Inherency 15 Inherency Energy Dept Blocking 16

US weakness leads to allied aggression – still draws in the US

(Le Thuy, “The (continued) need for American Pivot to Asia,” http://southchinaseastudies.org/en/publications/vietnamese-publications/863-the-continued-need-for-american-qpivot-to-asiaq)

Another reason many believe the “pivot” is not in America’s security interests comes in the form of “entrapment risks”. Analysts such as Kenneth G. Lieberthal of the Brookings Institution and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute increasingly see Asia as a “cost center” for the United States in which heightened American commitment is likely to encourage many Asian states’ increased reliance on the US to provide for their security and/or raise the possibility of America being drawn into unnecessary conflicts with China to protect those countries’ interests.[22] To compound the problem of “free-riding”, many have contended that by touting the “Asia rebalance”, the Obama administration was creating promises it would not be able to fulfill, given current budget constraints.[23] US security commitments in Asia, so the argument goes, have allowed US allies and partners in the region to keep a limited defense budget while behaving more provocatively than they would be if they were not certain about American posture.[24]¶ ¶ Yet it is mind-boggling to think that absent US security commitment, those ally and partner countries would both pump up their defense spending and behave more accommodating towards China. More likely is that without America playing the role of a balancer, increased military investment would bolster those countries’ ability and willingness to take China head-on, which would be far more detrimental to everyone’s interests. As has been widely noted, however, the Japanese have slowly but surely begun to upgrade their defense capability while working closely with the US.[25] Paradoxically, while critics of “cheap riding” have argued that the projected two-percent increase in Japanese military expenditure is minimal and inadequate,[26] others are worrying about a possible resurgence of Japanese militarism,[27] which suggests that the Japanese investment in their military buildup might be at the right level.

Successful pivot is key to solve Asian conflict

(Aaron L., “China’s Challenge at Sea,” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/05/opinion/chinas-challenge-at-sea.html?_r=1, accessed 9-30-11, CMM)

Impact – Asia War Bad

The impact is fast and escalates

Boyes 1-30 - Berlin correspondent for British newspaper The Times, covering Germany and northern Europe

(Roger, “Chinese ambitions a test of Obama's pivot towards Asia,” http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/chinese-ambitions-a-test-of-obamas-pivot-towards-asia/story-fnb64oi6-1226813342972#)

IF the Third World War breaks out this year, it could well go something like this: a Chinese trawler is stormed by the Japanese Coast Guard as it approaches disputed islands in the East China Sea. The fishermen are arrested, shots are fired. Beijing sets an ultimatum, Tokyo invokes the US-Japanese security accord. The commander of the Chinese navy, Wu Shengli, has already made clear he is not going to sit on his hands if there is a flare-up: "If Japan fires the first shot, it will not be given the chance to fire a second."¶ The Japanese army, meanwhile, has been carrying out military exercises in preparation for what it fears might be a Chinese grab of the forlorn rocks, known as the Senkaku islands by the Japanese who administer them. Both countries have been studying the Falklands campaign. One Chinese participant at Davos let slip that its navy could in "a surgical operation" plant the red flag of China on the uninhabited and strategically worthless land.¶ While we in Europe fret about Ukraine, about Iran and the gathering tragedies of the Middle East, a cold war is turning hot in Asia. This crisis-in-the-making has the potential to turn our world upside down. How do we contain Chinese power? Can a strong China co-exist with a strong Japan? Faced with the choice of facing down China or abandoning its defence pledges to Japan, which way would the US jump?¶ As tensions rise, commentators reach for the example of World War I, which is being over-analysed to mark its centenary. There are indeed parallels. China, like Germany, is an emerging, impatient state with a swollen arms budget. The US, like Britain 100 years ago, is a hegemonic power in apparent decline. Japan, like France in 1914, is dependent for its security on that declining power. Rival nationalisms, now as then, can spark war.¶ Any future conflict would play out differently from the Great War; the alliance system has changed and so has the inter-dependence of the world economy. For sure, though, war in Asia would not stay in Asia.¶ The US, China and Japan are the top-three global economies and a head-on clash would crash the markets.¶ Europeans might not end up in the trenches this time but they would be on the dole queue. No wonder Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was given such an attentive hearing at Davos when he compared Sino-Japanese competition with the Anglo-German struggle at the beginning of the 20th century.¶ In fact, China is almost certainly not on the war path.¶ Rather, it has sniffed out what it believes to be the decay of US power abroad and wants to test President Barack Obama's supposed "pivot" to Asia. Does the new focus on Asia make the US a friend or foe of China?

