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was announced on local radio across Rwanda. 3. In postgenocide Rwanda, as in many other African countries, academics require permission from the highest level of government for three reasons: to allow the government to ensure that the research is appropriate to its development or peacebuilding agenda, as a way for the government to register and keep track of foreign researchers, and to provide a letter of introduction to government officials and local partner organizations who work at the local level with individual researchers. 4. At the same time that I was negotiating research relationships with both of my local partners, the government introduced imihigo (performance) contracts, in which appointed local government officials commit to specific development goals in their jurisdictions in a formal meeting with President Kagame (Bugingo and Interayamahanga 2010; MINALOC 2006; Versailles 2012). This means that local officials are contractually obligated to develop their bailiwick in accordance with national policy objectives; they are not accountable to the needs of the local populations they are supposed to serve. As Ingelaere (2011, 71) notes, the “implementation of central policies at the local level mostly coerce ordinary peasants.” Chapter 2. The Historical Role of the State in Everyday Life 1. Uvin identifies structural violence as one of the root causes of the 1994 genocide, defining it as “a deep and widening inequality of life chances; corruption, arbitrariness, and impunity; the permanence of social and economic exclusion; lack of access to information, education, health, and minimal basic needs; and an authoritarian and condescending state and aid system” (Uvin 1998, 107). 2. The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) was established by an act of Parliament in 1999 (law no. 03/99 of March 12, 1999). The 1993 Arusha Peace Accords provided for the Commission as well as for a national summit on unity and reconciliation. 3. Literally, “the gate to the compound” (Vansina 2004, 31). Lineages are made up of inzu (house), made up of three generations: grandparents, their married sons, and grandchildren. They live in the same compound, or near one another. Inzu is the basic social unit in Rwandan society and the smallest political unit. Only older married men were the leaders of inzu. Younger married men and all women were their dependents. The social position of women was “complex and variable” (Burnet 2012, 76), because their status derived from that of their father, husband, or sons. Age and personality were of considerable importance, and a generous bride wealth could greatly enhance a woman’s position, bringing along with it considerable freedom of action within the family. 4. On the various (and contradictory) forms of the hypothesis see Chrétien 1985; Evans 1980; and Sanders 1969. 5. Ethnic Tutsi make up about 15 percent of the Rwandan population, both at the time of colonization and today. For an explanation of these percentages, see Codere 1973. 6. Ubukonde is the practice of acquiring land through sweat equity. As Vansina (2004, 40) writes, “whomever cleared a plot of land became its owner because the arable land was the fruit of his labor.” 7. Strikingly, this inability to secure land has contemporary parallels, with young men today being unable to secure sufficient land holdings to allow them to grow into adulthood (Sommers 2012a). 8. Under the 2006 territorial restructuring, Rucunshu is a community in South province, just outside of Muhanga (former Gitarama) town. See figure 3. 9. Kinyarwanda uses prefixes to indicate whether a word is singular or plural: “Ba” is plural, while “mu” is singular. 10. For analysis of the political origins of the manifesto and its recommendations for structural change, see C. Newbury 1988, 190–93. 11. Rwanda’s first president was Dominique Mbonyumutwa, who served as provisional president from January until October 1961. Kayibanda became president following the September 1961 referendum/election. 12. These public safety committees were similar in form and substance to the local defense forces later introduced by the Kagame regime. 13. It was not entirely bloodless. Approximately fifty members of Kayibanda’s regime were killed or later died in prison. Kayibanda himself starved to death in prison in December 1976. 