Australian Quarantine Review Secretariat Australian Quarantine a shared responsibility
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- 8.3.2 Relationships with Other Border Agencies
- Department of Health and Family Services
- 8.3.2.3 Federal Airports Corporation
- Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories
- Delivery of Quarantine Services
- Performance Indicators for Border Programs
- Quarantine-approved Premises
- 8.3.7 Cost-recovery for Quarantine Programs
8.3 Elements OF BORDER QUARANTINEIdentifying High Risk PathwaysIn 1988, the Lindsay Review commented that ‘one of the first things a quarantine service must know is how effective its operations are at assessing and addressing risk’ (DPIE 1988, p. 35). The Review Committee agrees that the principles of risk analysis should be applied to help determine the effectiveness of current border quarantine activities. Risk analyses of the pathways by which exotic pests and diseases might enter Australia would enable current border policies and procedures to be evaluated, and help management of Quarantine Australia to allocate its resources to high risk areas. Just as for import risk analysis, the validity of such risk analyses depends on the quality of the available data and information. The Lindsay Review also recognised this, and recommended the use of ‘coordinated databases and database management systems oriented to the needs of quarantine’ (DPIE 1988, p. 57), especially for policy development, risk analysis, and ‘evaluating the effectiveness of programs’. The Review Committee concurs with these views, and specific recommendations on developing such databases and information systems are discussed in Section 9.5.3. During the course of the Review, it came to the attention of the Review Committee that inspectors at the border do not always complete the full inspection of consignments in accordance with the sampling protocol, and do not always analyse products confiscated at first ports of entry, to determine the actual quarantine risk (see Section 8.4.4.2). The Review Committee appreciates that limited resources and the advent of full cost-recovery inhibit the incentive for border staff to analyse completely all intercepted product. However, without this full analysis quarantine officials have an imperfect database on which to formulate future policy and operational decisions. For example, current work practices may provide data on the number of times a particular import protocol or quarantine regulation is breached, but not on the level of quarantine risk associated with each breach. The Review Committee believes that records on the detection of pests and diseases at the border need to be improved to provide adequate data for the development of comprehensive databases and information systems on incursions. Areas the Review Committee considers need more attention, and to which it believes relatively few resources have been allocated, include international mail exchanges and courier depots, seaports and air cargo. Although all border activities should be the subject of risk profiling and analysis over the next three years, these three areas need particular attention in the interim. This matter is considered further in Chapter 11 on Resources and Legislation. Recommendation 48: The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia use risk analysis based on comprehensive detection databases and information systems to target resource allocation to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of border activities. 8.3.2 Relationships with Other Border AgenciesAustralian Customs ServiceThere is a long-standing and close working relationship between quarantine authorities and the Australian Customs Service (ACS). Both agencies operate within a regulatory framework with separate Acts and Regulations. At international airports, the first contact disembarking passengers have with Australian officials is when they reach the customs, immigration and quarantine border within the international terminal of the airport. This border, known as the primary line, is staffed by ACS officers and it is at this point that passengers present a completed Travellers Statement and other documents. At the primary line, the ACS officer marks the statement to indicate that the passenger has: · declared quarantine goods, in which case the passenger must go through the red channel for inspection of the goods by a quarantine officer; · declared goods on the quarantine free list and is given ‘free runner’ status, in which case the passenger may exit via the green channel; or · nothing to declare and is given free runner status, in which case the passenger may exit via the green channel. Customs marshals also play a role in directing declarants and others to baggage search channels. Although ACS performs a decision-making role in relation to passenger clearance at the red–green channels and intuitive judgements at the primary line, it has no involvement in policy development in quarantine. However, because of an extensive agency role — for the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Nature Conservation Agency and others — and its large staff numbers, ACS exercises considerable influence over airport operational arrangements that affect, to varying degrees, the implementation of quarantine procedures. Quarantine officers instruct and advise newly recruited international airport customs staff on quarantine concerns. To assist in the clearance of passenger baggage, the quarantine service developed in 1988 a list of low risk items that customs officers could clear without the need to refer to a quarantine officer. The further