Arctic Oil/Gas Neg


Dispute Resolution Advantage Answers



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Dispute Resolution Advantage Answers

1NC Dispute Rez Fails

No sufficient strictures in place to solve Arctic disputes; bilateral treaties have failed


Hober 11 Hober, Kaj. "Territorial Disputes and Natural Resources: The Melting of the Ice and Arctic Disputes." Oil and Gas Journal. Oil and Gas Journal, 2 Feb. 2011. Web. 28 June 2014. .

Bilateral agreements It is helpful and necessary to look at some of the existing, mostly bilateral, treaties concerning the Arctic Sea. Several agreements have been entered into among the Arctic states. It should be noted, however, that there is no agreement encompassing all Arctic states with respect to territorial disputes. In 1920, the Svalbard Treaty gave Norway sovereignty over Svalbard but also provided "treaty parties equal rights to Svalbard resource exploration." This language has caused an ongoing territorial dispute with Russia. Russia and Norway entered into an agreement known as the Royal Norwegian Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Agreement concerning the Sea Frontier between Norway and the USSR in the Varangerfjord of 15 February 1957 (the "Varangerfjord Agreement"). The Varangerfjord Agreement determined relevant boundaries between the two nations in the Varangerfjord. With that said, "it did nothing to settle borders in the Barents Sea, where Norway and Russia have overlapping EEZs and claimable continental shelves." In 2007, the agreement was extended and as discussed below, a provisional agreement was reached in April 2010 on the maritime boundary in the Barents Sea. On Dec. 17, 1973, Denmark and Canada entered into an agreement known as the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of Canada relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Greenland and Canada, which defined the border of the two territories. Despite this agreement, a significant dispute remains between Canada and Denmark over Hans Island. The half-square-mile rock is important because surrounding areas may contain possible oil reserves. In 1980, Iceland and Norway entered into an agreement to resolve a longstanding dispute "with regard to the claims by each for fishery zones and exclusive continental shelf rights." Despite this agreement, a dispute still remained in relation to Iceland's claim to an area near the Jan Mayen Ridge until it was finally resolved through a conciliation commission. Based on the recommendations of the conciliation commission, the governments of Iceland and Norway entered into an agreement on Oct. 22, 1981, for the joint management of resources of the Jan Mayen continental shelf. Specifically, each country is entitled to participate with a share of 25% in petroleum activities outlined in the agreement in each other's continental shelf. Denmark, Iceland, and Norway have entered into agreements to delimit boundaries of their respective 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones in the northwest Atlantic. On 1 June 1990, the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary was entered into which, among other things, "delimits the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles between the United States and the Russian Federation." This agreement has yet to be ratified by the Russian parliament, but its provisions have been applied through an exchange of diplomatic notes.

1NC Arctic Coop High



Military build-up does not mean conflict is likely --- Arctic countries still pursuing cooperation.


Will Rogers, 4/5/2012. Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “New Study Highlights Military Capabilities in the Arctic,” CNAS, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2012/04/new-study-highlights-military-capabilities-arctic.html.

A new report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) finds that the build-up of Arctic military capabilities is limited, with few indications that conflict is looming. According to the study, all five Arctic states – Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States – have increased their military capabilities in the Arctic in recent years in response to growing accessibly to the region owed largely to climate change.¶ Some of the increased military activity is likely a response to the changing geostrategic environment that will make military capabilities increasingly important for power projection that states need to maintain in order to secure access to lucrative natural resources and other national interests. According to the SIPRI study, for example, “Russia’s Arctic policy underlines the importance of the Arctic as a principal source of natural resources by 2020,” and “Denmark’s defence policy underlines the changing geostrategic significance of the Arctic.”¶ Despite the increased deployment of military assets, Arctic states are continuing to pursue new avenues of cooperation, mollifying concerns – at least for the time being – that tensions will worsen as the region becomes more accessible. Last year, the Arctic Council – an intergovernmental forum for Arctic states to address challenges in the High North – hosted a high-level forum that led to an agreement for countries in the region to increase search-and-rescue cooperation given the growing concerns surrounding increased eco-tourism and commercial shipping that could portend future law enforcement challenges. Some states’ newly deployed military assets are intended for search-and-rescue purposes, according to the SIPRI study. Canada, for example, will replace older C-130s and other aging aircraft with 17 new search-and-rescue aircraft in the next several years.

2NC Arctic Coop High

Military build-up has been limited to defense of territory --- cooperation is still the norm.


Siemon Wezeman, 3/26/2012. Senior Fellow with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme. “Increased military capabilities in the Arctic reflect border demarcations,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/26-mar-increased-military-capabilities-in-the-arctic-region-reflect-territorial-consolidation.

