HUMINT and Whole of Government Force Structure

HUMINT and Whole of Government Force Structure

HUMINT must strive to meet the needs of all consumers across all agencies of government, in large part because the civilian successes help avoid a need for the military interventions and mobilizations; and because the future is unaffordable as things now stand. The USA is insolvent, the government is chaotically incoherent, and only intelligence-driven leadership can save us.

General Al Gray and I nailed it in 1988,¹³¹ and I will limit myself here to listing the differences between conventional and emerging threats that he and I promulgated in 1988—21 years ago—to no avail.

Conventional Threat Governmental Conventional/Nuclear Static Orders of Battle (OOB) Linear Development Rules of Engagement (ROE) Known Doctrine Strategic Warning Known Intelligence Assets

Emerging Threat Non-Governmental Non-Conventional (Asymmetric) Dynamic or Random OOB Non-linear (e.g. Off the Shelf) No Constraints (ROE) Unknown Doctrine No Established I&W Net Unlimited 5th Column

In 1998 the US Army Strategy Conference addressed force structure needs, on the next page is a depiction of the “Four Forces After Next” that I presented in 1998 to general acceptance.¹³² In 2008 the same annual conference addressed the same question, the findings in 1998 having been ignored, and we have yet to see any grasp of “Whole of Government” strategic planning and programming from the White House, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), or the Cabinet Secretaries.¹³³

Only DoD can move, deliver, and communicate globally on a no-notice basis, and this is why DoD should be the “Core Force” for all future Whole of Government operations. This is a concept I developed in the 1990’s for a briefing to East and West European Parliamentarians at the George Marshall Center, a concept I continue to believe in that prizes DoD as the hub of inter-agency o

It merits comment that three of the core force elements are thinkers rather than shooters, three are shooters able to think, and the last—constabulary stabilization operations—is an even mix of thinkers and shooters.

I will not belabor Sun Tzu’s wisdom about the acme of skill being victory without fighting, but I will point out that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is waging peace (irregular warfare) with Presidential-level trade missions, massive loans, major construction projects, and free headquarters buildings for regional organizations (no extra charge for the embedded audio-visual remote monitoring devices). They have also mastered cyber-warfare, something I and others warned about in the early 1990’s.¹³⁵

From where I sit, the USG is “scattered,” and only DoD can get us on track.

I venture to suggest that CIA is never going to offer Whole of Government intelligence suitable for deciding how we train, equip, and organize both military and civilian elements of the USG. In fairness, DoD does not use intelligence properly to support all policy makers, all acquisition managers, and all commanders, staff, and action officers across the inter-agency spectrum of need, but there is no reason why it cannot do so beginning immediately. It merits comment that because of the size of its budget—the largest discretionary spending element in the total USG budget—how DoD applies intelligence really makes a huge difference. If DoD commits to non-fossil fuels (which also have very low heat signatures), it can move an entire industry overnight. Similarly, what DoD does in the way of personnel policies impacts on the Whole Nation. I believe we need to restore Universal Service, but with a huge difference—only volunteers are joined to the Armed Forces and the Peace Corps, all others are directed into Homeland duties.¹³⁶