14. For analysis of the coffee economy in the late 1970s and 1980s, see Verwimp 2003. Chapter 3. A Continuum of Violence, 1990–2000 1. In this instance, the phrase “moderate” refers to a Hutu killer who shared his resources with Tutsi before the genocide. This usage is a modified form of the phrase “Hutu moderate,” which has come into popular usage since the 1994 genocide. For analysis, see Eltringham 2003. 2. Making Didier’s Hutu friend a likely Category One killer, according to the 2004 gacaca law. 3. The Interahamwe were associated with the ruling party, Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement (MRND), of President Habyarimana. 4. The Impuzamugambi were associated with the Coalition pour la défense de la république (CDR), an extremist and hardline satellite of the MRND. 5. This chauvinist statement contradicts the stated goals of the policy of national unity and reconciliation. 6. In no way should readers interpret this sentence to conclude that the RPF was part of the plan to institute and carry out the plan for the 1994 genocide, the responsibility for which rests squarely on the relevant political and military actors within the Habyarimana regime. I am suggesting only that the RPF’s strategy to take state power (which it did in July 1994) evolved in the fluid context of the October 1990–April 1994 civil war. 7. Pro-MRND parties were the Parti démocratique (PADE), the Parti progressiste de la jeunesse rwandaise (PPJR), and the Rassemblement travailliste pour la démocratie (RTD). Other parties “flirted” with the MRND, only to later align with one or more of the opposition parties. These included the Parti démocratique islamique (PDI), the Parti socialiste rwandais (PSR), and the Union démocratique du peuple rwandais (UDPR) (Burnet 2005, 84). In keeping with the times, the MRND added another “D” to its name, becoming the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement et la démocratie (MRND[D]) (Prunier 1997, 126). 8. Indeed, the unwillingness of the RPF to share political power in the postgenocide period is also well documented, as is analyzed more fully in the next chapter (Amnesty International 2010; Habimana 2011; Longman 2011; Rafti 2004; Reyntjens 2004, 2011; Sebarenzi 2011). 9. “Hutu Power” refers to the coalition of Hutu extremists from within the MRND and CDR, as well as those members of the MDR who defected to join the Power cabal. 10. Old-caseload refugees are individuals, mainly Tutsi, who fled Rwanda during successive waves of violence between 1959 and 1973 and their descendants. 11. Sometime in the late 1990s or early 2000s, the RPF instituted the Oath of Oneness, which is a solemn declaration that individual Rwandans take (many are forced) to publicly demonstrate their commitment to RPF rule. In taking the oath, individuals vow to faithfully serve the party and accept that any attempt to leave the party will be interpreted by party elites as an act of treason. It is believed that acceptance of the oath is required to gain a job in the state bureaucracy, as an appointed or volunteer local government official, or as a gacaca judge (field notes 2006). Chapter 4. Practices of National Unity and Reconciliation 1. “Good governance and a capable state” is the first pillar of the RPFs’ economic development policy “Vision 20/20.” Neither of these concepts is defined in the policy document, which states: “The country is committed to being a capable state, characterized by the rule of law that supports and protects all its citizens without discrimination” (MINECOFIN 2000, 14). 2. Note that imihigo contracts were not yet in effect in 2006, during my period of research. 3. In 2006, during my period of research, Hutu perpetrators were known as génocidaires (those who committed acts of genocide). The term génocidaire (perpetrator) had two meanings in 2006. It referred to individuals (almost exclusively ethnic Hutu) who fell into one of two broad categories: (1) those convicted of acts of genocide through formal legal channels (via the gacaca as well as domestic and international courts), and (2) those who were believed to have participated in acts of genocide (regardless of the available evidence). The term has been less commonly used in public parlance since my fieldwork ended, even less so since the closure of the gacaca courts in 2012. 4. The practices of the state power analyzed here were representative of everyday life in 2006. At the time of writing, in 2012, the RPF government had intensified its use of many of the practices identified here (see Freedom House International 2013; United States Department of State 2013). 