The background paper, entitled Military Capabilities in the Arctic, is based on the findings of SIPRI Senior Researcher Siemon Wezeman and shows that while governments of the five Arctic states have made protection of their Arctic territory a priority, the military build-up is limited. ¶ The effects of climate change are making the Arctic more accessible to economic activity—including exploitation of oil, gas and fish—and increased commercial traffic. Arctic governments have responded with increased attention to the region in several fields, including the military. ¶ However, rather than projecting power over the Arctic as a whole, the increased military capabilities described in the background paper are generally limited to forces and equipment for policing and protection of recognized national territories and territorial waters.¶ Military build-up occurring but cooperation remains the goal¶ Military interest in the region does exist. Canada, Denmark and Norway are moving forces into their respective Arctic regions and acquiring weapons and equipment for specific Arctic use. Russia has also started to expand its Arctic military capabilities, while the USA’s Arctic security concerns still play only a minor role in its overall defence policy.¶ Although some tensions have emerged in the region, cooperation, not conflict, is more visible in the Arctic. Norway and Russia have settled a 40-year border dispute in the Barents Sea and Arctic states are enjoying stable and peaceful bilateral relations. Meanwhile, the Arctic Council is coming into its own as an important sub-regional organization.¶ The so-calledscramble for the Arctic’, whereby Arctic states compete for the region's resources, has not proven to be a military affair. Rather, the littoral states remain committed to follow existing legal frameworks to settle border issues and claims on Arctic exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves.


Arctic coop is high – The risk of war is low


Grätz 12 - Researcher @ Center for Security Studies [Jonas Grätz, “The Arctic: Thaw With Conflict Potential,” International Relations and Security Network, July 2012, Pg. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=157901&contextid774=157901&contextid775=157922&tabid=1453469894

Prospects for cooperation



Against the background of the changes in the Arctic, this region is occasionally identified as a potential area of future conflict. However, it is important first to point out that there is much scope for cooperation. This is particularly apparent when considering “soft” security concerns such as environmental pollution resulting from the extraction of raw materials. The threats that arise for humans from the exceptional climatic situations are pushing actors towards cooperative approaches, too. Many of these issues are taken on by the Arctic Council. Founded in 1996, the Council is a forum to promote coordination among the eight Arctic countries. Representatives of indigenous peoples have a consultative role. One concrete result of the Arctic Council is a binding agreement on maritime search and rescue activities. For 2013, an agreement on standards for oil spill preparedness and response is expected, which will reinforce the current non-binding offshore oil and gas guidelines.

Cooperation among the littoral states is also advancing in the sensitive area of national sovereign rights. The 2010 border treaty between Russia and Norway indicates that bilateral agreements are possible – even though the power asymmetry between the two countries is reflected in a deal advantageous to Russia. International maritime law and the pressure of non-Arctic countries are also fostering multilateral cooperation, at least in areas where all parties can still gain further sovereign rights. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allows for the extension of the continental shelf towards the North Pole, which would extend the mining privileges of the coastal states at the expense of the interests of non-Arctic states. The water column and the animals living in it, by contrast, would continue to enjoy international status. In the Ilulissat Declaration adopted in 2008, the coastal states declared their intention to settle any territorial conflicts within the framework of UNCLOS. By signing the declaration, the US which has not ratified UNCLO S – has signalled its willingness to observe it within the Arctic. What is more, the coastal states have been collaborating for a long time in the exploration of the sea bed. Provided that there are no major conflicts among these countries, non- Arctic players will hardly be able to assert themselves in this context. Potential for conflict The scope of sovereign rights in the maritime area around the Svalbard archipelago, believed to be rich in oil and gas, is a question that is not easy to resolve. On the one hand, the archipelago and the surrounding 200-mile zone are an undisputed part of Norwegian territory. On the other hand, Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago is substantially limited by the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. All 40 signatory countries have the right to exploit natural resources and to conduct research. The treaty also states that the archipelago must not be used for offensive military purposes. Likewise, the right to levy taxes is limited to the administrative requirements of Svalbard. It was only later under UNCLO S that the EEZ emerged as an institution. Hence, it remains unclear whether the Svalbard Treaty also applies to this zone. Countries such as Russia, Iceland, and the UK assume this to be the case. Norway takes the opposite view. Nevertheless, Oslo has not declared a full EEZ in this area, but established a fisheries protection zone instead. It concedes fishing privileges to Russia, Iceland, and other nations. This has never been explicitly acknowledged by these countries, but is usually accepted in practice.

The modus vivendi has so far provided stability as it has served Russian interests too, with the fisheries protection zone granting privileges to Russian fishing interests over other signatory states. Moreover, Russia has sufficient oil and gas reserves at its disposal on its own territory. Norway, by contrast, has a strong interest in opening up the area for oil and gas exploration. Such an opening, however, would undermine the current fragile balance and encourage other signatory states to question openly the scope of the Treaty. Even if Norway were to take no action, other nations could try to push for an opening of the area for exploration with reference to the Treaty. Due to the variety of the players concerned and the absence of international rules, the issue can ultimately only be resolved at a political level.

Interests and positions diverge concerning the issue of sovereignty over the new sea routes as well. Again, even the Arctic coastal states do not agree on the legal status: Russia and Canada regard the routes as internal waterways in what is a very broad interpretation of UNCLO S. This implies that ships flying foreign flags must request permission for transit. Other coastal nations, such as the US, and non-Arctic players like the EU and presumably China, however, consider these to be international waterways for which no authorisation for transit is necessary.

For the time being, no escalation of this conflict is to be expected, since the commercial navigation routes are competing with non-Arctic sea routes and the use of these routes will correlate with the extent of their opening and the stability of the agreed arrangements. In addition, Russia and Canada depend on the cooperation of foreign non-state and state-owned players in order to attract investments in their inadequate coastal infrastructures. Also, the International Maritime Organisation is working on a binding Polar Code, which will establish clear rules for polar navigation. This will weaken the case for additional national regulations and approval procedures.

