Afghanistan wave 4
Afghanistan wave 4 1
***1ac – hegemony advantage rework 4
***1ac – hegemony advantage rework 4
1ac – plan 5
1ac – Hegemony 6
1ac – Hegemony 7
1ac - Hegemony 8
1ac - Hegemony 9
1ac – Hegemony 10
1ac - Hegemony 11
1ac – Hegemony 12
1ac – Hegemony 13
1ac – Hegemony 14
1ac – Hegemony 15
1ac – Hegemony 16
1ac – Hegemony 17
1ac – solvency 18
***COIN fails 18
***COIN fails 18
COIN fails – Northern Afghanistan 19
COIN fails – population protection 20
COIN fails – population protection 21
ANA fails – Taliban infiltration 22
COIN fails – Wikileaks proves 23
COIN fails – Wikileaks proves 24
COIN Fails---Corruption 25
Losing the war 26
***Solvency 26
***Solvency 26
Counterterrorism causes decentralization - solves 27
Counterterrorism causes decentralization – solves 28
Solvency – counterterrorism solves Afghan collapse 29
AT: CT approach causes Taliban takeover 30
AT: Intelligence Turn 31
AT: Domestic terrorism is a greater threat 32
Afghanistan key to US foreign policy credibility 33
Withdrawal causes SCO cooperation 34
Withdrawal causes SCO cooperation 36
Withdrawal causes SCO cooperation 37
***Disad answers 38
***Disad answers 38
AT: Withdraw disad 39
AT: Withdraw disad 40
AT: Withdraw disad 41
Plan popular in Congress 42
NATO withdrawal now 43
Iran prolif advantage / addon 44
US spends 7 billion a month on Afghanistan 45
US-Russian nuclear war outweighs India-Pakistan nuclear war 46
Al Qaeda nuclear terror threat high 47
***Counterplan answers 47
***Counterplan answers 47
AT: Silk Road CP 48
AT: Regional Cooperation Counterplan (this is also neg vs. SCO advantage) 49
AT: Regional Cooperation Counterplan (this is also neg vs. SCO advantage) 50
AT: Regional Cooperation Counterplan (this is also neg vs. SCO advantage) 51
AT: Regional Cooperation Counterplan (this is also neg vs. SCO advantage) 52
AT: Regional Cooperation Counterplan (this is also neg vs. SCO advantage) 53
AT: Taliban Negotiations 54
AT: Bilateral Defense CP---Commitment 55
AT: Condition on the Taliban Not Housing Al Qaeda 56
***Counterplans 56
***Counterplans 56
Bilateral Defense CP---Population Protection Key 57
Bilateral Defense CP---ANA Solves Nationalism 58
AT: Illiteracy 59
CP Solves – Liberia proves 60
Economic development counterplan solvency 61
Withdraw to Northern Afghanistan CP (works with partition CP solvency / plan mechanism) 62
Withdraw to Northern Afghanistan CP (works with partition CP solvency / plan mechanism) 63
Withdraw to Northern Afghanistan CP (works with partition CP solvency / plan mechanism) 64
Aid Pakistan COIN CP 65
Aid Pakistan Counterplan 66
Iran cooperation counterplan 67
Iran cooperation counterplan 68
***AT: Wikileaks reports 68
***AT: Wikileaks reports 68
No Impact to Wikileaks 69
No Impact to Wikileaks 70
***Hegemony advantage answers 71
***Hegemony advantage answers 71
Overstretch answers 72
Overstretch answers 73
Overstretch answers 74
***Terrorism advantage answers 74
***Terrorism advantage answers 74
AT: Terrorism advantage 75
AT: Terrorism advantage 76
XT – Al Qaeda is dead 77
XT – Prefer Sageman evidence 78
***COIN good / Winning now 78
***COIN good / Winning now 78
Winning the war 79
Winning the war 80
2009 COIN Strategy Good 81
COIN Wins Hearts and Minds 82
AT: Nationalism means COIN will fail 83
No Taliban Support 84
Afghanistan is Not Vietnam 85
Iraq Applies to Afghanistan 86
***Counterterrorism fails 86
***Counterterrorism fails 86
Counterterrorism Bad 87
***Iran advantage answers 87
***Iran advantage answers 87
Plan => Iran Emboldenment 88
Plan => Iran Emboldenment 89
Plan => Iran Emboldenment 90
AT: Iran Cooperation / relations 91
AT: Iran Cooperation / relations 92
AT: Iran Cooperation / relations 93
Sanctions alt cause 94
Sanctions alt cause 95
AT: Iran/Middle East Stability 96
AT: Drug Trafficking 97
AT: China Scenario 98
AT: Caspian Oil Interests 99
***SCO advantage answers 99
***SCO advantage answers 99
AT Russia-NATO Conflict 100
AT: Russia-NATO conflict 101
AT: Russia-NATO conflict 102
No Arctic Energy Wars 103
No Arctic Energy Wars 104
SCO Bad 105
SCO Bad 106
***1ac – hegemony advantage rework
1ac – plan
The United States federal government should substantially reduce military presence assigned to the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan.
