Draft chapter 9 eu-russia Security Relations: Lessons from the South Caucasus Licínia Simão

The nature of political-security issues is traditionally secretive, managed by political and military elites. According to the realist paradigm, it is also one of the most difficult areas in inter-state relations, because of suspicion and competition in international relations, where hard power remains a fundamental currency for state survival in an anarchical system. European integration has often deviated from this understanding, promoting interdependence, transparency and consultation in a regional process of gradual supranational integration in economic, financial and legislative issues. This European choice remains a conundrum for realist analysis and for other international actors who are still privileging traditional nationalist and sovereign approaches. This is surely the case of Russia.

The argument has been made that Russia and the EU remain two fundamentally different actors in international relations and that this distinct nature is an insuperable obstacle to closer cooperation, namely in security issues (Simão, 2011; Freire, 2009, p. 73). Whereas the EU has been seen as a security community (Waever, 1998), privileging consensus building and a cooperative approach to security and favouring international institutions, within which inter-state relations can develop in a predictable way; Russian elites continue to privilege high politics, rooted in a conception of state power which drives to a large extent on militarist power projection capabilities by the state (Allison, 2006, p. 76). Its view of sovereignty is absolute and interference in domestic issues of the state is unwarranted.

Considering this scenario, it is not surprising that cooperation on security issues between Brussels and Moscow has been rather limited. What might be surprising is their ability actually to engage on some level of cooperative action in this field. This chapter seeks to explain patterns of cooperation and conflict between the EU and Russia on security issues in their shared neighbourhood. The chapter deals with the security issues challenging EU-Russia relations in the South Caucasus, and explains patterns of cooperation and conflict on security issues using the assumptions guiding liberal institutionalist and realist perspectives. On the one hand, the chapter argues that in order for a cooperative security approach to develop, the EU and Russia would have to share a meaningful set of views and interests, which so far has been lacking in their perceptions of European security. On the other hand, non-cooperation and conflict can also be explained by the EU’s attempt to control the institutional and normative context of security cooperation in Europe, thus increasing the costs of non-participation for Russia. Although EU leaders often portray this process as Europe’s contribution to regional stability, the view from Moscow is that EU leaders either do not consider Russian interests or they seek to weaken Russia’s position as a security provider in the shared neighbourhood.

As the chapter argues, Russia’s response has been to externalise the costs of non-participation to the neighbours of the CIS, who are heading closer to the EU. The war in Georgia in 2008 and the gas wars with Ukraine can be seen from this perspective. For those states embracing the legal and institutional order proposed by the EU – one which Russia contests – this would have costs, mainly derived from Moscow’s inability to shape that order. Building on this approach, the chapter starts with the conceptual framework, followed by a section contextualising EU-Russia institutional relations. It then addresses European and Russian policies towards Eurasian security and the final section deals with conflict management in the South Caucasus and the main illustration of EU-Russia security relations.
Conceptual framework: cooperation and conflict in international relations

The explanation of patterns of cooperation and conflict among actors in international relations has been approached from divergent perspectives by the classical theories of International Relations (IR). These approaches have either underlined the inherent nature of the international system as anarchical and, thus, prone to conflict; emphasised patterns of amity and enmity; or argued that conflict could be overcome by the growing realisation of interdependence and absolute gains, which could be derived from transparency and institutionalisation. Thus, cooperation and conflict need to be perceived as two faces of the same coin, providing meaning and context for the other to take place. As argued by Stein (1990, p. 172) ‘[c]ompetitive and conflicting relations can underline concerted, cooperative ones [and] international cooperation is embedded within a structure of competition, rivalry and insecurity’. Therefore, we need to understand in an integrated way what drives conflict and cooperation simultaneously, to explain the evolving relations of the EU and Russia on security issues in their shared neighbourhood.

