Gonzaga Debate Institute 2011 Gemini Landsats Neg


AT: Surveillance – Threat Perception – Economy



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AT: Surveillance – Threat Perception – Economy


Landsats not competitor-neutral—perceived as economic threat
De Saussarie 77(Alexander, Prof @ Akron Law School, American Journal of International Law, Dec., “Remote Sensing Satellite”, accessed 7-4-11, Heian Online, CH)

Even though fact-gathering is politically a neutral activity, earth resource satellites are often perceived as an economic threat, because of the satellite's potential for providing economically useful data to other states. Such data may provide information which is closely held by the subjacent state and not subject to public access. A state's resources, its population distribution, and the level of its activities may be sensitive information. One noted space lawyer and technical expert has suggested one way in which information derived through remote sensing may be utilized to the detriment of the subjacent state. He suggested a situation where a state's economy might depend heavily upon the sale of a certain agricultural commodity on the world market. If the existence of an oversupply of that commodity became worldwide knowledge, it could produce an undesirable effect on prices.37 On the other hand, worldwide knowledge of an abnormally small supply might equally affect prices and divert customers to the disadvantage of the sensed state. The effect of the sale of grain to the Soviet Union four years ago was to drive up the price of grain in the United States. At the same time, there was apparently no critical shortage of wheat in the Soviet Union, since the grain purchased from the United States was partly sold to Third World countries at a profit. Had the data and analyzed information derived from remote sensing been available then, it could have shown there was no shortfall of wheat production in the Soviet Union and that the sale of grain, which turned out to be a disaster to the American consumer and farmer alike, could have been avoided.


AT: Surveillance – Threat Perception – Space Race


US intelligence dominance triggers a space race
Chen 8 (David, research analyst, Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, 3/14, http://www.ypfp.org/forestalling_an_anti_satellite_arms_race_with_china, accessed 7-7-11, CH)

By obscuring the assets that provide U.S. information dominance, “the shot” on February 20 can be more than a step toward confrontation in space. It also can be the first step in avoiding an arms race that is heavily weighted against the incumbent space power. The task is to build a robust, diversified, and redundant system of service delivery platforms, which until now had been provided by satellites only. This is a technical policy, and, perhaps especially, diplomatic challenge that should be taken up now. U.S. national security and international stability depend on it.


Empirically, surveillance information exaggerated and used to justify arms build-up
U of Oregon 5(12/5, http://abyss.uoregon.edu/~js/space/lectures/lec09.html, accessed 7-8-11, CH)

Interestingly, the main purpose of Corona was to estimate the number of Soviet missiles, the so-called missile gap that dominated the 1960's Presidential election. However, Corona found far few missiles than thought, but the US government perpetuated the threat, promoting an arms build-up and an accelerated military program. By the end of Corona, satellites had imaged every Soviet missile base, imaged each Soviet submarine class, revealed the presence of Soviet missiles protecting the Suez Canal and identified Soviet nuclear assistance to China. With the declassification of Corona images, comparison of images from the 1960's to the present day assist in several scientific programs. For example, comparison of Corona and Landsat image of the Aral Sea from August 1987 shows the extent of the environmental disaster that has occurred there. Excessive use of pesticides and unwise irrigation practices have poisoned and shrunk this once large and bountiful sea.



AT: Surveillance – Turn – Countesurveillance


Intelligence gathering spurs counter action—France, UAE prove
Thomson 95 (Allen, senior scientist of defense analysis, Space Policy, Feb, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/at_sp.htm, accessed 7-8-11, CH)

It has been public knowledge for many years that the U.S. possesses photoreconnaissance satellites in low earth orbit (LEO).[1] There are also sources which assert that American space-based reconnaissance resources include imaging radars and signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites in various orbits, from LEO to geosynchronous orbit (GEO).[2] In the words of one Russian author, [3] The orbital grouping which supported the operations of multinational forces [during Desert Storm] included more than 20 spacecraft of imaging ('KH-11', 'Lacrosse') and SIGINT ('Ferret', Chalet', 'White Cloud', 'Aquacade') reconnaissance... While this information has long been in general circulation, up until the Desert Storm operation of 1991 there was an aura of remoteness about the subject. Despite occasional indications that reconnaissance satellites might be used for tactical purposes, there seems to have been a general perception that satellite- derived intelligence only pertained to the arena of 'superpower' affairs -- monitoring strategic arms control treaties or supporting political and military confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The wide and often official publicity given satellite reconnaissance during Desert Storm marks a fundamental and extremely important break in the world's perception of the use of spacebased intelligence. 'Lessons learned' from the Gulf War by all the world's military commands must include an appropriate assessment of the tactical use of space.[4] Heightened international interest in offensive, or at least proactive, use of satellite reconnaissance has been manifested in the increased activity by France in designing the Helios photoreconnaissance satellite. The recent interest of the United Arab Emirates in acquiring a one-meter-resolution reconnaissance satellite probably is due to the impression US imagery made on the Coalition partners during the Gulf War.[5] Of greater concern for American intelligence planners is that Desert Storm has prompted states which might find themselves in conflict with the USA in the future to develop countermeasures against US space-based reconnaissance.[6]



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