1ac – Hegemony
Advantage I: Hegemony
The war in Afghanistan will collapse American primacy – 2 internal links:
First – credibility. Obama announced a July 2011 withdrawal date, but it is based on the conditional success of the counterinsurgency mission. This deadline is perceived as unconditional withdrawal and has created global confusion
Rogin, 10 - staff writer for Foreign Policy, Prior to that, Josh covered defense and foreign policy for Congressional Quarterly. Josh has also worked at the House International Relations Committee, and the Brookings Institution (Josh, “Petraeus: Withdrawal timeline does not mean "switching off the lights",” The Cable, 6/29, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/29/petraeus_withdrawal_timeline_does_not_mean_switching_off_the_lights)
When General David Petraeus testifies today on Capitol Hill, his main job will be to carefully define the timeline for the beginning of America's exit from Afghanistan, a timeline that has stakeholders in Washington and throughout the region confused and concerned.
"As the President has stated, July 2011 is the point at which we will begin a transition phase in which the Afghan government will take more and more responsibility for its own security," Petraeus wrote in his advanced questions submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee and obtained by The Cable. "As the President has also indicated, July 2011 is not a date when we will be rapidly withdrawing our forces and -switching off the lights and closing the door behind us."
His job will also be to defend President Obama's decision to set a public date for the beginning of the withdrawal in the first place, by arguing that having a time line in the public discussion helps pressure the Afghans to move faster toward being able to govern and secure their country on their own.
"I believe there was value in sending a message of urgency -- July 2011... But it is important that July 2011 be seen for what it is: the date when a process begins, in which the reduction of US forces must be based on the conditions at the time, and not a date when the U.S. heads for the exits," he wrote to the committee. He stressed that multiple times that the pace of the drawdown would be "conditions based."
But even in his own writing to the committee, Petraeus acknowledged that the enemy, the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan, are waiting out the coalition and biding their time until foreign forces decide to leave.
"Insurgent leaders view their tactical and operational losses in 2010 as inevitable and acceptable. The Taliban believe they can outlast the Coalition's will to fight and believe this strategy will be effective despite short-term losses. The Taliban also believe they can sustain momentum and maintain operational capacity," he wrote.
One of the main enablers of any U.S. exit is the development of the Afghan National Security Forces, which has not gone at the pace the coalition had hoped. Petraeus wrote that he would review the situation of the ANSF within four months of assuming command, if confirmed.
As of the latest review, only 5 out of 19 Afghan National Army brigades can function without a majority of their functions supported by the U.S., according to Petraeus, and only 2 out of 7 major headquarters can function properly without significant coalition support. As of June 27, there are 7,261 ANA troops in the city of Kandahar and 6,794 Afghan soldiers in Helmand province, Petraeus wrote.
He also said that a comprehensive plan to reintegrate some Taliban fighters is under final review with President Hamid Karzai and "offers the potential to reduce violence and provide realistic avenues to assimilate Pashtun insurgents back into Afghanistan society."
Petraeus promised to take a look at the rules of engagement that U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan feel are tying their hands in the fight, but he didn't say whether he was leaning toward changing them or not.
Meanwhile, confusion over the president's timeline persists both in Washington and abroad as interested parties try to interpret the July 2011 date in a way that serves their own political interests.
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-CA, said Monday that there would be "a serious drawdown" next summer, seemingly getting ahead of the administration in an effort to appease the liberal wing of her caucus, which is threatening to not support more funding for the war.
Two of the committee members Petraeus will face today, Sens. John McCain, R-AZ, and Lindsey Graham, R-SC, held a press conference Thursday to announce their opposition to setting any public date, no matter what the caveats.
Foreign leaders are especially confused, particularly the Afghan and Pakistani governments, who see a difference between public promises of drawdowns and private assurances from the administration that the July 2011 date would not precipitate large scale troop reductions.
One high level diplomatic source said that Pakistani and Afghan leaders believe that they were told by National Security Advisor Jim Jones that there was not going to be a big withdrawal and the there would be "no reduction in commitment" in July 2011.
But regardless of whether the administration sent mixed messages, the nuance of their time line policy has been misunderstood or ignored in the region, as various actors start to plan strategies with the expectation that U.S. troops are leaving.
"In retrospect, despite all the caveats, it was a mistake to put such a date certain for the beginning of withdrawal," said Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. "The word beginning was lost and it strengthens the ability of different interests to hedge, which is exactly what they've been doing."
Share with your friends: |