Defensive and offensive military capabilities

Following the disarmament of the 1990s, new military capabilities are again being deployed in the Arctic. In many instances, these capabilities are defensive in nature and linked to intensified activities concerning either the extraction of raw materials or new “soft” security issues. Due to the weather conditions, only military or coast guard assets tend to be able to safely operate under Arctic conditions. In light of the new possibilities, there is also a growing awareness of the lack of surveillance capabilities for the territory and the enforcement of sovereignty. Particularly for countries like Canada and Denmark, building up policing and military capabilities serves to avoid the impression that the Arctic is of little national interest.

However, offensive capabilities are also being built up in the Arctic, reflecting global ambitions rather than changing regional dynamics. Since the Arctic Ocean provides Russia’s best access to the world’s main oceans, two thirds of its navy are already stationed in the Arctic. Instead of upgrading border protection capabilities, Moscow so far has focused on modernising its offensive capabilities for the purpose of power projection. What is more, Russia has resumed patrol flights over the Arctic and submarine patrols previously carried out during the Cold War, albeit at a lower frequency. This testifies to the persistence of a rather traditional Russian threat perception.

Today, the Arctic is characterised by a mixture of cooperation, competition, and conflicts of interest. There are indications that the growing presence of non-Arctic players prompts more cooperation among the coastal states. Open conflicts are unlikely to break out in the foreseeable future: While existing mechanisms for cooperation may be too weak to resolve some conflicts of interest, the costs of military conflict will likely be considered too high in light of uncertain gains. If conflicts were to occur, they would probably be limited in both time and space, aiming at the enforcement of interpretations of international law. Having said that, as the involvement of all key political players increases, the Arctic is also the scene of overarching geo-strategic competition and conflict. The extent to which the thawing of the Arctic means conflict or rapprochement and cooperation will therefore also depend on the shape of the future world order and the relationships between the different power centres.

Lack of a US military presence prevents a great power war. Drilling removes that impediment


Wezeman 12 - Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme [Siemon T. Wezeman, “MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE ARCTIC,” SIPRI Background Paper, March 2012

VI. The United States One of George W. Bush’s final acts as US President was the presentation in January 2009 of an Arctic Policy, replacing the previous policy from 1994. It lists security as the first of six policy priorities.73 Later in 2009 the US Navy published an ‘Arctic roadmap’ as a guide for its policy, strategy and investments in the Arctic.74 However, Arctic security concerns play only a minor role in overall US defence policy. The US National Security Strategy, issued in 2010 by the administration of President Barack Obama, and the US National Military Strategy, issued in 2011, define the goals of US security and military policies but mention the Arctic only in passing.75 The Arctic is not mentioned at all in a January 2012 document outlining security priorities for the 21st century.76 Because of the increased commercial activity in the Arctic, Admiral Robert Papp, commandant of the US Coast Guard since May 2010, has expressed the need to begin preparing, with partners, for operations in the Arctic, including establishing bases. However, he also recognizes that US ‘strategic interests’ in the region are not yet prominent enough to support anything but ‘outreach, planning, and small-scale summer deployments’.77 The USA has not yet announced plans for a separate command to super- vise military operations in the Arctic. Currently, the Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the European Command (USEUCOM) all have responsibilities in the Arctic region.78 However, from 2011 USNORTHCOM has been assigned responsibility for Arctic planning and for coordination with other US and foreign government agencies.79 US forces in Alaska fall under the Alaskan Command (ALCOM), which is part of USPACOM.80 ALCOM consists of 16 000 regular personnel and 3700 National Guard and reserve personnel. The USA also has a presence in Antarctica and experiences from there, such as for example supply by air, are applicable in the Arctic region.81 pg. 11


US will militarize the Arctic to protect the drillers’ interest – They are on the wrong side of the link debate


Backus 12 - Principal member of technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories and uses behavioral and physical simulation methods to access security risks associated with climate change [George Backus (Director of environmental and energy research at Cambridge Econometrics), “Arctic 2030: What are the consequences of climate change? The US response,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists July/August 2012 vol. 68 no. 4 9-16

Because no entity, other than perhaps the Russian government, has the military bases and means to accommodate area-wide protection and enforcement needs, the United States will necessarily have to maintain strong cooperative arrangements with nations and corporations for the coordinated, safe, and secure use of Arctic resources. Although the Arctic nations themselves may strive for cooperation, entanglement with corporations and other foreign entities will assuredly produce tensions that are outside the domain of the US Coast Guard.

Right now, the US military position in the Arctic is problematic. Both the Northern Command and the European Command have responsibility for what, in a cooperative multinational environment, is a single area (Carafano et al., 2011; Carmen et al., 2010). Some analysts argue that NATO should play the coordinating role in the Arctic (Conley, 2012), but such a path would create new tensions among the national players, and it does not resolve the specific position of the United States in the Arctic (Wezeman, 2012).

The United States asserts that it has power projection and strategic deterrence capabilities in the Arctic because of its submarine, missile, and airborne assets (Defense Department, 2011). But security events in the Arctic may be largely associated with expensive commercial assets populated by civilians and monitored or escorted by foreign government representatives. Fighter jets and torpedoes have no role to play in such confrontations. A naval presence is required, with personnel who can board and secure the facility, as necessary. In general, the US Defense Department lacks the naval resources to maintain sea control for these situations. If non-Arctic countries set a precedent—even simply through prospecting surveys or shipping activity—their case for limiting the unresolved sovereignty rights of the Arctic nations is strengthened. Corporations necessarily engage in such activities, and it is natural for commercial ventures to test the boundaries of their franchises. But in a more negative sense, there is also the fear that access to a relatively unmonitored Arctic may offer an alternative location for companies to dispose of toxic waste.

