Jackson Vanik will pass – bipartisan support of congress and interest groups gives momentum
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- Even if relations are difficult – doesn’t mean impossible or that we shouldn’t try
- Arguments about no cooperation in afghanistan just prove we should acknowledge the sphere
relations thresholdEven if the current state isn’t perfect – it could be worseAdomanis 3/7 (Mark Adomanis, Forbes contributor, “The Russian Presidential Election and the Future of the Reset,” 3/7/12) http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/03/07/the-russian-presidential-election-and-the-future-of-the-reset/ What Rubin does not attempt to argue, largely because its impossible, is that confrontation with Russia will better serve American interests. You think the Russians are being insufficiently supportive of our war effort in Afghanistan? You think they should more fulsomely back our efforts to sanction Iran? You think they should stop arming Assad? Great, how are you going to get them to do so? Saying nasty things about Putin won’t get them to change their policies as the man seems to truly revel in the hatred of Western hawks (recall his famous speech in Munich in 2007). The Russians have never been in the habit of giving up something for nothing, and while they are open to considering deals they will not simply fold in the face of angry Republican rhetoric. The idea, embraced by people like Rubin, that there is no conflict between America’s interests and its values is just flatly inaccurate – a country with a globe-spanning presence will always have to cut deals with some truly unsavory regimes (hello, Saudi Arabia!) and some truly nasty people. It’s not pretty, but that’s the way the world works. The alternative to the reset, then, is not a Russian policy that magically forces the Russians to do our bidding, but a policy that guarantees mutual suspicion and heightened tensions. In an environment in which the US’ position is swiftly crumbling, it has to be very careful about whom it picks its fights with. Obama and the reset architects seem to understand this, Rubin and the Republicans absolutely do not. Even if relations are difficult – doesn’t mean impossible or that we shouldn’t tryAllison and Blackwill, 11 – * director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND ** Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?”, Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report, October 2011) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia-and-US-NI_final-web.pdf Some acknowledge that Russia matters to the United States, but argue that the Russian government’s foreign and domestic conduct prevents the U.S. from cooperating effectively with Moscow. Having worked with Russia over the past two decades, members of this group are painfully aware of how difficult Russian policy and action can sometimes be. Nevertheless, we believe strongly that America can engage effectively with Moscow in ways that advance U.S. national interests and values. Where best efforts by the United States are rebuffed, Washington should act to achieve what it can and continue to engage toward further progress. Those who dismiss efforts to collaborate with Moscow typically argue that the U.S. cannot collaborate with Russia because: • American and Russian national interests diverge so substantially that cooperation is impractical and unlikely to achieve substantial results. American and Russian values differ so significantly that cooperation is impossible without sacrificing key U.S. principles. • The possible benefits to the United States will not justify the effort, either because Russia is too difficult or unreliable an interlocutor or, alternatively, because Moscow is not able to deliver on important issues. This section briefly responds to each of these objections. First, U.S. and Russian national interests do indeed diverge in many areas. Despite this, however, the United States and Russia share many common interests, including some which are vital: slowing the spread of nuclear weapons; combatting international terrorism; promoting a reliable international energy system; and sustaining a prosperous world economy. Of course, American and Russian national interests, priorities, and perspectives will likely always differ in significant respects. Thus U.S. leaders must recall clearly that their obligation is to advance American national interests rather than U.S.