Jackson Vanik will pass – bipartisan support of congress and interest groups gives momentum
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- Relations Impact – Laundry List
- More ev-relations independently solve every single impact
- Relations Impact – Terrorism
- Nuclear war and extinction
Relations Impact – Spill OverAnd, Jackson-Vanik spills over to the rest of the relationship-makes every impact inevitable and worseTrenin and Medish 2006 (Dmitri Trenin is deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Mark Medish is a vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, International Herald Tribune, November 17) Perhaps most damaging of all, Russophobia in the United States and anti-Americanism in Russia are rampant. If unchecked, these attitudes could become self-fulfilling prophecies. Although the WTO deal is an important sign of renewed cooperation, the eventual Congressional debate over Russia's trade status could reignite controversy. To accord Russia unconditional normal trade relations, Congress would have to lift the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment originally imposed on the Soviet Union for restricting immigration. Bush now has a chance to make good on his longstanding commitment to remove the Jackson-Vanik obstacle, though the task could be harder now that his party has lost control of Congress. Bush and Putin should also build on the WTO breakthrough and try to steadily enlarge the ambit of bilateral cooperation. The gains for global security could be substantial. Concrete areas of mutual interest to focus on in the near term include: * strengthening sanctions on North Korea and Iran as an inducement for direct negotiations; * finalizing an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, allowing America and Russia to develop a more robust international nonproliferation regime; * initiating the next chapter of strategic arms reduction talks; * working together to reduce tensions in the South Caucasus, specifically in Georgia's breakaway regions; * avoiding conflict over Kosovo's final status by supporting a negotiated settlement. Russia and the United States need a change of direction, which only the two presidents can signal. Their meeting in Vietnam should remind them of history's blind alleys and the potential advantages of making U-turns. Relations Impact – Laundry ListRelations key to energy security, terrorism, global economy, prolif and hegeCommission on US Policy Toward Russia 2009 (US Senate, “THE RIGHT DIRECTION FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA,” March) Securing America’s vital national interests in the complex, interconnected, and interdependent world of the twenty-first century requires deep and meaningful cooperation with other governments. The challenges—stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, defeating terrorist networks, rebuilding the global economy, and ensuring energy security for the United States and others—are enormous. And few nations could make more of a difference to our success than Russia, with its vast arsenal of nuclear weapons, its strategic location spanning Europe and Asia, its considerable energy resources, and its status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Rapid and effective action to strengthen U.S.-Russian relations is critically important to advancing U.S. national interests An American commitment to improving U.S.-Russian relations is neither a reward to be offered for good international behavior by Moscow nor an endorsement of the Russian government’s domestic conduct. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the importance of Russian cooperation in achieving essential American goals, whether preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, dismantling al- Qaeda and stabilizing Afghanistan, or guaranteeing security and prosperity in Europe. Success in creating a new and cooperative relationship with Russia can contribute to each of these objectives and many others. Failure could impose significant costs. More ev-relations independently solve every single impactCommission on US Policy Toward Russia 2009 (US Senate, “THE RIGHT DIRECTION FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA,” March) Protecting and advancing America’s national interests in the decades ahead requires a strategic reassessment of the United States’ relationship with Russia with an emphasis on exploring common interests. A constructive relationship with Russia will directly influence the United States’ ability to advance effectively vital national-security interests in nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and energy security, and to deal with many specific challenges such as Iran or European security. If left unchecked, the ongoing deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations will begin to seriously damage our ability to achieve objectives across these interests. The Obama administration must establish an effective, comprehensive bilateral structure to facilitate consultation, dialogue, and negotiation. U.S. priorities must be defined more clearly. And we must more realistically assess Russia’s views of its interests. Though leaders in both countries have made encouraging statements in recent weeks suggesting a new commitment to improving relations, we are deeply concerned by the gap between the current U.S.-Russian relationship and the level of cooperation that the United States needs with Russia in order to advance vital American interests. Not only rhetoric but swift action is essential to build a relationship with Moscow that addresses critical U.S. goals in Iran, Afghanistan, and around the world. Relations Impact – TerrorismRelations are key to solve terrorism-Russian coop outweighs your internalsCommission on US Policy Toward Russia 2009 (US Senate, “THE RIGHT DIRECTION FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA,” March) The September 11 attacks starkly demonstrated the common threat of terrorism to America and Russia. Moscow has since provided important assistance to the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan; however, this help may be at risk if U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia relations weaken further. After initially acquiescing to a U.S. military presence in the region, Russia has complicated U.S. efforts to maintain air bases in central Asia to support operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, including Kyrgyzstan’s recent decision that the United States should close its Manas base. This in part reflects U.S.-Russian differences over both Afghanistan and the wider central Asian region. It also starkly illustrates the potential costs of treating the former Soviet Union as a competitive battleground rather than a zone of cooperation. Though the Russian government has an interest in preventing the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, Moscow might revoke its permission for transit of NATO cargoes to Afghanistan via Russia if NATO-Russia relations deteriorate further. Greater cooperation in Afghanistan is far more desirable and could build on past collaboration to develop deeper intelligence sharing and improved coordination with Russia’s long-standing allies in the country. However, it will require greater willingness to consider Russian perspectives. Broader U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation has been hindered by divergence in U.S. and Russian assessments of the challenges and opportunities presented by various non-state actors to the United States, Russia, and other countries. This divergence has prevented the two countries from agreeing on a common definition of terrorism and is one of the factors behind American reluctance to assist in Russia’s fight against Chechen separatists and Russian engagement with Hamas and Hezbollah. Despite this, working successfully with Moscow could offer major opportunities, especially in the greater Middle East, where the United States has relatively few sources of human intelligence. Intensified cooperation in the Middle East peace process could also have some impact on terrorism in the region. Nuclear war and extinctionSpeice 2006 – 06 JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary [Patrick F. Speice, Jr., “NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,” William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427 Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. 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