In assessing US security needs in the Arctic, the question to ask is not “What are the security risks when the Arctic opens?” but rather “How will security risks evolve as the geopolitical and economic expansion play out?” The physical speed with which the Arctic changes will determine the gap between reality and expectations. For example, the more Russia, China, or South Korea experience significant benefit from Arctic activities—to the point where they expect and depend on the growth from those activities—the more likely that a period where the Arctic again becomes environmentally inhospitable, or that the rules of sovereignty change to limit access, or that commercialization of the region will cause political strains from lost revenue or prestige.

Abrupt changes in expectations and in a nation’s ability to cope with changing circumstances appear to be factors that can trigger conflict (Agency for International Development, 2009). If the early international relations dynamics in the Arctic move fairly slowly, all parties could co-evolve toward balanced positions with relatively little conflict. Rapid dynamics could raise tensions. If all nations sustain approximately equal positive or negative repercussions from changes in Arctic regulations or climatic conditions, or they all believe they could limit the pace and extent of negative impacts through negotiation, routine diplomatic processes could mollify tensions. Climate change will, however, produce an ever-shifting playing field that heightens tensions among countries more concerned with relative rather than absolute advantage in the area.

Will events in the Arctic require US military responses before 2030? The consideration of uncertainty is part of climate and economic forecasting (Hendry and Ericsson, 2001; Meehl et al., 2007), and uncertainty is a mainstay of military planning: The adversary seldom announces battle plans prior to engagement. Military preparedness hinges not on best estimates, but on uncertainties that reflect risks the nation wants managed. From the vantage point of the present, the best estimate is that the Arctic of the near future will be free of military conflict. Risk, however, is the combination of probability (uncertainty) and consequence. Lower-probability, high-consequence events generally contribute more to risk than the best estimate. They are consequently much more relevant to national security planning than high-probability, routine-consequence conditions.



Perceived economic accessibility to the Arctic and commercial success in the Arctic change the conditional probabilities; they increase the odds that a sequence of events that leads to conflict will materialize. It would be foolhardy to disregard the risks that low-probability, high-consequence events imply. An unexpected confluence of vessels and aircraft being in the wrong place, when Arctic weather conditions prevent adequate communications, could lead to tense situations, unless national security forces have the ability to readily manage the situation.

No Arctic war- cooperation high now


Aruliah, 9-28 -- Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada Post-Graduate research fellow

(Charles, "The Cold Truth: Why the Arctic isn’t the same as Asia’s island disputes," iPolitics, 9-28-12, www.ipolitics.ca/2012/09/28/charles-aruliah-the-cold-truth-why-the-arctic-isnt-the-same-as-asias-island-disputes/, accessed 10-7-12, mss)



But if one looks past such public displays, it becomes increasingly clear that, unlike territorial disputes in Asia, Arctic relations remains primarily characterized by cooperation rather than conflict. And here’s why: First and foremost, despite the fact that in August, the Arctic melted at an unprecedented 91,700 km2 per day, it remains one of the harshest environments on the planet. While it’s true that sailing through the Arctic could potentially cut the distance for international shipping in half, it can only be achieved during the late summer melt – less than one quarter of the entire year. Even then, ships must be wary of left-over multi-year ice, icebergs, and floating growlers, some of which can be as hard as concrete. Ships hoping to traverse the passage will still require constant monitoring and icebreaker escorts, all of which incur significant additional costs. This is why Arctic states are closely cooperating in areas such as Search and Rescue. Contrast this with the significantly busier Malacca Straits located near the South China Seas, which draws about 50 percent of the world’s oil tanker traffic, and saw some 70,000 transits in 2007 (compared with the Northwest Passage’s 26 in 2010). The East China Sea too, remains a busy waterway and central hub located between some of the world’s busiest ports. In general, the cost of controlling Arctic shipping just isn’t worth the risk of provoking conflict through the exercise of such dominance. Secondly, unlike the Arctic, territorial disputes in East Asia remain intimately linked to historical grievances and nationalistic passions from the region’s conflict-ridden past. South Korea attributes Japanese claims to the Dokdo/Takeshima islands to its imperial annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1905. China too has argued that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were historically administered by China, until the territories were ‘unfairly’ redistributed to Japan by the post-war powers following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. Throw in other long-standing disputes like China-Taiwan relations and it’s no wonder why mobs of zealous citizens have taken to the streets in anger over supposed incursions of national territory. In the Arctic, the main sources of territorial aggravation exists between long-standing allies (United States and Canada in the Beaufort Sea), and peace-minded Middle Powers (Canada and Denmark over Hans Island) whose idea of conflict involves marking territory with a bottle of Schnapps or Canadian Club. Even the ‘Great Power’ of the region, Russia, has gone through great lengths with Norway to settle a 40 year territorial dispute in the Barents Sea which has also laid the foundations for future joint economic ventures in the area. On the contrary, nationalist rhetoric may actually be driving Arctic cooperation. The encroachment of Arctic ‘outsiders’ such as the EU, China, Japan, South Korea and India, some of whom have argued that the Arctic be declared as ‘a common heritage of mankind’ has led Arctic states, who fear losing territorial integrity, to adopt an ‘us vs. them’ mindset. This has partly resulted in the denial of these countries’ applications for permanent observer status in the exclusive Arctic council, the preeminent intergovernmental forum on the Arctic. Finally, the prominence of scientific/environmental issues and community sustainability in Arctic discussions has mitigated potential nationalistic posturing. The Arctic Council remains geared towards Arctic preservation and studying the effects of environmental change – issues where international scientific collaboration is the norm. Furthermore, the Arctic Council’s endeavor to promote the well-being of indigenous communities, as evidenced by the inclusion of six indigenous organizations as permanent participants in Council discussions, means that Arctic issues are dispersed amongst a variety of actors, and are not the sole realm of national governments.