development of this list since that time has facilitated faster passenger movement through international airports while maintaining the required level of quarantine border integrity. ACS cargo clearance electronic systems form the basis for all imported cargo clearance arrangements at airports and seaports and quarantine’s databases have been developed in conjunction with ACS. Section 8.5.2.1 covers in more detail the relationship with ACS in developing joint electronic information systems. ACS also conducts initial screening of mail for quarantine authorities at international mail exchanges and courier mail depots. However, in recent times the focus of customs and quarantine authorities at the border appears to be diverging. ACS emphasis on its role in trade facilitation and advanced planning for passenger preclearance, together with revised arrangements for handling mail, may have a significant effect on the delivery of quarantine services at airports, seaports, mail exchanges and cargo handling facilities. Although quarantine authorities share the objective of facilitating passenger and cargo movements, their primary objective at the border is to maintain and enhance Australia’s quarantine integrity. ACS has a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) that sets out the cooperative and consultative arrangements between the two organisations. The organisations have formal and informal consultations on a range of border issues. These arrangements are covered in more detail in Chapter 4 on Quarantine Australia. Department of Health and Family ServicesThe Department of Health and Family Services, through its Chief Medical Advisor as the Director of Human Quarantine, has responsibility for determining human quarantine policy. It advises quarantine authorities of its policy requirements, which are then implemented through operational instructions and directions for border quarantine staff. The Department of Health and Family Services maintains its advisory role with quarantine border operations through periodic meetings called usually on specific issues. The Director of Human Quarantine has been consulted on all recommendations in this Report that may affect human quarantine policy. In the event of an outbreak of an exotic pest or disease of humans that may pose a threat to Australia, the Department of Health and Family Services takes a far more active role in operational matters. Depending on emerging disease situations, this role may extend to developing or approving changes to operational procedures and directions. 8.3.2.3 Federal Airports CorporationThe Federal Airports Corporation is the controlling authority at most international airports in Australia. Its charter gives it control over airport infrastructures with a consequent effect on how agencies operate within airports. As such, its policies and procedures inevitably influence quarantine operations. There are both formal and informal contacts between AQIS and the Federal Airports Corporation on operational matters. AQIS is a member of the facilitation committee at each international airport. These committees meet regularly to discuss, among other things, cross-agency issues and airport operations generally. There is also a National Facilitation Advisory Committee, a joint industry and regulatory authority committee that examines and resolves aircraft scheduling and other operational difficulties. Department of the Environment, Sport and TerritoriesThe Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories is the agency with responsibility for the Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1982 and thus has an interest in quarantine matters, particularly at the border. From the inception of this Act, ACS has acted as an agent for the wildlife protection authorities (currently the Australian Nature Conservation Agency, which is part of the Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories) under an agreement that sets out the responsibilities of each organisation in relation to the administration and enforcement of the Act. This agreement is currently under review and is being developed as an MOU between both organisations. One of the components of the draft MOU relates to interaction with AQIS on a number of issues, although AQIS is not party to the proposed MOU. The Review Committee has been advised that once the draft MOU with ACS has received some degree of consensus, the Australian Nature Conservation Agency intends to approach AQIS to have a similar MOU with that organisation. The Committee supports the establishment of an MOU between Quarantine Australia and the Australian Nature Conservation Agency, and suggests that the MOU should make specific reference to quarantine officers exercising powers under the Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1982 (see Section 4.4.6). 