Its Corridor Protection Report



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21st Century Realities—on Redirecting Transportation Resources

An Analysis of the Gateway Connector Feasibility Study

Its Corridor Protection Report

And Trends in America



Prepared by:



Citizens for Smart Growth

Prepared for:

The Illinois Department of Transportation

December 11, 2014


BILL OF RIGHTS: Article 1

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishing of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.



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Table of Contents

Page Number

Chapter 1

Introduction and Overview 1

Background 2

Corridor Protection 2

Leadership Responds to Reality 3

Why the Project is Wrong 4

The Studies 4

Transportation Planning in the 21st Century 9

Social and Cultural Trends 11

Outlook for the Midwest 12

Public Involvement and Regional Vision 13

Along Came CSS 14

Concluding Remarks 15


Chapter 2

The Gateway Connector Feasibility Study 16

The Goal of Transportation Mobility 16

Population Growth 17

Growth by Migration 17

Sprawl in the MetroEast 20

Existing Highway Capacity 21

Travel Trends 26

Safety 27

The Goal of Economic Development 32

Assist the Counties 32

Facilitate Goods Movement 33

Access to Labor Pools 33

The Goal of Enhancing the Environment 35

Natural Resources 35

Human Development 37

Other Weaknesses 39

CSS 39


Traffic Demand Model Issues 40

Public Involvement 41


Chapter 3

The Gateway Connector Corridor Protection Report 43

Part 1.0 Introduction 44

Part 2.0 Purpose and Need 45

Part 2.1 Population Trend Analysis 46

Part 2.2 Traffic 48

Part 3.0 Alternative Development and Analysis 52

Part 4.0 Environmental Conditions and Consequences 53

Part 6.0 Public Involvement 56

Failures of Corridor Protection 59

Other Critics of Corridor Protection 64

Alternatives to a Gateway Connector 65

Final Comments 66
Chapter 4

Current Expert thinking on Transportation 67

Social and Cultural Trends 68

Demographic Trends 73

Employment Trends 75

The Economics of Highway Spending 77

Trends in Car Usage 82

Transportation Planning and Management 83

Actual Outer Belt Experiences 89
Chapter 5

Context Sensitive Solutions and Our Outreach 92

Context Sensitive Solutions (CSS) 92

Continuing Contacts 96

When is a Phase I study Necessary? 98

What Regional Vision is the Department Supporting? 100

The 10-year Review 101
List of Tables

Table 1 Traffic Counts in the GC Study Area 7

Table 2 Corridor Protection Study, Comparison of Predicted

Volumes to Actual Volumes 10

Table 3 Population Changes in Select Cities, 2000 – 2012 49

Table 4 Public Meetings for the Corridor Protection Study,

Vol C – Vol F Analyses 57
List of Appendices

Appendix A List of Sources 102

Appendix B “Have Your Say” comments 106

Appendix C Petitions and Signatures 110



CHAPTER 1
Introduction and Overview
Citizens for Smart Growth: Stop158, an Illinois Not-For-Profit social welfare corporation, has made its opposition to the Gateway Connector (GC) project clear for more than a decade. We present many of the issues we raised over the years in these chapters, and add new information that has been released more currently.

A lot has changed over the 15 years since the District 8 Engineer opened the door to the project and Study Management Group (SMG) first began to develop its rationale to justify the GC. Not only have the circumstances surrounding America’s transportation needs changed in dramatic ways, but the published study’s assumptions and facts, as well as the projections from them, have been shown to be false. Social behavior, infrastructure planning and programming, demographics, and engineering science have all changed. We believe those changes overwhelm the past rationale and obviate the need for the highway, now and for generations to come.

The work of the Illinois Department of Transportation (hereinafter referred to as the “Department”), and its consulting agencies, had a single objective at the outset of this project--simply to set the stage for construction of a new highway. Though some data was studied to provide objective justification, it appears the Feasibility Study was just what its name suggests, a statement that building the highway was feasible; and it appears the Corridor Protection study was a statement that the project was viable.

We suggest that if one phone call in 1998 essentially started the process to establish feasibility and viability for this proposed highway, it should take only one phone call to end it if leadership decides the highway is not really needed.