Cooperation emerged as a central concept for liberal institutionalists dealing with issues of increased economic interdependence (Keohane 1984; Lake 1996; Weber 2000), but also transparency and predictability in world affairs, which could be deepened in the framework of international institutions. Institutions would thus reduce transaction costs for states (still regarded as the main actors in the international system) and reduce the likelihood of violent conflict, by providing the institutional avenues to cope with conflict. The process of European integration is perhaps the most widely recognised political phenomenon illustrating these dynamics. Even if the argument has been made by intergovernmentalists (Moravcsik, 1998) that steps towards integration reflect a rational and self-interested choice by the most powerful actors in Europe, the expectation that cooperation within institutions could avert further conflict in Europe was widely shared. In his latest State of Union Address, the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso argued that

[it]t was an illusion to think that we could have a common currency and a single market with national approaches to economic and budgetary policy. Let’s avoid another illusion that we can have a common currency and a single market with an intergovernmental approach. (Barroso, 2011)

This statement reminds us that the choices of political actors to cooperate or to pursue strategies rooted in conflict, coercion and bargaining are not predetermined, begging the question of what makes states pursue different strategies at different times. Another illustration that states are not intrinsically cooperative or conflicting comes from democratic peace theory. The theory acknowledges that, although democracies tend not to wage war on each other, they are nevertheless capable and willing to use force and violence on other non-democratic nations (Risse-Kappen, 1995). Therefore, faced with a choice or dilemma actors must find suitable criteria to make a decision about whether to pursue cooperative efforts or chose conflict, based on a rational assessment of their interests. This is a view shared by both liberal and realist authors. For realists, cooperation is rare and context-specific. This means that, in order to explain cooperation among states, realists look at power rather than common interests. One line of realist argument underlines limits to international cooperation due to the relative gains for states as compared to relative gains for others (Grieco, 1988). This perspective is particularly relevant in a context of increased multipolarity and fading hegemony, both at the global and the regional level.

The second line of realist argument focuses on power and coercion as a driving force for cooperation. Powerful actors see advantages in creating institutions and cooperative frameworks as a way to create rewards for those within the club (Stein, 1982) and create pressure to those left outside to join. This is the logic behind Ikenberry’s argument of why the US’ post-World War II foreign policy privileged the creation of multilateral institutions (Ikenberry, 2001). Institutions can reduce the costs of maintaining order and provide powerful tools to restrain other actors’ choices, to the benefit of those setting the rules. As Barnett and Finnemore (2005, p. 162) underline, institutions may play a functionalist role, by proving services to the states which create them; but they also exercise power by ‘construct[ing] the social world within which cooperation takes place’. States can therefore regard cooperation within the institutions they establish as a form of power exercise, which is regarded as legitimate and creating benefits for the whole community. Ultimately, assuring compliance or exercising leadership becomes less costly within these institutional and cooperative frameworks and provides important leverage over other states and actors seeking to join the club.

IR theories’ explanations for cooperation and conflict in the international system either underline mutual gains from the management of common challenges and common interests in a cooperative way or, alternatively, underline cooperation as a limited tool to assure order and stability and in a best case scenario just an expedient way to exercise power. In both accounts, states’ perceptions of the gains they derive from cooperation are fundamental to avoiding conflict. Whereas liberal views require that interests be perceived as common in order for cooperation to be the rule, realists assume that interests are mainly conflicting and cooperation will take place as a rational assessment of relative gains. These assumptions are important guiding tools to EU-Russia security relations vis-à-vis the South Caucasus, as further elaborated below. Whether both actors share any meaningful understanding of their interests in stability in the South Caucasus becomes a fundamental aspect for cooperative security to develop. On the contrary, cooperation within the framework of the Western-led security formats, such as the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), becomes undermined by the perceived advantage that the EU and the US have by dictating the rules of the game. In the absence of truly cooperative approaches to security in the shared neighbourhood, and particularly in the case of the South Caucasus, the prevalence of competitive approaches or at best a division of labour in managing regional security issues is not surprising.