8.3.2.5 Australia PostAustralia Post is responsible for the handling of all official mail items entering Australia. Traditionally, quarantine staff have played a secondary role in mail inspection, examining items referred by ACS ‘screeners’ for quarantine clearance. Thus ACS has generally had the primary role in negotiations with Australia Post on matters relating to mail handling and examination. This situation is gradually changing, with quarantine authorities taking a closer interest in mail surveillance. Revised arrangements with Australia Post are under negotiation, including the development of an MOU with AQIS on quarantine aspects of handling mail (see Section 4.4.6). Delivery of Quarantine ServicesBefore 1994, all quarantine service delivery was carried out under agency arrangements by State administrations, on the Commonwealth’s behalf. In October 1994, a meeting of the Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New Zealand resolved to transfer responsibility for delivery of quarantine services to the Commonwealth. Ministers from the Northern Territory, Tasmania and Western Australia did not agree to the transfer. This decision has led to a situation whereby there is now a mix of Commonwealth and State agencies delivering supposedly identical Commonwealth quarantine programs in different parts of the country. For instance, State staff appointed as Quarantine Officers by the Commonwealth perform the border function at Darwin, Hobart and Perth International Airports. Commonwealth quarantine officers carry out the border activities at all other international airports in Australia. As stated in Chapter 2, the principles underpinning the goal of quarantine are that quarantine programs should be delivered effectively, efficiently and with a consistent national approach. To ensure that these principles are achieved, one agency should bear the full responsibility for provision of quarantine services. The Review Committee believes that Quarantine Australia should be that agency, although Quarantine Australia, for reasons of geographic and economic efficiency, may choose to appoint third-party agencies to deliver some services subject to contestability and appropriate audit. Recommendation 49: The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia ensure consistent, effective and efficient national delivery and reporting of quarantine services. Performance Indicators for Border ProgramsAt the time of conducting its examination of border programs, the Review Committee was concerned to note that performance indicators for some border programs were not properly established. Although data on workload and effectiveness have been maintained in a variety of forms for many years, they are not sufficiently detailed, complete or retrievable to be useful for either internal program review or external auditing. The Review Committee understands that part of this deficiency arises from laxity with the former arrangement under which the States directly operated quarantine border functions under agreements with and policy guidelines from the Commonwealth. In its report on an efficiency audit of quarantine operations, the Auditor-General noted that ‘currently, the management of the agency agreements is limited by a lack of clearly agreed objectives between AQIS and State agents. There is an absence of meaningful performance indicators to allow effective management of the delivery of services and the evaluation of agency operations’ (Auditor-General 1991, p. 26). It would appear that this is still the case. The Review Committee has been advised that effort is being directed towards rectifying this situation. AQIS has established a working party to develop appropriate performance indicators for all border programs. It is expected that these indicators, which are due for completion and dissemination to program staff in November 1996, will be developed to be effective as both program management and auditing tools. The Review Committee sees such data as fundamental for the effective management of all programs. Recommendation 50: The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia establish, as a matter of priority, performance objectives and indicators for all border programs, and implement regular audits of programs against these indicators for both efficiency and effectiveness. Quality AssuranceBefore 1990, there were only a limited number of quarantine compliance agreements with industry. During the period from 1990 to 1992, quality assurance arrangements were developed with companies that were prepared to produce procedural manuals and accept the challenge of undertaking some components of quarantine inspection activities, subject to audit. However, there was considerable variety in the types of auditable quality assurance arrangements that were developed during this period. Generally, the arrangements were known as Approved Quarantine Directives or Compliance Agreements. Approved Quarantine Directives were scheduled for two audits per year; Compliance Agreements, which had more flexibility, were generally required to have one audit per year. New quality assurance arrangements being developed will allow accredited customs brokers to undertake assessment of packaging material for low risk commodities. Under the proposed arrangements, there will no longer be a requirement for accredited customs brokers to present all packaging documentation. Further advances in quality assurance arrangements will see developments in both the plant and animal quarantine areas for post-arrival quarantine management. However, the Review Committee is adamant that all quality assurance arrangements must be accompanied by well developed auditing programs. Although endorsing the extended use of quality assurance arrangements with industry for activities with low quarantine risk, the Review Committee believes that these arrangements should be approved only when subject to regular auditing. The determination of the level of risk and the means of managing risk are discussed in more detail in Section 8.3.1. During the Review, some industry groups expressed concern that there was a tendency for quarantine authorities to develop complex and onerous Approved Quarantine Directives that were difficult for industry to adopt and hence were commercially unattractive. Although quarantine integrity must not be compromised, the Review Committee considers that the conditions applicable to quality assurance arrangements