Arctic Oil/Gas Neg



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Air Power 1NC

Alt cause – no new aircraft and asymmetrical conflict


***careful, aff may solve

Haffa 12

Robert P Haffa jr., Director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center. He is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy, holds an M.A. degree from Georgetown University and a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is an adjunct professor in the Government program at Johns Hopkins University.

“Full-Spectrum Air Power: Building the Air Force America Needs” 10/12/12

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/full-spectrum-air-power-building-the-air-force-america-needs

A number of factors have led the U.S. Air Force into its current state—described by some as geriatric.” The size of the Air Force has declined in tandem with the perceived threat and as a result of a decade-long concentration on land combat against irregular forces. Without new aircraft to replace the existing fleet, the Air Force was required to keep its aging aircraft flying, creating a “death spiral”—spending funds on maintenance, repair, and overhaul of obsolescent airframes instead of acquiring new aircraft. Moreover, the Air Force has engaged in nearly continuous combat operations since Saddam Hussein’s forces crossed the Kuwaiti border in 1990. The “long hard slog” of counterinsurgency that occupied America’s armed forces over the past decade emphasized a manpower-intensive doctrine that sought to find and fix an elusive, asymmetric adversary in unconventional armed conflict at the expense of the core Air Force missions of air superiority and long-range strike.

No air power – anti-access weapons and new fighters


Grant ‘9

Greg Grant, contributing editor for DOD Buzz, 9-15-2009, “U.S. Air Dominance Eroding,” DOD Buzz, http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/09/15/u-s-air-dominance-eroding/



Emphasizing the increasing capabilities of “anti- access weapons,” such as long range precision missiles, Deptula said pilots in future wars will not operate in the “permissive” threat environments of current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Deptula, best known for crafting the Desert Storm air campaign, said potential opponents have learned from U.S. operations and will use precision arsenals to stop a buildup of U.S. airpower near their borders before a war even begins. Without functioning ground bases, aircraft cannot operate; the Air Force is investing heavily in shorter ranged tactical aircraft, such as the F- 22 and F- 35, along with a host of older F- 15 and F- 16. Overseas bases from which these aircraft operate are now threatened by increasingly accurate ballistic missiles in Chinese, Russian, Iranian and North Korean arsenals, Deptula said. The newest models are road mobile and exceedingly difficult to locate. Enemies will use cyber attacks to target U.S. command and control networks and satellite relays, the smooth functioning of which the military is now completely dependant. “Space is no longer a sanctuary and our satellites are at risk… for five decades the U.S. has led the world in space,” he said, now, “the space domain is perhaps the most likely arena for threats to achieve leveraged effects,” against U.S. operations. The Chinese are developing anti- satellite weapons, as are the Russians, and the number of countries that can launch sensor- loaded satellites into space is increasing. Because of improvements in over the horizon and passive radars, U.S. aircraft will be detected long before they reach their targets. “The area that we operate in free from detection is rapidly shrinking,” Deptula said, “our adversaries are going to have capabilities that we’ve never operated against.” The newest generation surface- to- air missiles, such as the Russian SA- 21, have ranges exceeding 300 miles and the ability to target low flying aircraft, and will likely be exported. Speaking to the more traditional realm of air- to- air combat, so dear to his audience’s heart, Deptula contends that the U.S. technological edge there is eroding. While “fourth generation” fighters are no match for the most advanced U.S. fighters, Deptula reminded the audience of the Russian export success with the MIG- 21, some 12,000 of which were built, and operated by over 50 countries. Russia and China are both developing “fifth generation” fighters that will be widely exported at prices that will undercut the F- 35 price tag. Both nations will thus acquire “near F- 22 performance… while attempting to proliferate the [aircraft] to perhaps near F- 35 like quantities,” he said. “We may be facing a fighter threat capability in quantities we’ve never experienced before.”

Useless at fighting wars


Donnelly ‘9

Thomas. Resident scholar @ AEI. America's Air Supremacy Allowed to Evaporate. 9/8/9. http://www.aei.org/article/100990.

Second of all, U.S. armed forces find themselves embroiled in wars that naturally dissipate the effects of air power. Attacking irregular enemies from the air is inevitably a whack-a-mole enterprise. Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda lieutenants are hard to find and they don't sit still for long. When we can find prime targets, such as Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq or Baitullah Meshud just recently in Pakistan, they prove to be of lesser and brief value; indeed, the air power concept of "leadership" or "high value" targets needs rethinking. Even if we were lucky enough to at last kill bin Laden, it's getting harder to argue that this would produce anything like a decisive effect in the so-called "long war."

Alt cause – oil dependence


Bender 7

Bryan. 5/1/7. http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/05/01/pentagon_study_says_oil_reliance_strains_military/.

A new study ordered by the Pentagon warns that the rising cost and dwindling supply of oil -- the lifeblood of fighter jets, warships, and tanks -- will make the US military's ability to respond to hot spots around the world "unsustainable in the long term." The study, produced by a defense consulting firm, concludes that all four branches of the military must "fundamentally transform" their assumptions about energy, including taking immediate steps toward fielding weapons systems and aircraft that run on alternative and renewable fuels. It is "imperative" that the Department of Defense "apply new energy technologies that address alternative supply sources and efficient consumption across all aspects of military operations," according to the report, which was provided to the Globe.