EU-Russia relations have developed within the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 1994 and which entered into force in 1997. As Portela (2001) notes, the PCA ‘transcended for the first time the economic dimension to establish a regular political dialogue’ and focused on creating convergence of positions on international issues of mutual concern and security. In 1999 the first important step towards deepening and institutionalising the EU-Russia security dialogue was taken in the European Council of Cologne, with the adoption of the EU’s first Common Strategy (a new tool envisioned under the Amsterdam Treaty) establishing a framework document governing EU and member states’ actions towards Russia (Fernandes, 2009; Haukkala, 2010). Despite difficulties in bilateral relations due to the EU’s views on Russia’s management of the Chechen wars, the Common Strategy was an important achievement in bilateral security relations. As Lynch (2003, p. 57) underlines, the Common Strategy on Russia established three main dimensions: development of political dialogue to address security challenges in Europe, including operative decisions on how Russia could join EU Petersberg Missions on conflict management; help Russia enter the European political family, by transforming Russia’s domestic system; and a third dimension underlining the shared values of this relationship. Overall, the EU established the framework for Russia’s participation in the new European security order, but failed to engage Moscow in defining that order.

The Europeanisation of Russia has been on the western agenda since the fall of the Soviet Union as a way to resolve the idiosyncrasies of Russian identity and to anchor it in the European political space. The EU’s neo-functionalist approach to Russia sought to derive political and security benefits from gradual economic integration, in a classic spill over effect (De Speigeleire, 2002, p. 146). In a way, the EU sought to weave Russia into its expanding governance network revolving around the institutions in Brussels (Gaenzle, 2008). But, as Dmitri Trenin (2002, p. 140) argues, the integration of Russia in Europe is only partly a foreign policy issue and depends first and foremost on the changes taking place in Russian society. In that regard, for the changes effectively to bring the two neighbours closer together, common interests and common values need to be defined. As Bordachev and Moshes (2004) argue

The idea that Russia’s integration into Europe is possible in principle, and that Russia could become a member of the community of nations sharing similar values, has been circulating throughout Europe, although it has never prevailed. Now it is becoming increasingly weaker. The edifice of common interests has been built on the basis of common values, but if values differ, then the community of interests weakens. […] There is a growing sentiment that Russia is unintegrable in principle and that it remains a natural partner (and rival at the same time) outside the European space.

Bilateral relations might actually prove an important vehicle for security dialogue to take place and develop, making the best use of the EU’s multilevel governance, if properly anchored in CSDP decision-making processes. This could also address concerns that the EU’s neighbourhood policy is being developed at the expense of Russia’s interests. With the adoption of the EU’s Security Strategy (European Council, 2003), embryonic strategic thinking about the EU’s role in the world began to develop, with a particular emphasis on its neighbourhood, as set in the wider Europe communication (European Commission, 2003). EU enlargement posed real challenges for Russia, namely the issue of Kaliningrad and EU engagement in the so-called shared neighbourhood (DeBardeleben, 2008; Averre, 2005). Overall, the EU is gradually creating a new regional order in which Russia’s position is not clearly defined. If anything, Moscow is now being portrayed as a threat, considering Moscow’s use of energy interdependence and its reaction to the pro-Western policies in Georgia and Ukraine. On the other hand, NATO enlargements towards the CIS further reinforce Moscow’s concerns, as the hopes of anchoring Russia in the European post-Cold war security system failed (Arbatov, 1995, p. 140; Berryman, 2009, p. 167).

The latest changes in the EU, with the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, and in Russia, with the announcement that Medvedev will not run for a second term and Putin will lead the lists of the United Russia Party to the 2012 presidential elections, seem to place the security dialogue as a second order priority. Although the Lisbon Treaty aims to reinforce coordination and coherence through the appointment of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with extensive powers to define the guidelines of EU foreign and security policy, in coordination with the member states, EU-Russia summits are still headed by the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council, underlining the importance of economic issues and member states’ interests. Both President Medvedev’s proposal for a security treaty in Europe and the EU-Russia CSFA have lacked EU support illustrating the reluctance of EU members to engage in Russian proposals. As far as Russia is concerned, two important issues stand out in the next President’s agenda, which might take attention from security dialogue with Europe. On the one hand, the urgency to address and reverse the negative effects of the global financial crisis on Russia and to truly give substance to the modernisation agenda; on the other hand, Putin has hinted that he will pursue deeper integration in the Eurasian space, reinforcing Russia’s presence in the region through economic and institutional means (Putin, 2011).

