BAIER’S MORALITY UNDERESTIMATES THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC

BAIER’S MORALITY UNDERESTIMATES THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC

1. CRITICISM OF THEM (BAIER AND RAWLS) ON THIS POINT IS THAT THEY DO NOT SEEM TO FULLY APPRECIATE THE FORCE OF THE CLAIM THAT MORALITY MUST BE PUBLIC.

Bernard Gert, MORALITY, A NEW JUSTIFICATION OF THE MORAL RULES. 1988. p-np.

Both Baier and Rawls agree that morality must be a public system, that it must consist of rules or principles that are known and could be accepted by all those whose behavior is supposed to be governed by that system, and that for a moral system this includes all rational persons. They both agree that the content of that system should be determined by the agreement of impartial rational persons. These features are what make a theory a version of morality as impartial rationality. The publicity of morality is a crucial feature for both Baier and Rawls; they are concerned with the content of a moral system that would be openly used by everyone to determine the moral acceptability of an action. They both rule out as being inconsistent with the very nature of morality any system that could not be openly taught and defended. If a Utilitarian maintains that he has a system that will result in the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but only if no one knows that anyone else is using that system to guide his behavior, both Rawls and Baier would claim that the Utilitarian is not putting forward a moral system. They are interested in a system to which everyone can openly appeal, either as grounds for acting themselves or for judging the actions of others. My only criticism of them on this point is that they do not seem to fully appreciate the force of the claim that morality must be public. That morality is a public system that applies to all rational persons places considerable constraints not only on the content of a moral system, but also on the foundations of that system, the moral theory that generates it. If a moral system must be such that it can be understood and can be accepted by any rational person, it must be based solely on beliefs that are held by all rational persons, what I call rationally required beliefs. This not only rules out religious views as the basis of morality, it also rules out scientific views insofar as such findings are not known to all rational persons. Rawls, who allows those behind his veil of ignorance to have all general knowledge, including the findings of all the sciences, could not be appealed to and accepted by all those to whom it applies, that is, to all rational persons. In fact, Rawls makes no use of the findings of any science in developing his moral system, but the fact that he thinks that it is allowable to use such findings indicates that he does not fully appreciate the constraints imposed by morality being a public system that applies to all rational persons.

Bernard Gert, MORALITY, A NEW JUSTIFICATION OF THE MORAL RULES. 1988. p-np.

For Baier, as for most contemporary philosophers who have attempted to put forward an account of rationality, there is a very close connection between acting rationally and acting on reasons. According to Baier, acting rationally simply consists in acting on the best reasons. Baier gives content to this formal account by providing a list of various kinds of reasons and ranking them according to their weight. He regards self-regarding reasons of law, religion or morality. Baier wants an account of rationality such that for any course of action everyone will always agree whether the reasons supporting that way of acting are better, worse, or equal to the reasons supporting some alternative course of action. Baier’s particular ranking of reasons creates serious and unresolved problems when one’s self-interest conflicts with the much greater interests of others. His strong distinction between moral reasons and altruistic reasons, the former being stronger than self-regarding reasons and the latter being weaker, prevents Baier from saying that it would be morally good to sacrifice one’s own interests between altruistic reasons and moral ones. When he discusses an actual case of this sort he uses the term “decent” to characterize acting in ones interests and thereby, e.g., ruining a competing business firm. But on his own theory, he cannot consider these judgments of the alternative ways of acting to be moral judgments. It is clear that something has gone wrong.

MORAL SYSTEMS FAIL

1. MORAL SYSTEMS ARE INADEQUATE WHEN ONE ATTEMPTS TO USE THEM AS A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CONDUCT.

Bernard Gert, MORALITY, A NEW JUSTIFICATION OF THE MORAL RULES. 1988. p-np.

In summary, the faults commonly found in the theory of morality as impartial rationality are not faults intrinsic to the theory; rather, they are faults that stem from an inadequate statement of the theory. Baier and Rawls both provide inadequate accounts of rationality, neither fully recognizing that rationality should be analyzed in terms of content rather than form and that irrationality rather than rationality should be taken as basic. Both regard impartiality as requiring unanimity, and thus do not realize that equally informed impartial rational persons may, in many circumstances, advocate different ways of acting, neither regards the question of enforcement as essential to basic moral theory, thus making it unlikely that they will provide an adequate moral system, one that distinguishes between moral rules, which may be enforced, and moral ideals, which should not be. Neither gives serious consideration to either the formulation of particular moral rules or to the procedure for determining exceptions to these rules. Baier and Rawls never attempt to apply their accounts to particular ethical problems; they emphasize the evaluative rather than the practical aspects of morality as impartial rationality. This may explain, in part, why their moral systems are inadequate when one attempts to use them as practical guides to conduct. My criticism of their presentations of morality as impartial rationality is designed to show that one need not reject this theory if one does not accept it must be as a practical theory. Morality as impartial rationality is, or can be presented as, a practical ethical theory. As such it can provide useful guidance to those who are looking for help in solving real moral problems. In the following chapter 1 shall provide some practical applications of the moral system that I have provided.

Bernard Gert, MORALITY, A NEW JUSTIFICATION OF THE MORAL RULES. 1988. p-np.

Baier and Rawls both present morality as impartial rationality primarily as an evaluative theory. Neither spends much time or effort in developing his theory in such a way as a way as to provide a moral system that would be useful to people who want a moral guide to action. The most important part of such a moral system is the formulation of specific moral rules together with a method for theories of most philosophers, including the versions of morality as impartial rationality presented by Baier and Rawls, have been seriously inadequate. Most time, of course, is spent developing the basic theory from which the moral rules will be derived. The formulation of the moral rules themselves is usually done quite quickly, and generally very carelessly. This may be due to the acceptance of Mill’s view that the various schools of ethics “recognize….to a great extent the same moral laws; but differ as to their evidence, and the source from which they derive their authority.”