Air Power 2NC—Anti Access Weapons

Area denial takes out the ability to have air power


Donnelly ‘9

Thomas. Resident scholar @ AEI. America's Air Supremacy Allowed to Evaporate. 9/8/9. http://www.aei.org/article/100990.

So what's gone tyuwrong? To begin with, our enemies, current and potential, have taken note and taken steps particularly to try to neutralize the effects of American air power. The closest student has been the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Almost since the ink was dry on Cohen's essay, the PLA has both been devising ways to limit the U.S. ability to use its air power in East Asia. The Chinese have invested heavily in long range, land-based air defenses, but perhaps the most challenging Chinese capabilities are those that attempt to restrict American access to air bases in the region or to effectively employ carrier-based aviation. The prime mission for China's growing arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles is to target airfields around the region--especially those in Japan--and, in concert with the Chinese navy's expanding submarine force, hold U.S. carriers at risk. 

1NC japan – resilient


Japan won’t abandon the alliance – shared vital interests and perceived common threats – makes sustained cooperation inevitable

Sang-ho 9/7/2012 Song, “US-Japan alliance grows for Asia-Pacific security balance,” Korea Herald, http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?id=33084&sec=1

On the surface, the alliance between the US and Japan appears to have worsened in recent years due to a long-standing controversy over the relocation of the Futenma airbase in Okinawa.

But this would not undermine the core of the alliance between the two countries that share security interests and values of democracy, and take initiatives against global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, experts pointed out.

People should not misconstrue a long-running local dispute over how to close one Marine air base with the durability and capability of that vital alliance,” said Patrick M. Cronin, senior director of the Asia Programme at the Centre for a New American Security.

After the Democratic Party of Japan took power in 2009, ending a half-century of almost unbroken conservative rule, the alliance appeared to have deteriorated with the Tokyo leadership pursuing a closer yet “equal” relationship.

But it has apparently re-prioritised its relationship with Washington as it recognised growing security challenges from China and North Korea.

Amid its strategic pivot toward Asia, the US is likely to escalate its calls for the Asian ally to contribute more to maintaining stability in the region.

Japan also wanted to increase its military role in the region and beyond. But it has been fettered by the pacifist constitution.



The law prohibits Japan from going to war and having any potential war materials, and engaging in collective defence action, which makes it difficult to help support its ally US even if it is attacked. Right-wingers have sought to rewrite the law or tried to alter the interpretation of it to expand the role of the Self-Defence Forces.

The deepening of the military alliance is also crucial for Tokyo, which has been engaged in an increasingly strident territorial disputes with Beijing over a set of islands in the East China Sea, which are called Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese.

Relations resilient

Green 11 – associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University and senior advisor and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Michael J., "The Democratic Party of Japan and the Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance" The Journal of Japanese Studies, Volume 27, Number 1, Winter 2011, Project MUSE)

Despite the travails and uncertainty now clouding the alliance, there are multiple reasons to expect that Japan will continue to be closely aligned with the United States and influential in the international system. First, there is historical precedent. As Kenneth Pyle has pointed out, Japan has always successfully reordered its domestic institutions and instruments of national power in the face of new international challenges even if institutions in Japan's conservative political culture have a sticky resistance to change, as Carol Gluck has observed.10 Postwar history also demonstrates the resilience of U.S.-Japan security relations. The fact is that the alliance has entered periods of drift and faced crises before, including the 1960 Anpo demonstrations, the protests against the Vietnam War, the "Nixon shocks," the FS-X confrontation, and the 1995 Okinawa rape incident. In each case, observers predicted the end of the alliance, yet in each case the security relationship emerged significantly strengthened. Kent Calder has described a pattern in Japanese domestic politics in which the conservative LDP elite would co-opt the opposition's policy initiatives in response to social or economic crises, thus reinforcing the social contract and legitimacy of conservative rule.11 In similar ways, the United States and Japan have repeatedly responded to bilateral political crises by offering new reciprocal "compensation" in terms of expanded Japanese security responsibilities and a reduction of the U.S. military footprint in Japan.12 This continual process of redefining and reaffirming the 1960 security treaty is not always visible in the midst of a crisis, but it is one reason why support for the alliance has steadily expanded in both the United States and Japan over its 50-year history. In addition to historical precedent, structural factors will bind if not ultimately define Japan's strategic options. The rise of Chinese power and North Korean nuclear brinkmanship render a close alliance with the United States by far the best guarantor of Japanese security, while growing economic [End Page 94] interdependence with China will ensure that Japanese governments (and U.S. governments, for that matter) will resist crude strategies of containment against China. Japan's demographic and fiscal challenges are already limiting the DPJ's original promises of largess (cutting highway fees, distributing child allowances, etc.) and forcing a consensus within the party that the policy tool kit will have to include some combination of cutting corporate taxes, raising the consumption tax, and restricting spending. If these seemed like uniquely difficult choices for Japan at one point, it is only necessary to observe the enormous changes Europe must now make in its social contract in order to remain fiscally solvent – or to consider the massive demographic challenge looming in the decade ahead in China as a result of the one child policy and a massively deficient social welfare net. Exaggerating the uniqueness and irreversibility of Japanese challenges today makes no more sense than predicting Japan's certain global domination did 20 years ago.