EU and Russian revisionist policies towards Eurasian security

A major challenge to the development of cooperative approaches to security in the shared EU-Russia neighbourhood is the perception that both actors sponsor revisionist approaches to European security. The lack of clarity as to the foreign policy goals of both actors in a post-Cold War context has largely contributed to this perception, as also argued by Freire in this volume. On the one hand, the EU is perceived by Russia as redesigning political and security relations in Europe to its advantage, through the expansion of its rules and norms. Moscow also perceives the European partners as largely supporting US interests in Eurasia, namely regarding NATO expansion and democratisation of the shared neighbourhood. On the EU side, the accusations that Russia is set on a revisionist path have been mainly voiced by former-Warsaw Pact EU member states, who see Russia’s new found power and assertiveness as part of a wider process of competition for influence with the EU and the US at the global and regional level. Regardless of whether these perceptions are justified or not, policy implications include lack of trust and a growing gap in security perceptions in Europe (Alexandrova-Arbatova 2009, p. 287).

The South Caucasus is not immune to these dynamics. The EU and Russia are now central actors in some of the most important issues affecting the region. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, like most of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are still in the process of devising a political and economic transition, looking for models of social, economic and political development. This has been done over the last twenty years of independence in a context of instability, reinforcing the heterogeneous yet interdependent nature of the region. Each country is pursuing different approaches to state building, but the security interdependence of the South Caucasus region makes it a security complex (Buzan et al, 1998; Simão and Freire, 2008). However, due to its location, the Caucasus anchors a set of different dynamics developing in neighbouring areas, which affect these countries’ options and external actors’ behaviour. It is deeply influenced by the Caspian energy development, through the increase in revenues in production and transit countries, through the disputes of sovereign prerogatives over natural resources, as in the case of the Caspian basin, and by the developments in the Middle East, the world’s largest energy-producing region, which affect the strategic importance of the Caspian energy for global and regional powers.

The Caucasus is also closely linked to developments in the Black Sea region. Although this heterogeneous region has lived in relative stability since the end of the Cold War (Antonenko, 2009, p. 264), it is clearly affected by the persistence of protracted conflicts in Moldova and the South Caucasus. The region is also at the heart of the EU’s and NATO’s expansion to the traditional areas of influence of the Russian Federation and is increasingly disputed by other regional and global powers, like Turkey, the US and China. Finally, the Caucasus is at the heart of Eurasian politics, clearly marked by Russian foreign policy priorities and the EU’s project of regional stabilisation, the ENP, as well as a gradual integration of Eurasia into the global international system. Considering these characteristics, can we consider EU and Russian policies towards the South Caucasus as revisionist? Moreover, what does that mean for relations between the two actors and the region?

Russia’s revisionist position vis-à-vis the South Caucasus is mainly due to the perception in Moscow that keeping the status quo is no longer, either possible, or to Russia’s advantage. Although Russia has been seen as conducting a policy of managed instability through the protracted conflicts and the support of semi-authoritarian and corrupt regimes, the changes ignited by the Colour Revolutions in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) demanded a serious readjustment of Russian policies. Russia denounced Western engagement as fomenting competition in Eurasia, but had to acknowledge that these events were accumulating political capital for Western political and economic interests.² Russia’s response was a mix of goodwill gestures and coercive measures. It supported the Saakashvili administration’s efforts to deal with the peaceful ousting of the leader of the Ajarian region, Aslan Abashidze, in the post-revolutionary period, but later imposed trade embargos and energy price increases as a way to undermine the pro-Western regimes in Georgia and Ukraine.

