Harvard kennedy school
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- Littauer Bldg 280 (HKS) Faculty
- 1. Course Objective and Description
- 3. Audience and Pre-requisites
- 7. Grading and Academic Honesty
- DETAILED CLASS SCHEDULE 2016 Fall Semester: Module 2
- Targeting for Redistribution
- Redistribution or Behavioral Change
- Mapping Theory Back to Implementation
- READINGS ** Required Readings Class 1: Introductions No required readings Class 2: Energy Subsidies
- Class 3: David Ellwood- Transfer Programs in the US
- Class 4: Targeting the Poor
- Class 5: Targeting the Poor
- Class 6: In-Kind versus Cash
- Class 7: Unconditional Versus Conditional
| HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL
Course Syllabus for PED-322M, Fall 2016 Social Protection Programs in Developing Countries *** PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE*** Module 2: October 18 – December 1, 2016 T/TH - 1:15-2:30pm Littauer Bldg 280 (HKS) Faculty: Faculty: Rema Hanna Faculty Assistant: Sarah Hamma Office: Rubenstein 316 Office: Littauer 302 E-mail: Rema_Hanna@hks.harvard.edu E-mail: Sarah_Hamma@hks.harvard.edu Office hours: sign-up online Phone: 617-495-2133
Social protection programs are increasingly becoming an important policy tool to provide a “safety net” for the poor and vulnerable. Overall, more than 1 billion people in low-income countries participate in at least one safety net program. As of 2013, a total of 67 countries have a social protection policy or strategy in place that outlines a systemic approaches, up from just 19 in 2009. Moreover, the sustainable development goals (adopted on September 25, 2015) promote social protection as one of the targets to achieve its number one goal of “no poverty”: “Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable.” But, taking a step back….what is social protection policy, and why is it important? Is it realistic to think it will help achieve a goal of eliminating poverty? What types of programs and policy levers fall under social protection programs? And, perhaps more importantly, given that we know that the details of program design matter considerably to the ultimate policy outcomes, how should we best design these programs? What aspects of the particular context that we are working in are important to consider when thinking about design? In this module, we will explore social protection as it relates to the developing and emerging world. We will begin by discussing the varying definitions of social protection and its overall rationale and importance in policy. Then, in the first set of lectures, we will explore the theory and evidence on targeting: the methods for identifying the poor for redistributive programs. This series will cover policy tools ranging from universal fuel subsidies to proxy means testing to the rise of more formal means testing. This set of lectures will include a guest lecture from David Ellwood on means-tested programs in the United States to provide us with a broader point of comparison in understanding both the common and unique challenges in delivering redistributive programs across contexts. The next set of lectures will cover the debate—and recent evidence—on just pure redistribution versus behavioral change. Should we just give cash? Or should we provide transfers in-kind? Should transfers have a “string” attached to it? As social protection aims not just to provide a floor for a certain living standard, but to also help households insure against risk when insurance markets fail, we will also cover a number of social insurance programs. This will include disaster relief programs to insure against group shock, farmers insurance (including a case study presented by leading expert Shawn Cole of the Harvard Business School), old-age pension programs and the rise of unemployment insurance. Finally, we will talk about real-world implementation problems and how new technologies do or do not help. 2. Learning Outcomes By the end of this course, students will have a broader understanding of the challenges and debates underlying social protection and a framework for assessing the economic and social tradeoffs in designing these policies and programs. In addition, this class will help students to think critically about the theory and research, a useful skill not just for evaluating social protection but for other areas of public policy as well. 3. Audience and Pre-requisites Intermediate level microeconomics or API-101 is a pre-requisite to PED-320M. This course is designed to help students understand the theory and recent, cutting-edge research underlying the design of social protection programs. The course will be useful for both students who are interested in these programs for future career paths or for those who just want to have a broader picture of this policy space. Students from the MPAID, MPP and MPAs, including Mason Fellows, are encouraged to consider taking this course. 