Asian conflict escalates; miscalc is unique

Campbell 8 - Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Dr. Campbell served in several capacities in government, including as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and the Pacific, Director on theNational Security Council Staff, previously the Chief Executive Officer and co-founder of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), served as Director of the Aspen Strategy Group and the Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Washington Quarterly, and was the founder and Principal of StratAsia, a strategic advisory company focused on Asia, rior to co-founding CNAS, he served as Senior Vice President, Director of the International Security Program, and the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security Policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, doctorate in International Relation Theory from Oxford, former associate professor of public policy and international relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and Assistant Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, member of Council on Foreign Relations and International Institute for Strategic Studies

(Kurt M, “The Power of Balance: America in Asia” June 2008, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatelSingh_iAsia_June08.pdf)

Asian investment is also at record levels. Asian countries lead the world with unprecedented infrastructure projects. With over $3 trillion in foreign currency reserves, Asian nations and businesses are starting to shape global economic activity. Indian firms are purchasing industrial giants such as Arcelor Steel, as well as iconic brands of its once-colonial ruler, such as Jaguar and Range Rover. China’s Lenovo bought IBM’s personal computer¶ We call the transformations across the Asia-Pacific the emergence of “iAsia” to reflect the adoption by countries across Asia of fundamentally new strategic approaches to their neighbors and the world. Asian nations are pursuing their interests with real power in a period of both tremendous potential and great uncertainty. iAsia is: Integrating: iAsia includes increasing economic interdependence and a flowering of multinational forums to deal with trade, cultural exchange, and, to some degree, security. Innovating: iAsia boasts the world’s most successful manufacturing and technology sectors and could start taking the lead in everything from finance to nanotech to green tech. Investing: Asian nations are developing infrastructure and human capital at unprecedented rates. But the continent remains plagued by: Insecurity: Great-power rivalry is alive in Asia. Massive military investments along with historic suspicions and contemporary territorial and other conflicts make war in Asia plausible. Instability: From environmental degradation to violent extremism to trafficking in drugs, people, and weapons, Asian nations have much to worry about. Inequality: Within nations and between them, inequality in Asia is more stark than anywhere else in the world. Impoverished minorities in countries like India and China, and the gap in governance and capacity within countries, whether as backward as Burma or as advanced as Singapore, present unique challenges. A traditional approach to Asia will not suffice if the United States is to both protect American interests and help iAsia realize its potential and avoid pitfalls. business and the Chinese government, along with other Asian financial players, injected billions in capital to help steady U.S. investment banks such as Merrill Lynch as the American subprime mortgage collapse unfolded. Chinese investment funds regional industrialization, which in turn creates new markets for global products. Asia now accounts for over 40 percent of global consumption of steel 4 and China is consuming almost half of world’s available concrete. 5 Natural resources from soy to copper to oil are being used by China and India at astonishing rates, driving up commodity prices and setting off alarm bells in Washington and other Western capitals. Yet Asia is not a theater at peace. On average, between 15 and 50 people die every day from causes tied to conflict, and suspicions rooted in rivalry and nationalism run deep. The continent harbors every traditional and non-traditional challenge of our age: it is a cauldron of religious and ethnic tension; a source of terror and extremism; an accelerating driver of the insatiable global appetite for energy; the place where the most people will suffer the adverse effects of global climate change; the primary source of nuclear proliferation; and the most likely theater on Earth for a major conventional confrontation and even a nuclear conflict. Coexisting with the optimism of iAsia are the ingredients for internal strife, non-traditional threats like terrorism, and traditional interstate conflict, which are all magnified by the risk of miscalculation or poor decision-making.

Link – Plan solves oil linking

US exports solve oil linking price structures

Ebinger 12

Senior fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, Charles, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for US Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” 5-2-12, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports/20120502_lng_exports

Additional volumes of U.S. LNG will be beneficial to the global gas market. While U.S. export vol- umes are unlikely to transform the existing frag- mented structure of existing LNG trade, it will help to erode the basis of oil-linked contracts that have characterized it for decades, and to move the market toward global price convergence. In the short-term, the emergence of the United States as an exporter comes at a time of tightening global supply, meaning U.S. exports will provide much needed liquidity to natural gas consumers around the world, potentially improving the energy costs for consumers in LNG-dependent countries like Japan and India. While the economic benefits of this are clear, the progression towards a more global LNG market has substantial geopolitical implications as well. Although the U.S. govern- ment cannot directly influence the destination of each LNG cargo exported from the United States, U.S. foreign policy interests are served through a better-supplied global LNG market and through assistance to import-dependent strategic allies in Europe who will gain strategic leverage from the increased competition to Russian gas.

Link –LNG k2 US Econ

LNG exports are key to the econonmy – terminal construction, increased production, trade revenues, and price stabilization

Ebinger 12

Senior fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, Charles, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for US Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” 5-2-12, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports/20120502_lng_exports

The potential benefits of U.S. LNG exports relate to trade, macroeconomics, and geopolitics. Ex- ports of natural gas would bring foreign exchange revenues to the United States and have a positive effect on U.S. balance of payments, although in the context of overall U.S. trade, the impact of LNG revenues are likely to be small. The construction, operation, and maintenance of LNG export facili- ties and related infrastructure will also likely lead to some, limited, job creation. Exports may also serve as a stimulus to continue and even increase production of natural gas, which may result in an additional supply of employment. With some do- mestic production—mainly dry gas with little liq- uid content—being suspended due to gas prices being too low for continued economic extraction, exports may serve as an important source of in- cremental demand to support necessary volumes to stabilize gas prices. To the extent that gas for export is produced at zero or negative cost in as- sociation with unconventional oil, such gas can be seen as a consequence, rather than a detriment to increased U.S. energy security.

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