The protracted conflicts in Eurasia remain one of Russia’s most important assets to project influence in the region. A major priority of the Saakashvili administration in Georgia was to revise the existing formats for conflict resolution. This led to the process of de-frosting of the so-called frozen conflicts, including through the internationalisation of the mediation efforts and ultimately through the resort to violence in 2008. Russia readjusted its priorities to the changing context and favoured a re-freezing of the status quo, which would give Moscow greater ability to manage instability in its southern borders. Russia’s military intervention in Georgia, in 2008, re-configured Russia’s positioning in the South Caucasus, and readjusted the military and political balance of the region. After the war Russia reinforced its military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and by recognizing the independence of the two regions it increased the number of its political allies. Russia also reinforced its presence in Armenia, extending the leasing of its military base until 2044 (RFE/RL, 2010) and continued its presence in the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan, strategically important to control the Caspian and the Middle East. Overall, Russia embraced the changes in the South Caucasus as inevitable and sought to re-shape the new status quo to its advantage.

Looking to improve its image among the CIS countries after the war in Georgia, Russia became more engaged in conflict resolution efforts in the South Caucasus. Russia has prioritised the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and President Medvedev personally engaged in mediation efforts, meeting the Armenian and the Azerbaijani Presidents at nine trilateral summits since 2008. Russia accepted also a reinforced international presence in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus, namely agreeing to the EU’s mediation of the cease-fire agreement after the war in 2008 and the deployment of a team of observers in Georgia, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM).³ As further developed below, Russian compliance with the agreement has been limited and the pace of the peace process has been staling, indicating that Russia has somehow been trying to limit and reverse the impact of this renovated international presence in the Georgian protracted conflicts. Moscow also acquiesced to the process of normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey. Although Russia remains dissatisfied with the increasing external presence in Eurasia, it has adjusted to the new realities. Russia has retained a veto power over the protracted conflicts and is now better positioned to control the region, after having lost its military presence in Georgia in 2007 (Antidze, 2007). In the meantime, the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement did not reach fruition, stalling the Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks and straining Azerbaijani-Turkish relations, granting Russia short-term advantages. Turkish influence has receded in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Russia managed to revitalise its image as a peace-broker.

The EU has also expressed a mix of revisionist and conservative trends in the South Caucasus. The 2004 enlargement brought new advocates for EU policies towards the Eastern neighbourhood. Poland and the Baltic States were particularly active in bringing the South Caucasus to the EU’s agenda. As the Wider Europe communication underlines, the EU perceives itself as having a ‘duty’ to act to ‘ensure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism’ and to ‘promote regional and subregional cooperation and integration’, perceived as ‘preconditions for political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social divisions in our shared environment’ (European Commission, 2003, p. 3). The ENP rejected the consolidation of new division lines in Europe, by creating opportunities for the FSU countries to engage with EU governance structures: a sort of ‘enlargement-lite’ (Popescu and Wilson, 2009). The EU also actively supported the revolutionary movements in Georgia and Ukraine and their pro-Western foreign policies, including their NATO membership aspirations, through political and financial backing. This had a clear security purpose of creating stability at the borders of the enlarged EU. In this regard, the EU was clearly a revisionist power in Eurasia.

At the level of conflict resolution the EU was more conservative, reluctantly taking on new security functions in Eurasia and rarely seeking them proactively. In 2005, the EU officially became part of the mediation efforts in the Transdnister conflict (the 5+2 format) and established the EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) to assist in the modernisation of border management and to act as a confidence-building measure in the Transdnistrian conflict.⁴ The previous year the EU had deployed its first ESDP rule of law mission in Georgia, the EUJUST Themis. Both in Moldova and the South Caucasus the EU has appointed Special Representatives (EUSRs) actively contributing to conflict resolution.⁵ The EU did respond to the demands from the ground with practical mechanisms, but failed to devise a long-term strategy for its engagement with the region. Russia remained the most divisive element among EU member states in this regard. A central concern of the EU was not to antagonise Moscow by supporting a radical change in the status quo, but rather to provide support for the existing mechanisms on conflict resolution, such as the Joint Control Commission (JCC) on South Ossetia and the Minsk Group, for Karabakh, as well as through a policy of limited engagement with Abkhazia. Despite the limited nature of Russian cooperation, the most important turning point in EU engagement was the war in Georgia in 2008, to which the EU responded by leading the negotiations of a cease-fire between Georgia and Russia, followed by the unprecedented deployment of the EUMM and the appointment of Pierre Morel as the EUSR for the crisis in Georgia,⁶ responsible for leading the peace-process, known as the Geneva Talks (Council of the European Union, 2008).