5. “Genocide ideology” was not defined until the Senate issued its report “Genocide Ideology and Strategies for Its Eradication” in 2007. It is “a set of ideas or representations whose major role is to stir up hatred and create a pernicious atmosphere favouring the implementation and legitimisation of the persecution and elimination of a category of the population” (Senate of the Republic of Rwanda 2007, 16). The definition was legally defined in a 2007 amendment to the Organic law No. 10/2007 of 01/03/2007 on gacaca, article 3, as follows: “Ideology of genocide consists in behaviour, a way of speaking, written documents and any other actions meant to wipe out human beings on the basis of their ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, colour of skin, physical traits, sex, language, religion or political opinions” (MINIJUST 2007). Waldorf (2011) found that individuals were accused of having genocide ideology before the law was passed. 6. The 1996 and 2001 gacaca laws included provisions for the use of a “confession and the guilty plea procedure which enables the accused to have a reduced sentence and to finish the second half of the sentence performing community service” (PRI 2004, 3). 7. I cannot confirm if the anthem contains these lyrics, as no RPF leader would discuss the message of the anthem with me. The fact these individuals believe that the lyrics warn Tutsi to protect themselves against Hutu is significant. 8. At the time of my research, in 2006, Fatuma Ndangiza was the executive secretary. At the time of writing, in 2012, the executive secretary was the Right Reverend John Rucyahana. Rucyahana is also a member Rwanda’s Presidential Advisory Council (PAC). 9. On the practical difficulties and political constraints of teaching history in post-genocide Rwanda, see Freedman et al. 2011. 10. “Ex-soldier” means any member of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (the military branch of the current government) who demobilized after 1995; “ex-combatant” means any ex-FAR soldier who remained in or returned to Rwanda after July 1994 or any member of an armed group who is a Rwandan national and who returned to Rwanda after May 2001 (World Bank 2002, 5). Chapter 5. Everyday Resistance to National Unity and Reconciliation 1. The Fonds d’assistance aux rescapés du génocide (FARG) was established by the government in 1998 to provide social services to all victims of the genocide, not just Tutsi survivors. 2. The question of what constitutes an act of resistance and what is a survival strategy runs through the literature. See the edited collection of Scott and Kerkvliet (1986) for an overview of the debates. 3. The average yearly salary is FRw 350,000 (US$780). 4. Several Tutsi survivors told me that they found it particularly difficult to provide evidence to the gacaca courts because they were in hiding during the genocide and did not actually see anything. Alice told me, “I heard a lot. The screams. There would be screaming and then some cheering and even some laughter. Eventually the screams would stop, but the laughing continued. I really only heard the genocide, I did not see anyone kill anyone. Even if I did, I wouldn’t dare tell the authorities. They would make me tell what I saw. I struggle enough without adding the burden of testifying at gacaca” (interview 2006). 5. Since 2011 the term ibipinga has been used by RPF cadres to name and shame whoever tries to oppose RPF ideology and policies. At the time of writing, in late 2012, ibipinga was used to identify Hutu opponents of the government. Chapter 6. Everyday Resistance to the Gacaca Process 1. The courts concluded their work in June 2012. 2. Citizen spectators are nonparticipating attendees; all adults over the age of eighteen must attend gacaca or risk sanction (MINIJUST 2004, article 29). 3. Despite the appearance of free and fair local elections in Rwanda (starting in 2001 and most recently in 2010), I consciously use the language of “chosen” elected official as the RPF controls the electoral process for all levels of government. At the sector level, Rwandans line up behind their candidate of “choice” after having been told by appointed local officials for whom they should vote, guaranteeing electoral support of at least 90 percent for RPF candidates. For analysis, see Delany 2010; International Crisis Group 2002; Reyntjens 2009, 2011. 4. IBUKA (Kinyarwanda, “to remember”) is the umbrella organization of survivor groups. Each sector has its own representative. 