xt resilient


Cooperation inevitable – disputes won’t manifest

Bader 10 Jeffrey 6/7, Senior fellow at Brookings- Director of the John L. Thornton China Center, 6/7/10 [Keynote Speech: US-Japan Alliance at 50: Toward a Reenergized Partnership” http://stimson.org/japan/pdf/Transcript_Jeff_Bader.pdf]

The sinking of the South Korean naval vessel, Cheonan, by North Korea served as a dramatic reminder that Northeast Asia is still “a dangerous neighborhood.” The Japanese Cabinet noticed. The Japanese government also experienced some difficulties in its relationship with China, in which it had invested a considerable amount. The DPJ has come to understand with increasing clarity that others in the region have been watching closely the U.S.-Japan alliance, and Japan could not afford the impression of a rift to “gain traction.” It turns out that all politics is not 100 percent local, as it had been seen in Japan for some months before then. The decision came against a series of other policy decisions by the Japanese government that demonstrate that the alliance is about more than basing issues. Japan has allocated $900 million in its current budget towards a multi-year, $5 billion, pledge to the Afghan Army and police, including for rehabilitation and training of demobilized Taliban and important development projects. Japan, like the United States, believes that peace and security in Afghanistan depend significantly on stability in Pakistan, and Tokyo has pledged $1 billion in assistance to Pakistan and hosted a major pledging conference. Japan has strongly backed the Republic of Korea, in the face of aggression from the North, in the wake of the Cheonan incident. Its solidarity with South Korea has been firm and public. Japan has sought trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and South Korea, and taken a leading role in fashioning a UN Security Council response. As a member of the UN Security Council, this year, Japan is supporting the U.S.–led draft of a resolution on Iran. Prime Minister Kan – Prime Minister to be Kan – indeed reiterated that support in his first conversation with President Obama, this past week. Japan’s leadership has made clear recently that it favors U.S. participation in an eventual East Asian Community, a change taken from the DPJ position last fall. Japan strongly supported President Obama’s initiatives in the April Nuclear Security Summit and worked closely with the U.S. delegation at the NPT Review Conference in May. So, nine months after the DPJ’s electoral victory, the scorecard, from the U.S. perspective, at last, is positive and improving. There has been lots of attention to what a rough ride it has been, to the precipitous decline in Hatoyama’s polling numbers and, ultimately, his demise, his political demise, to the difficulties of the DPJ government in “getting its feet under it.” And now the – as I said – the resignation. I’ll leave to experts on Japan the analysis of these, but from the viewpoint of the U.S., the larger issue, in conclusion, is this: That Japan has gone through the single most dramatic political change in 50 years – after 50 years of stasis in party rule, and the U.S.-Japan alliance has emerged in sound condition, having been scrutinized and ultimately validated by the new political leadership. This is, in one sense, not surprising, since 80 percent of all Japanese, in polling, support the alliance.** That is the indispensible foundation for the alliance.

Resilience overwhelms their internal link.

Bisley 08 (Nick, Associate Prof. IR @ La Trobe U., Contemporary Southeast Asia, “Securing the "anchor of regional stability"? The transformation of the US-Japan alliance and East Asian security; Report”, 4-1, 30:1, L/N)

The US-Japan relationship stands on robust political foundations and has overcome many of the strategic and operational problems which had bedevilled it in the 1990s and it is one of the key pieces of America's global strategy. It rests on a number of pillars which include a shared set of interests, shared threat perceptions and policy responses, and is underpinned by a set of common values that are overtly expressed as vital to the relationship. In the words of a senior Japanese policy-maker, the US-Japan relationship is in a "mature phase". (41) The quality of the relationship was personified by the concord which existed between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi. Koizumi's final trip to the United States included not only a summit putting the rhetorical stamp on alliance transformation, it included an unprecedented presidential tour of Elvis Presley's home, Graceland. As a metaphor for the alliance more generally, the visit could hardly be more fitting. Although the personal relationship between the two was very important to the political and operational process of alliance enhancement, the strategic interests it advances and the extent of the consensus about these among policy-makers is such that, providing alliance managers exercise due care, the basic tenor of the current relationship will last long after these two political leaders have left the stage. (42)

The United States and Japan now have a genuine alliance, although one distinguished by an unusual and clearly delineated division of labour, which is intended to be the foundation of Japanese defence and security, a mechanism to stabilize a strategically complex region and a vital piece of America's global strategy. In both states there is a strong consensus as to its long-term value. Although, the US-Japan alliance is still quite different from those which America has with other states, it is testimony to the scope of changes wrought in the past five years or so that it is now not impossible to imagine that, over the longer term, Japan could become an ally which carries a strategic weight similar to that born by the United Kingdom.

Basing dispute proves. We mangled the relocation issue yet cooperation increased

Hornung 12/10/2010 – PhD, Associate Professor Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, postdoctoral fellow at Ohio State University’s Mershon Center for International Security Studies (Jeffrey, CSIS Pacific Forum, Number 61, “More than Futenma”, http://csis.org/files/publication/pac1061.pdf)

Since former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s bungling of the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, it has become normal for Japanese and Western media outlets to report that the US-Japan alliance has weakened or is adrift. It is neither. While US-Japan relations have suffered damage at the political level, including a loss of trust, the fundamentals of the relationship remain strong. This strong foundation, in turn, enables continued bilateral cooperation in a wide variety of areas.