As regards the Karabakh conflict and the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey, the EU has had a more limited and cautious engagement. The EU was largely unable to use its institutional links to Turkey and Armenia and its diplomatic resources to prevent the failure of the process. This reduced the EU’s contribution to the resolution of the Karabakh conflict even further. Besides the commitments in Georgia, the major driving force of EU engagement in the South Caucasus is EU interest in the Caspian energy, positioning Azerbaijan as a strategic partner for the EU. This however has decreased the EU’s leverage on democratic reforms and conflict resolution, as Baku has found new assertiveness in the regional and international stage, building on oil revenues and its strategic regional position (RFE/RL, 2008).

The EU has now more security functions directly related to the protracted conflicts in Georgia and is indirectly engaged in confidence-building measure in Moldova. The reappointment of a new EUSR for the South Caucasus, announced in September 2011 after months of uncertainty as to how the restructuring of the EU’s external relations after Lisbon would be managed in the South Caucasus, can be seen as a sign that the EU will stay committed to regional stability. The EUSR’s Philippe Lefont will take on functions of conflict resolution both in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and in Georgia, which will demand a careful balancing of resources and time. These changes at the security level were largely unwanted by the EU and in that sense the EU was not openly a revisionist power. However, politically and economically the EU did push for an agenda of mild European integration with the region and pro-actively sought to advance policies such as the ENP and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), with the ability to exert significant influence in Eurasia in the long-term.
Conflict management in the South Caucasus: schism or opportunity?

Conflict resolution issues in Eurasia have been largely absent from EU-Russia relations. Although the PCA established the possibility of cooperation on foreign and security policy and crisis management, it was not until 2005 with the celebration of the four Common Spaces that concrete proposals began to be discussed regarding the conflict in Moldova (Fernandes, 2009, p. 238). Georgia, which had been another potential candidate for closer EU-Russia cooperation on conflict-related issues, became a sore point of debate after the arrival of President Saakashvili to power in Tbilisi. By 2006 Georgian-Russian relations had deteriorated deeply and a diplomatic crisis developed between the two countries (Vieira and Simão, 2008, p. 5, König, 2007, pp. 87-90). Faced with the prospect of further escalation and pressured by Georgia to mediate between Tbilisi and Moscow,⁷ the EU Council Conclusions of October 2006 called on both parties to tone down the rhetoric and revise the measures adopted, and indicated the EU’s ‘willingness to work with Georgia and the Russian Federation to facilitate mutual confidence building and contribute to a peaceful resolution of the crisis’ (Council of the European Union, 2006).

This marked another turning point in EU engagement in the conflicts in the South Caucasus. The EU had already developed substantial efforts towards rehabilitation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, having allocated €33 million in 1997-2005, the largest financial donor after Russia (Wilson and Popescu, 2009, p. 326). The projects remained largely de-politicised, as a way to assuage Russia and more reluctant EU member states, with the Commission deliberately presenting them as apolitical. Starting from this low profile engagement promoted by EU institutions, the EU gradually took on new functions. These included observer status for the European Commission to the JCC meetings and, following a Commission and Council fact-finding mission to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in January 2007, the report presented to the Political and Security Council (PSC) suggested additional measures the EU could take (Rettman, 2007). EU member states’ reaction to the proposal was to strip it of any controversial issues in relations with Russia. This concern with Russia’s perceptions is also illustrated by the fact the EUSR Peter Semneby travelled to Moscow and consulted with the Russian ambassador in Brussels, before submitting the document to the PSC (Popescu, 2011, p. 82). Conflict resolution, unlike other more structural approaches to security, proved to be an area of peaceful coexistence, even if not of cooperation, between the EU and Russia, as long as the EU acknowledged Russia’s leading role in defining the scope of engagement.

