A. Space being used to support ruling party legitimacy

**1NC- Militarization

This mix imbues space security discourse with a questionable logic reminiscent of the US posture on nuclear weapons and its emphasis on deterrence. Perhaps most disconcertingly the NSSS appears to validate the findings of a 2001 commission chaired by then defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld, which concluded that "every medium--air, land and sea--has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different" (Report of the Commission 2001, p. 10). The message conveyed by the NSSS seems clear: US space policy will be driven by this assumption, and the country will ready itself--unapologctically--for potential war in space. 
The NSSS, which completes the Congress-mandated Space Posture Review, outlines how the National Space Policy released in June 2010 will be carried out and sets forth US strategic objectives for the space environment. Among its goals is to "ensure national security access to space and use of space capabilities in peace, crisis or conflict" (p. 4). For political analysts the NSSS also constitutes a concrete reference point on how space policy under President Barack Obama differs from the hawkish stand adopted by George W. Bush. 
Overall, a positive change in tone, approaches and aspirations is evident. Whereas the 2006 National Space Policy (US DoD 2006, p. 2) stated that "the United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space," the newly released NSSS declares that the United States "will support development of data standards, best practices, transparency and confidence-building measures Confidence-building measures (CBMs) are certain techniques which are designed to lower tensions and make it less likely that a conflict would break out through a misunderstanding, mistake, or misreading of the actions of a potential adversary. , and norms of behaviour for responsible space operations" (p. 5). 
But the 2011 policy is far from advocating the adoption of a legally binding policy instrument to prohibit hostile actions against an adversary's space assets. Recent developments suggest that the United States may consider endorsing the European Union's Code of Conduct proposal. Despite being a step in the right direction, the EU proposal is non-binding and, for the most part, skirts the thorny issue of space weaponization.

Although many U.S. experts are correct in emphasizing the importance of space war in China’s asymmetric strategy to counter U.S. conventional ad- vantages, this article suggests that China’s military space agenda is also driven by the security dilemma between the two countries. China is pursuing mili- tary capabilities in space to counter perceived national security threats posed by the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense that could neu- tralize China’s nuclear deterrence.

In both cases, Chinese security experts believe that the U.S. seeks “abso- lute security” in order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats.9 This means that China at least recognizes the defen- sive motivations behind the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, with the chaotic nature of international relations, one country’s efforts to maximize its security could degrade the security of others by changing the balance of power. Inevitably, the U.S. quest for “absolute security” evokes countermeasures from other countries. As Kenneth Waltz observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since “maintaining status quo is the minimum goal of any great power.”10

According to Robert Jervis, “The heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one state’s security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imagined hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations.” In this context, “Even if they can be cer- tain that the current intentions of other states are benign, they can neither neglect the possibility that the others will become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves will remain peaceful.”11 Inevita- bly, when one state seeks to expand its military capability, others have to take similar measures.