Understanding the strength of current relations matters because US-Japan relations are about to enter Round Two of political mudslinging after Sunday’s Okinawa gubernatorial election. The winner, incumbent Hirokazu Nakaima, opposes Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s promise to fulfill the May 28 agreement with the US to relocate Futenma from Ginowan to Nago City. Because Kan’s other promise is to listen to local voices, it will be difficult to make progress on relocation. The expected deadlock will lead to frustration in Washington and the rise of more ‘alliance adrift’ cries. While Futenma relocation will require compromise by both sides to balance the desires of Okinawa residents with the security requirements for Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, it should not define bilateral relations. The challenge for Tokyo and Washington is to keep Futenma in its proper perspective. The US-Japan relationship is more than Futenma.

Sound Fundamentals

Consider first the fundamental purpose of the alliance. In exchange for the US defense of Japan, Japan allows the US to maintain bases in Japan. The US receives a forward military presence in Asia while Japan enjoys defense at a lower cost than if it was responsible for its own. This agreement remains solid and has been confirmed by recent events. After the Chinese fishing trawler incident near the Senkaku Islands (Daioyutai in Chinese), US officials have repeatedly expressed the applicability of Article 5 of the Japan-US Security Treaty to the defense of the Senkaku Islands. The highest expression of support came from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her meeting with Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara in Honolulu last month.



The same is true of Japan’s responsibilities. Despite facing strong opposition in Okinawa, both by the people and the gubernatorial candidates, Kan is committed to fulfilling the May agreement to relocate Futenma to Nago City. Additionally, regarding the Japan-US Special Measures Agreement that outlines Japan’s financial contributions for host nation support of US forces (called the sympathy budget in Japan), Kan agreed to sustain the current level of 188.1 billion yen. While it falls short of US requests for a budget increase to cover eco-friendly facility improvements, sustaining current spending is impressive given the previous opposition of Kan’s Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to the special agreement authorizing the budget. Indeed, the party had been pushing Kan to reduce Japan’s financial burden.

Robust Ties and Potential for Growth



In addition to strong fundamentals, there is room not only for the continuation of robust security ties, but even further growth. Consider first the reaction to recent naval activity by China in the East China Sea. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) hosted the first meeting of senior officials of the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) and the US Marine Corps (USMC) with an explicit aim of strengthening bilateral cooperation via the exchange of opinions on opportunities for defense cooperation near Japan’s southwest islands. Their civilian counterparts also agreed to launch senior-level consultations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Department officials to exchange views on the changing situation in East Asia. In January, the GSDF will join the US Army and USMC to conduct a joint command post exercise that, for the first time, incorporates the defense of Japan’s southwestern islands. In addition to confining China’s navy to the East China Sea, the exercise simulates troop deployment to outlying islands and re-capture operations.

Japan has also been making progress in cooperating with other US allies. Just as Japan stood side-by-side with the US in support of South Korea after the Cheonan incident, it has denounced North Korea’s recent shelling of South Korea. Similarly, two Maritime SDF (MSDF) destroyers have recently participated in naval training exercises hosted by South Korea under the Proliferation Security Initiative. The MOD hopes to push for further confidence-building measures with its Korean counterpart. Such moves are welcomed by the US as it strengthens trilateral cooperation among its allies at a critical time for regional stability. This follows a decision by both Japanese and US militaries to hold strategic security talks with Australia and South Korea concerning China’s military modernization. For the US, stronger ties among its allies mean improved joint action in disaster relief, information sharing, warning and surveillance, and cooperation against future Chinese anti-access strategies.

While the Hatoyama administration terminated the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, Japan has not turned its back on US-led efforts in Afghanistan. Although it does not pack the same symbolic punch as Japanese vessels refueling NATO vessels, and revives images of checkbook diplomacy, Japan remains committed to Afghanistan reconstruction via $5 billion in aid. Kan is seeking to build upon this by dispatching a contingent of some 10 SDF doctors and nurses to Afghanistan. While the small medical team resembles Japan’s 17-member medical team dispatched during the Gulf War, it does demonstrate Japan’s ongoing commitment to disaster relief and humanitarian operations. This includes dispatching helicopters to relief efforts in Pakistan and the extension of GSDF missions in Haiti and Nepal. It also demonstrates Japan’s willingness to engage in SDF operations beyond the region. Further evidence is found in Kan’s extension of the MSDF antipiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden.

Diplomatically, Tokyo and Washington show ongoing commitment to each other’s interests. Despite having an economic interest in maintaining a role in Iran’s Azadegan oil field project, Kan sided with the US by applying sanctions on Iran and withdrawing from the project. For his part, President Barack Obama took advantage of the international spotlight created by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum to endorse Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, a goal Japan has been pursuing for nearly two decades.

Economic relations are strengthening too. First among these ties is Kan’s decision to begin consultations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to collect information for possible participation. While this decision is not a guarantee that Japan will join the TPP, it is impressive. Not only does it signal a significant change in Japan’s trade policy and abandonment of the East Asian Summit as the chosen framework for economic integration, it also pits Kan against members of his own party and the powerful agricultural lobby that oppose Japanese participation. If Kan decides to join, Japan’s participation would be equivalent to a free trade agreement with the US, prioritizing US economic relations over Japan’s agricultural sector.

