Relations Low
Japan US relations declining now, the base in Okinawa is hindering ties
Rogin, 6/16/10
(Josh, Staff Writer at Congressional Quarterly, Defense Reporter at Federal Computer Week, and Staff Reporter at Asahi Shimbun, “Will Obama Hit the ‘reset’ button on US-Japan relations?” Foreign Policy, pg online @ http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/16/will_obama_hit_the_reset_button_on_us_japan_relations //ag)
Now that Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has fallen on his sword, and the United States Japan have an opportunity to "reset" their relationship, which suffered due to the personal discord between Hatoyama and President Obama and the lingering dispute over a base in Okinawa. But will they take it? For now, the battle over the Futenma air station seems to be tabled, with the new prime minister, Naoto Kan, pledging to largely stick to the deal struck in 2006. But there are lingering doubts as to whether either Washington or Tokyo is ready to revamp the rest of the alliance, which needs an update as it crosses the 50-year threshold. So far, Kan seems to be sounding the right notes. "The new prime minister has done everything possible to underscore the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance," an administration official close to the issue told The Cable. "This is a very complex set of interactions but we're reassured by what we've heard so far from Prime Minister Kan." Japan hands in Washington note that Kan, in his swearing-in remarks, affirmed the U.S.-Japan alliance as "the cornerstone" of his country's diplomacy and pledged to honor the 2006 agreement. But Kan also said he would place equal emphasis on improving ties with China. That struck many in Washington as a sign that the Democratic Party of Japan, which took power last year for the first time, is still hedging against what party leaders see as an Obama administration that just isn't giving Japan the respect and attention it feels it deserves. As for the recent cooling in relations, "I don't think it's over, but a change in leadership is a chance to reset," said Randall Schriver, former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia. The U.S. problem with Hatoyama was personal, based on his style and inability to meet his own deadlines, resulting in a lack of trust, Schriver said. "Japan's a democracy and Hatoyama brought himself down," said Devin Stewart, senior fellow at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs.
US Japan relations are declining; previous Prime Minister brought political chaos
Green, 6/13/10
(Michael, senior advisor and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and associate professor at Georgetown University, “Prime Minister Kan Can Fix U.S.-Japan Ties,” Wall Street Journal, pg online @ http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703433704575303592164774492.html?mod=wsj_india_main //ag)
To say the United States-Japan alliance has been strained under the Democratic Party of Japan's leadership is an understatement. Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama opened his term in September with promises to counterbalance American influence through a closed "East Asia Community" and sowed doubt about Japan's commitment to America's forward presence in Asia by blocking implementation of a plan to build a new air base to replace a Marine Corps facility on Okinawa. He threw the policy-making process into chaos with an antibureaucracy campaign that had inexperienced ministers doing the work of clerks and a collection of playwrights and television pundits in the Prime Minister's Office trying to decide security policy. Worst of all, Mr. Hatoyama let then DPJ Secretary-general Ichiro Ozawa reverse key government decisions based on the wishes of the DPJ's anti-alliance and antimarket coalition partners, the Social Democrats and the People's New Party.
Okinawa is highly contentious, the way it’s resolved will directly affect US Japan relations
Feffer, 3/6/10
(John, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, “Okinawa and the new domino effect,” Asia Times Online, pg online @ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh01.html //ag)
The immediate source of tension in the US-Japanese relationship has been Tokyo's desire to renegotiate that 2006 agreement to close Futenma, transfer those 8,000 Marines to Guam, and build a new base in Nago, a less densely populated area of the island. It's a deal that threatens to make an already strapped government pay big. Back in 2006, Tokyo promised to shell out more than $6 billion just to help relocate the Marines to Guam. The political cost to the new government of going along with the LDP's folly may be even higher. After all, the DPJ received a healthy chunk of voter support from Okinawans, dissatisfied with the 2006 agreement and eager to see the American occupation of their island end. Over the last several decades, with US bases built cheek-by-jowl in the most heavily populated parts of the island, Okinawans have endured air, water, and noise pollution, accidents like a 2004 US helicopter crash at Okinawa International University, and crimes that range from trivial speeding violations all the way up to the rape of a 12-year-old girl by three Marines in 1995. According to a June 2009 opinion poll, 68% of Okinawans opposed relocating Futenma within the prefecture, while only 18% favored the plan. Meanwhile, the Social Democratic Party, a junior member of the ruling coalition, has threatened to pull out if Hatoyama backs away from his campaign pledge not to build a new base in Okinawa.
