A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve
The U.S., Turkey, and Iran won’t enter an alliance because of lack of interest. Even if they did, it would take too long to solve the issue.
Larison 10 (Daniel, Journalist, “The U.S., Turkey, and Iran” Eunomia, http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2010/07/03/the-u-s-turkey-and-iran/) MKB
Improbable as it may seem right now, given the current regime in Iran, a partnership that unites Turkey, Iran, and the United States is the future and makes sense for two reasons: The three countries share strategic interests, and their people share values. Our evolving relationship with a changing Turkey offers a model for the kind of relationship we might one day–not necessarily tomorrow–have with a changing Iran. This is the tantalizing possibility of a new way for the U.S. to engage with the Middle East in the 21st century.I am quite skeptical whenever someone tries to justify a present or future alliance even in part by invoking shared “values.” This is usually added to the mix when supporters of the alliance cannot point to any tangible or significant benefit from the alliance for the U.S. For example, pro-Georgian enthusiasts here in the U.S. have to lean heavily on Georgian democracy and Georgia’s market-oriented economic reforms to make sense of U.S. support for Georgia, which is in almost every other respect a stategic liability. There may be no American interest served in sending aid or selling weapons to Georgia, and it does complicate and sometimes damage relations with Russia to do these things, but if Georgians share our “values” then that makes everything all right. This doesn’t apply in the cases of Turkey and Iran, whose strategic importance is obvious but whose respective “values” are not entirely ours. That said, I find Kinzer’s proposal interesting. Over the last few years, I have made it pretty clear that I think rapprochement with Iran is the obvious and wise course to pursue, and in the last month I have been emphasizing the value of the Turkish alliance at a time when many Americans seem to have decided that Turkey is no longer an ally. The trouble for Kinzer’s proposal and for my arguments is that much of the political class has been turning against Turkey partly because Turkey has become too accommodating with Iran. As Kinzer will have noticed, “our evolving relationship with a changing Turkey” has meant a deteriorating relationship with an increasingly alienated Turkey, and the relationship has deteriorated in no small part because Turkey has already started improving ties with Iran right now. Ankara isn’t waiting for the far-off day when the Iranian opposition becomes organized and effective enough to force some internal political change in Iran, in part because its “zero problems” approach does not require that Turkey’s neighbors share “values” with the Turks. Kinzer is not quite so bold as to argue that this triple alliance will exist anytime soon:A new triangular relationship involving the United States, Turkey, and Iran cannot emerge overnight. In order to become a reliable American partner, Iran would have to change dramatically. Turkey would also have to change, although not nearly as much. So would the UnitedStates.Our world, however, advances only as a result of strategic vision. First must come a grand concept, a destination; once the destination is clear, all parties can concentrate on finding the way to reach it.
Unfortunately, leaving it to Iran to “change dramatically” before this realignment or new “triangle” of relationships could be established guarantees that it will not happen for decades. If we are going to wait until Iran dramatically changes, it may never happen at all.
A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve
Turkey’s role as a mediator is highly dangerous and could isolate Turkey from the West and end up being a tool for Iran.
Sobecki 10 (Nichole, Journalist, “Turkey caught in U.S- Iran Nuke Rift” News Max World, http://www.newsmaxworld.com/europe/Turkey_US_Iran/2010/05/04/314985.html) MKB
And despite warming relations between the two neighbors, Ankara has its own fears about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. “If Iran continues on this path there is long-term potential for cascading nuclear proliferation and regional instability,” said Ian Lesser, an expert on Turkey and Iran at the Washington-based German Marshall Fund. “I see no good news for Turkey coming from Iran’s current position.” If their efforts to resolve this crisis through mediation fail, Turkey is likely to face a tough choice between historic Western alliances and newfound friends in Tehran. “It is clear that if he [Davutoglu] can pull it off and ease the international tension over Iran, then both his and Turkey’s international prestige will increase greatly,” wrote Semih Idiz, a Turkish columnist, in the Turkish paper Hurriyet Daily News. “But if he cannot, then Turkey will not just have been isolated in NATO and Europe, but will also end up having been used by Iran to buy time against the West.”
A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve
Turkey will only be mediator if it is explicitely asked to do so. Iran refuses to do so.
