Arctic Oil/Gas Neg



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***Unilat DA

1NC Unilateral Action DA

Unilateral development of Artic resources sparks military conflict with Russia and Canada- only a multilateral approach solves


Stoicof 8

Alexandra, SIT Geneva: International Studies, Organizations and Social Justice, The George Washington University International Affairs and Geography, THE POLAR THAW: An Analysis Of The Impacts Of Climate Change On The Environment And Geopolitics Of The Arctic Polar Region, Spring



The current pursuit to unclaimed Arctic waters has the potential to create unprecedented conflict; environmentally, politically, and economically. Russia, Canada, and the United States pose the greatest threat to the stability of the region if they continue to act unilaterally to pursue resources. The scrabble to claim territory can lead into political conflict and have the potential to involve military force. Oil companies that have interests in developing the resources, such as Arctic Oil and Gas Corporation and British Petroleum, have no legal mechanisms to determine the extraction rights of the region. Thus, the development of hostile situations need to be avoided by realizing that every state in pursuit of the Arctic has similar motives and intentions, and that these similarities can be funneled into a joint effort to develop the region. A collective corporation representing various oil companies and national governments would insure that each party would gain from the resources, without the presence of numerous actors battling over the same area. Such a corporate agreement would serve as the legal framework for an area currently without any jurisdiction.

This war goes nuclear


Huebert 7 – Professor of Political Science/Strategic Studies Program @ University of Calgary

Rob, “Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century: A Critique of Chapter 4 – ‘Post-Cold War Cooperation in the Arctic: From Interstate Conflict to New Agendas for Security,’” http://www.carc.org/calgary/a4.htm



The potential for an accidental nuclear war remains as a threat to the Arctic regions. On January 25, 1995 Boris Yeltsin activated his "nuclear briefcase" when Russian radar detected a rocket launch from somewhere off the Norwegian coast. The rocket was first thought to be headed towards Moscow, but eventually veered away from Russian territory. The rocket was in fact an American scientific probe sent to examine the northern lights. The Norwegians had informed the Russians of the launch, but mis-communications had resulted in the failure of the message to reach the proper Russian officials. (4) This incident, while hopefully rare, indicates that the potential for nuclear misunderstanding remains as real as ever. In addition to the Russian Government's perception of a military threat posed by the United States, as evidenced by the continuing weapons programme in Russia and the continued threat of accidental nuclear war, some American policy-makers are perceiving an increased military threat from Russia. In particular, they are questioning the assistance provided to the Russians for the purpose of decommissioning their older nuclear submarines. (5) They are concerned that such programmes are subsidizing the Russian modernization of their submarine fleets. However, the current administration does not share this point of view. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that the American leadership is bound to be disturbed if, on the one hand, the Russians continue to plead poverty when decommissioning their older submarines while, on the other hand, they continue to build the Borei class.

Extinction


Corcoran 9 – PhD, Senior Fellow @ Global Security

Ed, Ph.D., serves as a Senior Fellow on national security issues at GlobalSecurity.org., Frmr. Strategic Analyst at the US Army War College where he chaired studies for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and member of the National Advisory Board for the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues, we win the qualification game, April 21, http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/090421301-strategic-nuclear-targets.htm

That brings us to Russia, our former main adversary, now a competitive partner and still a potential future adversary, particularly as relations have gradually soured in recent years. Russia is the only other nation with a formidable arsenal of some three thousand strategic weapons. Our opposing arsenals were built up in the period when Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was the underlying strategic concept -- each side deterred from striking the other by the prospect of assured retaliatory destruction. The situation became even madder as both sides worked to develop a capability to destroy the other's strike force with a crippling first strike. This resulted in further large increases in the sizes of the arsenals, as well as early warning systems and hair-trigger launch-on-warning alert procedures. The final result was an overall system in which each side could destroy the other in a matter of minutes. And it also raised another chilling specter, Nuclear Winter, in which the atmospheric dust raised from a major nuclear exchange would block sunlight for an extended period and essentially destroy human civilization globally. The collapse of the Soviet Union collapsed this threat, but did not eliminate it. US and Russian nuclear forces remained frozen in adversarial positions. The May 2002 Moscow Treaty began to address this legacy and is leading to a reduction in strategic nuclear forces down to levels of about two thousand on each side by 2012. These levels are still sufficient to destroy not only both nations but also human civilization. It is hard to even construct scenarios where the use of even a few strategic nuclear weapons does not risk a total escalation. Strikes on Russian warning facilities or strike forces would almost certainly bring a wave of retaliatory strikes. Strikes on hardened command centers would be of questionable effectiveness and also risk total escalation. In addition, successful elimination of Russian leaders could greatly complicate any efforts to stop escalation short of a total nuclear exchange.

2NC AT No War

Don’t trust their defense – Russians are intentionally hiding their belligerence to encourage complacency in the US


Huebert 10 – PhD, Professor of Political Science @ U of Calgary

Rob, “The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment,” http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf

It should be clear that the Russians have been according a growing importance to the Arctic region . They continually issue statements affirming their commitment to peaceful cooperation in the Arctic, which show up in the form of public statements by their leaders and in their primary documents. These same leaders are also very quick to condemn the actions of the other Arctic states as being aggressive and a threat to international peace and security in the region whenever they engage in any form of military related activity. It is clear, however, that the Russians have embarked on a much more assertive use of military force in the region by taking various action – the missile test launches near the pole, the sudden and substantial resumption of the long-range bomber patrols, and the voyages of their surface units into the disputed zones – which exceeds that of any of the other Arctic states. Furthermore, the Russians’ proposed rearmament plans greatly exceed the plans of any other Arctic state. Thus, the Russians have excelled at portraying themselves as cooperative while taking increasingly assertive action. The question remains as to why? Are they merely reasserting themselves as a global power, or, does this new action point to an increasingly assertive Russia? This is not known.



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