The Okinawa base receives the most attention from all sides
Feffer, 3/6/10
(John, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, “Okinawa and the new domino effect,” Asia Times Online, pg online @ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh01.html //ag)
The bases, as set out in the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty, support the US commitment to protect Japan, as well as giving the US access to much of the Pacific. Officials argue that the distant US territory of Guam is no substitute as a deterrent to North Korea or to China’s ambitions towards Taiwan. Futenma is not the biggest base but it is a key cause of tension, embedded as it is in the city of Ginowan. The larger Kadena airbase is only slightly to the north. Military air traffic is constant, even on weekends, and the signs of US expat life are everywhere, from the fleets of yellow school buses to the shops proclaiming: “We buy second-hand American furniture,” to the 30ft (9m) declaration on the side of the United Christian nursery that “Jesus is Lord”.
Okinawa receives the most attention from both the US and Japan, closing the base would be a victory for US Japan relations
Feffer, 3/6/10
(John, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, “Okinawa and the new domino effect,” Asia Times Online, pg online @ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh01.html //ag)
The Hatoyama government is by no means radical, nor is it anti-American. It isn't preparing to demand that all, or even many, US bases close. It isn't even preparing to close any of the other three dozen (or so) bases on Okinawa. Its modest pushback is confined to Futenma, where it finds itself between the rock of Japanese public opinion and the hard place of Pentagon pressure. Those who prefer to achieve Washington's objectives with Japan in a more roundabout fashion counsel patience. "If America undercuts the new Japanese government and creates resentment among the Japanese public, then a victory on Futenma could prove Pyrrhic," writes Joseph Nye, the architect of US Asia policy during the Clinton years. Japan hands are urging the United States to wait until the summer, when the DPJ has a shot at picking up enough additional seats in the next parliamentary elections to jettison its coalition partners, if it deems such a move necessary. Even if the Social Democratic Party is no longer in the government constantly raising the Okinawa base issue, the DPJ still must deal with democracy on the ground. The Okinawans are dead set against a new base. The residents of Nago, where that base would be built, just elected a mayor who campaigned on a no-base platform. It won't look good for the party that has finally brought real democracy to Tokyo to squelch it in Okinawa.
Taking action on the Okinawa base issue will bolster US Japan relations
AFP, 6/21/10
(“Okada, Clinton Affirm Japan-US Ties,” AFP International News Tokyo, pg online @ http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iM98Ks6fAsFGdbNvxzrf0PEKcrKA //ag)
It was their first conversation since Okada retained his post in a cabinet formed by new Prime Minister Naoto Kan in early June. "Our Minister Okada said the Japan-US alliance is a cornerstone of Japan's diplomacy," the Japanese foreign ministry said in a statement. "The two ministers agreed to cooperate closely from now on." Okada vowed to follow the accord reached by the previous cabinet on the relocation of an unpopular US base on Okinawa, while asking for US efforts to reduce the "burden" of the US military presence on the southern Japanese island. In late May, Tokyo and Washington agreed that the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma would be moved, as first agreed in 2006, from a crowded city area on Okinawa to the island's coastal Henoko region. Okada and Clinton also agreed to cooperate on key diplomatic issues, including the sinking of a South Korean warship blamed on North Korea and talks at the UN Security Council against Iran in response to its nuclear programme, they said.
US-Japan relations low now
Packard, ’10 (George R., President of the United States-Japan Foundation, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2010, “The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50,” C^2)
On January 19, 1960, Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter signed a historic treaty. It committed the United States to help defend Japan if Japan came under attack, and it provided bases and ports for U.S. armed forces in Japan. The agreement has endured through half a century of dramatic changes in world politics -- the Vietnam War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the spread of nuclear weapons to North Korea, the rise of China -- and in spite of fierce trade disputes, exchanges of insults, and deep cultural and historical differences between the United States and Japan. This treaty has lasted longer than any other alliance between two great powers since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.
Given its obvious success in keeping Japan safe and the United States strong in East Asia, one might conclude that the agreement has a bright future. And one would be wrong. The landslide electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) last August, after nearly 54 years of uninterrupted rule by the Liberal Democratic Party, has raised new questions in Japan about whether the treaty's benefits still outweigh its costs.