REFERENCES Abrams, Philip. 1988. “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State.” Journal of Historical Sociology 1 (1): 58–89. Abu-Lughod, Lila. 1990. “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power through Bedouin Women.” American Ethnologist 17 (1): 41–55. Adamczyk, Christiane. 2011. “ ‘Today, I Am No Mutwa Anymore:’ Facets of National Unity Discourse in Present-Day Rwanda.” Social Anthropology 19 (2): 175–88. ———. 2012. “Independent Actors or Silent Agents: Where to Go for Rwandan Civil Society?” In Rwanda Fast Forward: Social, Economic, Military and Reconciliation Prospects , edited by Maddalena Campioni and Patrick Noack, 60–75. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Adhikari, Mohamed. 2008. “Hotel Rwanda—The Challenges of Historicising and Commercialising Genocide.” Development Dialogue 50:173–96. Aegis Trust. 2006. We Survived Genocide in Rwanda: 28 Personal Testimonies . Edited by Wendy Whitworth. London: Quill Press. African Online News (AFROL). 2008. “Rwanda Ex-leaders Granted Immunity.” July 17. http://www.afrol.com/articles/29858. Accessed April 10, 2013. African Rights. 1994. Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance. London: African Rights. ———. 2000. Confessing to Genocide: Responses to Rwanda’s Genocide Law . Kigali: African Rights.
———. 2003a. Rwanda: Gacaca Justice: A Shared Responsibility. Kigali: African Rights. ———. 2003b. The Gisimba Memorial Centre: No Place for Fear. Kigali: African Rights. ———. 2003c. Gishamvu: A Collective Account. Kigali: African Rights. ———. 2003d. Nyarugunga: A Collective Account. Kigali: African Rights. ———. 2003e. Nkomero. Kigali: African Rights. ———. 2003f. Nyange. Kigali: African Rights. ———. 2003g. Kindama: A Collective Account. Kigali: African Rights. ———. 2005. Gahini: A Collective Account. Kigali: African Rights. Alevesson, Mats, and Kaj Sköldberg. 2000. “Language/Gender/Power: Discourse Analysis, Feminism and Genealogy.” In Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research, 200–237. London: Sage. Allina-Pisano, Jessica. 2007. The Post-Soviet Potemkin Village: Politics and Property Rights in the Black Earth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Alonso, Ana Maria. 1994. “The Politics of Space, Time and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism and Ethnicity.” Annual Review of Anthropology 23:379–405. AmnestyInternational.1997. Rwanda:EndingtheSilence.September25. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR47/032/1997/en/dom-AFR470321997en.html. Accessed July 21, 2006. ———. 2004. “Rwanda: Government Slams the Door on Political Life and Civil Society.” June 9. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR47/012/2004/en/dom-AFR470122004en.html. Accessed July 29, 2006. ———. 2005. “Rwanda: Human Rights Organisation Forced to Shut Down.” January 10. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR47/001/2005/en/dom-AFR470012005en.html. Accessed July 29, 2006. ———. 2010. “Safer to Stay Silent: The Chilling Effect of Rwanda’s Laws on ‘Genocide Ideology’ and ‘Sectarianism.’ ” August 31. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR47/005/2010. Accessed October 29, 2012. ———. 2011. “Rwanda: Freedom of Expression” Annual Report 2011: The State of the World’s Human Rights. June 7. http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/rwanda/report-2011#section-120-3. Accessed August 4, 2012. André, Catherine, and Jean-Pierre Platteau. 1998. “Land Relations under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Directory: wp-content -> blogs.dir blogs.dir -> 3rd EurasiaTrajeco Conference blogs.dir -> Tsl 3378 – Pronunciation and tesl professor Paula Golombek blogs.dir -> Electrical engineering degree technical elective requirement blogs.dir -> The Security Organs of the Russian Federation a brief History 1991-2005 blogs.dir -> Aurelia aubert blogs.dir -> Task: Choose a play in which an important theme is effectively highlighted by one specific scene or incident blogs.dir -> Press release Huawei Releases LampSit 0 for Indoor mbb blogs.dir -> Dues Increase & State of the Union blogs.dir -> Civil Division General Information Booklet blogs.dir -> Away in the basement Download 3.15 Mb. Share with your friends:
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