Making less news are two other agreements. One, an open skies agreement involving Haneda and Narita airports, enables carriers in both countries to set flight routes and the number of flights at their discretion. The result will be Japanese carriers strengthening business ties with US counterparts and an increase in convenience for passengers travelling between the two countries using Japanese or US carriers. The other, a bilateral agreement to diversify rare earth suppliers and possible joint development, was a response to China’s use of rare earth exports as a political tool. It looks like agreement to act in concert with the US to minimize potential leverage China may seek via its dominance in the rare earth trade.

Changes Ahead

There are other moves in the DPJ that could signal significant changes in Japan’s security policies if realized. Importantly, they are changes that past Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administrations could not (or would not) achieve and would lead to closer US-Japan relations.

The most significant is a proposal to revise Japan’s ban on exports of weapons and related technology. Because small-to medium-sized Japanese defense subcontractors face increasing production costs, it is becoming more difficult for Japan to maintain a domestic production base. The current ban includes exceptions that allow Japan to transfer arms technology to the US and jointly develop and produce a ballistic missile defense system, but it does not allow Japan to participate in the development of other weapons, such as the F-35. The current proposal is to revert to Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s original three principles but add four standards. The net result would enable Japan to participate in joint development and production of weapons with the US and 18 other countries, including South Korea, Australia, and Western European members of NATO. Passage of this proposal would strengthen alliance relations as it would enable the US and Japan to pool resources and technologies for research and production of equipment at lower costs. It also averts problems that will arise after the US begins exporting to third countries the SM-3 Block II interceptor that is part of the jointly developed USJapan missile defense system. Another proposal under discussion is a permanent law on the overseas dispatch of the SDF. Previous LDP administrations considered a similar law, but opposition halted any progress. Depending on the content, it could make dispatching the SDF much easier in situations that do not fall under the Law for Cooperation on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO Law) and enable Japan to react faster to international needs. This comes at the same time that the DPJ is considering a review of the PKO Law to expand the scope of Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations, including the possibility of relaxing weapons’ use standards for SDF personnel to defend foreign military personnel. Any revision would expand the range of UN missions in which Japan can participate.



Political winds may disturb bilateral relations, but there is much more robust cooperation than is often acknowledged. While the Futenma relocation has eroded trust in political relations, it should not overshadow the positive areas of cooperation. Relations remain strong in the security, diplomatic, and economic realms. What is more, the DPJ seems set to make significant changes in Japan’s policies that would further bolster our partnership. Critical challenges lie ahead, including how to integrate the areas of cooperation under a new joint declaration next spring. Okinawa’s gubernatorial election added a further layer of complexity. Yet, there is much more to US-Japan relations than what is happening in Okinawa. As long as Futenma defines the health of bilateral relations, this point will be lost.

japan – alt cause


Alt causes to the alliance

Cossa & Glosserman 09

[11/13, Ralph A., president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, Brad, executive director of the forum, “Future of Japan-US Alliance (1),” http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/11/137_55152.html]