This document analyzes the Department’s two foundation studies in depth, and goes beyond just the GC’s feasibility and viability, but evaluates its need and purpose, as well. Our case is objective and compelling. Relevant facts from Department sources, as well as studies/opinions from transportation experts and their scholarly writings, are used throughout. Some editorial comment is unavoidable, and is added primarily for emphasis.

This document is divided into 5 chapters. They are:

Chapter 1 Introduction and Overview

Chapter 2 Analysis of the Feasibility Study

Chapter 3 Analysis of the Corridor Protection Report

Chapter 4 Current Expert Thinking in Transportation

Chapter 5 Context Sensitive Solutions and Our Outreach

A list of most of the source material used in this document is provided in Appendix A.



Background

The GC project was formally introduced in an old St Clair County Comprehensive Plan, as one of a number of North-South arterials through the county. Over the years, a couple of roads have been built, moving gradually from west to east as the county tried to stimulate economic development. We have read and heard that some officials regretted letting I-64 go through Fairview Heights instead of Belleville. In the same way, we have heard others express regret on building I-255 in the American Bottoms, instead of along the GC corridor or IL4, perhaps because economic development has been so slow to evolve there. Today’s leaders do not want to make the same mistake.

Our view is different. Studies show that economic activity is nearly always slow to develop when a highway is built for no other reason than to stimulate growth, if it ever does. Today’s leaders have not yet learned that lesson, so we might ask why, if those past decisions were leadership mistakes, would anyone think a leadership decision to build the GC now is a smart one? We believe it would be another regrettable decision.

The 1991 St Clair County Comprehensive Plan was written with the expectation that there would be robust economic development, an ever-growing population, and widening employment well into the future. Under the plan’s Major Highways section was a full description of the GC highway and its preferred location. As far as we can tell, this was enough for the Department to consider the highway “proposed,” under the definitions used in their written procedures covering highway studies.

Ten years later, the 2002 Feasibility Study’s projections mirrored the optimistic vision of a booming community, even though the strong growth of the 90’s ended with a tech meltdown in 2000 and an uncertain outlook for the nation’s economic future. The county’s vision expressed in its 1991 Comprehensive Plan didn’t change, even though it should have. The county ignored the Great Recession of 2008, as well, so the 2011 version of their Comprehensive Plan still depicts a rosy future.

We are 23 years into that 1991 plan and it’s never been clearer that a different, regional vision is needed. The realities of the last 40 years and the trends predicted for the region and the nation for the next 40 years demand a more reasoned view.



Corridor Protection

The issue to be resolved in this 10-year review is whether to maintain corridor protection. It also ought to include a determination of whether the underlying project should be kept. We hope it will.

To the first question, we hasten to point out that the Department has not been complying with the statute’s provisions in good faith for most of the corridor’s 10 years. That alone ought to suggest removing corridor protection.

More specifically, the Department has declined to protect the public interest in almost every case that has come to it. Only five parcels along Troy-O’Fallon Road were purchased by the Department, all belonging to a single owner, and all at the very beginning of protection on March 5, 2005. We cannot ascertain what capital improvements were proposed, though we believe the owner planned to build new homes on them.

We reviewed all the cases which came to the Department after that first one with Mr. Mike Myler, Chief of Land Acquisition, in November 2011. Eighteen were for residential improvements and 32 were for commercial properties. The latter ranged from strip malls to entire subdivision plans. Not a single property was acquired, and all the improvements proposed were permitted to proceed. We are unaware of any acquisitions since 2011, either.

We would also point to the 2015-2020 Highway Improvement Plan which shows the budget for land acquisition in the GC corridor has dropped from $100,000/yr to $10,000/yr. A 90% drop signals to us that the Department does not expect to purchase any property for at least the next 6 years, but rather will allow capital improvements to continue. In other words, corridor protection is illusory.

To address the second question on the underlying GC project, we present a detailed analysis of the circumstances surrounding it in the material which follows.

Leadership Responds to Reality

The response of those we pay to plan, build and manage transportation systems has lagged far behind the reality of the economic and cultural shift of the 21st century. For the last 10 years, most experts, scholars, and consultants have been nudging the nation in a different direction with respect to transportation planning and construction. The 70 million millennials and the 77 million retiring baby boomers have changed the dynamic in transportation needs. Still, there are some who are still mired in the 1950’s; most are politicians and not transportation people. We would challenge these officials to look around at what is happening in other cities and respond to the new reality.