Their impact is misleading


Young ’11 (Professor – Institutional and International Governance, Environmental Institutions @ UCSB, Arctic expert, PhD – Yale, ‘11 (Oran R, “The future of the Arctic: cauldron of conflict or zone of peace?” International Affairs 87:1, p. 185-193)

Popular accounts of the Arctic’s jurisdictional issues are regularly couched in terms of provocative phrases like the afore-mentioned ‘who owns the Arctic’ or ‘use it or lose it’. But these phrases turn out to be highly misleading in this context. There are virtually no disputes in the Arctic regarding sovereignty over northern lands; no one has expressed a desire to redraw the map of the Arctic with regard to the terrestrial boundaries of the Arctic states. Most of the disagreements are to do with jurisdiction over marine areas where the idea of ownership in the ordinary sense is irrelevant. While some of these disagreements are of long standing and feature relatively entrenched positions, they are not about establishing ownership, and they do not indicate that some level of ‘use’ is required to avoid the erosion of sovereignty. There is little prospect that these disputes will spawn armed clashes. As both Michael Byers and Shelagh Grant make clear in their excellent analyses of Arctic sovereignty, recent efforts to address matters involving sovereignty in the Arctic are marked by a spirit of rule-based problem-solving, rather than an escalating spiral of politically charged claims and counterclaims. The process of delineating jurisdictional boundaries regarding the seabed beyond the limits of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) is taking place in conformity with the rules and procedures set forth in Article 76 of UNCLOS. Norway and Russia have signed an international treaty resolving their differences regarding jurisdictional boundaries in the Barents Sea. There are signs that Canada and the United States are interested in a similar approach with regard to the Beaufort Sea. The Russians, whose much ballyhooed 2007 initiative to plant the Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole is widely discussed in the books under review, have acted in conformity with the relevant rules of international law in addressing jurisdictional matters and repeatedly expressed their readiness to move forward in a cooperative manner in this realm. There are, of course, significant sensitivities regarding the legal status of the Northern Sea Route and especially the Northwest Passage. But given that commercial traffic on these routes is likely to be limited during the near future, and that the use of these routes will require the active cooperation of the coastal states, regardless of their formal legal status, opportunities arise for devising pragmatic arrangements governing the use of these waterways. The progress now being made regarding the development of a mandatory Polar Code covering Arctic shipping is good news. The fact that ‘hot spots’ in the search for oil and gas in the Arctic are located, for the most part, in areas that are not subject to jurisdictional disputes is also helpful. Overall, it seems fair to conclude that the Arctic states are living up to their promises to deal with jurisdictional issues in the region in a peaceful manner.

It won’t escalate


Ackerman 11 (Spencer, National Security Reporter @ WIRED, " War For the Arctic: Never Mind," June 8th, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/war-for-the-arctic-never-mind/,

It wasn’t long ago that the press was running wild with hyperbolic claims of the U.S. losing out in an impending Arctic conflict. After all, global warming is freeing up access to large deposits of oil, gas and minerals right in the backyard of the Russians. But the press forgot to tell other polar nations to freak out. Indeed, at a forum convened on Wednesday by the Center for Strategic and International Security, ambassadors from four polar nations, including some traditionally menaced by Russia, were sanguine about the future of polar exploration. “We actually think we handled these areas for decades during the Cold War rather well,” said Wegger Strommen, Norway’s man in Washington. The U.S Geological Survey assesses that the North Pole holds about 13 percent of the world’s untapped oil supplies. Companies and nations are champing at the bit to expand exploration as the ice caps melt. The Russians have an advantage: a fleet of six nuclear powered icebreakers on its northern shore. By contrast, the U.S. Coast Guard has just one, the cutter Healy. But no one’s sweating it. Should there actually be an arctic sea conflict, the U.S. submarine fleet is second to none, as my colleague David Axe has pointed out. And a massive Arctic oil rush is “years off,” Strommen added, since the “climate is harsh, the conditions are difficult and it’s incredibly expensive.” Beyond that, the Russians are warm in the Arctic. Russia finalized a maritime border with Norway on Tuesday that took 30 years to negotiate. Strommen’s colleagues from Greenland, Canada and Sweden gave high marks to a meeting last month of the Arctic Council, the diplomatic contact group of arctic nations, in which Russia signed onto an accord for search and rescue missions in the cold waters. Think of it as a diplomatic thaw.

