Eeoc: ada case Law Update Joyce Walker-Jones
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- A. Definition of “Disability”
- b. Asthma/Respiratory Conditions
- d. Back/Leg/Knee Impairments
- g. Cancer/Abnormal Cell Growth No new cases added. h. Carpal Tunnel No new cases added. i. Depression
- k. Flu
- n. Intellectual Disabilities No new cases added. o. Kidney Disease No new cases added. p. Migraine Headaches
- r. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
A. Definition of “Disability” 1. Actual Disability a. Anxiety Huiner v. Arlington Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 5424962 (D.S.D. Sept. 23, 2013). The plaintiff, an art teacher, alleged that she was discriminated against based on her anxiety and panic attacks when the school district failed to accommodate her. According to the plaintiff’s testimony and medical records, her anxiety limited her ability to “maintain her nutritional needs” (which had resulted in a 30-pound weight loss in eight months), care for her children, and sleep. Based on this evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiff had presented sufficient facts to make a prima facie showing that her anxiety constituted a disability under the ADA. b. Asthma/Respiratory Conditions Lopez-Cruz v. Instituto de Gastroenterologia, 960 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D.P.R. 2013). The plaintiff, a nurse, alleged that she was terminated because of her respiratory problems, a condition for which she took medication and needed regular checkups, when she asked to be excused from having to clean medical equipment using Cidex, a disinfectant. The court held that the plaintiff plausibly pled that her breathing was substantially limited by stating that the disinfectant affected her respiratory tract and caused “extreme coughing and difficulty breathing,” which was so bad on one occasion that she went to the emergency room. c. Autism Glaser v. Gap Inc., 2014 WL 349718 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2014). The plaintiff, who had worked as a merchandise handler at a distribution center for more than seven years, alleged that the defendant violated the ADA when it subjected him to a hostile work environment, failed to accommodate him, and terminated him for alleged misconduct. Although the defendant contended that the plaintiff’s autism did not substantially limit his ability to “interact with others,” the court held that, under the ADAAA, the term “substantially limits” is not meant to be a demanding standard. EEOC regulations enumerate impairments, including autism, that “will, at a minimum, substantially limit the major life activities indicated.” The regulations state that autism “substantially limits brain functions” and also might limit other major life activities not explicitly identified. Relying on evidence that the plaintiff frequently had been advised not to distract his coworkers, not to put his arm around his supervisor or touch her when speaking to her, and to stand further apart from others when talking, the court held that the defendant could not “seriously argue” that the plaintiff’s ability to interact with others was not impaired. d. Back/Leg/Knee Impairments Summers v. Altarum Inst. Corp., 740 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2014). The plaintiff, a senior analyst for a government contractor, fell and fractured his left leg, tore a tendon in his left knee, fractured his right ankle, and ruptured a tendon in his right leg. Following two surgeries, the plaintiff’s doctors restricted him from putting any weight on his left leg for six weeks and estimated that he would not be able to walk normally for at least seven months. After a period of short-term disability, the plaintiff asked to work from home but, instead, was terminated. The district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s ADA discriminatory discharge claim, concluding that the impairment was too temporary to be a disability. Reversing, the Fourth Circuit gave Chevron deference to EEOC’s amended ADA regulations, which state that “effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting,” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(1)(ix). The court also noted that, according to the accompanying appendix, “the duration of an impairment is one factor that is relevant” and “[i]mpairments that last only for a short period of time are typically not covered, [but] may be covered ‘if sufficiently severe.’” Citing an appendix example (“[I]f an individual has a back impairment that results in a 20-pound lifting restriction that lasts for several months, he is substantially limited in lifting….”), the court reasoned: “If, as the EEOC has concluded, a person who cannot lift more than twenty pounds for ‘several months’ is sufficiently impaired to be disabled within the meaning of the amended Act, then surely a person whose broken legs and injured tendons render him completely immobile for more than seven months is also disabled.” The appeals court also noted that the district court’s holding that a “temporary injury” cannot be a disability erroneously relied on pre-ADAAA case law. Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, L.L.C., 746 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2014). The plaintiff, who provided technical and sales services to customers, was diagnosed with a herniated disc and torn ligaments in his back that caused pain in his lower back and down his leg and that intermittently affected his ability to walk, sit, stand, bend, run, or lift objects weighing more than ten pounds. Shortly after informing his employer that he was scheduled to have back surgery, he was terminated. The district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s ADA discriminatory discharge claim, reasoning that his doctor’s affidavit was insufficient and conclusory. Reversing, the Eleventh Circuit found that because the plaintiff’s doctor explained that the plaintiff’s back problems stemmed from “nerve root involvement caus[ing] radicular symptoms” and indicated that his limitations were “substantial . . . and permanent,” the affidavit presented sufficient evidence, in light of the new standards under the ADAAA, to show that the plaintiff’s herniated disc substantially limited a major life activity. McFadden v. Biomedical Sys. Corp., 29 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 737, 2014 WL 80717 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2014). The plaintiff, a director of business development, alleged that his former employer refused his request for sick leave to have back surgery for his herniated discs and retaliated by terminating him. In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s allegation that his back condition sometimes caused him pain and limited his ability to walk, stand, or sit for long periods of time was insufficient to establish a significant restriction on a major life activity. Disagreeing, the court held that, given the “ADAAA’s liberalized standards,” the plaintiff’s allegation that he had an impairment that was disabling was sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss. Rocco v. Gordon Food Serv., 29 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 888, 2014 WL 546726 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2014). The plaintiff, a delivery driver, alleged that he was denied a reasonable accommodation and terminated based on his knee injury, which initially caused pain requiring prescription medication and limited his ability to walk or lift. The court held that because the plaintiff’s alleged limitations, including his inability to concentrate or sleep (caused by the pain medication), had resolved by the time of the alleged adverse employment decision, he failed to establish that he had a disability. e. Blood Disorders Johnson v. City of Chicago Health Dep’t, 549 F. App’x 579 (7th Cir. 2014). A former health aide alleged that she was denied a reasonable accommodation and terminated because of her sickle cell anemia, which, at times, substantially limited her ability to walk or bend. Reversing dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in finding that the plaintiff failed to show that her walking (or any other major life activity) was substantially impaired. Noting that the plaintiff submitted a form from her treating physician to support her request for reasonable accommodation, indicating that she “needed a walker and would have ‘gait instability’ for six to nine months,” the court held that a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff was substantially limited in walking. f. Breast Infection McKenzie-Nevolas v. Deaconess Holdings L.L.C., 29 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 366, 2014 WL 518086 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 7, 2014). The plaintiff, a former medical assistant, alleged that she was terminated based on recurrent cellulitis/infectious mastitis of her left breast (inflammation of the soft tissue), which caused redness, pain, and sometimes fever. Noting that no abscess was found in the plaintiff’s breast, that she never required drainage of her breast or a breast biopsy, that the limited infection of her breast was temporary and of short duration and did not spread to other parts of her body, and that her doctors never placed her on any restrictions or limitations, including lifting, the court concluded that she failed to establish that she had an impairment that substantially limited one or more of her major life activities. g. Cancer/Abnormal Cell Growth No new cases added. h. Carpal Tunnel No new cases added. i. Depression Palacios v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 27 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 860, 2013 WL 499866 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2013). The plaintiff, who received medical treatment and medication for depression over a period of years, testified that his condition affected his ability to sleep or eat, that sometimes he slept too much (one time for almost two days) and other times he could not sleep, that sometimes he did not eat, and that sometimes he just sat in his living room and did nothing. He also testified that prior to taking FMLA leave, he chose to allow others to work many of his hours, which company policy allowed, and that due to his depression he did not really care about potentially losing his house or making car payments or paying other accounts. The court held that the self-described severity of the plaintiff’s depression and its adverse effects on his desire to work and on his sleeping, eating, and attention to ordinary care of himself, which was supported by medical evidence, was sufficient under the more lenient standard of the ADAAA to raise a factual issue that