Successful leaders are visionary, pragmatic, inspirational, and adaptable, whether they are business leaders, military leaders, or government leaders. We firmly believe that it is time to exhibit the kind of leadership that citizens expect. We expect that of both elected officials and citizen-funded transportation experts at all levels of government.

The United Sates Department of Transportation (USDOT), the United States Public Information Research Group (USPIRG), and the American Association of State and Highway Transportation Officials (AASHTO), are among those calling local and state officials to “revisit their current transportation plans and transportation investment priorities…and…cancel (sic) those projects that are no longer justifiable given new trends in driving.” We believe this is an opportunity for Illinois’ leaders to heed that calling.

There are some signs of a just such a shift. In the 2011 version of its Comprehensive Plan, St Clair County puts nearly all its economic development emphasis onto the I-255 corridor, something both our organization and our allies strongly support. Redeveloping the urban core is the best way to move forward. Numerous communities have already learned that repurposing old resources is better than abandoning them and trying to start anew.

This hearing is the opportunity for state officials to make a new honest and objective assessment of the GC project. It is a chance to compare the actual benefits of the GC against the benefits of alternative projects needed by MetroEast citizens, before deciding whether the project is truly viable.



Why the Project is Wrong

Transportation experts now know that business and economic benefit will not come just because a new roadway is built. “Build it and they will come” is a myth, applicable to its baseball fantasy origin, but not as a policy guiding billions in highway spending. Conversely, it has been shown time and again that “If they come, we will build it” is a beneficial approach. Infrastructure support for specific business expansion returns many times more than the initial government investment.

A weak example of this might be the Dierberg’s in Shiloh Crossing. The Frank-Scott Parkway provided new access to a new retail area. We call it weak, because much of the retail merely shifted from other locations, like St Clair Square, creating a temporary construction bonanza, but few new permanent jobs and little new sales tax revenue. The tax breaks Shiloh allowed in both construction and retail operations further mitigate the overall benefit. Yet, it does illustrate that early cooperation between businesses and communities can be beneficial, while blindly and hopefully creating new roads does not.

From a purely operational point of view, consider how a 41-mile stretch of road would be built. Like IL255, it would be constructed in stages, over many years. Since each stage could be considered a small solution unto itself instead of a partial solution to a bigger problem, does it not make more sense to assess the needs in each locality and apply the appropriate solution, there? Especially if there is no vast over-reaching problem in the first place?

Such solutions could include building new capacity in some localities, as was done with IL3 around Waterloo, or adding turn lanes as was done at the Seibert Road intersection with IL158.

Solving problems in small chunks is what is happening right now in Kane, Kendall, and Grundy counties. Rather than building one lengthy new highway—the Prairie Parkway--each county is tackling its own specific transportation problems along IL47. One grand project did not solve one vast problem; a different solution in each city/county made more sense. We suggest that approach makes more sense here, as well. To assume one highway will handle all problems—economic, mobility, and environmental--is not being proactive; it’s being inflexible. In some ways, it’s also being lazy.

The GC project was not conceived to solve any particular problem set; it was an old idea, carried forward in repetitive plans, sold with three goals in mind. The data is in and the reality is known--its economic benefits are mythical, the environmental benefit is a fiction, and the mobility benefits are an illusion. Too harsh? In the pages which follow, we shall show it is not.

The Studies

Together, Chapters 2 and 3 point out the flaws in the two studies the Department currently use as the basis to assert the GC project is “feasible” and “viable.” Unfortunately, those are the only justifications the Department now needs under Illinois statutes to sustain the project beyond the 10-year review. On June 19, 2014, the District 8 Engineer told us face-to-face that nothing will change because of this review of the GC corridor. So long as he has the authority to make the determination, and so long as no senior officials exert any pressure or proponents alter their views, we expect nothing will.

Data collected and used to project demographics, such as population and employment; to assess public support; and to evaluate the success of stated goals have all been subject to the test of time. This document will demonstrate clearly that projections have failed that test. And if the claims in the studies are false, the conclusions must be false, as well.

While we believe that the project should be canceled, we recognize other actions may result in a more palpable death for the project. A first step could be reworking the original Feasibility Study; the staff of District 8 could review and revise its original report, engaging competent outside consulting assistance, as before. The evaluation should be multimodal, and the intent of CSS should be observed.

