Graduate school approval record northeastern university
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Demand ManagementThe aim of managing demand is to ensure that a given supply of water is distributed to accord more closely with its ‘optimal’ use pattern. It is argued that this theoretical ideal is unlikely to be achieved in the real world, but demand management measures can help to move closer to the ideal. “The shift from a supply orientation to emphasis on demand management necessitates a shift in water policy to support internal and external re-use, consumption technology, land-use planning, educational initiatives, sectoral adjustments in dependence on imported food, and water pricing.”(Hufschmidt, MM, in Asit, Biswas, Jellali, 1993:61) (Merrett, 1997:187) It is further argued that “what is needed is to change the focus from supply-driven, subsidized programs to ones in which users are provided the services they want and are willing to pay for”. The private sector—both for-profit and not-for-profit—will have to play a much larger role for both service quality and financing” to manage water in an environmentally sustainable manner, a challenge not yet met by any industrialized nation.(Briscoe, 2000) “We are entering the period of a maturing water economy with increasing competition for access to fixed supplies, a growing risk of water pollution, and sharply higher economic, social, and environmental costs of development. Our demand for water continues to increase so as to exceed any possible supply in the near future if the structure of demand is not changed.(Rogers, Lydon, 1993) Effective demand analysis and management, further, Rogers and Lydon argue, in developing new governance structures must include attention to the importance of market mechanisms of allocation. “Even in the dry Arab lands, this view of water is deeply embedded in the culture of leaders and of the people.”(Rogers, Lydon, 1993, x) The Agricultural Department of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, has taken the position that a shift from “a culture of supply management” to one of “demand management” is essential to effectively confront our global water crisis.(FAO, Water Management: towards 2030). As agriculture uses approximately 75 percent of the world’s water for farming, irrigation takes the greatest share of the world’s water” the economics of irrigation is increasingly important to sustainable development.”(Merrett, 2002) While effective demand management, as it pertains to irrigation, could support the dramatic decline in water resources use in this sector, the reallocation of water resources to other, non-agricultural uses will potentially be increased dependant on developments in this area. For this reason, demand analysis and management must be carefully considered. Effective water governance at this juncture is crucial. Arthur Okun argues that the “market is in truth the best protector of the environment, provided only that governments can arrange an appropriate specification of private property rights in natural resources and other environmental goods. “(Okun, 1975) The use of market mechanisms has begun to dominate the area of water policy, as it is assumed to be an efficient and environmentally acceptable allocator of the scarce resource. With this, there is a careful delineation of property rights as this is considered essential to ensuring that the market be efficient. Well defined property rights allow for a voluntary exchange of property between consenting owners while it promotes cooperation and compromise.(Dryzek, Schlosberg, 2003:212) According to economists, in a complex society where people gain from trade, interacting individuals must measure and monitor the actions of one another. In the marketplace, consumers must signal to suppliers what quantity and quality of products they demand at what prices; suppliers must determine which products to produce and which input combinations to use. To the extent that actions can be effectively measured and monitored, demanders and suppliers will internalize costs and benefits and profits will be made and efficient resource allocation will be a by-product according to neoclassical economic theory. Many in the field of water resources management argue that the most basic economic tenet that has often been ignored by traditional thinkers must be considered when developing institutions. “incentives matter.” (Dryzek, Schlosberg, 2003:217) “When we abstract from the political details of the political process, we ignore incentives inherent in the process. Political resource managers make trade-offs in terms of political currencies measured in terms of special interest support; at best, this unit of account provides imprecise measures of the subjective values of citizens. The incentive structure in the political sector is complicated because the bottom line depends on the electoral process where votes matter, not efficiency. Whereby …private ownership gives owners both the information and the incentive to measure performance.(Dryzek, Schlosberg, 2003:218) Property RightsThe effectiveness of economic mechanisms in a governance system is dependant on the delineation of property rights. It is generally accepted that good stewardship results from ownership and the extent of control ownership allows within a framework of assigned property rights. Accordingly, the effectiveness of market mechanism as they relate to water is dependant on a system of well-specified property rights to natural resources. Whether these rights are held by individuals, corporations, or non-profit environmental groups, a discipline is imposed on resource users because the wealth of the owner of the property right is at stake if bad decisions are made. Of course, the further a decision maker is removed from this discipline-as he is when there is political control-the less likely it is that good-stewardship will result. Moreover, if well specified property rights are transferable, owners must not only consider their own values, they must also consider what others are willing to pay, in turn supporting good stewardship again.