The Okinawa base issue has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines over what has been portrayed as an “ultimatum” from Gates that “it is time to move on,” combined with his warning that pulling apart the current (previously agreed upon) plan would be “immensely complicated and counterproductive.” But Gates also pointed out that “we are very sympathetic to the desire of the new government in Japan to review the realignment road map,” further noting that “we have not talked in terms of a time limit, but rather the need to progress as quickly as possible.” He further noted that “modest change” on the Futenma Air base relocation issue was a matter between Tokyo and the Okinawan government and people (who have thrice signaled acceptance of the plan). Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio clearly does not want to be rushed on this issue; efforts to publicly push him are likely to be counterproductive. But he has also pledged to take local opinions into account and to make a final decision once his administration’s review process is over. In discussing the issue, the prime minister also noted that “there are still numerous causes for concern in the Asia-Pacific region. The deterrence capability of U.S. forces in Okinawa is also necessary for the security of our country.” With a bit of patience, there could yet be a happy ending. The key for both sides is not to make this an issue of contention during President Obama’s visit. This bit of cautious optimism aside, there are a number of other sensitive issues that could just as easily put new strains on the alliance if not properly handled. One centers around Prime Minister Hatoyama’s apparent determination to unveil details of an alleged “secret pact” between Japan and the United States – one that is said to allow U.S. vessels and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons to stop in Japan. This investigation threatens a collision between Tokyo’s three nonnuclear principles and the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship that serves as the cornerstone of the U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense. While we applaud transparency, the DPJ government needs to be fully aware of the potential consequences of this investigation if followed through to its logical conclusion. In December 1967, then Prime Minister Sato Eisaku introduced the “three nonnuclear principles,” which pledged that Japan would not possess, manufacture, or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. That policy – it was passed as a parliamentary resolution in 1971 and is not a law – reflected Japan’s deep-rooted aversion to nuclear weapons and helped Sato win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974. It has been a pillar of Japanese diplomacy and foreign policy ever since – Hatoyama renewed Japan’s “firm commitment” to these principles in a speech to the United Nations Security Council just last month. That pledge notwithstanding, for decades there have been rumors of a secret “don’t ask, don’t tell” arrangement between Japan and the U.S. that allowed the U.S. to keep nuclear weapons on ships and aircraft that stopped in Japan or transited its waters. Previous Japanese governments denied this deal existed, and it became moot in 1991 when then-President George H.W. Bush ordered the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from deployed U.S. ships and aircraft. Nonetheless – and here’s the rub – the U.S. still follows a strict “neither confirm nor deny” policy in discussing the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons anywhere to avoid precedents that could limit its flexibility or threaten operational security during periods of crisis or conflict or compromise nuclear storage facilities on U.S. territory. As part of its “transparent government campaign,” the DPJ pledged that it would uncover the truth behind the allegations if it won the August parliamentary elections. After taking office, Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya said his office would launch an inquiry and “We will reveal everything we find.” Fine; then what? Let’s say that the Hatoyama government comes up with “proof” that such a deal existed. What happens next? Is the Hatoyama government then prepared to announce “case closed” and move on or will it feel compelled to take measures to ensure that this could never happen again – a move that would force Washington to choose between maintaining its “neither confirm nor deny” policy or maintaining the alliance? That might seem like a simple choice to the Japanese, but it is not so easy for Washington, which has to always keep one eye on precedents and how this would affect operations and alliances elsewhere. Facing a similar choice when an antinuclear government came to power in New Zealand in 1984, the U.S. chose to let go of its long-standing ANZUS alliance and continue bilaterally with Australia alone. Wellington further complicated the issue by also banning nuclear-powered ships, but it was the "neither confirm nor deny" straw that broke that camel's back. New Zealand remains outside of ANZUS to this day. Then there is the "no first use" issue. Hatoyama, in praising Obama's global disarmament initiative, went further by unilaterally suggesting that Washington also forswear the use of nuclear weapons except in response to a nuclear attack from elsewhere. On the face of it, this "moral high road" stance would likely enjoy the support of the majority of Japanese (and perhaps even American) citizens. But let's phrase it another way: "Should the U.S. assure North Korea that, in the event of a chemical or biological attack against its Japanese ally, it would not respond using all available means?" Leaving a potential enemy wondering about the level of response to an act of hostility is aimed at making him think more than twice about starting trouble in the first place. Please note that refusing to adopt a "no first use" policy does not mean that the U.S. has a "first use" policy or intends to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively or in response to chemical or biological attacks by North Korea or anyone else. But, for deterrence reasons, it leaves open that possibility. Would Japanese (or American) citizens feel more or less secure if the U.S. limited its options in advance? (Arguing for a "no first use of weapons of mass destruction" policy might make sense, however, but this is another issue and one that should be discussed privately between allies before public pronouncements are made.) Secretary Gates, in discussing the "secret pact" issue with Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, warned that "We hope that care is taken not to have a negative impact on nuclear deterrence and the bilateral relationship." The same applies to "no first use." Gates' mention of the extended deterrent provides context for this entire discussion. Extended deterrence is the cornerstone of the U.S-Japan security treaty, which is in turn the foundation of the two countries' security strategies. It is remarkable to us that the new government in Tokyo would risk threatening that core of the alliance at the very time when conversations in Tokyo reveal growing concern about the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Japan's defense. Several Japanese interlocutors have even suggested that Japan consider revising the three principles by dropping the one forbidding the introduction of nuclear weapons as a cure for the lack of confidence and to add an extra level of deterrence in the face of North Korea's demonstrated nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities. We are not suggesting that Japan needs to change its three principles – that is a decision for the Japanese alone to make – but the DPJ's demand for transparency has the potential to poison alliance discussions and raise even more doubts about the glue that binds the two alliance partners. Before the Hatoyama government paints itself into a corner, it needs to think through where it plans to go with its "secret pact" investigation and its support for a "no first use" policy and make clear to the Japanese people and its U.S. allies what the desired end result will be. Is Tokyo really prepared to open this potential Pandora's Box? Or is the new government in Tokyo playing a high-stakes game of chicken, assuming the U.S. will "blink" and continue to defend Japan despite clear indications that U.S. security requires it to maintain opacity when it comes to transporting or using its nuclear weapons? Neither move makes sense to us. Please note that we are not accusing the Hatoyama government of deliberately trying to undermine or diminish the alliance relationship. The prime minister has made it clear that he sees the Japan-U.S. alliance as "the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy" and that he wants to "deepen the alliance in a multilayered way from medium and long-term perspectives." While he has received a lot of criticism about his support for East Asia community- building efforts that do not necessarily involve the U.S., he has also made it clear that "priority must be given to the Japan-U.S. alliance." But he has also thrown Washington off guard by mentioning that he wants to renegotiate the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that currently protects U.S. forces serving in Japan. It does not place them above the law, but puts limits on jurisdiction based on the offense and whether or not it was committed in the line of duty. SOFA discussions are certainly not off limits; they seem to be perpetual (with South Korea as well as with Japan, with each watching for precedents that the other may set). But vehicles exist for such deliberations. Publicly adding SOFA, host-nation support and other sensitive issues to the list of other contentious issues like the "secret pact" investigation, "no first use" and Futenma relocation a few weeks before Obama's first visit to Japan seems aimed more at trying to persuade him not to come than at laying the groundwork for a successful summit.

xt alt cause


Alliance collapse is inevitable

Tatsumi ’07 Tatsumi-Research Fellow with the East Asia Program at The Henry L. Stimson Center-2007(Yuki, The Henry L. Stimpson Center, " US-Japan Alliance: Adrift Again?", July 13, 2007, http://www.stimson.org/about/?SN=EA200707131338)