4. Class Meetings Class sessions will include lectures, discussions and presentations by a number of guest speakers. Class attendance is, thus, mandatory. If you will need to miss a lecture, please contact Sarah Hamma (Sarah_Hamma@hks.harvard.edu) in advance of the lecture. 5. Course Assignment As the course is designed for us to apply theory and to think about how recent evidence informs policy design, the primary assignment will be to assess the social protection strategy of a given country. While we will discuss the assignment in more detail during the course, the basic deliverables and deadlines include:
Memo Format: Page lengths must be conformed to, and include text only (times new roman, 11-point size, 1.5 spacing, 1 inch margins on all sides). Students are allowed up to 2 pages additional for annex materials (e..g. figures, tables, charts, pictures), but this is not required. A works cited is also required; there is no page limit on the works cited. Sources: Given the short period of time involved, students will not be expected or asked to perform any additional data analysis or primary field data collection (either quantitative or qualitative). Instead, students will be expected to compile information from a number of sources: government websites, journal articles, newspaper and magazine articles, and so forth. 6. Readings Readings are an important part of the class. They will be used to reinforce the materials covered in class, but also provide more details on particular areas of interest for further study. If you would like even more details and materials in a particular area below, please contact Professor Hanna, who would be happy to talk more! 7. Grading and Academic Honesty Grading will be based on two components:
As is expected across all classes at HKS, the assignments that are submitted for this class are presumed to be a student’s original work and it should not have previously been submitted for credit in another course. One can use words or ideas written by others in publications, newspaper articles, websites, or other sources, with proper attribution. If you have any doubts about how to properly attribute another piece of work, please contact Professor Hanna. 8. Office Hour Policies Please sign up for office hours electronically; appointments are for slots of 15 minutes. If you cannot make the times offered, office hours are already full, or you need to see Professor Hanna for an urgent reason, please contact Sarah Hamma (Sarah_Hamma@hks.harvard.edu) and she can help set up an appointment. DETAILED CLASS SCHEDULE 2016 Fall Semester: Module 2
READINGS ** Required Readings Class 1: Introductions No required readings Class 2: Energy Subsidies ** Coady, David P., Ian Parry, Louis Sears, and Baoping Shang. “How Large Are Global Energy Subsidies?” IMF Working Paper No. 15/105 (May 2015): 1-42. ** Arze del Granado, Francisco Javier, David Coady, and Robert Gillingham. “The Unequal Benefits of Fuel Subsidies: A Review of Evidence for Developing Countries.” World Development 40, no. 11 (November 2012): 2234–48. Plante, Michael. “The Long-Run Macroeconomic Impacts of Fuel Subsidies.” Journal of Development Economics 107 (2014): 129–43. Komives, Kristin, Todd M. Johnson, Jonathan D. Halpern, Jose Aburto Luis, and John R. Scott. “Residential Electricity Subsidies in Mexico : Exploring Options for Reform and for Enhancing the Impact on the Poor.” The World Bank, February 4, 2009: 1-96. McRae, Shaun. “Infrastructure Quality and the Subsidy Trap.” American Economic Review 105, no. 1 (January 2015): 35–66. Optional: For those with additional an interest in this area, the International Monetary Fund has put together an EdX course on energy reform: https://www.edx.org/course/energy-subsidy-reform-imfx-esrx-0#! Class 3: David Ellwood- Transfer Programs in the US ** Aizer, Anna, Shari Eli, Joseph P. Ferrie, and Adriana Lleras-Muney. “The Long Term Impact of Cash Transfers to Poor Families.” Working Paper. National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2014: 1-42 ** Nichols, Austin, and Jesse Rothstein. “The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).” Working Paper. National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2015: 1-82 Currie, Janet. Chapter 9: Anti-Poverty Programs for Poor Children and Families, The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Poverty. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012: 277-315 Hoynes, Hilary, Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, and Douglas Almond. “Long-Run Impacts of Childhood Access to the Safety Net.” American Economic Review 106, no. 4 (April 2016): 1-54 Class 4: Targeting the Poor ** Alatas, Vivi, Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken, and Julia Tobias. “Targeting the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.” American Economic Review 102, no. 4 (June 2012): 1206–40. ** Baker, Judy L., and Margaret E. Grosh. “Poverty Reduction through Geographic Targeting: How Well Does It Work?” World Development22, no. 7 (1994): 983–95. Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee. “Decentralizing Anti-Poverty Program Delivery in Developing Countries” Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Paper. University of California at Berkeley, March 1, 2000: 1-44. Barrera-Osorio, Felipe, and Deon Filmer. “Incentivizing Schooling for Learning : Evidence on the Impact of Alternative Targeting Approaches.” The World Bank, July 1, 2013: 1-40. Elbers, Chris, Jean O. Lanjouw, and Peter Lanjouw. “Micro–Level Estimation of Poverty and Inequality.” Econometrica 71, no. 1 (January 1, 2003): 355–64. Elbers, Chris, Tomoki Fujii, Berk Ozler, Wesley Yin, and Peter Lanjouw. “Poverty Alleviation through Geographic Targeting : How Much Does Disaggregation Help?” The World Bank, October 1, 2004: 1-42. Class 5: Targeting the Poor **Alatas, Vivi, Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Ben Olken, Ririn Purnamasari, and Matthew Wai-Poi. “Self-Targeting: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming: 1-52. Banerjee, Abhijit, Rema Hanna, Gabriel Kriendler, and Ben Olken. “Debunking the Stereotype of the Lazy Welfare Recipient: Evidence from Cash Transfer Programs Worldwide,” Working Paper, October 2015: 1-25. Camacho, Adriana, and Emily Conover. “Manipulation of Social Program Eligibility.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 3, no. 2 (May 2011): 1–54. Dupas, Pascaline, Vivian Hoffmann, Michael Kremer, and Alix Peterson Zwane. “Targeting health subsidies through a non-price mechanism: A randomized controlled trial in Kenya,” Science, forthcoming: 1-26. Class 6: In-Kind versus Cash ** Cunha, Jesse M. “Testing Paternalism: Cash versus In-Kind Transfers.”American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 6, no. 2 (April 2014): 195–230. ** Aker, Jenny C. “Comparing Cash and Voucher Transfers in a Humanitarian Context : Evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo.” The World Bank, October 30, 2015: 1-45. Cunha, Jesse M., Giacomo De Giorgi, and Seema Jayachandran. “The Price Effects of Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers.” Working Paper. National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2011. Hidrobo, Melissa, John Hoddinott, Amber Peterman, Amy Margolies, and Vanessa Moreira. “Cash, Food, or Vouchers? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Northern Ecuador.” Journal of Development Economics 107 (March 2014): 144–56. Honorati, Maddalena, Ugo Gentilini, and Ruslan Yemtsov. “The State of Social Safety Nets 2014.” The World Bank, May 13, 2014: 1-124. Popova, Anna, and David K. Evans. “Cash Transfers and Temptation Goods : A Review of Global Evidence.” The World Bank, May 1, 2014: 1-36. Skoufias, Emmanuel, Mishel Unar, and Teresa Gonzalez de Cossio. “The Poverty Impacts of Cash and in-Kind Transfers: Experimental Evidence from Rural Mexico.” Journal of Development Effectiveness 5, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 401–29. Class 7: Unconditional Versus Conditional ** Baird, Sarah, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Özler. “Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer Experiment.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, no. 4 (11–1, 2011): 1709–53. ** Benhassine, Najy, Florencia Devoto, Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, and Victor Pouliquen. “Turning a Shove into a Nudge? A "Labeled Cash Transfer" for Education.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 7, no. 3 (August 2015): 86–125. Bursztyn, Leonardo, and Lucas C. Coffman. “The Schooling Decision: Family Preferences, Intergenerational Conflict, and Moral Hazard in the Brazilian Favelas.” Journal of Political Economy 120, no. 3 (June 1, 2012): 359–97. Gertler, Paul J., and Simone Boyce. “An Experiment in Incentive-Based Welfare: The Impact of PROGRESA on Health in Mexico.” Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003. Royal Economic Society, June 4, 2003. Gertler, Paul J., Sebastian W. Martinez, and Marta Rubio-Codina. “Investing Cash Transfers to Raise Long-Term Living Standards.”American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4, no. 1 (January 2012): 164–92. Haushofer, Johannes, and Jeremy Shapiro. “The Short-Term Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers to the Poor: Experimental Evidence from Kenya.