The most controversial issue to all the parties to the conflicts in Georgia was the nature of the peacekeeping operations in the two separatist regions, where changing the status quo would prove harder and more costly for all involved. Russia was actively engaged in providing military, political and economic support to the separatist regions, while simultaneously engaged in peacekeeping activities under the CIS mandate. Faced with these prospects, the Georgian authorities began an intensive campaign to internationalise the conflicts, aimed at changing the peacekeeping formats. The EU’s reluctance to even discuss this possibility can be seen as contributing to Georgia’s decision to rely on NATO security guarantees through formal accession and close relations with the US, including military support to rearm the Georgian states (Pardo, 2011, p. 1393). Both aspects were fundamental in Russia’s calculations and the escalation of the conflict into open confrontation. In fact, the war was the only event that led the EU to accept a conflict resolution role, as Georgia had actively requested. Following the war, Russia’s position as a peace-broker was also clearly challenged. The 3+3 format of the Geneva Talks, with the EU, the OSCE and the UN acting as co-chairs, on the one hand, and Russia, Georgia and the US on the other, seems rather artificial. Russia is seen as a party to the conflict and offering patronage to the separatist entities, whereas the US is seen as Georgia’s patron (Mikhelidze, 2010, p. 3).

Following the war, EU-Russia relations evolved positively and a new openness to address the protracted conflicts has been visible. Although some EU member states demanded sanctions to be applied to Russia, others advocated a policy of dialogue. The former-High Representative for the CSFP, Javier Solana, made this point stating that

[after the war w]e opted for dialogue and negotiation [with Russia] rather than sanctions as the best means of passing our messages and defending our interests. This decision should not be misunderstood, however. [...] Russia knows that what happens there [in Georgia] is important for our relationship. (Solana, 2009)

The realist argument of limited cooperation based on relative gains is useful in this context to help us understand why Russia accepted the EU’s presence in these conflicts, but also why the EU chose to engage with Russia in the aftermath of the war. Both stood to lose a great deal from breaking communication and dialogue in a context of increased competition in Eurasia. Moreover, interdependence is a fundamental explanation of these calculations of relative power gains, as is a time-flexible perspective. Both actors seem to base their strategies on limited losses in the short term and potential gains in the long run. Moreover, the regional context of Eurasia has been favouring competition and the establishment of a new multipolarity based on the control of power leverages in the region: conflicts, energy and ideology. Relative gains from cooperation thus become an important calculation for the actors involved. The EU’s reluctant engagement in Georgia’s conflicts confirms the perception among most EU member states that the costs of confronting Russia would be too high and the complexity of the conflicts highly reduced the chances for positive gains and success. Russia’s acceptance of a short-term EU presence in the Georgian scenario derives from the changes in the status quo and the need to revert the losses that the military intervention in Georgia caused to Moscow.

It is in this context that a new division of labour emerged in conflict management in the South Caucasus. Whereas the EU consolidated a central position as a security provider for Georgia and became an interlocutor in the mediation efforts, Russia has been more proactively engaged in the mediation efforts on Nagorno-Karabakh. The potential for cooperation in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could be higher, since Russia is not a party to the conflict. Here the main obstacle to closer EU-Russia cooperation comes from the EU’s lack of direct mediation role and poor involvement, both at the high political level of the official peace process and inside Nagorno-Karabakh (Simão, 2010). The EU has agreed to a potential role as a peacekeeper, once an agreement is reached, but has refrained from any attempt to take on a role as a mediator. This position is in line with the views in Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have expressed their satisfaction with the current mediation format.

Cooperation between the EU and Russia on conflict resolution seems to depend more on a structure of opportunity and necessity, rather than on the existence of shared interests to cooperate. Both the EU and Russia seem to share the view that the role of external mediators in solving the Karabakh conflict is rather limited and it depends primarily on Armenia and Azerbaijan to take the necessary steps to achieve a lasting solution. Despite President Medvedev’s efforts to mediate the conflict over the last year, ultimately the persistence of the status quo is more favourable to Moscow’s short-term interests than a deterioration of the situation on the ground. In the absence of realistic possibilities to reach an agreement, small gestures towards confidence building are a suitable strategy. Russia has been supportive of recent efforts to develop a strategy of cultural diplomacy, which resulted in the visit of Armenian and Karabakh representatives to Azerbaijan in 2007, and of Azerbaijani representatives to Armenia and Karabakh in 2009, including the Armenian and Azerbaijani ambassadors to Moscow (Broers, 2010). Russia has also taken a back seat in the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, even if it stood to lose some strategic advantages in the short-term, since it did not want to be seen as opposing this important process.