-Russian relations. Sustainable cooperative relations with Moscow are an instrument to achieve key U.S. goals, not an end in themselves, and Washington must be prepared to confront Russia when U.S. national interests require it. Second, the fact that the United States and Russia have different political systems, and that many Americans see considerable flaws in how Russia is ruled, should not prevent cooperation with Moscow to advance American national interests. The first responsibility of the U.S. government is to ensure the security and prosperity of the American people. Because many nations important to the United States are governed differently, the U.S. government continues to have no alternative but to work with undemocratic governments when important national interests are at stake. In this context, there is no real substitute for dealing with Russia, in particular on countering proliferation, combating international terrorism and enhancing energy security. at: afghanistanRelations high – Afghanistan Japaridze 3/14 (Misha Japaridze, “Russia to offer air base to US for Afghan transit,” 3/14/12) http://www.kansascity.com/2012/03/14/3490004/fm-russia-offers-airbase-to-us.html Mexican cartel says no violence during papal visit MOSCOW -- A new deal allowing the United States and its NATO allies to use a Russian air base for transit of troops and military cargo to Afghanistan would help ensure Russia's own security, Russia's foreign minister said Wednesday. Sergey Lavrov said a plan to permit the U.S. and other NATO nations to use the base in the city of Ulyanovsk on the Volga River will soon be considered by the Russian Cabinet. If approved, the deal could help repair Russian ties with the United States, which have become increasingly strained over Washington's missile defense plans in Europe and the Syrian crisis. Moscow has provided the U.S. and other NATO member states with air corridors and railway routes for carrying supplies to and from Afghanistan. The new agreement would for the first time allow alliance members to set up a logistics facility for troops and cargo on Russian territory. Lavrov strongly defended such a deal, saying the success of NATO's mission is essential for fending off the spread of terrorism and illegal drugs from Afghanistan into ex-Soviet Central Asian nations and Russia. "It's in our interests that the coalition achieves a success before withdrawing and makes sure that the Afghans are capable of defending their country and ensuring an acceptable level of security," Lavrov told the lower house of Russia's legislature. Some lawmakers argued that the U.S. military's use of the Ulyanovsk facility could threaten Russia by allowing foreign troops on its soil. "We want those who are fending off threats directed at Russia to efficiently fulfill their tasks," Lavrov said. "We are helping the coalition to proceed from our own interests." In Belgium, NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu said boosting cooperation on the Afghan transit would benefit both the alliance and Russia. "Clearly we welcome the cooperation we have with Russia already on transit from and to Afghanistan," she said. "We look forward to reinforcing that agreement because ... NATO and Russia have a joint interest in a stable and secure Afghanistan." Lavrov said the deal to be considered by the Cabinet would allow the transit of NATO troops but that they wouldn't be allowed to stay there. "They aren't going to live there. They will only be moving from one transportation means to another," Lavrov said. He sought to assuage the lawmakers' concern by saying that Russia would reserve the right to check the cargo, but provide specifics about the deal. Earlier this week, Russia's daily Izvestia published excerpts from an official letter sent to parliament by Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, which said that the Ulyanovsk facility would be overseen by the civilian authorities and include customs control. The proposal comes amid shrinking supply options to coalition forces in Afghanistan. Earlier this month, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta met with Kyrgyzstan's leaders to stress that America needs the continued use of the U.S. air base there beyond the end of its contract in 2014, largely as a transit center to bring troops home from Afghanistan. The supply routes across the former Soviet Union also have become vital after Pakistan shut down its ground supply routes following the U.S. airstrikes in November that killed a number of Pakistani troops. The high-speed rail route through Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan handles the bulk of the ground supplies. Arguments about no cooperation in afghanistan just prove we should acknowledge the sphereAdomanis 1/19 (Mark Adomanis, Forbes Writer on Russia, degrees from Harvard and Oxford, “National Review's Latest Attack On Obama's Russia Policy: Grasping at Straws,” 1/19/12) http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/01/19/national-reviews-latest-attack-on-obamas-russia-policy-grasping-at-straws/ Writing in National Review, Daniel Vajdic of the American Enterprise Institute mounts a confused and almost incoherent attack on the Obama administration’s Russia policy. Having read Vajdic’s piece several times, I am genuinely unsure of what his actual substantive criticism is. He seems not to be presenting a structured critique of either the formulation or execution