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ag.vi)Other Classifications of Modality
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ag.vi)Other Classifications of ModalitySome authors (Bybee at al. 1994; Coates 1983; among others) who deal with modality have suggested different classifications of this concept. Nuyts (2006:6) states that there are two main reasons for it. First, they want to highlight different semantic relationships among categories, second, they focus on providing a new approach to modality, such as a concentration on “properties of the linguistic forms expressing modal categories” (Nuyts 2006:6). An influential categorization has been proposed by Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1994:177ff), who have defined four types of modality: agent-oriented speaker-oriented epistemic subordinating moods Agent-oriented modality includes “the existence of internal and external conditions on an agent with respect to the completion of the action expressed in the main predicate” (Bybee et al (1994:177). However, Bybee et al. emphasize that this modality is a “part of the propositional content of the clause and thus would not be considered a modality in most frameworks” (1994:177). The main reason why they have included it in their study is that “these modal senses are the diachronic sources of most senses that DO qualify as modality in other studies” (1994:177, emphasis in original). Types of modality that fall within this category are obligation, necessity, ability, and desire. A significant type of agent-oriented modality is root possibility, which relates not only to the internal condition of ability, but also to external factors, which include social and physical conditions (Bybee et al. 1994:178). Coates (1983:114) gives this example of root possibility: I actually couldn’t finish reading it because the chap whose shoulder I was reading the book over got out at Leicester Square. Speaker-oriented modality covers directives, such as imperatives, prohibitives, optatives, hortatives, admonitives (warnings), and permissives. These directives “represent speech acts through which a speaker attempts to move an addressee to action” (Bybee and Fleischman 1995:6). In other words, “speaker-oriented modalities do not report the existence of conditions on the agent, but rather allow the speaker to impose such conditions on the addressee” (Bybee et al. 1994:179). Within this framework, agent-oriented and speaker-oriented modality are close to deontic/dynamic distinction of modality. What is yet important in Bybee et al.’s classification is the so called “enabling factor”. If this factor is the speaker himself, then it is an instance of speaker-oriented modality; otherwise we are dealing with the agent-oriented modality (de Haan 2006:31). Epistemic modality “indicates the extent to which the speaker is committed to the truth of the proposition” (Bybee et al. 1994:179). Apart from possibility and probability, it includes inferred certainty, which implies that the speaker is convinced of the truthfulness of the proposition, as in the sentence There must be some way to get from New York to San Francisco for less than $600, for example (Bybee et al. 1994:180). Finally, subordinating moods relate to the modality employed in subordinate clauses, such as complement clauses, concessives and purpose clauses. When studying modality, one can encounter the term “root modality”, especially in the Anglo-American literature. As de Haan (2006:29) points out, the first significant study to make use of this term and define the notion of root modality seems to be Coates’ corpus research (1983) into the English modals. In actual fact, Coates (1983) uses the term “root modality” as a cover term for both dynamic and deontic modality. However, she finds the term “deontic” inappropriate since “it refers to the logic of obligation and permission” (1983:20-21) that is why she prefers the term “root modality” for all other types, including dynamic modality. She explains this by appealing to the fact that common root modals express a variety of meanings, obligation and permission being only the core. Moreover, according to Coates, the division of modality into deontic and dynamic overlooks the fact that all non-epistemic uses of must, for example, are interconnected and gradual, i.e. they lie on a continuum ranging from a strong obligation to a weak obligation (1983:20-21). “By subdividing this category, Palmer is forced to choose arbitrary cut-off points, and to obscure the essential unity of the Root modals” (Coates 1983:21). However, she is well aware of the fact that a deontic explication is more appropriate in contexts where “the authority structure is well-defined” than in less clearly defined contexts (1983:21). To conclude, it can be stated that although there is a difference between the terms “deontic” and “root” modality, this difference is very fine and sometimes these two terms are not distinguished properly and are used as interchangeable. When using the term “root”, the authors probably want to indicate that “there are aspects of modality that lie outside the traditional domain of modality in logic [...]. The use of a term such as root modality highlights this aspect of modality” (de Haan 2006:30). ag.vii)Classification of Modality in this StudyThe classification of modality proposed in this study follows the traditional division of modality into two primary semantic categories: epistemic and deontic, and their subtypes. The research will not concentrate on dynamic modality since it does not express the modification of illocutionary force to such a great extent as epistemic and deontic modalities. The terminology used rests partly on Palmer’s division of modality, partly on Huddleston and Pullum’s types of modality. However, Palmer’s categorization of modality is problematic and simplistic in some respects and it is not possible to follow it in all of its points. When analysing the corpus of political interviews, there were many sentences with the modal verb can which could not be determined according to Palmer’s classification. Consider the use of could in Examples 92 and 93 below. They fall neither into the category of deontic possibility nor into dynamic abilitive modality. That is why I have employed the category of “circumstantial possibility”, which is mentioned by Huddleston and Pullum (2002:197) as it seems to be appropriate in these cases. Circumstantial possibility expresses a possibility which can happen under certain circumstances. Example