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, July 19, 2016: 1-58. Manacorda, Marco, Edward Miguel, and Andrea Vigorito. “Government Transfers and Political Support.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3, no. 3 (July 2011): 1–28. Hanna, Rema, and Dean Karlan. “Designing Social Protection Programs: Using Theory and Experimentation to Understand how to Help Combat Poverty.” Handbook of Field Experiments. March 2016: 1-50. Class 8: Asset Transfers ** Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Nathanael Goldberg, Dean Karlan, Robert Osei, William Parienté, Jeremy Shapiro, Bram Thuysbaert, and Christopher Udry. “A Multifaceted Program Causes Lasting Progress for the Very Poor: Evidence from Six Countries.” Science 348, no. 6236 (May 15, 2015): 1260799. Bandiera, Oriana, Robin Burgess, Narayan Das, Selim Gulesci, Imran Rasul, and Munshi Sulaiman, “Labor Markets and Poverty in Village Economies.” Working Paper. July 2016: 1-72. Gertler, Paul J., Sebastian W. Martinez, and Marta Rubio-Codina. “Investing Cash Transfers to Raise Long-Term Living Standards.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4, no. 1 (January 2012): 164–92. Class 9: Disaster Relief ** Hornbeck, Richard. “The Enduring Impact of the American Dust Bowl: Short- and Long-Run Adjustments to Environmental Catastrophe.” The American Economic Review 102, no. 4 (2012): 1477–1507. ** Yang, Dean. “Coping with Disaster: The Impact of Hurricanes on International Financial Flows, 1970-2002,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 8: Iss. 1 (Advances), Article 13. 2008: 1-43. Anttila-Hughes, Jesse Keith, and Solomon M. Hsiang. “Destruction, Disinvestment, and Death: Economic and Human Losses Following Environmental Disaster.” SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, February 18, 2013:1-86. Dinkelman, Taryn. “Mitigating Long-Run Health Effects of Drought: Evidence from South Africa.” Working Paper. National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2013:1-54. Class 10: Farmer’s Insurance (Shawn Cole) **Cole, Shawn and Peter Tufano. “Basix.” Harvard Business School Cases. February 13, 2007: 1-15. ** Review paper to be circulated prior to class Karlan, Dean, Robert Osei, Isaac Osei-Akoto, and Christopher Udry. “Agricultural Decisions after Relaxing Credit and Risk Constraints.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, no. 2 (5–1, 2014): 597–652. Class 11: Pensions and Unemployment Insurance ** Gerard, Francois, and Gustavo M. Gonzaga. “Informal Labor and the Cost of Social Programs: Evidence from 15 Years of Unemployment Insurance in Brazil.” SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, April 4, 2013: 1-75. **Bertrand, Marianne, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Douglas Miller. “Public Policy and Extended Families: Evidence from Pensions in South Africa.”The World Bank Economic Review 17, no. 1 (6–1, 2003): 27–50. Chetty, Raj. “Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance.” Working Paper. National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2008: 1-58. Hamoudi, Amar, and Duncan Thomas. “Endogenous Co-Residence and Program Incidence: South Africa’s Old Age Pension.” Working Paper. National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2014: 1-21. Imbert, Clément, and John Papp. “Labor Market Effects of Social Programs: Evidence from India’s Employment Guarantee.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7, no. 2 (April 2015): 233–63. Class 12: Implementation Challenges in Delivery ** Banerjee, Abhijit, Rema Hanna, Jordan Kyle, Benjamin Olken, and Sudarno Sumarto. “Tangible Information and Citizen Empowerment: Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia.” Working Paper. National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2015: 1-39. ** Banerjee, Abhijit, Rema Hanna, Jordan Kyle, Benjamin Olken, and Sudarno Sumarto. “Contracting out the Last-Mile of Service Delivery Subsidized Food Distribution in Indonesia,” Working Paper, August 2016:1-46. **Aker, Jenny C, Rachid Boumnijel, Amanda McClelland, and Niall Tierney. “Zap It to Me: The Short-Term Impacts of a Mobile Cash Transfer Program.” Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 268. 2011. **Muralidharan, Karthik, Paul Niehaus, and Sandip Sukhtankar. “Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India.” Forthcoming, American Economic Review. February 2016: 1-93. 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