Top U.S. officials admit that Iran has nuclear weapons.
World Net Daily 9 (“Axelrod claims Iran has nuclear weapons” World Net Daily, http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=102520) MKB
President Obama's senior adviserDavid Axelrod stated during an interview yesterday there are nuclear weapons in Iran which are a threat to the entire world. No country has ever claimed Iran currently has a nuclear arsenal. A 2007 U.S. intelligence estimate previously claimed Iran halted its nuclear weapons-related work in 2003, although that report was highly criticized. Other American agencies have stated Iran could obtain nukes by 2013 or later. Israel maintains Iran could have enough enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon in less than a year, although other Israeli estimates put the timeline at 2012. Axelrod, meanwhile, said yesterday in little noticed comments to ABC News that there are already nuclear weapons in Iran. "I think the president's sense of solicitude with those young people has been very, very clear, and we're very mindful of that," said Axelrod."We are also mindful of the fact that the nuclear weapons in Iran and the nuclearization of that whole region is a threat to that country, all countries in the region, and the world. And we have to address that. We can't let that lie," he said. Axelrod was responding to a question from ABC News' Chief Washington Correspondent George Stephanopoulos about whether U.S. talks with Iran's leadership would undermine the opposition movement in Tehran. The White House did not immediately respond to a WND query about whether the U.S. has new information indicating Iran possesses nuclear weapons.
A2: US/Turkey Relations: Arms Control Turn
Arms control destroys deterrence and increases the probability of conflict.
Schofield 10 (Julian, journalist, “Arms Control Failure and the Balance of Power” Canadian Volume of Political Science, Volume 33, page 769) MKB
This calculus may work for conventional weapons, but the destructive potential of nuclear weapons may overpower any deterrent threat inherent in the balancing function of the international system. Albert Wohlstetter has argued that with certain technologies, such as nuclear weapons, stability is far more delicate than commonly believed. It' is here that the logic of secure deterrent forces and arms control can compensate for the weakness of the balance of power. In this context, arms control policies enhance the security of both parties in a rivalry by stabilizing their forces.92By stabilization I mean the creation of deterrent postures and procurements that do not encourage surprise attacks or first strikes, decapitatior~attacks, pre-emption, offensive advantages, a launch-on-warning response system, military action without confirmation, weapons which are difficult to control, fait accompli attacks, or the deployment of vulnerable use-it-or-lose-it sys- tems. These measures may be taken unilaterally, as in the deployment of secure second-strike systems (this is the justification for the deploy- ment of nuclear missile-armed submarines). Other measures may be taken co-operatively, such as the 1972 SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, that actually sought to minimize instability by preserving the status quo vulnerability of the superpower countervalue targets. Arms control that makes pre-emptive escalation or war impossi- ble may, perversely, lead to still greater conflict. This is because it is the fear of a conflict escalating to a nuclear war that creates fear, and thereby restraint. Glenn Snyder's stability-instability paradox hypoth- esizes that perfect strategic stability (certain retaliation) creates opportu- nities for violence at lower levels. The practice of informal arms control measures by India and Pakistan in Kashmir has not stemmed the persistent infiltrations and exchanges of artillery fire between these two nuclear-armed states. Arms control must, therefore, never under- mine the threat of escalation that creates the fear of initial provocation. Arms control can also increase the likelihood of war if it prohibits an offensive weapon that a state needs to guarantee the extended deterrence of an ally.
A. The NPT causes opaque proliferation and waists resources that are better spent on arms control that are responsive to circumstances in the Middle East.
Wesley 5 (Michael, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59( 3), It’s time to scrap the NPT) KGL
The NPT was always a flawed regime, based on an unequal distribution of status and security. Its apparent effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation was largely due to other factors. The events of the past 15 years have only magnified the NPT’s flaws. The end of the Cold War decoupled the possession of nuclear weapons from the global power structure. While many commentators were applauding the expansion of the number of NPT signatories, and South Africa, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina renounced plans to acquire nuclear weapons, deeper and more insistent proliferation pressures were building among the emerging great powers of Asia. The succession of Persian Gulf wars demonstrated to many insecure states that only nuclear*/not chemical or biological*/weapons deter conventional military attack. The international community was repeatedly surprised by the extent and sophistication of Iraq’s, Pakistan’s, North Korea’s and Libya’s progress in acquiring nuclear materials and know-how, each time underlining the inadequacies of the non-proliferation regime. After the 1998 South Asian nuclear tests, India’s highly effective rhetorical defence of its policy and the world’s half-hearted and short-lived sanctions against India and Pakistan damaged the moral authority of the NPT regime, perhaps terminally. Even worse than being ineffective, the NPT is dangerous, because it increases the pressures for opaque proliferation and heightens nuclear instability. Equally flawed, I argue, is the current counter-proliferation doctrine of the United States. I advocate scrapping the NPT (and the doctrine of counter-proliferation) and starting again, because the NPT is a failing regime that is consuming diplomatic resources that could be more effectively used to build an alternative arms control regime that is responsive to current circumstances. We need to confront the practicalities of scrapping the NPT*/the positives and the negatives*/and think clearly about the requirements of a replacement regime.
Opaque Proliferation makes nuclear war and detonation inevitable due to accidents, miscal, terrorism, and preemption
Wesley, Professor of Strategic Studies, 5 (Michael Wesley, Professor Michael Wesley is director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University. Prior to taking this position he was the Assistant Director-General for Transnational Issues at the Office of National Assessments, Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 283/299, ‘It’s time to scrap the NPT” September 2005)
By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for aspiring nuclear weapons states.4 Opaque proliferation is destabilising to regional security. It breeds miscalculation*/both overestimation of a state’s nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of Iraq), and underestimation (in the case of Libya)*/that can force neighbouring states into potentially catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine that is destabilising: In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs, less attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use. The necessary exercises cannot be conducted, nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be practised, nor alert procedures tested. As a result, the risk of accidents or incidents may rise greatly in the event of deployment in a crisis or a conventional conflict. Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also appear more likely, given their uncertainties about the adversary’s capabilities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics in original).