QUESTION: Let me tell you about a current poll. Iraqis were asked about their lives today, Madame Secretary. Listen to these results: Nearly nine in ten people said that they live in fear that the violence that is ravaging their country will strike them or the people they live with. That's startling. Ninety percent fear that they'll fall victim to the violence in that country right now. Don't you have to wonder what that percentage would have been under Saddam? SECRETARY RICE: Well, under Saddam, I guess, the fear would have been that he could have come into your village with his secret police, lined up the women and men and shot them and put them in the mass graves as he did in villages in the south and in Kurdish territory or used chemical weapons against your neighborhood. I don't doubt that the Iraqi people have a lot of fears. It's a very violent circumstance, particularly in and around Baghdad. It's a circumstance that the Iraqi Government understands that it has to get under control. That's why this opportunity that is afforded by the Baghdad security plan thus far going relatively well, though I would be the first to say that there will be good days and bad days. This gives them an opportunity now to deliver security for their people and to delivery it as a democratic government for all Iraqis. (App., pp. 206-207, Condoleezza Rice, 2007-03-19, ll. 35-50) When justifying British intervention in the Iraq War, Tony Blair explains the situation there and asks a rhetorical question about the possibilities of Iraqi people. Using can’t in that question, he expresses that the situation of Iraqi people could change under certain circumstances: Example DF: In terms of Iraq, prime minister, in the light of the latest figures from the Iraqi health ministry, that the number of Iraqis who have died is between 100,000 and 150,000 and so on, with those scale of figures, if you had known that that was the scale of bloodshed, would you have still gone to war? TB: Well the alternative was leaving Saddam in charge of Iraq, where hundreds of thousands of people died, there were a million casualties in the Iran/Iraq war, Kuwait was invaded and four million people went into exile. So the idea that Iraqis should be faced with the situation where they either have a brutal dictator in Saddam or alternatively a sectarian religious conflict, why can't they have in Iraq what their people want? Which is a non-sectarian government, a government that is elected by the people and the same opportunities and the same rights that we enjoy in countries such as this. (App., p. 38, Tony Blair, 2006-12-11, ll. 65-76) More examples of circumstantial possibility may be found in Section 9.9.4. Additionally, I have identified a new category of modality which I label “epistemic attitudinal modality”. This category comprises modal adverbs actually, frankly and really. All instances of uses of these adverbs are epistemic in that they express speaker’s stance to the proposition and in this way they modify its illocutionary force. It was not possible to place these adverbs within the subtypes of epistemic modality as they express neither possibility, necessity nor assumption that is why a new type of modality was determined. To illustrate this category, there are two examples from the corpus, more examples may be found in Section 9.9.3. These three instances of really and actually used in the example below are, pragmatically speaking, boosters, which means that their pragmatic function is to accentuate the force of the utterance. They express the attitude of the speaker towards the proposition, which means that they are epistemic in their nature, that is why they fall under the category of epistemic attitudinal modality: Example JON SOPEL: I don't want to get hung up on the titles, but there was a time when a Labour person would have been thrilled to be described as Blairite, because it - you know they were being associated with the winning team. I just wonder whether it is seen a bit more maybe as a handicap now? HAZEL BLEARS: Well I, I think it's really dangerous erm if we actually distance ourselves from what we've been doing over the last ten years. If you think about it, in America, Al Gore kind of tried to put a bit of distance between himself and Clinton and what people did was they voted for George Bush. What I don't want us to do is to distance ourselves from all the good things that we've done over the last ten years, because I do think we've got a really good record. (App., p. 66, Hazel Blears, 2007-02-25, ll. 31-42) As with really and actually in Example 94 above, in Example 95 the adverb frankly boosts the force of the forthcoming message and expresses the attitude of the speaker towards it. So again, it may be identified as an instance of epistemic attitudinal modality. Example JON SOPEL: What of the charge that this is a policy essentially to deal with the problem in London that is irrelevant to the rest of the country. JACQUI SMITH: Well, that's completely wrong. In actual fact of course, what we've succeeded in doing in London is to improve standards quite considerably.
(App., p. 253, Jacqui Smith, 2005-11-27, ll. 84-93) Download 1.35 Mb. Share with your friends:
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