All studies prove


IN ‘9 (Ice News – Iceland national news source, 11/29/’9 (“Military dispute over Arctic resources unlikely,” http://www.icenews.is/index.php/2009/12/29/military-dispute-over-arctic-resources-unlikely/)

The natural resources of the Arctic region are unlikely to lead to any military conflict in the region according to new research by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) of Norway. The study further found that a diplomatic solution to any dispute resolution is far likelier and more rational than armed action. In a statement posted on their website, FNI downplays the threat of lawlessness in the Arctic. “Contrary to the general picture drawn by the media and some commentators over the last couple of years, the Arctic region does not suffer under a state of virtual anarchy. The era when states could claim rights to territory and resources by simply planting their flag is long gone,” the statement reads. International law largely regulates any issues in the Arctic region that have been dubbed “security policy challenges” in the past, SikuNews reports, while adding that the report claims that regional states prefer an observation-based approach over any desire for military conflict. Those issues which arise that are not clearly governed by international law in respect to resolution procedures are generally only minor, say researchers. The focus of the majority of the case studies contained in the findings was on relations in the Barents Sea, between Russia and Norway. These included the management of ocean resources, the status of the continental shelf and waters around Svalbard and the delimitation of unresolved boundaries. These case studies collectively found little or no threat of armed dispute likely and concluded that the Arctic region has little rationale or legal space for military conflict resolution.


No US russia war - generals


Graham ‘7 (Thomas Graham, senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, September 2007, "Russia in Global Affairs” July - September 2007, The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive lon-term relations with Russia.


No Russia war – blowback


Weitz 11 - senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor(Richard, 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely remain limited and compartmentalized. Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.


2NC—UQ


Set the bar high for arctic militarization – nuclear subs and coast guard ships – cites best study, indicts the media.

Wezeman 12 - Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme [Siemon T. Wezeman, “MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE ARCTIC,” SIPRI Background Paper, March 2012

While some media, politicians and researchers have portrayed the changes in the capabilities of the Arctic littoral states as significant military build- ups and potential threats to security, the overall picture is one of limited modernization and increases or changes in equipment, force levels and force structure. Some of these changes—for example, the strengthening of the Canadian Rangers, the move of the main Norwegian land units to the north of Norway or the new Russian Arctic units—have little or nothing to do with power projection into the areas of the Arctic with unclear ownership; rather they are for the patrolling and protecting of recognized national territories that are becoming more accessible, including for illegal activities. Others changes—such as new but unarmed navy or coastguard icebreakers—may have more to do with civilian research in support of national claims to an ‘extended continental shelf’ under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).100 While aircraft and ships play a much more important role for Arctic secur- ity than land forces, most of the extensive changes—such as the acquisitions by Canada and Norway of new combat aircraft or large surface combat vessels—have a much more general background than increasing worries about potential threats in the Arctic region. Russia’s expansion of its fleet in the Arctic also appears more a matter of providing protection for its SSBNs, as the Soviet Union did during the 1970s and 1980s, than a programme building up for a military struggle over Arctic resources. Some of the large military acquisitions announced have little prospect of being completely realized. It is unlikely that Russia will be able to fund the envisaged expan- sion of its navy and even the Canadian and Norwegian plans for the F-35 combat aircraft may be curtailed for financial reasons. This review of current and projected military forces in the Arctic region points to a process of modernization and the creation of new capacity to address challenges associated with the environmental, economic and polit- ical changes anticipated in the region, rather than as a response to major threat perceptions. Conventional military forces specially adapted to the harsh Arctic environment are projected to remain small scale, especially given the size of the Arctic region, and will remain in some cases considerably below cold war levels. This notwithstanding, an increase of military forces in a region where several states claim maritime zones that are expected to contain extensive natural resources does give some reasons for concern, including for unexpected incidents between claimants. In order to help mitigate negative perceptions about security policies in the region as well as the possibility of misunderstandings, the Arctic littoral states need to be clear about their military policies, doctrines and operational rules and should include mili- tary confidence-building measures in their bilateral or multilateral relations associated with the Arctic. 100 pg. 13-14

They are wrong about Russia

Eide 1/21/13 - Norway minister of foreign affairs [Espen Barth Eide, “Norway and Sweden to cooperate with Russia in Arctic,” The voice of Russia, Jan 21, 2013 17:13 Moscow Time Pg. http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_01_21/Norway-and-Sweden-to-cooperate-with-Russia-on-the-development-of-the-Arctic-region/

Q: What ways of cooperation with Russia do you see in the Arctic?

A: We’ve been working well with Russia for many years. We have several institutional frameworks. We have originally the Barents cooperation which has just celebrated its first 20 years. We have the Arctic Council which is circumpolar. And I think more important than any of it is the fact that Russia and Norway both agree that UNCLOS applies, which means that if there are any disputes – they will be solved as is stipulated in UNCLOS.

And again, as I said in the previous answer, the question is not whether countries agree on everything because that never happens. I’m the Foreign Minister and I’m dealing with disagreements every day. The point is – whether we have an agreement on how we find a solution. And I think we do have an agreement on the way of how we find solutions in the Arctic.”

Are there any projects with Russia?

“Many, I mean we for decades had a fisheries commission between Russia and Norway that settled quotas in quite advanced way. We for instance allow Russians to fish, fish which we see as Russian, because it was born in Russia but to fish it in Norwegian areas because we know how they migrate, and vice versa. So, that is ongoing. We have good cooperation between our coast guards. We have very good cooperation with our border guards. And we have mutual, two way investments in each of these projects. So, there is quite a lot of cooperation with Russia in the Arctic.