Uslu 9 (Emrullah, Journalist, “Would Iran want Turkey as a mediator for U.S.- Iranian Negotiations?” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 6, Issue 46 ) MKB
While encouraging Iran to hold discussions with the United States, Turkey is not going so far as to declare itself a mediator between Washington and Tehran. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said that he would not carry a message from the United States to Iranian officials on his current visit. Turkey would, however, consider serving as a mediator if both sides requested it (Today's Zaman, March 10). Clinton stated that "the United States would ask Turkey to help push forward President Obama's plan to engage Iran" (Iran Daily, March 9).
The Iranian side, however, does not seem as enthusiastic about opening up contacts with the United States. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said, "We are closely pursuing all the current developments in Washington's policies. However, we have seen no revolution as a result of Barack Obama's change motto" (Tehran Times, March 10). To understand Iran's attitude, one must remember its long history of mistrust toward the United States. The official Iranian News Agency IRNA quotes a UK-based Iranian political analyst Bijan Zhand Shakibi as saying, "I remain skeptical that the U.S. will make any dramatic moves. The domestic political climate in America and the geopolitical situation in the Middle East play a major role in the U.S. inability or unwillingness to make a dramatic move toward Iran" (Tehran Times, March 9). The Iranian side says that the United States should take the first step toward Iran. Mottaki stated that "The prospects for the establishment of relations between Iran and the U.S. will not be bright until the U.S. changes its approach" (Tehran Times, March 9). Iranian leaders see the U.S. attitude as aggressive. Mottaki describes the differences in approach between the United States and Iran with an analogy to American football and a game of chess. "We have no interest in American football. Rather, we are interested in a fair chess match, which requires fortitude and patience because in chess an unnecessary or illogical move will lead to defeat" (Tehran Times, March 9). With this "chess game" mentality, Iranians misunderstand Hillary Clinton's recent visit to Ankara "as a calculated move to reduce tensions between the two sides" (Siaset-e Rouz [Iranian Daily], quoted in Iran Daily, March 9). One of the challenges between Ankara and Washington that Siaset-e Rouz lists is the "differences between the two countries regarding regional developments, in particular how to interact with Iran, Palestine, and Iraq, plus the excessive demands of the U.S. in its relations with the Turks" (Iran Daily, March 9). While the United States seizes every opportunity, including Turkey's good relations with Iran, to end Iran's nuclear weapons program, Iranians think that Clinton visited Turkey to reduce the tension with the United States. Overcoming Iran's misunderstanding of world politics, even Turkish-U.S. relations, will be Ankara's biggest problem in convincing Tehran to come to the negotiating table, if such a mediatory role is requested by both sides. Moreover, Iran's "chess game" with the world would make a Turkish role even more difficult. On February 26, for example, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan revealed that Iran had asked Turkey to mediate between the United States and Iran during the Bush administration (Hurriyet, February 26); but a week later Hasan Gasgavi,the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, told the conservative Iranian daily Kayhan that "Iran has asked neither Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan nor any other foreign dignitary to serve as a mediator between Iran and the United States" (www.byegm.gov.tr, March 4). Gasgavi added that "In the last 30 years there is no channel that [has been] closed. In addition, there is no unexpected development that [would] require someone to open [a] channel. If needed, Iran and the U.S. [can] officially share their views in a diplomatic manner" (www.byegm.gov.tr, March, 4). Iran's reluctant attitude indicates two things: First, negotiations between Iran and the United States would be a major policy shift for Iran, requiring political and psychological preparation on a societal as well as a leadership level. Iran's zigzag attitude about whether it wants Turkey to be a mediator shows hesitancy in the Iranian leadership. Given that the Foreign Ministry spokesman denied to a conservative newspaper that Iran had asked Turkey to serve as a mediator indicates that conservative segments of Iranian society and the leadership may be resisting the idea of negotiations with the United States. In fact, Gul's planned meeting with Ali Khamenei may have been planned for the purpose of convincing the conservative leadership to accept negotiations. Second, requesting Turkish mediation would harm Iran's self-proclaimed role of being a regional power. If Turkey successfully convinced Iran and the United States to begin negotiations, it would make Ankara and Tehran competitors for the role of regional power. Such a peace agreement would make Turkey appear as an absolute regional power while Iran would seem to be jumping on the Turkish bandwagon. For this reason, Iran would not want Turkey to be the peace broker and the policy maker of the region, however necessary it might be. Tehran would want direct talks with the United States only if it would clearly serve Iran's national interests.