Continued US-Japan relations Cause China to Extend It’s Military Capacity
Bush ‘9 Director for Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies [June 06, Richard C. III, China and the U.S.-Japan Alliance Asia, China, Japan, International Relations Brookings Institute http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0606_china_japan_bush.aspx; WBTR]
For years, Americans and Japanese have discussed what their alliance should do in the post-Cold War era. With its response to the DPRK’s May 25 nuclear test, I believe the U.S.-Japan alliance is fulfilling its most important strategic function: to serve as a mechanism to bring about cooperation with China. The United States and Japan have benefitted from China’s economic growth and its contributions on issues like North Korea. But Tokyo and Washington are also concerned about Beijing’s political and military clout, to the extent that a minority of Americans and Japanese favor containment of China. Although I disagree with such a policy, because it would ensure China’s hostility, focusing on China’s rise is proper. A rising power poses a challenge to the prevailing international system and to the states that guard that system, because the new power’s intentions are usually unclear. How the United States and Japan interact with China in the future will shape the future strategic map of Northeast Asia. There are two ways that this interaction could produce a vicious circle of mutual mistrust. The first is an arms or capabilities race: China’s builds its military power because the United States and Japan strengthen their alliance, and vice versa. Dangerously, each side takes action based on its fears of the other. Second, a vicious circle can result as China interacts with the U.S. and Japan on specific issues where they believe their fundamental interests are at stake. On matters like Taiwan, North Korea, and the East China Sea, each side may draw negative conclusions about the long-term intensions of the other and act accordingly. This creates the potential for a tragedy, in spite of the many ways in which the three countries cooperate. That is, even though United States and Japan may be prepared to accommodate a rising China into the international system, China’s actions require them to resist or oppose China. Conversely, even though China may be willing to accommodate to the international system, American and Japanese actions lead it to challenge the existing order. The Chinese have saying: two tigers can’t lie on the same mountain. The challenge is for all three countries to create a situation where tigers can lie on the same mountain, a situation in which China, Japan, and the United States can cooperate and coexist and avoid the tragedy of a competition for power. The U.S.-Japan alliance should management of the rise of China as a strategic task.
Current US-Japan Alliance in Outmoded
Bandow ‘7 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan J.D [Doug, July 07, 2007. from Stanford University A New Era in Asia, includes quoting and analysis of Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose by veteran Japan-watcher and University of Washington professor Kenneth Pyle http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/07/06/a-new-era-in-asia-japan-rising/; WBTR]
At the same time, the U.S.-Japan alliance has come under pressure. It was created in a specific time and circumstance, all of which have, mercifully, disappeared. Japan has recovered economically. Japan’s imperial mentality is dead. The Soviet Union is gone. Maoism has disappeared from China. Why America should defend Tokyo, and from whom, is no longer obvious. Pyle acknowledges that “Once the Cold War ended, the terms of the grand bargain that underlay the alliance became outmoded.” Pyle would seek “a new, efficient, and equitable division of labor that serves the interests of both countries.” Yet he fails to consider whether those interests would be best served by fashioning a new relationship, where cooperation on issues of mutual interest replaced a formal defense alliance committing the U.S. to battle China or other powers to protect Japanese interests. Washington’s Cold War disarmament of Japan made Tokyo dependent on America. But that era has ended. The U.S. would protect its own interests more effectively by acting as a distant balancer rather than constant meddler in East Asian affairs.
The recent election of the left wing DPJ is straining relations
Bandow, ‘9 – Senior fellow at Cato and former special assistant to Reagan, (10/20/09, Doug, Korea Times Transforming Japan-US Alliance, CATO, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10645)
American influence is facing another challenge in East Asia. The latest loss of U.S. power may occur in Japan. Last month, the Democratic Party of Japan ousted the Liberal Democratic Party, which had held power for most of the last 54 years. Exactly how policy will change is uncertain: The DPJ is a diverse and fractious coalition. But Washington is nervous. U.S. policymakers have grown used to Tokyo playing the role of pliant ally, backing American priorities and hosting American bases. That era may be over. Although Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama insists that he wants to strengthen the alliance, before taking office he wrote in the New York Times: "As a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financial crisis, the era of U.S.-led globalism is coming to an end." America's alliance with Japan — like most U.S. defense relationships — is outdated. Of course, there are significant barriers to any dramatic transformation of Japanese policy. Indeed, during the campaign the DPJ platform dropped its earlier pledge to "do away with the dependent relationship in which Japan ultimately has no alternative but to act in accordance with U.S. wishes, replacing it with a mature alliance based on independence and equality." Nevertheless, the DPJ possesses a strong left wing and vigorously opposed the ousted government's logistical support for U.S. naval operations in the Indian Ocean. Other potentially contentious issues include reducing the military presence on Okinawa, renegotiating the relocation of the Marines' Futenma Airfield to Guam at the Japanese expense, cutting so-called host nation support, and amending the Status of Forces Agreement.
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