No Arctic War

EU countries won’t get drawn in


Jakobsen June 25 2014

Peter Viggo Jakobsen- Associate professor at the Institute for Strategy of the Royal Danish Defense College. “Judy Asks: Should the EU worry About the Arctic?” http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=56002

The EU has more than enough to worry about as it is. It should not worry about the Arctic for two reasons.¶ The first is that the five states bordering the Arctic (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States) will not permit the EU to play a formal role in the region. Canada and Russia directly oppose the idea. Denmark, the only EU member of the five, officially welcomes EU involvement in areas such as fisheries, energy, and climate change that are of interest to Denmark and its self-governing territories, Greenland and the Faroe Islands; but at the same time, Copenhagen prefers to keep the EU at arm’s length in the Arctic.¶ The second reason for the EU not to worry about the Arctic is that the risk of military conflict in the region approximates to zero. The confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine will not spill over into the Arctic for the simple reason that the costs would be prohibitive for Moscow. Russia has accepted the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as the means to distribute the disputed territories in the Arctic because it gives Russia the largest slice of the pie while keeping China out.

Arctic conflict with Russia inevitable


-nuclear icebreakers

-70,000 troops

-military base build up

-comptetition

-US-NATO response

Joachim Hagopian 5/9/14

Writer and analyst for Global Research.citing metro news. “Global Militarization, the East-West Divide and the March towards World War III” http://www.globalresearch.ca/global-militarization-the-east-west-divide-and-the-march-towards-world-war-iii/5386333

One relatively new global region where the US-NATO military is currently facing off against the Russian armed forces is fighting over the disputed waters accounting for 30% of the world’s vast oil reserves sitting underneath the Arctic Ocean floor. As the global warming rapidly melts the polar icecaps, the result makes the value of its mineral and oil reserves both more assessable and coveted by all the nations that share Arctic territory. The melted ice also opens up new trade routes never available before. Thus competition and potential conflict is ratcheting up as Russia the nation with the most Arctic territory has been building a military presence in the region since 2007 and currently possesses ten military bases along the northern sea route. Only in the last year has NATO recognized the need to match Russia’s head start both militarily and economically.¶ Recently 16,000 soldiers from the US and NATO participated in the largest Western joint military exercise north of the Arctic circle in a hurry up effort to try and catch up to the 70,000 troop buildup of the Russian Army already stationed on the northern tundra. Russia has the distinction of being the only nation in the world with a nuclear icebreaker fleet. ¶ Last month Norway’s defense minister echoed the NATO party line seeing Russia’s annexation of Crimea as a direct threat to all NATO countries and called for an increased focus on matching Russia’s Arctic circle growth. In April Russia successfully shipped its first oil from its Arctic drilling operations. Canada, the US, Norway and Denmark through Greenland all have a vested NATO interest in the Arctic for its plentiful deposits of oil, gas and minerals. And the Russian Federation has beaten NATO to the punch both in its resource extraction as well as its military stronghold in the region.


There’s no rush to the arctic – no real disputes exist!


Andersen and Perry 12

(Perry, M. Charles. Dr. Perry holds an M.A. in international affairs, an M.A. in law and diplomacy Ph.D. in international politics from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, officer in the USAR, member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies IFPA. Andersen, Bobby, MA in international relations from Boston University and a BA in political science from Whittier College, completed coursework at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. "The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis." New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region. N.p., 1 Nov. 2012. Web. 25 June 2014. http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/ArcticAtlanticPerspectivesOct2012.pdf) ʕっ•ᴥ•ʔっ♥eve

That said, time, cost, and technology constraints appear to be working against any competitive “rush to the Arctic,” fueled in part by the lure of an oil and gas bonanza be- yond compare, as some have suggested. Far more likely is
a slow and methodical push into the High North, not the least because there is so much yet to learn (or, in some cases, to relearn) about operating safely in the harsh Arctic landscape, so little infrastructure already (or soon to be) in place to support such operations, and such limited capacity even among the Arctic Five to undertake and sustain Arctic operations of any kind, be they commercial or military in nature. Moreover, while access to – if not control over – offshore Arctic resources remains a strategic goal shared by quite a few influential countries located both within and beyond the Arctic region, the probability of serious interstate rivalry or, in the worst case, open conflict in pursuit of this objective seems quite low, at least in the near- to mid-term future. In the first place, the vast majority of hydrocarbon deposits locked in the Arctic seabed are concentrated within the sovereign terri- tory of one or another of the Arctic Five, where ownership is clear and undisputed. Secondly, while there are disagreements over who owns various resource-rich areas where two or more exclusive economic zones and potential ECS’s appear to overlap, the 2010 agreement between Norway and Russia over how best to divide a sector they both claimed in the Barents Sea, together with a commitment by the Arctic Five in 2008 to abide by procedures set forth in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for determining the dimensions of each country’s ECS, sug- gest that a peaceful settlement of any territorial dispute is more likely than not. Third, and finally, the sheer expense and technical challenges involved in extracting oil, gas, and other strategic resources from the Arctic ocean floor argue for a joint, collaborative effort among interested parties, Arctic and non-Arctic alike, as opposed to a “go it alone,” unilateralist approach.