(Dryzek, Schlosberg, 2003:159) A widely accepted economic theory presented by Ronald Coase offered an explanation for inefficiencies previously attributed to the market. Coase claimed that social externalities are caused by a failure to specify property rights so that markets can internalize all costs and benefits. Once such rights are well-defined the allocation of scarce resources is accomplished efficiently.(Coase, 1960) According to John Dryzek and David Schlosberg, the theory of free market environmentalism is founded on the principles of human nature, knowledge and processes. First, man is assumed to be self-interested good resource stewardship depends on how well social institutions harness self-interest through individual incentives. Second, property owners, who are in a position and have an incentive to obtain time- and place-specific information about their resource endowments, are better suited than centralized bureaucracies to manage resources. Lastly, market processes are essential to determining optimal amounts use. Property rights must be well-defined, enforced, and transferable to allow self-interested individuals to assess the trade-offs inherent in a world of scarcity.(Dryzek, Schlosberg, 2003:222) “The key to effective resolution of environmental problems is the intelligent deployment of markets and quasi-markets.” (Dryzek, Schlosberg, 2003:205) Market failures can generally be attributed to a common origin: the failure to specify appropriate private property rights…To illustrate, the general acceptance that property rights are vital to securing good environmental stewardship. “The Dublin Water Principles” states that “one important State function is to clarify and maintain a system of property rights.” Accordingly, there is increasing pressure for states to recognize and formalize water rights. Water rights, it is theorized are closely linked to land rights with implicit connections to the transfer of rights and enforcement of water legislation.(Global Water Partnership, 2002) Like land rights, according to the Global Water Partnership, most water laws provide that a right may only be held or maintained if there is effective use. This often reflects the scarcity and value of the water resources and is linked to concern about the risk of vesting an absolute monopoly on a single individual. Water law must incorporate important provisions for the good of society. These include, but are not limited to the following: water must not to be obtained for speculation or let run to waste; the end use must be a socially acceptable use; water is not to be misused; the use must be reasonable as compared with other uses.(Global Water Partnership, 2002) Accordingly, the Global Water Partnership Forum has supported a move towards more rigid water property rights. Water law must articulate a hierarchy of priorities in times of scarcity to specify the allocation requirements of water in times of scarcity or in case of competing applications, e.g. water for basic human needs and/or ecosystem protection. A well defined legal framework specifying water rights allows for the development and conservation of water resources, provide collateral or assets for obtaining credit and recognize existing social and economic relationships. In some cases, legislation may allow for the transfer of responsibility for the operation, maintenance and management of irrigation systems to be local users, e.g. farmers.(Global Water Partnership, 2002) As water becomes scarcer, transfer mechanisms of water rights become increasingly important. The absence of well-defined processes for property transfer may result in social and economic instability. If water rights are assigned inequitably, or do not reflect the value of water, or the management role of specific social groups or gender, these rights must be redefined to reflect social values.(Global Water Partnership Forum, Water Rights, 2002) “Some economic theorists suggest that natural resources should be used in the way a perfect market would allocate them: to maximizes efficiency, consumer surplus, utility, preference satisfaction, or wealth allocation. As questions of justice, fairness, or equality arise with respect to the distribution of costs and benefits, argues Mark Sagoff, “most analysts concede that ethical or political choices may have to be made concerning these distributive effects.”(Sagoff, 2004) While the market supports the property owners’ right to develop the resources they own for profit and enjoyment, the nature of water resources requires an understanding that part of the value of property often comes from public investments and that government has an interest in promoting development that ensures public health, safety, and environmental protection. As a consequence, owners must respect the government’s duty to place limits on economic development and other land uses that diminish the collective well-being of present and future generations.( Durant et al, 2004:17) As the pressure on natural resources around the world continues to increase governments seek solutions to address its policy objectives and increased and changing demand. The state of the art of water resources management supports an integrated approach that incorporates a system of good governance. While this model is increasingly accepted its application and success is varied. To support effective water resources management development it is important to continually seek a greater understanding of the characteristics of an effective system within the context of established knowledge. It is important to continually look back to lessons learned and look forward to developing our current understanding of what makes a system effective. Through this process the following case allows us to look to a sustainable system to appreciate how current theory applies and how it can support the development of a more comprehensive knowledge of water resources management development. Download 0.56 Mb. Share with your friends:
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