Planet Debate 2011 September/October l-d release Animal Rights
Animal Rights Flawed – CLS Kritik
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- Animal Rights Flawed – CLS Kritik
Animal Rights Flawed – CLS KritikWORKING THROUGH THE SYSTEM REQUIRES ACCEPTANCE OF PROPERTY STATUS AND WELFARE AGENDA—RIGHTS ADVOCATES MUST SPLIT FROM WELFARE ADVOCATES Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 171 New welfarists assume that incremental change means change that depends on access to, and negotiation, with government decisionmakers. But that is simply a consequence of their acceptance of the legitimacy of welfarist reform in the first place. An animal rights advocate may reasonably conclude that attempting to secure insider status is, because of the structural defects of animal welfare, counterproductive. In the cases cited by Garner and Rowan, movement “unity” would have meant merely that those who agreed with the rights view should not have expressed their views and their disagreement with the welfarist approach. And had these rights advocates complied, and had they acted in a unified way, the results would have been the same anyway. The whole point is that the legal system structurally limits the scope of reform to what is dictated by the instrumentalist position. The best that can be hoped for is on rare occasions a strong radical presence may help to judge welfarist reforms in the direction of providing protection that slightly exceeds the level that would be provided pursuant to the orthodox position. ANY ATTEMPT TO USE THE LAW TO PROTECT ANIMALS—EVEN IN A RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE—RISKS COOPTATION Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 218-9 Fifth, I stress that any attempt to effect legal or administrative regulation will invariably involve the animal advocate’s seeking some sort of “insider” status. Indeed, even if the advocate stresses that she is an “outsider” who regards institutionalized exploitation as completely illegitimate, involvement in legislative or administrative processes always entail risks. Any animal advocate who seeks to effect incremental eradiation of the property status of animals in these ways is well advised to proceed with caution.
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 83 Rights language, according to some within CLS, is deceptive in another way. Given its foundation in liberalism and individualism, rights language minimizes our social and communitarian character and therefore contributes to a false and misleading image of human beings. “The actual capturing of what it means to be human, and in relation to other people, is falsified by the image of people as rights-bearing citizens. It’s a falsification of human sociability.” And “The concept of rights falsely converts into an empty abstraction (reifies) real experiences that we ought to value for their own sake.” Rights language thus conceals and falsifies a more complete understanding of ourselves.
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 83 In part, use of rights language reinforces dominance because it “deceives” the powerless who deploy it. According to some within CLS, this deception arises partly from the indeterminate nature of rights, that is, from the fact that the existence of rights does not determine future outcomes or determine how those in power will act. Hence, those in power can interpret rights any way they want and manipulate the language to their benefit. On the other hand, groups challenging the status quo often become mystified by rights. Instead of manipulating rights, the marginalized can become mesmerized and captivated by the ideals of the language. Groups begin to focus solely on achieving specific fights and, in turn, lose sight of their larger, broader goals.
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 49 The philosophical attempt to extend rights to animals outlined above might be cited by some scholars as a further indication of the trivialization of rights. Several scholars critique rights language on the grounds that its extension to various progressive causes empties the language of its content and power. The multiplication of rights, on this view, trivializes the concept and it underlying values. Hence, to suggest that rights apply not only to humans but also to animals undermines the notion and meaning of human rights. Furthermore, it is argued, putting forward animals rights raises the question of where to draw the line. Do plants have rights? Do future generations have rights? Does the planet have rights? The slippery slope onto which we fall when rights are extended too far diminishes the power and utility of rights, for if we extend rights to everything then rights become meaningless. SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW THE FORMAL GRANTING OF A RIGHT Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 84 Kristin Bumiller (1988) offer another reason for the mistaken belief that formal rights imply substantive change. Bumiller points to the fact that rights are generally bound up with the notion of individual responsibility. As such, rights may not be protected unless an individual acts to ensure the right. Hence, substantive change is frequently elusive despite the formal recognition of rights. Bumiller finds evidence for this within the realm of formal laws that seek to advance racial equality. Antidiscrimination law, according to Bumiller, has had limited success in achieving substantive change because individuals experiencing discrimination must bear the costs and burdens of applying the law.
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 95 A final critique offered by activists points to the problems with the philosophical nature of rights language. Several activists asserted that rights language as a philosophical construct is vague, insufficiently defined, and therefore misunderstood. As Tim Greyhavens, executive director of PAWS, summed it up, “it is such a vague philosophical term that it’s very confusing to people.” RIGHTS DISCOURSE IS DIVISIVE Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 93 A number of activists echoed a common criticism leveled by legal scholars who suggest that rights are inherently divisive. According to this critique, rights language encourages conflict and competition because rights imply corresponding obligations. For instance, when a claim is made that children have a right to education, there is an implication that someone has the corresponding obligation and burden to provide for that education. In addition, rights frequently foster conflict as a result of the competition between rights and the need to balance one right against another. Thus, for example, when women claim the right to choose whether or not to have an abortion, the opposition asserts the competing rights of the fetus. In some such situations, the conflict between rights is zero-sum.
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