Even if arctic disputes arise, they won’t escalate


Andersen and Perry 12

(Perry, M. Charles. Dr. Perry holds an M.A. in international affairs, an M.A. in law and diplomacy Ph.D. in international politics from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, officer in the USAR, member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies IFPA. Andersen, Bobby, MA in international relations from Boston University and a BA in political science from Whittier College, completed coursework at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. "The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis." New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region. N.p., 1 Nov. 2012. Web. 25 June 2014.) ʕっ•ᴥ•ʔっ♥eve http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/ArcticAtlanticPerspectivesOct2012.pdf)

As a result, it cannot be dismissed that localized episodes in the Arctic could still develop into armed clashes despite the original intentions of the parties involved, especially given local asymmetries of military strength (principally in Russia’s favor) which could potentially encourage the use of limited force by one or another state actor in the region, based on the conviction that the other side(s) would avoid at all costs escalating the conflict into a major confrontation. In addition, given their track record, it is possible to imagine as well countries like China and Russia deciding at some future date to exploit the natural resources found in pockets of “high seas” in the region, particularly those in the central Arctic Ocean, without ac-knowledging their obligations under UNCLOS and rejecting the legal control of the areas by the International Sea-Bed Authority (ISA).That said, it remains unlikely that any of the five Arctic littoral states would risk a large-scale, inter-state military conflict, particularly to impose its preferred solution to regional clashes of interest, since the resulting political and economic costs of doing so would likely outweigh any conceivable gain. Their military forces are far more likely to be used in the Arctic to support search and rescue, disaster relief, and other civil emergency/civil support operations than for combat-related missions.

Countries drilling in the arctic will cooperate


Andersen and Perry 12

(Perry, M. Charles. Dr. Perry holds an M.A. in international affairs, an M.A. in law and diplomacy Ph.D. in international politics from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, officer in the USAR, member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies IFPA. Andersen, Bobby, MA in international relations from Boston University and a BA in political science from Whittier College, completed coursework at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. "The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis." New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region. N.p., 1 Nov. 2012. Web. 25 June 2014.) ʕっ•ᴥ•ʔっ♥eve http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/ArcticAtlanticPerspectivesOct2012.pdf)



Indeed, whatever the source and level of regional tension at any particular time, the future of the Arctic and its strategic importance will be determined first and foremost by decisions made and actions taken by the five circumpolar states, each of which has a significant Arctic coastline, EEZ, and potentially resource-rich ECS to protect and over which to assert its sovereign rights. Each is also likely to witness a substantial increase in economic activity, along with seaborne trade, in and through Arctic waters under its jurisdiction in the 2030 to 2040 timeframe. Within this context, clarifying who owns what in those areas where that is still unclear, providing security (and protecting strategic interests) in resource-rich areas where ownership is not disputed, and establishing international rules of the road for those who wish to transit Arctic waterways and/or help to tap the region’s mineral wealth and fisheries are certain to remain priority tasks for the five coastal states in the future of the Arctic. Significantly, despite Russia’s sometimes belligerent stance in the north, including provocative naval maneuvers and increased incursions by Russian bombers into Arctic neighbors’ air space, Moscow will likely choose, at least in the near term, to act with, not against, other Arctic countries such as Norway and the United States, that can provide it with the necessary expertise for deep-water offshore drilling in icy conditions that Russian firms sorely lack. Norway, for example, whose energy giant Statoil operates the world’s only offshore gas-production facility above the Arctic Circle, continues its successful exploration of Arctic waters, with plans to develop as much as 600 million barrels of recoverable oil in the recently discovered Skrugard and Havis fields alone, while Russia’s Shtokman gas project in the Barents Sea has been delayed indefinitely, following years of failed Russian efforts.

Russia handles arctic policy rather rationally—no escalation


Andersen and Perry 12

(Perry, M. Charles. Dr. Perry holds an M.A. in international affairs, an M.A. in law and diplomacy Ph.D. in international politics from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, officer in the USAR, member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies IFPA. Andersen, Bobby, MA in international relations from Boston University and a BA in political science from Whittier College, completed coursework at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. IFPA. "Implications for National Security and International Cooperation." New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region. Institute for Foreign Policy Relations, n.d. Web. 25 July 2014. http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf.) ʕっ•ᴥ•ʔっ♥eve

While Russia engages in aggressive rhetoric, however, its policy actions in the Arctic are often far more pragmatic. This can be seen in recent progress made on territorial dispute negotiations (especially with Norway), environmental regulation, and search and rescue coordination, driven in part by a growing recognition among Russian authorities of their need for foreign assistance to develop Arctic resources and the NSR. The new U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed by the two sides in April 2010, also has the potential to change the tenor of Russian-U.S. and Russian-Western relations, as do oil production agreements. One such agreement was reached in August 2011 by Exxon Mobil and Rosneft, Russia’s state oil company, in which Exxon could gain access to as much as one hundred billion barrels of oil equivalent in the Kara Sea, in exchange for which Rosneft would acquire stakes in Exxon’s advanced drilling techniques and several of the company’s U.S. operations. Even so, Russia’s strategic outlook cannot be expected to transform overnight. For the foreseeable future, then, Russia’s Arctic policy will likely retain its strong militaristic element, which has been compounded by Moscow’s new tendency to “securitize” issues viewed as strategically important to Russian national interests. This is especially true of the Arctic, given its strategic importance to Russia economically, politically, and militarily. As a result, although a major conflict in the Arctic seems unlikely today, it remains uncertain whether the region will evolve into an area of competition or cooperation in the future.


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