covering low risk items should be no more complex than is required to manage the assessed risk, subject to audit. Recommendation 51: The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia facilitate the use of industry-developed quality assurance arrangements for low risk quarantine goods and tasks, subject to appropriate audit arrangements. Quarantine-approved PremisesDuring the public hearing process and the Review Committee’s inspections of quarantine operations, the issue of approval of private premises for the performance of quarantine was brought to its attention. In particular, concerns had been raised regarding the way in which premises were approved and approvals withdrawn. It was put to the Review Committee that different standards were applied across States, resulting in difficulties for importers. The Review Committee understands that the Quarantine Act 1908 (Sections 44B(1) and 46A) provides the legislative base for the use of places other than quarantine stations for the quarantine of goods, including those of animal or plant origin. The approval, which must be given in writing by a Quarantine Officer, is generally for a specific purpose and then subject to conditions applying to the particular quarantine. From inquiries made by the Review Committee, it would appear that State quarantine authorities have adopted different policies and guidelines over the years, although there are similarities in overall requirements. This situation is not dissimilar to others encountered by the Review Committee where industry has difficulty with policies and guidelines being applied differently from State to State for imports of like product. The Review Committee is aware that since the transfer from some States of quarantine functions to the Commonwealth, a project officer has been appointed by AQIS to examine the differing arrangements and to prepare standardised criteria for the various types of approved premises. The Review Committee raises this issue as a further example of a lack of a national and uniform approach to the application of quarantine policies and guidelines. Not only should these premises that serve an important role in quarantine security be approved under uniform guidelines, but they should also be subject to regular audit. The Review Committee believes that an urgent examination of these inconsistencies should be undertaken and that Quarantine Australia should develop and implement appropriate auditing programs for these establishments. Recommendation 52: The Review Committee recommends that a national system for the approval and audit of private premises for the performance of quarantine be established and implemented as a matter of urgency. 8.3.7 Cost-recovery for Quarantine ProgramsOver many years, the Commonwealth has pursued a policy of partially recovering the direct operating costs of quarantine programs. Under former policies, such elements as quarantine surveillance, clearance of aircraft, ships and their passengers, research and general administrative costs were excluded from cost-recovery. However, since 1979 successive governments have introduced policies leading to much higher levels of cost-recovery, culminating in a 1990 decision to increase cost-recovery levels to 100%. Cost-recovery was gradually extended over the next three years to this pre-determined level. A number of submissions to the review were critical of cost-recovery and the user-pays principle. In its submission, the National Farmers’ Federation (NFF) stated that ‘as a general principle NFF believes that tasks identified as functions of the national government such as border surveillance and collection of statistics, should he funded by the Commonwealth. So too should analytical assessment, policy development, and risk and cost–benefit determinations. Some operational activities identified as benefiting individuals or groups of individuals could be funded through cost-recovery’. The NFF submission went on to propose that an AQIS Charging Review Committee be established to review beneficiaries and community service obligations. Canberra Consumers made the point that ‘the quarantine service is not provided for the benefit of users; it exists to protect the country from the importation and spread of threats to man, animals or plants’. The Review Committee is aware that industry-based charging review committees were established in 1994 to permit greater scrutiny of charges to these end users (see Section 3.3.2). The function of these committees is to assess operational procedures and staffing, consider the composition of user-attributable costs, and advise on charging structures and rates. Although supporting the general principle of cost-recovery for quarantine services, the Review Committee believes that the application of this policy should not be taken to the extreme. Observations during the inspection phase of the Review lent weight to the view that quarantine staff were tending to concentrate effort on cost-recovered programs to the detriment of budget-funded activities such as wharf surveillance. Further, the Review Committee received a strong impression that some quarantine activities appeared to be driven more by the ability to charge for services than by the need to meet the objectives of quarantine. In such situations, quarantine security is likely to be compromised. Urgent consideration should therefore be given to reviewing the balance between funding provided for community service obligations and from cost-recovery in border activities. This issue is discussed further in Chapter 11 on Resources and Legislation. 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