Today, the US-Japan alliance is again in danger of going adrift. At the end of its presidency and preoccupied with Iraq, the Bush administration has very little time to spend on Asia, let alone Japan. With a parliamentary election coming up on July 29, Japan is also heading into a period in which its political leadership is preoccupied with its domestic agenda. Depending on the result of the election, Japan may face a period of weak political leadership, and may continue to be unable to focus on its foreign and security policy agenda. Furthermore, a mutual sense of frustration has been rising between political circles in the two countries. The Japanese leadership’s – particularly Abe’s – inability to take a disciplined position on the issues related to Japan’s wartime conduct frustrates Washington where more and more people see Japan’s mismanagement of these issues as a key impediment to the successful US pursuit of its interests in Asia.


japan – fails


And the alliance doesn’t work

Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment, pg. 13



One thing that has not changed about the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the fifty years that it has existed is that it is supposed to have maintained regional stability. If stability is defined as a state where war or the high level threat of war does not exist, then the alliance has not been terribly effective. Although the Soviet Union never attacked Japan during the Cold War, other serious destabilizing forces have appeared despite the continued existence of the bilateral alliance. The Korean War, which began in June 1950, did not end after the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951 nor after the accord went into effect in 1952. The alliance did not prevent China from developing nuclear weapons-hardly a stabilizing event in the region. The U.S.-Japan alliance did not prevent or end the Vietnam War. More recently, the U.S.-Japan security alliance did not stop the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) from beginning a nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s, thwart Pyongyang's missile development efforts, or discourage it from launching a projectile over Japan without prior notice in August 1998. With the bilateral alliance in effect for decades, China went ahead with nuclear testing in 1995 to assure that its nuclear arsenal was capable of neutralizing the threats it perceives from the other nuclear powers.

canada – resilient

Relations resilient but tensions are inevitable.


Nesnera 04 – (Andre, VOA News, December 11, 2004, The Epoch Times, “Some Trade Issues Divide US, Canada,” http://english.epochtimes.com/news/4-12-11/24897.html)

President Bush recently visited Canada, his first trip abroad since his re-election. The two neighboring countries are strong allies and have deep ties that bind them. But there are some issues, especially dealing with trade, that still divide Ottawa and Washington. Trade is the most important component of U.S.-Canada relations. Each country is the other’s biggest trading customer. Eighty-four percent of Canada’s exports go the United States and Canada buys more than 70 percent of its imports from its neighbor. So it was no surprise that when President Bush visited Canada, trade issues - and especially contentious trade issues - were high on the agenda in discussions with Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin. Charles Doran is Director of Canadian Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. He says one major disagreement between the two countries deals with Washington’s tariffs on the import of Canadian softwood lumber, such as pine. “There is a huge amount of trade in lumber between Canada and the United States. Canadians sell a large amount, billions of dollars, and the argument has been on the part of a small group of producers in the United States that Canada has subsidized this. Now the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and the World Trade Organization, in dispute resolution panels, have denied that there is unfair subsidy. But in fact, every President for some time has been unable to unravel the legal challenges and so on, to get rid of that issue,” he says. Following the Bush-Martin meeting, the softwood lumber issue remains unresolved. Professor Doran says another problem stems from the US action to ban beef imports from Canada because of mad cow disease. “There was one cow found in Alberta with this disease, but the consequence of that has been enormous in the sense that trade for beef, for the United States and Canada has been affected and third markets like Japan and Europe. They are trying to get around this problem. They are trying to establish common standards, but it’s hard to believe, it’s almost hard to imagine how one cow could cause that much catastrophe to this industry in North America,” he says. Canadian statistics indicate that the 18-month ban has cost the Canadian beef industry more than $4 billion in lost revenues. That issue, too, still remains to be solved following the Bush-Martin summit. Tied to those two trade issues, is the question of security along the Canadian-American border - at nearly 9,000 kilometers the world’s longest undefended frontier. Both countries have stepped up cooperation in the security field, especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Kim Nossel, Director of Political Studies at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, says Americans and Canadians are approaching the border security issue from different angles. “From the American perspective, there is the concern about the porousness of that long, undefended border and the ease with which one could in fact get across the border. From a Canadian perspective, the major concern is an absolute fear that there will be a terrorist incident in the United States that will openly and manifestly have come from Canada, that will lead to, essentially, a closing of the border. And of course that border and the openness of that border is absolutely crucial for Canadian wealth.” Experts say Ottawa and Washington have to find a delicate balance between the free flow of commerce and legitimate security concerns. Gill Troy is a U.S.-Canada expert at McGill University in Montreal. He says despite various disagreements between the two countries, one overriding issue must be kept in mind. “Even if there is an agreement to disagree, even if the United States says: ‘look, we can’t do this because of internal constituency pressures or external trade pressures,’ the awareness that nevertheless, while we might part on some issues, we are still fundamentally friends, we are still fundamentally linked in so many ways - economically, ideologically, intellectually, culturally, socially - is important,” he says. Experts agree that President Bush’s trip to Canada was an attempt to improve relations between the two countries - relations that were strained in recent years, during the tenure of Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien. Analysts say based on the recent Bush-Martin meeting, things are looking up.