We found that the District collects a myriad of data, and much of our analysis is based on information in East-West Gateway Council of Governments (EWG) and the Department’s libraries. We also used academics’ reports/studies, which should be part of each transportation engineer’s continuing professional education. We would expect the District to use all that information, not to just archive it. Therefore, a new study using more-current data and newer traffic and land use models ought to be a simple matter.

The Feasibility Study

Department procedures require a phase study for most projects, to include a Feasibility Study to determine “whether or not a proposed highway improvement warrants further study…” But, Chapter 11 of the engineering bureau’s Manual requires a Feasibility Study only for new four-lane highways. The fact that a Feasibility Study was done for the GC signals that the Department agreed with St Clair County’s 1991 plan and had already decided that’s what they would support.

The language in the report confirms that. It reported the SMG dismissed alternative highway improvement projects, even up to five lanes, preferring “an interstate-like facility,” and “a high speed facility.” The study group only considered other improvements which would “complement a proposed new outer belt facility.”

“Feasibility” is a pretty general term and whether something is feasible or not is limited only by one’s imagination. It was feasible to split the atom, go to the moon, and save General Motors from bankruptcy. To declare something as simple as building a highway to be “feasible,” even in light of the financial constraints and resistance by thousands of residents, is trivial by comparison.

We concede that building the highway is feasible; the real questions are whether it’s needed by the motoring public, and whether that need is worth the adversities created by the construction.

We, therefore, have to conclude that conducting a feasibility study is not so much about finding feasibility, as it is to follow a process that deflects criticism and attribution. As recently as April 2014, Ann Schneider, then Secretary of Transportation, held the position that the GC project was “feasible,” implying that alone was sufficient reason to keep it.

Yet, in trying to find reasonable goals, the study presented some obvious contradictions.

For example, if preserving land is a project objective, how does carving out and paving nearly 2,400 acres of land in use accomplish that? We suggest that it does not—changing it to a new purpose is the opposite of preservation. Moreover, one cannot “improve…air quality” simply by redistributing traffic from one road to another. And if this new road generates an increase in traffic, and fails to eliminate congestion (it cannot, because roads in the area are not currently congested), then air quality will necessarily diminish. In addition, the unavoidable and acknowledged adverse effects on both the human development factors and natural resources factors discussed in the study report belie the claim that a better environment is a goal of the GC.

If the project should be “consistent with public support,” how does basing the entire plan on the “desires” of a few government officials meet that objective? If safety is a concern, how does adding miles to the system reduce accidents when we already know the per mile accident rate? In addition, we know that high speed accidents are generally more severe than those on local streets, so this highway may well convert cheap fender benders into expensive disabling injuries.

On analysis, each of the three goals falls short in some way.

Consider traffic mobility. Table 1 shows a 15% increase in vehicle traffic in the study area from 1996 to 2012. The study forecast an increase of 98%. Projecting actual data to 2020, one would expect another 8% increase to 112,500 vehicles per day, compared to the projected 186,000. That’s a huge error. Our assessment is that no segments in the study area will need widening before 2020.



There has been considerable population growth in the study area, but the added traffic has been successfully handled by existing roads’ capacities; It appears that their actual free-flow (Level C) capacity is nearly double the traffic projections presented in the studies. In the few places where “congestion” resulted from building new subdivisions, that congestion was satisfactorily eliminated by means other than new capacity—turn lanes, widening, signaling.

Where expansion was pursued, IL15 between Belleville and Freeburg, and IL3 between Waterloo and Columbia, for example, speed was increased and safety was enhanced, but sprawl was also facilitated, which could well result in future congestion. We note these projects cost but a small fraction of the magnitude of the GC project.
Now, consider the economic goals. One study objective is to “assist economic development goals” of the three counties, but none of three counties’ long-range transportation plans list any goals related to the GC! We could find no mention of the GC in the Madison County plan, or even its I-55 Corridor Plan to which the GC connects. The same is true for Columbia’s plan. Only St Clair County even addresses the GC and they reject it as a transportation corridor because that would be “bad for development.” Instead, their plan focuses economic development in the American Bottoms and the Kaskaskia River. In 1998, St Clair County wanted a divided highway to promote economic growth; and in 2011, they don’t want it because it’s bad for development. That suggests the Feasibility Study needs to be discarded.

