A. Space being used to support ruling party legitimacy

Link-Militirization/Weaponization Affs

It is clear that the weaponization of space is not inevitable. However, does the concern of foreign weaponization justify the pursuit of space weapons anyway? The answer is an emphatic no. Although doing so would seem to increase the asymmetric space advantage the US has, it would actually have a destabilizing effect and result in a decreased advantage. The idea of space weapons brings to mind visions of military omnipotence, with the US able to easily strike down any adversary without fear of retaliation. Such an ability would deter many conflicts. A similar rationale developed in the 1940s with the creation of the atom bomb. It too seemed to provide infinite power that would cause the rest of the world to kneel before the US or suffer unimaginable retaliation. This idea worked once, ending World War II. Once the atom bomb became public, it sparked a massive arms race as other nations developed nuclear power. The stockpiling of nuclear arms led to the Cold War, an era defined by a world on the brink of destruction and rapidly shifting political climates. It is not a large leap in logic to conclude that since space weapons offer advantages of similar magnitude to nuclear weapons, their development will cause a similar situation. Other nations will not stand idle as the US weaponizes space—they will follow suit. In the end, space will become a volatile political liability and the medium for a new Cold War–style weapons spiral.

As viewed by Chinese leaders, China’s own small strategic nuclear arsenal appears to be a plausible target for U.S. missile defenses.10 China fears that the BMD network would give the United States more freedom and power to inter- vene in its affairs, including undermining the country’s efforts at reunification with Taiwan. Moreover, China is concerned that putting weapons in space would constrain its civilian and commercial space activities. China sees itself as a de- veloping economic space power, dependent on free access to space for financial gain. However, U.S. driven space weaponization directly threatens this access.

In particular, China is concerned that the U.S. missile defense network will undercut China’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Even a limited missile defense system could neutralize China’s fewer than two dozen single-warhead ICBMs that are capable of reaching the United States. China is even more concerned about space-based BMD systems that would be far more dangerous to China’s nuclear deterrent than a non-space-based BMD system. In addition, Beijing is worried that the deployment of missile defense systems would further promote a preemptive U.S. military strategy.

As viewed by Chinese leaders, China’s own small strategic nuclear arsenal appears to be a plausible target for U.S. missile defenses.10 China fears that the BMD network would give the United States more freedom and power to inter- vene in its affairs, including undermining the country’s efforts at reunification with Taiwan. Moreover, China is concerned that putting weapons in space would constrain its civilian and commercial space activities. China sees itself as a de- veloping economic space power, dependent on free access to space for financial gain. However, U.S. driven space weaponization directly threatens this access.
China perceives militarization as an attempt toward weaponization

Zhang 11 (Hui, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, University of California Press, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship

The Prospects for Arms Control,” http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311.pdf?acceptTC=true)

One particular concern for the Chinese military is that the U.S. may no longer be content with merely militarizing space, which involves extensive use of satellites for military operations. Instead, weaponization of space is on the agenda. The PLA now believes that the U.S. is on the verge of important breakthroughs in the development of weapons for space war. As one study claims: “Currently, the U.S. military already possesses or will soon possess ASAT technologies with real combat capabilities, such as aircraft-launched ASAT missiles, land-based laser ASAT weapons, and space-based energy ASAT weapons.”21 Moreover, the PLA suggests that the U.S. is trying to acquire space-based weapons to attack targets on earth:

The U.S. military is developing orbital bombers, which fly on low altitude orbits, and when given combat orders, will re-enter the atmosphere and attack ground targets. This kind of weapon has high accuracy and stealth capability, and is able to launch sudden strikes. These capabilities make it impossible for enemies to defend against. Orbital bombers thus can strike at any target any- where on the planet. It is the major means for the U.S. military to perform global combat in the 21st century.22
China perceives US space program as an attempt for total dominance and will respond to it

Zhang 11 (Hui, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, University of California Press, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship

The Prospects for Arms Control,” http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311.pdf?acceptTC=true)

Although many U.S. experts are correct in emphasizing the importance of space war in China’s asymmetric strategy to counter U.S. conventional ad- vantages, this article suggests that China’s military space agenda is also driven by the security dilemma between the two countries. China is pursuing mili- tary capabilities in space to counter perceived national security threats posed by the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense that could neu- tralize China’s nuclear deterrence.

In both cases, Chinese security experts believe that the U.S. seeks “abso- lute security” in order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats.9 This means that China at least recognizes the defen- sive motivations behind the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, with the chaotic nature of international relations, one country’s efforts to maximize its security could degrade the security of others by changing the balance of power. Inevitably, the U.S. quest for “absolute security” evokes countermeasures from other countries. As Kenneth Waltz observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since “maintaining status quo is the minimum goal of any great power.”10

According to Robert Jervis, “The heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one state’s security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imagined hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations.” In this context, “Even if they can be cer- tain that the current intentions of other states are benign, they can neither neglect the possibility that the others will become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves will remain peaceful.”11 Inevita- bly, when one state seeks to expand its military capability, others have to take similar measures.

China takes U.S. plans to boost its space military capabilities very seriously and is likely to respond with energetic counter-measures of her own, a leading expert on the Chinese space program told United Press International. 

Chinese experts and leaders fear if the United States achieves absolute military and strategic superiority in space it could be used to intervene in China's affairs, such as the Taiwan issue, Hui Zhang, an expert on space weaponization and China's nuclear policy at the John F, Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University told UPI. 

He was discussing issues he had presented earlier this week in a paper to a conference on space weaponization at Airlie, Va., organized by the Washington-based Nuclear Policy Research Institute. 

Chinese leaders have noted that the Taiwan issue was included as a hypothetical threat in the 2001 Rumsfeld Commission report on space weaponization. Also, in a January 2001 U.S. war-gaming exercise China was taken as an assumed enemy, Zhang said. 

Hu Xiaodi, China's veteran senior negotiator on space weaponization, expressed Beijing's fears at a Committee on Peace and Disarmament panel on October 11, 2001. 

"It is rather the attempt toward the domination of outer space, which is expected to serve to turn the absolute security and perpetual authority (many people call this hegemony) of one country on earth," he said. "The unilateralism and exceptionalism that are on the rise in recent months also mutually reinforce this." Chinese strategists believe that U.S. missile-defense plans pose a great threat to China's national security, Zhang said. They believe such defenses could be used to neutralize China's nuclear deterrent and give the United States more freedom to encroach on China's sovereignty, including on Taiwan-related issues, he said.

Other aggressive space rhetoric appeared in the 2003 US Air Force Transformational Flight Plan which included “Hypervelocity Rod Bundles” (a.k.a. rods from God) as a key long-term program5 and 2004’s Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1 which officially codified Counterspace Operations as a warfighting mission area.6 Recently, the US continued the aggressive, unilateral rhetoric when it published its 2006 National Space Policy which again repeated that the US would dissuade, deter, defend, and deny, if necessary, to protect its space capabilities.7 Though the US has traditionally advocated “peaceful uses of space”, the aforementioned types of rhetoric coupled with its preemptive war against Iraq and its refusal to sign space arms control treaties in order to keep “all options on the table” has caused the international community to view the US as a “bad actor bent of preemptive and hegemonic use of space power for its own purposes.”8 China’s behavior and rhetoric during this time period indicate that they share this “bad actor” view of the US in regards to space.