eventually, China fears that the U.S. space weaponization plan would lead to an arms race in outer space and turn outer space into a battlefield.
Moreover, space weaponization would seriously disrupt the arms control and disarmament process. The initiation of U.S. space-based missile defenses would likely cause Russia as well as the United States (in response to Russia) to make smaller reductions in their nuclear arsenals. China would likely be forced to build more warheads to maintain its nuclear deterrent, which could in turn encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit. Also, Russia has threatened to respond to any country’s deployment of space weapons. Failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament process would also further undermine the already fragile nuclear nonproliferation regime. As Ambassador Hu Xiaodi warned in 2001, “With lethal weapons flying overhead in orbit and disrupting global strategic stability, why should people eliminate [weapons of mass destruction] or missiles on the ground? This cannot but do harm to global peace, security and stability, hence be detrimental to the fundamental interests of all states.”
US-China Space war is bad
Gargaz 10 (Michale Luke, Major, United States Air Force, A research Report Submitted to the Faculty of the Air Command and Staff College Air University, “We’ve Rattled Our Sabers…Now What?” pdf)
Is Xu Qiliang correct? Is militarization of space inevitable? Is it in the interest of China or the US to engage in a space war? Perhaps the answer to all these questions is an emphatic no! The US and Chinese economies are symbiotically linked. For example, US and China trade in 2008 amounted to greater than 400 billion dollars.13 Outset of war between the US and China would have horrific economic ramifications to both parties. In addition, both countries have thriving space programs and rely heavily upon space platforms for military and economic purposes (albeit the US is far more reliant). So, the resulting acts in space would asymmetrically affect both nations. China and the US would be foolish to instigate a space shooting war because the “ensuing debris could quickly render Earth orbital space unusable for centuries.”14 Also, there would be great pressure from other international space powers to avoid space war since they could eventually become collateral damage of a US/China kinetic conflict in space. Given that space war is not advisable, what can the US do to prevent it?
Space security threats lead to US-China war
Zhang 06 (Hui, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, "Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective"
Journal Article, China Security, volume 2, issue 1, pages 24-36)
Due to the threatening nature of space weapons, it is reasonable to as- sume that China and others would attempt to block their deployment and use by politicaland,ifnecessary,militarymeans.11 Many Chinese officials and scholars believe that China should take every possible step to maintain the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. This includes negating the threats from missile defense and space weaponization plans.12 In responding to any U.S. move toward deployment space weapons, the first and best option for China is to pursue an arms control agreement to prevent not just the United States but any nation from doing so – as it is advocating presently. However, if this effort fails and if what China perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, it would very likely develop responses to counter and neutralize such a threat.
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