Won’t collapse – geography and demographics.


Negroponte 08 – (John, research fellow and lecturer in international affairs at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, former United States Deputy Secretary of State April 23, America.gov, “Three-Nation Partnership Growing Strong, Says Negroponte” http://www.america.gov/st/democracy-english/2008/April/20080423115446eaifas0.4505579.html)

Our nations' leaders have been discussing unprecedented levels of cooperation among our three governments, at every level, that are making us all safer and more competitive in the world. And they also have been discussing the dynamic force and power of a trilateral relationship that is driven by millions of decisions made by millions of Americans, Mexicans and Canadians every single day -- people in each of our countries who decide it is in their interests to travel, to purchase and to sell, to study, work, play and invest in their neighboring countries. We are connected by social, family, educational, commercial and cultural ties that are staggering in their size and continuous growth.

Econmic ties sustain relations


Negroponte 08 – (John, research fellow and lecturer in international affairs at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, former United States Deputy Secretary of State April 23, America.gov, “Three-Nation Partnership Growing Strong, Says Negroponte” http://www.america.gov/st/democracy-english/2008/April/20080423115446eaifas0.4505579.html)

The big message here is that the North American relationship brings enormous benefits, like jobs, energy security and lower prices, to the citizens of all three countries on an historic scale. And it does so peacefully, legally and cooperatively. This enables North America's increasingly integrated manufacturing sectors to compete more effectively in a quickly expanding global marketplace. Today, the North American relationship is undisputedly a dynamic platform for our long-term success in the world, just as it is a critical platform for confronting -- better, quicker and more cooperatively -- the big challenges of transnational crime and regional emergency preparedness that threaten that success.


AT Canada Key to Afghanistan

Canadian combat operations in Afghanistan are done


Chase 14 (Steven, Globe and Mail, 5/18 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadian-troops-come-home-after-12-year-afghan-mission/article17538898/) // SC 6/23/14

There were tears, smiles and warm embraces as loved ones greeted the final homecoming flight from Kabul – the last soldiers to return from a costly military mission that spanned more than a decade and claimed the lives of 162 Canadians. And now, three years after it ended combat operations in the Afghanistan war, Canada is finally marking the end of its soldiering in the conflict-ridden central Asian country. The Conservative government, which sent home combat troops in 2011, was unable to declare the mission over then because its allies pressed Ottawa to tack three years of military training operations onto the end of its deployment. That aid to the Afghan government just ended. On Tuesday, Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Governor-General David Johnston and senior military brass gathered at the Ottawa airport to greet returning Canadian Armed Forces members, the remainder of more than 40,000 soldiers from this country who have served as part of the Afghanistan mission since 2002. Mr. Harper announced May 9 would be designated by royal proclamation as a “national day of honour” to salute the end of Canada’s Afghan engagement. “This morning, as you stepped onto Canadian soil, you brought to a close the longest active military engagement in Canadian history,” the Prime Minister told the troops. “From Kabul to Kandahar, Canadians like you fought to loosen the grip of terror and repression,” he said. “Canada has also made a tangible difference in Afghanistan to some of the world’s most vulnerable people.” Defence Minister Robert Nicholson noted homecoming ceremonies have not always been a cause for celebration. “On too many occasions it brought grief. Today, we can’t help but pause to think of those who lost their lives in Afghanistan. We pay tribute to the families who are the strength behind the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces.” A C-17 military transport carrying the soldiers landed in Ottawa at about 9:30 a.m. as CF-18 fighter jets conducted a flypast to salute the occasion. Master Corporal Anthony Alliot swept up his girlfriend Sarah Tooth in a passionate embrace, kissing for the cameras. She surprised him by showing up in Ottawa for the return. “It’s something I will remember for the rest of my life, and I’m glad I got to share it with a special lady,” he said. The Forces member said he’s proud to have played a part in Afghanistan. “It’s been an honour to serve. It was a great experience; something I will remember for the rest of my life.” Asked what he plans to do now that he’s back after months abroad, the Canadian soldier smiled and looked as his sweetheart. “I don’t know if I can say it on TV, what I’m going to do,” MCpl. Alliot said. Canada has fielded soldiers in Afghanistan since 2002, shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Soldiers returning Tuesday were part of a training mission based in Kabul that began in 2011. Canada ended more than half a decade of combat operations in Afghanistan that same year. The conflict cost the lives of 158 Canadian soldiers, one diplomat, a journalist and two civilian contractors. In addition to blood, Canada expended significant treasure in the Afghanistan mission. Canadian taxpayers’ bill for the conflict is expected to exceed $22-billion, according to independent defence analysts. Major-General David Milner, the last Canadian commander of troops in Afghanistan, said he thinks the question of whether Canada’s sacrifice was worth it has been settled. “That question is getting old,” he says. “The bottom line is, look at that country [today] and where it was in 2001.” He said Afghanistan is much better off than it was 12 years ago, when it was home to Taliban occupiers. “Were we just going to sit back home and do nothing with terrorist havens throughout the south of Afghanistan, a country that has been at war for 30 to 40 years?” Maj.-Gen. Milner says Afghanistan today is beginning to move in the right direction. “It’s got a capable force: 350,000. They’re confident. They’re capable. They’re well equipped.”


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