These shifts in regional balances and in perceptions, as well as the increased militarisation of the Karabakh conflict (and of the Caucasus as a whole) should be a central concern in bilateral EU-Russia relations. However, neither Russia’s increased militarisation of the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, nor its arms deals with Armenia and Azerbaijan have been openly discussed with Brussels. Overall, both Russia and the EU have clear energy concerns that drive them to short-term considerations in their relations with the South Caucasus, as opposed to a concerted long-term commitment to peace. Moreover, the EU seems to be driven by the principle of ‘causing no harm’,⁹ in the absence of a clear strategy towards the South Caucasus. As one EU member state ambassador in Moscow has put it: ‘voluntarism is not necessarily the best option in this region’.¹⁰ Cooperative action on confidence-building measures has also been limited, since both actors are careful to capitalise on these initiatives for their own regional image, more than effective results.
Conclusions

EU-Russia relations on political-security issues remain one of the least developed areas of their interaction. Despite important steps in the institutional development of relations and growing economic interdependence between the European region and Russia, the lack of shared views on how to move the relationship forward has been hampering cooperation in the field of high politics. The very different nature of both actors, including the EU’s gradual coming of age as a political and security actor, has added confusion on how to develop a pragmatic approach that responds to the evident need to address the security challenges in their shared neighbourhood. One important realisation is the inability to fully harness the EU-Russia security dialogue on the protracted conflicts within the framework of the strategic partnership (Kuzmicheva, 2011, p. 30). To the extent that these issues have been addressed, they have remained outside of the existing structures, as illustrated by the German-Russian Meseberg initiative.

The South Caucasus stands out as a particularly difficult challenge in this security dialogue. Until 2008 the EU was largely reluctant to engage in security functions and some member states were cautious not to let EU actions be perceived as offsetting Russian interests. Because of this careful approach, there has not been open conflict between the EU and Russia on these issues. However, if we consider the EU’s structural approach to security in its neighbourhood, and the proactive diligences of some of the new member states towards the Eastern neighbours, the perception in Moscow was that the EU was actively challenging the post-Cold War status quo in Eurasia, by becoming a pole of attraction and a model of political development for the CIS. Russia has been challenging this structural and normative approach and the validity of the EU’s model for Russia and the CIS. Instead, Russia has called for dialogue and a partnership in its bilateral relations with the EU and has externalised the costs of non-participation to the neighbours engaged in the ENP. The coercive strategies adopted by the Kremlin, especially towards Ukraine and Georgia, are an illustration of this.

The protracted conflicts in the South Caucasus helped to shed light on the limits of EU-Russia security cooperation in their shared neighbourhood. Although the EU did not seek to challenge Russia’s dominant position on conflict management, local actors displayed an important ability to shape external actors’ agendas. Georgia’s strategy of internationalisation of the conflicts achieved its goals against all odds. Lack of dialogue between the EU and Moscow facilitated the escalation of the conflict, demanding that important lessons be drawn from this experience. Although after the war both actors seem to have taken a more constructive approach on security dialogue, the opportunity has been missed to do so within the institutional context of the Four Common Spaces and the strategic partnership they are developing. This weakens the liberal argument that institutions can be learning sites, favouring transparency and interdependence and pushes EU-Russia security dialogue back to the realm of bilateral diplomacy. This makes any effort to link the EU’s structural approach to security to more effective CFSP and CSDP instruments harder to achieve, even after the Lisbon Treaty. Although this might present Russia with short-term opportunities to undermine EU influence, it does little to stabilise a very important region standing between these two actors and to further their strategic cooperation.

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