Major external actors and their tools that can influence the crisis

Major external actors and their tools that can influence the crisis

The United States of America

However, this unwillingness on behalf of the US to get significantly involved in the Ukrainian crisis has been apparent from the very beginning of the crisis, firstly by letting the EU and Germany to manage the situation and subsequently, even when the United States assumed a more active role, it was made adamantly clear that the US were not going to commit in preventing Russia from exerting its influence over Ukraine.

It appears that after the bellicosity of the George W. Bush years, the Obama Administration is extremely reluctant to risk confrontation or even flex its muscles, whether it is dealing with N. Korea, Assad’s Syria, China, the ISIL, Iran or Russia. Certainly, the United States of America is capable of power projection around the globe; however it is clear that America lacks the will to do so.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine the tools available to the US Government and the actions it can take, the possible results of those actions and finally consider if they are worth implementing or not.

As stated before, the US has imposed mild economic sanctions on selective Russian individuals, alongside the EU, however their results remain in doubt. Hence wider and bolder sanctions targeting vital sectors of the Russian economy such as the energy and defense sectors could be a viable option to really hurt Russia and its economy. Evidently, such sanctions could harm the unstable Russian economy and possibly force Putin to change his stance. The United States’ bilateral trade with Russia is relatively small for the world’s largest economy; however such sanctions could inflict significant collateral damage on the shaky European economy, which is heavily interconnected with Russia’s.

Furthermore, the US could face retaliation measures from Russia in the form of similar sanctions, like the already announced retaliation measures against the US space and satellite programs and the future of the international Space Station beyond 2020. [76] Additionally, Russia could become less cooperating in other significant issues, irrelevant from the Ukrainian crisis, like North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq or the containment of China. [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82]

Another option for the United States would be to increase its military assistance to Ukraine by providing intelligence, training, small arms, munitions and perhaps even more sophisticated weapon systems to the Ukrainian Army. Such measures taken by the US would definitely tip the balance of power in favor of the Ukrainian Army in its struggle against the pro-Russian separatists. Such change from the US Government would definitely infuriate Moscow and probably would prompt them to increase its support for the rebels resulting in a more violent and deadlier conflict between the two factions. Moreover, such decision to provide additional non-lethal and lethal assistance to Ukraine could create precedence for similar type of assistance towards opposition fighters in Syria. Therefore, the provision of lethal military assistance is considered highly impossible, but additional non-lethal aid could still impact the balance of power in Ukraine by decreasing the war costs for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, if we take under consideration the extremely worrisome financial situation of the country’s economy. [83]

Another potential course of action for the US would be to increase its military presence in the area, by transferring air, naval and land assets in neighboring NATO member states. Such a move would reiterate its commitment to its allies and provide a stronger deterrent against potential Moscow aggressiveness. Moscow would not appreciate such a move by the US and probably would try to further destabilize the region by commencing once more long military exercises along its borders with Ukraine and further mobilize and transfer military assets to the region.

The US could put pressure on its NATO allies to finally decide to live up to their commitments and increase their defense spending, making them more capable to withstand and deter Moscow on their own. It is no secret that the US primacy, after the end of the Cold War, allowed its allies to become freeloaders in international security, relying on the military prowess of the US to act as the global policeman and cover for their inadequacies. [84]

The US could opt to provide more financial aid to the troubled Ukrainian Government, a course of action that could greatly benefit Kiev and potentially soften the imminent austerity measures the IMF bailout is going to impose on Ukrainian citizens. Most likely, such assistance will not provoke Moscow a lot.

Another option for the Obama Administration would be to actively pursue the international isolation of the Russian Federation. It must be stated that the US did tried to accomplish that after the annexation of Crimea; however it can be argued that the US failed to do so. In the Un General Assembly vote condemning the Annexation of Crimea only half of the UN Member States voted in favor of the Draft Resolution, while 82 countries abstained or were absent from the session, among them Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan and the United Arab Emirates. [85] Even close US allies such as Israel have opted to maintain a neutral stance during the crisis, while other countries have refused to impose sanction on Russia, as they do not wish to imperil their normalized relations with Russia. [86] [87]

Another option for the United States is to influence the newly elected Ukrainian President to put an end to the conflict and start genuine all-inclusive national reconciliation in order to achieve a long-lasting peace, stability and security in Ukraine. If Kiev continues this deadly conflict with its own citizens, the situation gets more and more destabilized and irreparable. It is essential to outline that US vital national interests were never at stake in Ukraine and the longer and deeper the US gets involved in this crisis, the more difficult it will become for itself to disengage when necessary.

As Stephen M. Walt argues it is necessary for the United States to relearn power politics, a creed that it once excelled at. Strength and geography have always been essential elements in the international system and in world politics, even if the US has long forgotten it. [84]