of the administration’s policy. Rather, he lays a number of inconvenient and undesirable Russian policies at the feet of “the reset” despite the fact that many of the policies in question actually predate the Obama administration (or even dear Barack’s election to the US senate). To get an idea of what I’m talking about, let’s take a closer look at a few of his criticisms. Supply routes to Afghanistan via Russian territory — the northern portion of the Northern Distribution Network — have become increasingly important since Islamabad shut down transit corridors through Pakistan in late November. U.S. relations with Pakistan are arguably at a post-9/11 nadir. Still, there are a few problems with the Russian option. First, Russia limits NATO to nonlethal equipment and only allows the alliance to ship supplies from the West to Afghanistan, not in the reverse direction. Second, the Kremlin may prove to be no less erratic than Pakistan. Moscow’s ambassador to NATO recently threatened to cut off Russian transit routes to Afghanistan unless the U.S. agrees to scale back its missile-defense plans in Europe. Finally, an expansion of the Russian route makes the U.S. even more reliant on the Kremlin, which may use its leverage to extract concessions in unrelated areas. In addition to missile defense, Russia’s demands could include reduced U.S. engagement with the countries of the former Soviet Union — Moscow’s “sphere of privileged interests” — and a diminution in U.S. criticism of what can mildly be called the Putin regime’s democratic shortcomings. Moreover, to suggest that the Kremlin is cooperating over Afghanistan because of the reset is patently wrong. Perhaps more than any other country in the world save the U.S., Russia fears the return of the Taliban and the further diffusion of Islamic fundamentalism into Central Asia, which threatens its southern periphery. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Moscow assists the U.S. in Afghanistan because “it serves our security interests.” What is Vajdic’s actual criticism? That the Russians aren’t fighting shoulder to shoulder with us in Kandahar? That they’re not sufficiently engaged in part of some grand Western crusade against Islamic extremism? The Russian policy (helping NATO, but with restraint) makes perfect sense if you realize that, while the Russians certainly don’t want the Taliban to storm to victory, they also don’t want to have a permanent NATO presence in Central Asia. Vajdic is clearly unimpressed with the Russian contribution to our war in Afghanistan, but how would he change this? Would he offer the Russians concessions in their “near abroad?” No, that’s off the table. That’s appeasement. Would he agree to tone down US criticism of the Russian government? No, that’s also appeasement. Would he just yell at them a lot? Say really nasty things to Vladimir Putin until he agreed to offer more fulsome assistance? Maybe we could tell Susan Rice to bang her shoe on the gavel at the UN. The Russians, and Putin most of all, remember very clearly that, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when they enthusiastically signed on to the US war on terror it got them precisely zilch. Putin’s support of the American campaign in Afghanistan, something which he took very significant political risks to deliver, didn’t get him anything: Bush still unilaterally abrogated the ABM treaty (less than a month after we had officially overthrown the Taliban government), imperiously dismissed any Russian concerns over missile defense as the mindless complaints of people still stuck in the Cold War, and, of course, fomented “colored revolutions” all throughout the post-Soviet space. So why would the Russians repeat their mistake? Why would they unreservedly support our campaign in Afghanistan when they have, in the very recent past, clearly seen that such a stance is foolish and self-defeating? Why would they give us something for nothing? The Russians (very understandably!) will offer NATO assistance sufficient to ensure that the Taliban cannot win, but they will not help us so much that Afghanistan is transformed into an American satrapy. This concern about American power in Central Asia is not some strange and peculiar manifestation of Putin’s authoritarian malice, but a very basic geopolitical calculation. The Russians see Central Asia as part of their sphere of influence, and a permanent American military presence is obviously incompatible with that. The “democratic” Yeltsin administration had a very similar understanding of Russia’s role in Central Asia, that is a power broker that helped mediate disputes and which had to be consulted in all matters of importance, it was just too bankrupt and dysfunctional to pursue it. Let’s move on from Afghanistan to several more of Vajdic’s criticisms: Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 0.68 Mb. Share with your friends:
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