We believe the counties’ planners are right by ignoring the GC. There are dozens of published studies addressing the economic consequences of constructing new roads. One 2005 study illustrates under what circumstances investment in highway infrastructure actually yields economic benefit. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) reported on four states’ economic development programs, and found that only in those states where roads were built to provide access to new and expanded manufacturing facilities did the local community enjoy a lasting economic benefit. Where roads were constructed with the hope of an economic response, no benefit resulted.

Ironically, one of the things to support economic activity--a trucking industry which continues to grow nationally--is not wanted on the GC. The SMG makes it clear in the Feasibility Study report that truck traffic should NOT use that facility.

The FHWA reached two other conclusions on the economics issue: (1) only road projects providing an existing business direct access to previously isolated areas realize an economic benefit, while nearby areas do not necessarily benefit economically and (2) projects designed to improve traffic safety provide no accompanying economic benefit.

Finally, consider the goal of enhancing the environment. The best the report could say was that there were “no fatal flaws” that would prevent the highway from being built. Not exactly convincing. We assert there are many adverse impacts, and very likely no environmental benefits at all.

There is one other notable weakness. The conceptual basis for the travel demand model used in the study was at the end of its 50-year utility; the MINUTP model itself was over 20 years old. In spite of the shortcomings, the output was readily accepted and offered as proof of the GC’s need. MACTEC, the engineering consultant conducting the study, had an opportunity to employ existing land use models to validate the travel model’s output, but passed it up. At the time, other professionals were also advising MINUTP users to consider the model as only one tool, not to use it in highway design or alternative analysis, and not to use it without engineering judgment.

The Corridor Protection Report

The Corridor Protection report is built upon the premises outlined in the Feasibility Study. Therefore, it suffers from similar flaws—inaccurate projections, subjective assessments, and no proof of purpose.

For example, we have actual population growth data and now know the study’s projections are significantly in error. The predicted population growth rate for O’Fallon is off by +57%. From US Census Bureau data, the most recently measured growth rate will put the city’s population at 32,806 people in 2020. The corridor study’s rate projected up to 39,058 people, and based its model calculations on that. A 57% error in the data input should be unacceptable! Surely, with so much of the state’s money at risk, the District should want to reduce that error and reach a conclusion based upon better information.

One of the principal reasons the projections are so far off is because the study group assumed, in effect, that all the growth in each community’s past came through migration and births less deaths. They knew this not to be true, however. There were no fewer than four other factors that should have been considered and the model input adjusted before application. The four factors include (1) annexation of established neighborhoods, (2) the closure of housing units at Scott AFB and the relocation of families into the community, (3) the use of a short, distorted baseline which overstated actual long-term growth, and (4) “white flight” from core communities below the bluffs. Each was a one-time occurrence which severely skewed results. Those adjustments should have been made to prevent the erroneous output.

We know that Shiloh’s growth was largely through annexation of residential neighborhoods to its southwest (toward Belleville) and from the families who had to move off base as quarters were demolished. Both activities began in the1990’s. It was not growth in the sense that it was used in the study, but mere boundary expansion and relocation within the study area. The consultant contacted each of the cities, so the activities should have been known. The same adjustments should have been made for O’Fallon, Edwardsville, Glen Carbon, Troy and other cities cited in the study report.

That’s far from the only weakness in the Corridor Protection Report. Assuming the study’s projections for vehicle traffic in 2025 are correct (a poor assumption, as will be shown), the difference between the “Build” and “No build” options (Table 2) is only 16,800 vehicles per day on all the major collectors/arterials in the study area. Specifically, the roads are expected to handle 322,000 vpd if the connector is not built, and 338,800 if it is built. With no existing road exceeding its Level C service level, it would be irresponsible to build such an expensive road to handle a 5% difference in traffic volume.

Traffic volume along all 11 roads in the study area has increased, albeit at a substantially lower rate than predicted. It was 201,200 vpd in the study’s baseline year of 2000. The study put the volume increase at roughly a 60% to 322,000 if the GC was not built. The Department’s GIS database indicates that actual volume on those roads in 2012 was 213,100 vpd or a 6% increase.

Since 2000, there have been at least 10 new subdivisions and hundreds of homes added to older subdivisions in the study area. The study predicted that growth would congest the study area’s highways. That has not occurred. We hasten to point out, once again, that simpler improvements such as added turn lanes and new signals have prevented or eliminated congestion along those roadways.




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