he had a disability under the ADA. j. Diabetes Willoughby v. Connecticut Container Corp., 29 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 94, 2013 WL 6198210 (D. Conn. Nov. 27, 2013). After experiencing symptoms of “loss of vision, sweating, vertigo, loss of focus[,] and inability to stand,” the plaintiff was diagnosed with Type II diabetes and high blood pressure. Five months after his diagnosis, the plaintiff experienced an episode of low blood sugar and dehydration at work, which caused him to pass out. Despite evidence that the incident likely was diabetes-related, he was terminated allegedly for sleeping on the job. Applying the ADAAA’s broadened definitions of disability and major life activity, the court held that because the plaintiff experienced “symptoms due to diabetes [e.g., fluctuating blood sugar, dehydration, difficulty standing, dizziness, and faintness], which is by definition a disease which impacts the functioning of the endocrine system,” a jury easily could find that he had an impairment that substantially limited one or more of his major life activities. The court also pointed out that EEOC regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii), note that “diabetes substantially limits endocrine function” and, therefore, it “should easily be concluded that [diabetes] will, at a minimum, substantially limit” a major life activity. Kinchion v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 2013 WL 66077 (D. Kan. Jan. 4, 2013). The plaintiff, a small-parts finish painter, had a number of health problems during the 15 years he worked for the defendant. In his complaint alleging that he was terminated in violation of the ADA, he mentioned only that he had been diagnosed with diabetes and other conditions. Granting the employer’s motion to dismiss the complaint, with leave for the plaintiff to amend, the court held that the mere mention of diabetes with nothing more was insufficient to plead disability and that the defendant should not have to guess at the basis for the claim of disability discrimination. Although the EEOC’s regulations state that certain impairments such as diabetes will in virtually all cases result in coverage under the ADAAA, merely parroting the regulation without any supporting facts was insufficient. Szarawara v. County of Montgomery. 2013 WL 3230691 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2013). A telecommunicator with Type II diabetes who worked nights for an emergency dispatch services center resigned after the defendant refused to change his hours or move him to part-time status or a dayshift position. The court held that because the EEOC has advised that diabetes “will, as a factual matter, virtually always be found to impose a substantial limitation” on the endocrine function, the defendant’s reliance on pre-ADAAA cases and EEOC’s prior regulations was inapplicable. k. Flu No new cases added. l. Hypertension Gogos v. AMS Mech. Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 1170 (7th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff, a welder and pipefitter, alleged that he was terminated in violation of the ADA when he sought leave for medical treatment of his high blood pressure which “spiked to ‘very high’” and caused intermittent vision loss, sometimes for a few minutes at a time. Reversing dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court held that the plaintiff’s alleged episode of blood-pressure spike and vision loss was sufficient to plead disability under the ADAAA, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (“impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active”) and noted that the amended EEOC regulations list hypertension as an example of an impairment that may be episodic. The court concluded that “the relevant issue is whether, despite their short duration in this case, Gogos’s higher-than-usual blood pressure and vision loss substantially [limited] a major life activity when they occurred.” The court also held that the plaintiff’s chronic high blood pressure, for which he took medication, could be a disability that substantially limited his cardiovascular and circulatory functions on an ongoing basis. In this regard, the court referred to the rule of construction in the ADAAA that the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be made without reference to mitigating measures, such as medications. Thus, even if the plaintiff had not experienced the episode of elevated blood pressure and vision loss, his chronic hypertension could constitute a disability. m. HIV Infection Lundy v. Phillips Staffing, 29 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 685, 2014 WL 811544 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2014). The plaintiff alleged that the defendant fired him after learning that he had HIV. The court noted that although the Fourth Circuit had not definitively held that asymptomatic HIV is a per se disability, the plaintiff showed that he had HIV, “which is a physical impairment that has a ‘constant and detrimental effect on the infected person’s hemic and lymphatic systems.’” Further noting that the “[t]he lymph nodes, where the virus is most prevalent during the asymptomatic phase, play a key role in the body’s immune response system, a major life activity under the ADAAA,” the court concluded that the plaintiff had a physical impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities. n. Intellectual Disabilities No new cases added. o. Kidney Disease No new cases added. p. Migraine Headaches Freelain v. Village of Oak Park, 29 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 927, 2014 WL 148739 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2014). The plaintiff, a police detective, alleged that he was denied leave under the FMLA, sexually harassed, discriminated against on the basis of disability (anxiety that resulted in headaches, fatigue, and migraines), and retaliated against in violation of the ADA. The court held that, even if the plaintiff had the impairments he alleged, merely having a “medically identifiable impairment” is not enough to establish a disability under the ADA. “[T]he focus is on whether the impairments substantially limit a major life activity, not whether an impairment has a name.” Referring to a decision that relied on pre-ADAAA case law, even though the alleged discrimination in this case occurred after the effective date of the ADAAA, the court also stated that short-term, temporary restrictions, with little or no long-term impact, generally are not substantially limiting and do not render a person disabled for purposes of the ADA. q. Multiple Sclerosis Feldman v. Law Enforcement Assocs. Corp., 955 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D.N.C. 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 2014 WL 1876546 (4th Cir. May 12, 2014). The plaintiffs, one with a history of multiple sclerosis (MS) and another who had been hospitalized overnight and off work for several weeks because of a transient ischemic attack (TIA or “mini stroke”), alleged that they were fired because of their disabilities. Because the defendant conceded that MS is a disability even when in remission and the plaintiff explained that he experienced significant fatigue and weakness, had trouble walking, and could not drive a car when his MS flared up, the court found that the plaintiff established that he had a disability. With respect to whether TIA is a disability, the court held that, even if it is an impairment that is episodic or in remission, the plaintiff offered no evidence beyond his overnight visit to the hospital to show that it substantially impaired the major life activity of working or any other major life activity. In particular, the court noted that the evidence showed that all of the plaintiff’s diagnostic testing at the hospital was normal and that he was discharged the next day with no restrictions. r. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Beair v. Summit Polymers, 28 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 640, 2013 WL 4099196 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 13, 2013). A former production operator who had assembled automobile parts alleged that her employer failed to accommodate her disability, retaliated against her, and terminated her based on her major depressive disorder and post traumatic stress disorder. The court noted that EEOC “regulations provide that the ‘individualized assessment of some types of impairments will, in virtually all cases, result in a determination of coverage’” and “that, with certain specified impairments, ‘it should be easily concluded that [the impairments] . . . substantially limit the major life activities indicated.’” In particular, the regulations state that it should be easy to conclude that “major depressive disorder . . . [and] post-traumatic stress disorder . . . substantially limit brain function.” Because the plaintiff submitted evidence that she was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and PTSD and the defendant presented no reason why, in this case, those conditions did not actually limit her brain function, she presented sufficient evidence that she had a disability. s. Obesity Powell v. Gentiva Health Servs., Inc., 2014 WL 554155 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 2014). A former account executive, whose job duties were to make 10 to 12 sales calls per day to market the defendant’s hospice services, alleged that she was terminated based on her morbid obesity. Citing to pre-ADAAA cases (but acknowledging that the ADAAA governs), the court noted that a plaintiff’s status as being overweight, without more, had been held not to constitute a disability; rather, the question turns on an individualized inquiry about the specific condition and its limitations. Relying on the plaintiff’s testimony that (despite being 5’3” and weighing 230 pounds) her weight did not interfere with her ability to do her job; impair her ability to care for herself, engage in day-to-day activities, or walk; or cause any health conditions, the court held that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that her obesity substantially limited one or more of her major life activities so as to render her disabled. Anderson v. Macy’s, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 531 (W.D. Pa. 2013). In a suit brought under Title III of the ADA, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant retail store discriminated against her based on her obesity by selling plus-size clothing at higher prices and “segregating” such clothing from smaller sizes. The court noted that although the Third Circuit had yet to decide if obesity is a disability under the ADA, other courts had held that it may be a disability under the ADAAA. Considering decisions both before and after the ADAAA, in conjunction with Congress’s intent to broaden the scope of the definition of disability, the court concluded that it could not “definitionally exclude obesity when caused by an underlying physiological condition as a disability under the ADA,” especially since the plaintiff specifically alleged that her obesity was caused by a thyroid disorder and other medical conditions. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that it was unnecessary to decide if obesity or morbid obesity, without an underlying physiological disorder, is also a disability under the ADAAA. t. Pregnancy-Related Complications Wonasue v. University of Maryland Alumini Assn., 2013 WL 6158375 (D. Md. Nov. 22, 2013). While pregnancy-related complications may rise to the level of an ADA disability, plaintiff's single instance of more severe than typical morning sickness did not because there were no subsequent medical restrictions. Thus, the employer was not required to provide leave or schedule changes as reasonable accommodations. Other complications that arose after she resigned were irrelevant to the question of whether there was disability discrimination at time she sought accommodations. Heatherly v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Ill. 2013). The plaintiff, a restaurant server, filed suit against her former employer alleging discrimination under the ADAAA for failure to provide reasonable accommodation for her pregnancy-related disability when it required her to deliver food to outdoor customers. The plaintiff informed the employer that she was pregnant and presented a doctor’s note, which stated that she was only to perform light duties and was “not to work more than 8 hour shifts.” The employer complied with the plaintiff’s doctor’s requests but denied her request to work only indoors; the plaintiff based that request on her own interpretation of the doctor’s “light duty” restriction. The court granted summary judgment to the employer with respect to the plaintiff’s claim. While it found sufficient evidence to create a triable issue as to whether the plaintiff’s high-risk pregnancy rendered her disabled under the ADAAA, it could not conclude that the employer had failed to accommodate her, because nothing in the record – including testimony from her doctor and nurse – suggested that she was unable to work outside. Price v. UTI, United States, Inc., 117 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1876, 2013 WL 798014 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2013). The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated Title VII and the ADA when it terminated her three weeks after she gave birth and was recovering from a cesarean section. Denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim, the court noted that an impairment need not be permanent or long term to meet the definition of a disability. Although EEOC’s interpretive guidance excludes pregnancy itself as a physical impairment, a physical impairment includes any physiological disorder or condition that affects the reproductive systems, which can be an impairment or complication related to pregnancy. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court concluded that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, because there was evidence that she had multiple physiological disorders and conditions that affected her reproductive system. Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 2013 WL 121838 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013). The plaintiff, a medical student in an OB/GYN residency program, was not renewed in her third year, following a seven-month absence for pregnancy-related and post-partum complications that included being ordered to remain on complete bed rest for six months, miscarriage of one of the twins she was carrying, and post-partum difficulties that lasted two months and required physical therapy before returning to work. Denying in part the employer’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s ADA challenge to her termination, the court rejected the employer’s reliance on pre-ADAAA cases involving pregnancy-related complications. Given the lenient standard on a motion to dismiss and the current change in the law stating that an impairment lasting less than six months can be substantially limiting, the court, “in an abundance of caution,” found that the plaintiff sufficiently pled a plausible claim for disability discrimination. u. Stroke Feldman v. Law Enforcement Assocs. Corp., 955 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D.N.C. 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 2014 WL 1876546 (4th Cir. May 12, 2014). Directory: sites -> default -> files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations files -> Nstructions for Acquiring Excess Equipment online, through the 1033 Program files -> Occupational health and safety files -> The Black Panther Party’s Ten Point Program files -> International programs roel profile files -> Fermi Questions a guide for Teachers, Students, and Event Supervisors Lloyd Abrams, Ph. D. DuPont Company, cr&D/ccas experimental Station Wilmington, de 19880 files -> Personal Information Name: Maha Al-Ammari Nationality: Saudi Relationship Status Download 187.87 Kb. Share with your friends:
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